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FOREWORD 
Research on risks resulting from our highly technological society 
has a long tradition at IIASA and has firmly established the 
institute as a center for a growing network of scientists con- 
cerned with technological risks. IIASA's research has been cha- 
racterized by a small and dynamic group of scientists from many 
different disciplines and countries working together on a concrete 
technological risk problem. A major strength of the research has 
been its continuing focus on substantive problem areas with an 
evolving and often pioneering conceptual and scientific approach. 
Thus, IIASA has made important contributions to the general "risk" 
field in topics ranging from "decision making under uncertainty" 
and the "perception of risks" to the role of risk analysts in 
political and institutional processes. 
At its June 1986 meeting, IIASA's Council decided to consolidate 
and strengthen the institute's research on technological risk. 
Extensive discussions within the institute and with outside or- 
ganizations have taken place in an effort to ensure an optimal 
choice of issues to be addressed from the point of view of rele- 
vance and access to knowledge in the field. It was felt necessary 
to enter a fact-finding phase in order to evaluate the latest 
trends in risk research and to arrive at a meaningful set of 
issues on which to concentrate further research undertaken by the 
institute. Two meetings have been organized to this end: 
1. Technological Risk in Modern Society: This meeting took place 
in Laxenburg from March 18-20, 1987, and was organized by 
IIASA in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Its goal was to design a research agenda for 
work related to safety issues and to the control and manage- 
ment of accidents in power systems or other potentially 
high-risk utilities. The meeting was divided into three 
sessions: 
1. Regional Risk Management: This topic covered aspects of 
regional development and planning related to potentially 
high-risk installations. The session emphasized econo- 
mic aspects. 
2. Man-machine Interaction: A significant share of accidents 
or disturbances in complex operations are caused by 
what is commonly termed human failure. This session was 
devoted to this rather controversial subject. 
3. Management of Environmental Consequences: This session 
dealt with the use of regional- and global-scale tran- 
sport models to study the environmental implications of 
accidental or continuous releases of hazardous substan- 
ces. A further concern was the design of monitoring and 
warning systems. 
2. Safe Technological Systems: This workshop was organized ex- 
clusively by IIASA and took place at the Institute from May 
11-12, 1987. Instead of taking a given design and looking at 
ways and means to improve its safety, the meeting attempted 
to look at the impact of design principles and different 
types of trade-offs on the generic safety of technological 
systems. 
After numerous accidents in technological systems, it has 
become urgent to address the issue of how to improve the 
safety of technological systems. There have been discussions 
on inherently safe nuclear power plants, for example, but the 
general concept of inherently safe systems is subject to 
debate. Nevertheless, it is clear that in future system 
design, safety must assume a much more important role than 
in the past. Below is a summary of the three sessions of the 
meeting: 
Session I: Technical Concepts: Technical safety criteria, 
design principles, man-machine interaction, problem 
perception in different industrial sectors; 
Session 11: General Safety Criteria: Complexity vs safety, 
human factors, PRA, safety and risk definitions, fail- 
ure chains; 
Session 111: Policies and Constraints: Societal, economic 
and institutional constraints, procedures, institutions, 
regulation, and licensing. 
ABOUT THIS VOLUME: 
As the two meetings are closely related to each other, it was 
decided, instead of creating two separate proceedings volumes as 
originally planned, to combine the outcomes of both meetings into 
one logical volume. This allowed us to rearrange the topics 
across the two meetings, thereby arriving at a more coherent 
documentation. 
The papers included have been brought into proper context as far 
as possible, independently of in which session or workshop they 
were presented. In most cases, they are included as delivered by 
authors, without additional editing. The purpose of these pro- 
ceedings is strictly documentary without emphasis on layout, 
style or thematic consistency. 
Boris Segerstdhl and Gerhard Kromer, 
Editors, IIASA Task Force on Risk 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARIES 
WELCOME ADDRESS 
Prof. L. V. Konstantinov 
Deputy Director General 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
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I , INTRODUCTION 
Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
It is a pleasure for me to welcome you on behalf of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency at this Task Force Meeting. 
This meeting has been organized by IIASA in co-operation with the 
IAEA. The basic objective of our involvement, in addition to its 
scientific content, is to explore areas where co-operation between 
IIASA and IAEA might be useful in the future. Such a co-operation 
is not new and has proven useful in the past. In particular, I 
would like to remind you of the involvement of the IAEA in the 
IIASA Energy Programme some years ago. At that time, the co- 
operation concentrated on the assessment of the impacts of energy 
production, including comparison of risk of energy systems, public 
acceptance questions, and the COX problem. 
As you are aware, the IAEA is a governmental organization 
whereas IIASA is a non-governmental institution which is perform- 
ing research in an international setting. The past has shown 
that these two different types of organizations can well comple- 
ment each other in specific tasks. Since the IAEA has par- 
ticipated in the programme planning of this meeting, it is thus 
clear that some priorities of the present programme of the Agency 
are reflected in the programme of this Task Force Meeting on 
Technological Risk in Modern Society. 
Before going into more detail on the topics of the sessions, 
I would like to mention some related activities of the Agency 
which receive emphasis after the Chernobyl accident. 
1.1. International Conventions: 
Within a short time after the accident, the Agency has pre- 
pared two convention~: 
i The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 
and 
i The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Acci- 
dent or Radiological Emergency. 
Both conventions have entered into force, and the number of coun- 
tries which ratified them is steadily increasing. 
1.2. Operational Safety: 
In order to prevent future accidents, more emphasis is given 
to assisting Member States in safe operation and to facilitate 
feedback of experience. These activities include: 
i Operational Safety Review TEams (OSARTs) 
i Incident Reporting System (IRS) 
i Teams for the Analysis of Safety-Significant Events (ASSETS) 
1.3. Basic Safety Principles for Reactors: 
The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), a 
standing Advisory Group of the IAEA, is preparing a document on 
the "basic safety principles for existing and future reactor 
types, with special attention given to those principles which 
emerge from post-accident analyses." 
1.4. Nuclear Safety Standards Codes and Guides: 
NUSS documents developed by the Agency from 1974 to 1985 
will be reviewed and updated in the light of lessons drawn from 
Chernobyl. 
1.5. Man-Machine Interface: 
I will touch this problem later and now would like to inform 
you that the Agency, on the invitation of Japan, is preparing, in 
co-operation with NEA and CEC a major conference in Tokyo, 15-19 
Feb., 1988, on Man-Machine Interface in the Nuclear Industry 
(Control and Instrumentation, Robotics, and Artificial Intel- 
1 igence ) . 
1.6. Radiation Protection: 
Here, the work concentrates on data collection, model valida- 
tion, and intervention levels. I will come back to this later. 
1.7. Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA): 
In addition to its regular programme, which includes assis- 
tance to Member States in an inter-regional technical co-operation 
programme, the Agency is now also preparing guidelines on how to 
perform PSA. The objective is to reach a certain degree of stan- 
dardization, quality assurance and comparability of results. 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis is a tool also used in Risk 
Management. So let me now turn in more detail to the session 
topics of this task force meeting, 
1 Regional Risk Management 
1 Man-Machine Interaction, and 
1 Management of Environmental Consequences. 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
What today is called Risk Management is the product of a 
long development, which started with the debate about risks of 
energy systems in the early 1970's. 
The first step was comparison of risks in energy systems: 
the second step was cost-effectiveness of risk reduction measures; 
and the last step now is regional risk management. 
2.1. Comparison of Risks 
Comparative studies on risk and impacts from nuclear, coal, 
oil, solar and hydroelectric power served the purpose to put 
energy related hazards into proper perspective. 
Early studies concentrated first on specific aspects of the 
risks involved in energy production. More recently, specific 
problems such as severe accidents, sulphur dioxide releases, acid 
rain, and Cot were singled out. 
However, the value of risk comparisons for various energy 
sources rests not with the overall results, but with the iden- 
tification of major risk contributors in each of the fuel cycles 
investigated. 
In this context, it is important to recognize that a quan- 
titative comparison of the risks is only one factors in determin- 
ing a national "mix of energy" in a country. Other aspects in- 
clude: energy demand, international trade, industrial develop- 
ment, balance of payment, security of supply, capital costs, etc. 
2.2. Cost-effectiveness of Risk Reduction Measures 
Cost-effectiveness techniques are a rational tool for op- 
timizing policy decisions on the allocation of funds to safety. 
In 1983, the IAEA started a Co-ordinated Research Programme: 
"Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness of Risk-Reduction Among Dif- 
ferent Energy Systems." The main purpose of this programme is to 
activate and co-ordinate within its Member States a certain number 
of national case studies, utilizing the cost-effectiveness ap- 
proach. 
Fifteen Member States are cooperating with the Agency in 
these research efforts. The second research co-ordination meeting 
report is available, and it is planned to publish the final report 
in 1988. 
2.3. Regional Risk Management 
The recent history of catastrophic industrial accidents 
(such as Seveso, Bhopal, Chernobyl, and recently Basel) had dra- 
matically underlined the need to identify, assess and manage 
risks from complex industrial activities in order to minimize 
occupational and public risks and environmental effects. 
In the last few years, the attention in various countries 
and in several international organizations has been drawn to the 
necessity to identify and implement unified "safety policies" 
regarding the risks from technological activities. 
For instapce, after the Seveso accident, the Council of the 
European Community has adopted several "directives" related to 
major hazard installations, air pollution from industrial plants, 
and other risks. 
Several industrialized countries like USA, France, Nether- 
lands, Sweden, FRG, etc. have in the last years implemented risk 
assessment case studies in large industrialized areas. 
Risk management implies the definition of quantitative safety 
criteria and standards, and development of guidelines and proce- 
dures. 
Risk management at the plant level cannot resolve the multi- 
ple objectives of a decision-making process related to environmen- 
tal impacts, health, and socio-economic effects. The assessment 
and the management should be broadened to include regions where 
different industrial facilities are located and should also in- 
clude emergency planning. 
Therefore, the regional approach seems to be the most ap- 
propriate for the complex problem of technological risk manage- 
ment. In this regard, the IAEA, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are 
initiating a joint project "on the assessment and management of 
health and environmental risks from energy and other complex 
industrial systems." This new research effort will be conducted 
through the implementation of case studies in developed and devel- 
oping countries. It has the objective to establish a unified 
systematic procedure for making decisions about risk in highly 
industrialized areas within a country. 
3. MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE 
A more fundamental understanding of the interaction between 
man and the machine is necessary in industrial work situations to 
serve as a basis for more error tolerant task and equipment 
design. 
Mistakes and errors are common to both machines and humans. 
Failure data of equipment are quite well recorded; however, this 
is not the case for human error. The reasons are partly that 
they are not recorded at all, and partly that, due to fear of 
being reprimanded, humans are reluctant to put their own mistakes 
down in writing. An attempt to overcome this problem has been 
made e.g. in a Joint INPO/EdF effort on a "Human Performance 
Evaluation System" where mistakes can be reported anonymously. 
This has led in the nuclear power area to an increased information 
base. A similar procedure has been in use for many years with 
good results in commercial aviation. 
Human error data form the basis for improving the man-machine 
interaction. This can be achieved by: 
al adjusting equipment to be more error tolerant; 
b) improving human behaviour through training; 
C) providing the operator with additional aids to improve his 
understanding of the status and behaviour of the plant. 
The answers to a) and b) are clear: more automation and 
better training. However, the operators cannot be trained for 
all unlikely but possible and sometime unexpected accident sce- 
narios. Therefore, it is necessary to select accident sequences 
for training, including simulator training, which are sensitive 
to human error and which at the same time improve understanding 
of plant behaviour in general. The Agency has recently produced 
two reports on this subject.' As an interesting side aspect, I 
should mention that such training also has its risk. Given an 
abnormal situation in a plant, the operator is more likely to 
assume that this is part of an accident sequence for which he has 
been trained and might thus follow the wrong course of actions. 
Regarding c), there is a rapid development of operator com- 
puter aids. The trend here is to extend the capacities of these 
computer aids to assist also in normal operation. They provide 
the operator with relevant information about all safety sig- 
nificant systems, their status and often also expected develop- 
ments and recommended actions, to enable timely action if re- 
quired. 
Finally, I would like to mention one particular recent devel- 
opment. I have emphasized before that Probabilistic Safety Ana- 
lysis is an important tool to analyze plant safety. The rapid 
development of computer technology makes it possible to store the 
results of a complete level-1 PSA (i.e., up to core-melt) on a 
Personal Computer. In this way information about the new risk 
profile of the plant under certain operating conditions can be 
retrieved in a short time (typically in about 10 seconds). Such 
information includes new core-melt probability, ranking or proba- 
bilities of accident scenarios, and importance ranking of safety 
systems. 
4. MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
In the area of management of environmental consequences, the 
IAEA is active in two separate but complementing areas: probabi- 
listic consequence analysis and real-time assessment of hazards 
to the environment during or immediately following a nuclear 
emergency situation. 
The probabilistic consequence is becoming an important part 
of many stages in the life of a Nuclear Power Plant. It is being 
utilized in the preliminary or siting stages, in the definition 
of engineered safety features and in the rapidly growing in impor- 
tance subject of emergency planning. The Agency is convening a 
Technical Committee this summer to study existing computer codes 
for the consequence analysis and to define future needs and re- 
search for improving the models, based on experience gained from 
incidents in recent years. I am certain that Probabilistic Conse- 
quence Analysis is going to become an important tool for industry 
1 IAEA-TECDOC-XXX, Identification of Failure Sequences Sensi- 
tive to Human Error, Report on a Technical Committee Meeting, 5-9 
May 1986, VIC, and IAEA-TECDOC-XXX, Experience with Simulator 
Training for Emergency Conditions, Report on a Technical Committee 
Meeting, 15-19 September 1986, VIC. 
and regulatory bodies helping to promote better safety for the 
public and workers alike. 
Following the Chernobyl accident and following the Convention 
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, INSAG recommended 
that the Agency "should, in collaboration with WMO, review and 
intercalibrate models of atmospheric transport ... and establish 
a database for validation studies..." 
The Agency, in cooperation with the WMO, has embarked upon 
this programme and is now at the stage of establishing the data- 
base. The planned validation study will probably be more emergen- 
cy-response oriented than the usual model validation studies and 
its results will serve to define the source of errors and their 
magnitudes, to suggest means and methods for improvement of the 
models, and, finally, to arrive at better real-time models. The 
results of this study, which should be concluded during 1988, 
will be made public so that every Member State can benefit from 
it. 
In addition to this study, the Agency is convening this fall 
an "Advisory Group on the Use of Real-Time Models in Predicting 
the Radiological Consequences of a Nuclear Accident and Determin- 
ing the Necessary Protective Measures." This is carrying the 
utilization of the models one step further and should, with addi- 
tional implementation of real-time model updating (with radiologi- 
cal on- and off-site information), provide a complete set of 
emergency oriented models for real-time application, should a 
nuclear emergency occur. 
Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude by saying that 
the IAEA is placing considerable emphasis on the topics of this 
meeting. I was only able in this welcome address to highlight 
some of the iaaues. If more information on Agency programmes is 
needed, I am sure that the staff members of the Agency who par- 
ticipate in this meeting will be happy to provide it to you. I 
wish you interesting discussions, and I would be glad if, as an 
outcome, concrete recommendations for co-operation between the 
IAEA and IIASA would emerge. 
Thank you very much for your attention! 
SUMMARY: REGIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
Dr. Friedrich Niehaus 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
I would like to comment upon the concepts of the session 
which I had the pleasure to chair. I must say that for me this 
was one of the easiest sessions to chair in the past 3 or 4 years. 
The reason was that we took the remarks of Prof. Segerstdhl very 
seriously: IIASA is a non-governmental institution, and there- 
fore, the discussions were scientific and I did not find anybody 
in the session who was promoting or defending some kind of govern- 
mental policy decision. This is the reason why I think the coop- 
eration between the Agency and IIASA would be valuable as it was 
in the past. In this summary, I would like to remind you of the 
presentations which we had with some highlights as I perceived 
them. I would like to briefly summarize the discussions and then 
to give an overview of what I think could be future areas of 
cooperation coming based on the discussions in the session. 
If we go through the presentations, we had first the presen- 
tation of Mr. Slater about risk management of potentially hazar- 
dous industrial installations. Mr. Slater reviewed for us the 
steps of the analysis which has to be done. He gave a large 
number of practical examples and stressed the fact that we need 
simple reliable but also robust results which can be used for 
decision-making. He emphasized that criteria are needed to judge 
the results and in principle he convinced at least me that the 
basic tools are available. However, there is clearly room for 
improvement. In the discussion, we concentrated on the problem of 
uncertainties and to what extent we are able to model human error 
correctly. 
The next presentation was on the European Approach to Risk 
Management by Mr. Amendola. He informed us about the Post-Seveso 
directives of the European Community and a number of benchmark 
exercises which are being undertaken for nuclear power, but also 
in the area of the chemical industry to investigate uncertainties 
and answer the question how reliable are the results. In the 
discussion, we touched on the problem of secrecy of studies and 
also on how to insure quality of the studies if they are being 
kept secret. 
We then had the presentation on Decision Criteria for Siting 
of Complex Industrial Facilities by Mr. Keeney. He informed us 
about the different methodologies which can be utilized. He gave 
us a set of objectives which can be utilized in making such deci- 
sions and reminded us to separate between the means and the ends. 
He made one remark which I still have to think about. He said: 
"acceptable risk is the risk of the best alternative." I think 
this is something which maybe we should not forget. The discus- 
sion centered around the discrepancies between the normative and 
the descriptive approach and also on the problem of what happens 
if you have many decision-makers. 
The presentation on Emergency Planning and Preparedness by 
Mr. Hayns raised the problem how to define the accidents for 
which to do emergency planning. He suggested that what is neces- 
sary is training, monitoring, dose predictions, communication, 
human factor, and for some of these he proposed to use computer 
tools. The discussion centered on the problems of communication 
and how to deal with the large mass of data which have to be 
utilized. 
We then had a presentation on Risk Management in the Nether- 
lands by Mr. van Kuijen. He informed us about the policy in the 
Netherlands, the criteria which are being used and which are being 
discussed everywhere in the world at the present time. He gave 
us a number of practical applications of risk criteria, e.g. the 
use of contours of iso-risk ( 1 0 - 8 )  around a chemical plant for 
making decisions on construction permits for new private homes. 
The discussion, of course, then centered on the problem of how to 
deal with these results in the light of the uncertainties inherent 
in risk assessment studies, and on the practical use. 
We then had a presentation on Advanced Safety Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants - Proposal to Limit Catastrophic Releases by 
Mr. Kroger. The new item which he brought up in his presentation 
is that he proposed worst-case criteria which are not subject to 
the probability of occurrence. Even under those conditions, no 
public sheltering or evacuation would be necessary. The discus- 
sion then centered on the topic on how this relates to, for in- 
stance, the emergency reference levels which exist in the U.K. or 
to the recommendations of the ICRP and the IAEA. 
Finally, I would like to refer to the presentation of Mr. 
Costa-Ribeiro concerning Industrialization, Infrastructure, Risk 
Management: The Case of the Cubatao Area in Brazil. In this 
presentation, he gave us some examples of real problems, how the 
problems have been treated in Brazil so far, in something like a 
crash program. He also demonstrated that it is very easy in the 
beginning to set priorities. However, at a later stage, after 
solving the worst problems, it becomes important to do a thorough 
analysis and to consider costs and benefits. The discussion, in 
addition to the purely scientific content, also concentrated on 
the problem on how to use a regional approach, how to aggregate 
the various types of risks and the interaction from various faci- 
lities. 
Well, this in brief I think was what I at least would like 
to remember from the presentations which we had. We then had a 
discussion about the area of regional risk management. We tried 
to structure the discussion with regard to the tools, the crite- 
ria, the use, organizational aspects, and future work. We dis- 
cussed how to do crisis management and how to communicate risk 
information in the light of the uncertainties. It was stressed 
that in evaluating the tools, it is necessary to have real ap- 
plications, to have demonstrations how they are being utilized 
and to see what use they are and maybe what is useless. The pro- 
blem was raised to what extent we really know how good the tools 
are. It was suggested that it is necessary to have an assessment 
of the quality of the tools, especially as they relate to dif- 
ferent purposes for which they are being utilized. The problem 
was raised again how to bring together different data and dif- 
ferent results for different facilities if one takes a regional 
approach. Also the problem was stressed on how really to do risk 
identification, because this of course is a crucial part and it 
also relates to the problem of completeness of the studies. A 
word of warning was given on the use of computerized systems and 
the dangers if everything is computerized. One may be using a 
good tool, but one does not completely understand what is behind 
this tool. 
On the topic of criteria, we discussed how the results of an 
analysis can be compared with the criteria which are being pro- 
posed with appropriate methods for calculations including problems 
of quality assurance or standardization and which attributes 
should be utilized in these different criteria, because of course 
this is one of the crucial parts for establishing any rank order 
of alternatives. Again we mentioned the problem about different 
organizations which are involved. It is necessary to have an 
integrated approach towards risk management. In connection with 
these criteria, we also discussed the problem of acceptable risk, 
public attitudes, and the recommendation was that we should admit 
that this is a social and political process and that we should 
try to start with something which looks reasonable and go ahead 
and see how the social and political process goes. On the topic 
of uses, we discussed the problem that it is necessary to have 
some kind of standardized approach, a procedures guide. A word of 
warning was given to be very careful in using numbers and that it 
has to be clear what is the meaning of the numbers and where they 
are coming from. 
On the topic of organization, we discussed the problem that 
there are no useful models at the present time of cooperative 
decision-making, especially under time constraints and within a 
hierarchical system. An additional aspect is how to integrate 
risk management into organizational structures right from the 
beginning. 
This is in very short words the summary I have to offer for 
the discussion period. Based upon my notes, I will try to sum- 
marize areas which emerged for future work. First, the problem 
of uncertainties, including the problem of the quality of the 
tools. The main items here: risk identification, as I have 
mentioned before, and model uncertainties. There was agreement 
on how to treat the data. This is something we have more or less 
under control. But the model uncertainties are very important and 
of course the problem of human factors was discussed. But this 
will be treated in another summary. Another area of work which 
seems fruitful from our discussions is to deal with criteria. It 
is necessary is to start the process including selecting differ- 
ent attributes. This is something which in the nuclear field at 
IAEA we have started. One report is available and another one is 
under preparation. A meeting on safety principles will be held 
shortly. It is very important from a conceptual viewpoint and 
from a scientific viewpoint how to treat the uncertainties and 
how to show compliance in light of these uncertainties. 
Another topic which seems to be very fruitful for future 
work is real applications to case studies; this is what we have 
proposed in the document which was distributed to you about the 
joint project with the UNEP and WHO. It would be very useful if 
IIASA could help in this effort to develop a procedures guide, a 
standardized approach which one can give to other countries in- 
cluding the problem of aggregation of different effects. This 
problem occurs in particular when you go from the plant level to 
the regional level. 
Another area which could be useful for future work is cooper- 
ative decision making under time constraints in a hierarchical 
structure and considering multiple organizations. I think there 
was general agreement on that. 
In the area of emergency planning, we discussed that emphasis 
has to be given to crisis management and means of communication. 
I think I don't have to stress again the use of computer tools. 
The last topic is organizational aspects of risk manage- 
ments: how to integrate risk management into the organizational 
structure to insure consideration right from the beginning. 
This is in very short words the summary as I have perceived 
it and I would like to thank everybody who contributed in my 
session. Thank you. 
SUMMARY: MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION 
Prof. Bjorn Wahlstrom 
Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not going to give a 
summary of the presentations and the discussions we had in the 
man-machine interaction session. Instead I am going to pick up 
some of the ideas and recommendations for a further discussion. 
A large part of the discussion during the session was devoted 
to an argument on to what extent the human actors could be in- 
cluded in the modelling approach of a probabilistic risk assess- 
ment (PRA). I am well aware of the arguments in that discussions 
because I have in my own laboratory representatives of both the 
PRA and the human factor community. There we have, however, been 
able to reach a friendly co-existence of both approaches. I 
think it is necessary to get some agreement with respect to the 
large lines on what is possible to do and what is not. In this 
connection we had the suggestion by Dr. Niehaus to conduct a 
workshop to settle the disagreement between the two approaches. 
I think such a workshop is important to have, although I consider 
it to be a short-term issue. If such a workshop is arranged, it 
is clear that it should involve all parties working with different 
aspects of the problem. 
There was also a suggestion that IIASA should look into the 
use of expert systems. I will, however, deliberately not give 
that as a suggestion because I think IIASA will take up that 
subject regardless of what we are recommending. 
Going back a bit to the discussions we had before the work- 
shop, I think we all can agree that IIASA should not go into 
nuclear power as a specific subject. I think it is more important 
to look at the risks of modern technology in more general terms 
in order to be able to make fair comparisons between different 
approaches. Nuclear power provides on the other hand one impor- 
tant example, and IIASA should here build connections to other 
organizations, like IAEA, which are working in that field. 
In the man-machine group, we were yesterday evening discuss- 
ing what we should propose as a subject to be taken up by IIASA. 
Much of our discussion went around different decision-makers and 
their decision-making situation as parts of our technical systems. 
This subject involves many of the things we have been discussing: 
the policy-maker, the regulators, the designers, the operators, 
the safety analysts, etc. We should be able to understand the 
characteristics of the decision-making situation and the conse- 
quences of decision errors. This means that we have to consider 
the complexity of the systems and the tools the decision-makers 
are using. In short, we have to build models of how decisions 
are made in our technical systems. 
Considering decision-making, it is clear that IIASA should 
narrow down on the systems approach of the technology and the 
"low probability-high riak" sequences of events. In modelling 
auch sequences, we have to consider self-organizing systems as in 
the emergency planning situations Prof. Dynes was talking about. 
Another theme which should be involved in auch a modelling effort 
is how to plan for the unexpected. I think the only aolution 
here is to make our decision-making syatems more robust, and here 
is a connection to the risk control approach Prof. Rasmussen was 
talking about. 
My own vision is that it should be possible to get some 
general descriptions or models of the decision-making activities 
in the society when a new technology is introduced, assessed, 
adopted, and used. The models should certainly involve the dif- 
ferent actors, their tools, and how they handle information in 
their decision-making situations. Such models should be possible 
to use for the detection of possible problems and thus for the 
improvement of the decisions made. 
We should naturally put the subject also in an international 
framework and consider how different cultures and societies are 
influencing the decision-making systems. Just taking a small 
example of differences between countries, I here in Austria in my 
hotel saw a life-saving device which I have seen elsewhere only 
in Norway. It was a string in the bathroom by which you could 
call the hotel personnel. There was a alight difference in the 
man-machine interface, especially in connection with a procedure 
for how false alarms could be cancelled. The questions which 
came to my mind was whether or not the device is based on regula- 
tion, what kind of riak calculation has been used, and why only 
Austria and Norway have gone for this solution. 
If IIASA would like to take up something along these lines, 
I think there will be things to do for many years. I also think 
there are research communities in many places of the world which 
would be interested to support and join such work. We tried 
yesterday to find a label for such a program, but we were not 
able to get a catchy phrase. However, including key words such 
as technological risks, decision-making systems, human interac- 
tion, and system models, I think the aubject can be specified 
accurately enough. If this is a aubject to be brought up, I 
think IIASA will not have any problems in finding persona willing 
to work out the details of a research program. 
Before finishing, I would like to bring up one point which 
we have been discussing in our group. It has to do with a sys- 
tems-induced interaction which may induce safety threats in a 
complex environment. We are today in most places searching for 
increased performance, which has to be considered very natural, 
to save resources be being more efficient. In some cases, how- 
ever, it may happen that the new practices in some unexpected way 
are decreasing the safety margins inherent in the old practices. 
In the case, the system development is made by small exploratory 
moves, then it is easier to handle all the preconditions for 
safety. There are, however, also cases where the development is 
going in quantum jumps, and then it is far more difficult to make 
all the system changes necessary to maintain an acceptable safety. 
There are always risks in adopting new methods because long-term 
effects cannot be seen beforehand. By systematic efforts, how- 
ever, it should be possible to avoid too dangerous trial-and- 
error by and large. 
I really think IIASA has an important role in promoting 
international cooperation in the systems and risk areas. Coming 
from a small country, I often like to stress the importance of 
international cooperation, and I also think that the large coun- 
tries will get a similar benefit. We clearly get additional 
operating experience with the possibility of early warning based 
on events elsewhere. The "natural" experiments like the accidents 
at TMI, Bhopal, and Chernobyl require also a very careful analysis 
in order to fully utilize all the lessons to be learnt. Such 
work requires an international dialogue to utilize all expertise 
available for the verification of the models we are using for 
predicting the resulting safety level of the technologies. 
In maintaining and developing a deep and narrow expertise, 
it is sometimes difficult to find discussion partners in a small 
country, and then such have to be sought abroad. I think also it 
is important to note that our world is interconnected and that 
decisions in other parts of the world are influencing ours. The 
Chernobyl accident provides one example as we in Finland were well 
on the way with a decision to build a fifth nuclear power plant 
unit. After the accident, the decision was postponed, and it is 
now very unlikely that such a decision will be made in the near 
future with all the implications it may have. 
1. REGIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
1.1. RISK MANAGEMENT OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIAL IN- 
STALLATIONS 
Dr. David Slater 
Technica, Inc. 
Columbus, OH, USA 
Synopsis 
What is Risk Management? 
Many of the current problems being faced today by industry 
have to do with the impact of modern science and technology on 
society. 
Science, essentially knowledge, harms no one, but technology 
or the implementation of science in practice by definition is an 
action to which there is an inevitable societal reaction. It has 
been proposed by humanists that technology can have no legitimacy 
unless it inflicts no harm. 
Managers of technology use should therefore ensure that they 
comprehend and respect the laws of science applicable to their 
technology and exercise care in assessing the probable consequen- 
ces which, should they be harmful, require that they abstain from 
employing the technology until they have found ways of making it 
"safe." To be legally permissible or socially desirable, manage- 
ment of technology must conform to the legal maxim of "mutuality 
of liberty" -- the principle that one man's freedom of action 
ends where it would injure another. 
It is clear then that an assessment of the risk, i.e. whether 
the technology has the potential for harm ought not to be decided 
unilaterally by the proponents. But it is these proponents who 
must manage its practical exploitation, taking into account the 
economics and the politics as well as the technology. Indeed it 
has been suggested that currently top management with a background 
in banking and law is lacking the vital technological dimension 
to understand the full implications of the technological liabi- 
lity. 
The present challenge is to communicate a numerical assess- 
ment of system performance to decision-makers in a format that 
they can readily appreciate. Managing risk is fundamental to 
company survival. Historically, management information systems 
have been tailored to produce data on parameters essential to 
managing financial "risk," cash flows, profitability, etc. More 
recently, the management of research and development has addressed 
the areas of technical risk. But only in the wake of disasters 
like Bhopal has management finally realized that "risk" management 
is not just these factors, it is not even just ensuring that 
there is enough insurance coverage for their liabilities (the 
classic insurance definition of risk management), but it must 
include the understanding and control of the potential for harm 
from the exploitation of technology. 
What is Needed? 
Management of technological risk in common with management of 
most enterprises requires an overall strategy, detailed plans, 
and ways of monitoring current status and projected performance. 
Decisions are then required on the continuing appropriateness 
of the plans and the measures to be taken to implement the stra- 
tegy and correct any deviations in real performance versus chosen 
targets. Put this way, the requirements for fiscal, technical, 
and liability (risk) management are identical in form. 
Risk management requires decisions. Decisions need hard 
data. These data should reflect: 
* current situation, status 
t predicted behavior, trends 
t importance ranking of needs 
t cost effectiveness of solutions 
t an indication of assumptions, limitations and uncertainties 
( = confidence ) 
The need is for an organizational structure that will allow pro- 
duction of plans and targets, monitoring and assessment of the 
present situation, of proposed modifications or new ventures, and 
an effective control system for implementing the decisions. 
The Risk Management Program 
The first requirement in any program is an ability to com- 
municate the information to the participants. If top management 
is essentially legally or fiscally trained, the information needs 
to be put in terms that can be understood by them. (It is also 
more likely to be understood by the general public.) The second 
requirement is for a clearly understood process for making tech- 
nological decisions. This should contain three elements: 
t first quantify - to know 
* secondly model - to predict 
t thirdly rank or prioritize - to decide. 
Quantification 
Currently quantitative risk analysis is becoming firmly 
established worldwide as it does provide numerical results which 
represent more or less, depending on the quality of the analyst 
and the techniques employed, the actual risk picture of the system 
and its potential impact on society. 
Modelling 
As part of the RA process, the response of the system to 
process impacts, containment failure, human error, etc. needs to 
be modelled. When these elements are combined together and ag- 
gregated for whole plants, complexes or industries as present day 
computer packages allow, then there is made available to manage- 
ment an ability to examine the potential effects of decisions or 
options on a "what if?" basis. 
Decision 
Given numerical results from quantitative risk calculations 
and systems modelling (reliability, unavailability, loss rates, 
etc.) that can be directly integrated with numerical data on 
costs, effects, etc., decision-making ought to be relatively 
straight forward. (The fact that it is seldom so simple reflects 
the need to incorporate the other vital elements that reflect 
society's response.) 
For practical managers whose goals are essentially private, 
pragmatic and short-term, decisions are simple. The goals are to 
put the technology to use in the most economical and effective 
way as possible, with what little thought given to the long-term 
consequences being regarded as the responsibility of ot:lers. 
Risk Management Criteria 
There has to be a way of incorpor5ting a public, humanistic, 
and long-range element intq the process. In any organization, 
goals and targets ars an essential part of a management program. 
Similarly in many potentially hazardous industries, safety goals 
and targets are finding more and more acceptance. But it is 
widely felt in these industries that it would simplify matters if 
there were "norms" or criteria of acceptability which could be 
used as society-approved safety levels. A demonstration that 
these criteria have been achieved would then be a necessary and 
sufficient defense in the event of the inevitable accident. 
It is now realized that with many of the present day tech- 
nologies the goal of "mutuality of liberty" is not obtainable. 
As the cost of requiring that the design and operation of these 
technologies be modified to meet this maxim is too large to con- 
template, society needs to face pragmatically an existing situa- 
tion and "accepted" level of risk that has grown out of the last 
hundred years of operation. This is enshrined in the current 
engineering codes and standards, most of which are recognized 
worldwide. It is still possible to meet the humanistic goals, 
but not today. A phased program of pragmatic criteria of accep- 
tability progressively modified to decrease the risks or increase 
the safety by stages would help achieve a managed change, perhaps 
geared to overall quality of life and longevity expectation, and 
to natural disease and accident risks. 
Examples 
There are a number of examples of how potentially hazardous 
industry is coping with the problems of managing risk, and these 
will be outlined. Risk management decisions on process choice, 
siting, layout, routing of transportation hazards, etc. will be 
illustrated using risk contours, F/N curves and occupational 
indices. Finally, the role of more formal decision-making techni- 
ques such as importance ranking and hierarchical decision aids 
will be discussed. 
Conclusions 
Risk management of potentially hazardous industry is undergo- 
ing a serious rethink in the wake of recent incidents. It is 
recognized that internal goals and targets are needed in quantita- 
tive terms and that the skill must be available to provide numeri- 
cal data on the risk of current and planned operations. It is 
felt that a concerted and socially supported set of guidelines on 
acceptable risk either national or internationally would be a 
major contribution to simplifying and identifying the respon- 
sibilities of management. These have to be set, however, against 
a background of what is practicable and realistically achievable. 
In the absence of such criteria, management must balance 
liabilities and penalties from hazardous operations themselves 
using the best risk quantification and decision aids available. 
This will inevitably lead to a wide range of corporate attitudes 
with some adopting a more aggressive stance than others, being 
willing to take risks that perhaps society should not allow. 
1 . 2 .  THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT 
D r .  A .  h e n d o l a  
Systems Eng inee r ing  and  R e l i a b i l i t y  D i v i s i o n  
J o i n t  Research  C e n t r e ,  Cornmiasion o f  t h e  European 
Communities,  I a p r a ,  I t a l y  
ABSTRACT 
EEC directives concerning the major accident hazards of certain in- 
dustr ia l  ac t iv i t i es  and the assessment of the environmental impact of 
technological systems are described and commented upon. Thereafter, a 
short overview of the research ac t iv i t i es  sponsored by the Commission 
of the European Communities i s  presented, with particular emphasis on 
those concerning the assessment of state-of-the-art models and proce- 
dures for r isk analysis both of nuclear and chemical f ac i l i t i e s .  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk management is a very comprehensive subject covering a s ignif i -  
cant number of very different  topics which range from hazard identifica- 
t ion t o  the measures adopted for reducing r isks  to  accepted levels  and 
for facing emergencies. 
It  includes, therefore, c r i t e r i a  for r i sk  assessment, evaluation of 
costs and benefits of alternative measures, public perception and 
acceptability, as  well as decision making. 
In rea l i ty ,  r i sks  are managed a t  very different  levels by different  
decision makers (such as  industr ia l  companies, plant operators, local 
and governmental control authorities,  international bodies); a complete 
treatment of the subject would require an in-depth analysis of the 
decisional structure, which should give account of the different  situa- 
t ions i n  the EEC countries. Furthermore, a comprehensive treatment 
would require to deal with the diverse hazard sources such as  nuclear 
plants, chemical processes and storage f ac i l i t i e s ,  transportation of 
hazardous materials, waste disposal, biotechnologies, products, etc. 
Furthermore, r i sks  of accidents should be distinguished from r isks 
connected with continuous emissions and impacts on health and environ- 
ment should be discussed both a t  short-time and long-time scale. 
Sinerget ic  e f f e c t s  between d i f f e r e n t  sources should a l s o  be discussed. 
A s  a consequence, i f  c l ea r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a re  not assumed with respect  
both t o  the  scope and t o  the extent  of the  subject  proposed t o  the 
author f o r  the  present  workshop, the  paper would r e s u l t  e i t h e r  i n  a 
punctual and fragmentary l i s t i n g  of somewhat d ispara te  a t t i t u d e s  
according t o  the  s ingle  hazard sources o r  i n  a generic and abs t r ac t  
philosophical  statement since the  d i f f e r e n t  technological s ec to r s  a re  
not ye t  approached with uniform c r i t e r i a .  On the contrary,  by r e s t r i c t -  
i ng  the scope, some a c t i v i t i e s  which can be considered a s  exemplary 
can be discussed t o  a s u f f i c i e n t  extent .  In  pa r t i cu la r ,  the paper is 
focused on: 
- the  way the  so-called Seveso Directive is  being implemented fo r  the 
control  of the hazards presented by c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s ;  
- the  descr ip t ion of a more recent d i r ec t ive  on the  assessment of the  
environmental impact of new p ro jec t s ;  and 
- the  descr ip t ion of research p ro jec t s  aimed a t  es tabl ishing a common 
awareness on the advantages and l imi t a t ions  of avai lable  methods, 
models and procedures f o r  p robab i l i s t i c  sa fe ty  assessment both of 
nuclear and chemical f a c i l i t i e s ,  a s  well a s  on the  associated uncer- 
t a i n t i e s .  
2. TWE POST-SEWS0 DIRECl?IW 
The ove ra l l  Community pol icy  f o r  preventing accidents i n  the  chemi- 
c a l  industry i s  s e t  up by the EEC Directive 82/501/~EC of 24 June 1982 
on the major accident hazards of ce r t a in  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
system es tabl ished by the Directive has been i n  force s ince  January 
1984 and r e s u l t s  i n  a q u i t e  successful  on-going implementation process 
under the r e spons ib i l i t y  of the  DG X I  (Environment) /1,2/. 
The Directive covers a l l  the  aspects t o  be included i n  a r i s k  mana- 
gement pol icy  f o r  process and storage i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  which dangerous 
( i . e .  toxic ,  flammable o r  explosive) substances a r e  involved i n  quan- 
t i t i e s  presenting r i s k s  of major accidents (waste d isposal ,  mines, 
nuclear,  mi l i t a ry  and t ranspor t  hazards a re  excluded). 
The member countr ies  were obliged to conform t h e i r  l eg i s l a t ions  t o  
the Directive by January 1984, so  t h a t  t h i s  could be e f fec t ive  by 
January 1985 f o r  a l l  new plants ,  with a tolerance period f o r  ex i s t ing  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  expiring i n  1989. The requirements of the Directive can 
be summarized a s  follows: 
- each member country must appoint a competent author i ty ;  
- a l l  manufacturers a re  required to prove t o  the competent author i ty  t h a t  
they have i d e n t i f i e d  the major hazards and adopted sa fe ty  measures 
when dealing with dangerous i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  These a r e  iden t i -  
f i ed  through a l i s t  of 178 dangerous chemicals which a r e  o r  may be 
involved i n  the a c t i v i t y ;  
- when these substances a re  involved i n  quan t i t i e s  exceeding speci f ied  
thresholds,  the  manufacturer must submit a safe ty  case and supply 
a l l  information needed f o r  the establishment of emergency plans;  
- the a u t h o r i t i e s  have t o  evaluate the sa fe ty  r epor t  and t o  a sce r t a in  
t h a t  the most appropriate measures t o  prevent major accidents have 
been taken ; the a u t h o r i t i e s  must provide inspections t o  a sce r t a in  
t h a t  the sa fe ty  measures a r e  observed during operation; 
- the manufacturer must provide in - s i t e  emergency plans and must inform 
the  publ ic  on the r i s k s  presented by the a c t i v i t i e s  a s  well a s  on the  
immediate measures t o  be taken i n  case of emergency; 
- on the  bas i s  of the information provided by the  manufacturer, of f -  
s i t e  emergency plans must be prepared by the au thor i t i e s ;  
- major accidents must be no t i f i ed  to the  competent a u t h o r i t i e s ,  who 
must supply accident repor ts  t o  the  Commission; 
- the  Commission must keep the records of major accodents a t  the  dispo- 
s a l  of member s t a t e s  f o r  preventing purposes; 
- a l l  provisions should be subjected t o  revis ion according t o  experience. 
The relevance t h a t  the  Directive gives t o  inform the  public and t o  
r epor t  accidents should be noticed; despi te  the  s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h i s  
matter ,  important achievements a r e  being obtained. In  pa r t i cu la r ,  t he  
Major Accident Reporting System has become operational .  It  d i f f e r s  
from other i n d u s t r i a l  inc ident  data  bases /3,4,5/ since the information 
recorded i s  based on a very de ta i l ed  col lec t ion form /6/ which has been 
adopted by the  standing Committee of National Competent Author i t ies ,  
who a re  responsible f o r  the repor t ing  t o  the Commission. 
The r e t r i e v a l  and ana lys i s  of experienced events w i l l  ce r t a in ly  
c o n s t i t u t e  a bas ic  element of the Commission's pol icy  of prevention. 
The above mentioned Comnittee c o n s t i t u t e s  an es tabl i shed forum f o r  
the  exchange of information i n  order t o  ensure the  establishment of 
common standards i n  the  implementation and the  cont ro l  of  the Community 
l e g i s l a t i o n .  
The Commission, i n  col labora t ion  with the  na t ional  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  a l s o  
organizes regular  workshops f o r  the  na t ional  inspectors  a s  well  a s  
conferences aiming a t  e s t ab l i sh ing  s ta tes-of- the-ar t  on se l ec t ed  top ic s  
(such a s  the  conference on Emergency Planning to be held i n  Varese i n  
November 1987). 
All  these  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  s t rongly  cont r ibut ing  t o  a harmonized i m -  
plementation of the  Directive.  
As a r e s u l t  of the on-going process,  an amendment i n  the  Direc t ive  
has been proposed and adopted i n  1987 concerning the  threshold fo r  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  of p a r t i c u l a r l y  dangerous substances such a s  chlor ine  
and phosgene. A new amendment i s  being s tudied  to b e t t e r  cover the pro- 
blem of i s o l a t e d  s torage  which dramatically emerged a f t e r  the Sandoz 
accident  i n  Basel. 
I t  i s  a l s o  worth remarking how a f t e r  the  major d i s a s t e r s  i n  Mexico 
and India ,  worldwide i n i t i a t i v e s  a re  assuming the  EEC Directive a s  a 
milestone. 
The s a f e t y  case  i s sue  is of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t he  present  
workshop. The Direc t ive  e s t ab l i shes  which a r e  the items t h a t  must be 
included i n t o  the  n o t i f i c a t i o n  procedure, but  it does no t  speci fy  
appl icable  methods of analys is  and c r i t e r i a  f o r  accep tab i l i t y .  These 
a re  l e f t  to the nat ional  l e g i s l a t i o n s ,  even i f  a mutual exchange of 
information on sa fe ty  cases  is promoted, a s  described above. 
Now, i n  some countr ies  - such a s  The Netherlands - quan t i t a t ive  
r i s k  accep tab i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  a r e  being introduced /7/; i n  o ther  countr ies  
such a s  the  United Kingdom, the  Health & Safety Executive suggests  i n  
i t s  guidance on the  contents of "Safety Cases" t h a t :  "While it may be 
poss ib le  f o r  manufacturers t o  wr i t e  a Safety Case i n  q u a l i t a t i v e  terms, 
HSE may f ind  it e a s i e r  t o  accept conclusions which a r e  supported by 
quan t i t a t ive  arguments. A quan t i t a t ive  assessment is a l s o  a convenient 
way of l imi t ing  the scope of the Safety Case by demonstrating e i t h e r  
t h a t  an adverse event has a very remote p o s s i b i l i t y  of occurring o r  
t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  consequence i s  r e l a t i v e l y  minor." 
In  o ther  countr ies ,  purely qua l i t a t ive  analyses a r e  used. The major 
debate i n  the  indust ry  about the use of p robab i l i s t i c  r i s k  assessment 
concerns on the  one hand the maturi ty of d i sc ip l ine  and, on the  o ther ,  
poss ib le  misuse and resource waste i n  indiscriminate PSA adoption. 
The CEFIC pos i t ion  paper asks f o r  a f l ex ib le  approach and considers 
the  use of quant i f ied  r i s k  analys is  only j u s t i f i e d  i n  se lec ted  cases /8/. 
3. THE DIRECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
The Directive (85/337/EEC) on the  assessment of the  e f f e c t s  of c e r t a i n  
public and p r iva te  p ro jec t s  on the environment has been emitted i n  
June 1985 and should be enforced by the  member s t a t e s  by July  1988. 
According t o  t h i s  Directive,  " the  environmental impact assessment w i l l  
i den t i fy ,  descr ibe  and assess  i n  an appropriate manner ... the d i r e c t  
and i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  of a p ro jec t  on the  following fac to r s :  
- human beings, fauna and f lo ra ;  
- s o i l ,  water, a i r ,  cl imate and the  landscape; 
- the  i n t e r a c t i o n  between the f ac to r s  mentioned above; 
- mater ia l  a s s e t s  and the c u l t u r a l  heri tage." 
Information t o  the  public deserves a p a r t i c u l a r  a t t en t ion :  "any 
request  for  development consent and any information gathered according 
t o  the  Directive a re  made ava i l ab le  t o  the public;  t he  public concerned 
i s  given the opportunity t o  express an opinion before the  p ro jec t  
is i n i t i a t e d .  " 
The Directive may have a heavy impact on the environmental pol icy  
of the EEC countr ies  s ince  it p r a c t i c a l l y  covers a l l  kinds of man-made 
systems with the  exception of p ro jec t s  serving nat ional  defense pur- 
poses and those already s u f f i c i e n t l y  covered by a spec i f i c  s e t  of 
na t ional  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
The information t h a t  must be supplied fo r  the  concerned p ro jec t s  
includes among others :  
"- an estimate of expected residues and emissions (water, a i r  and s o i l  
pol lu t ion,  noise,  v ibra t ion,  l i g h t ,  heat ,  r ad ia t ion ,  e t c  . ) r e su l t ing  
from the operation of the proposed projec t ;  
- where appropriate,  an ou t l ine  of the main a l t e rna t ives  studied by 
the developer and an indicat ion of the  main reasons f o r  h i s  choice, 
taking i n t o  account the environmental e f f e c t s ;  
- a descr ip t ion covering the  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  and any ind i rec t ,  secondary, 
cumulative, shor t ,  medium and long-term, permanent and temporary, 
pos i t ive  and negative e f f e c t s  of the  proposed p ro jec t  on the  environ- 
ment r e su l t ing  from: 
. the existence of the p ro jec t ,  
. the use of na tu ra l  resources, 
. the emission of po l lu t an t s ,  the crea t ion of nuisance and the  elimi- 
nat ion of waste, 
and the descr ip t ion by the developer of the forecasting methods used 
t o  assess  the e f f e c t s  on the environment; 
- a descr ip t ion of the  measures envisaged t o  prevent, reduce and, 
where poss ib le ,  o f f - se t  any siqr. if icant adverse e f f e c t s  on the en- 
environment. " 
The p ro jec t s  which a r e  sub jec t  t o  the most s t r ingen t  obl igat ions  
when exceeding es tabl ished s i z e s  a re :  
- crude o i l  r e f i n e r i e s  and gasification/liquefaction of coal  on 
bituminous shale ;  
- thermal power s t a t i o n s ,  other combustion i n s t a l l a t i o n s  and nuclear 
power reactors  ; 
- permanent storage o r  f i n a l  disposal  of radioact ive  waste; 
- in tegra ted  work f o r  the  melting of cast-iron and s t e e l ;  
- ex t rac t ion  and processing of asbestos;  
- i n t eg ra ted  chemical i n s t a l l a t i o n s ;  
- mtorways, railways, a i r p o r t s ,  t rading por t s ;  and 
- waste disposal  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  fo r  the  inc inera t ion,  chemical t r e a t -  
ment o r  l a n d - f i l l  of toxic  and dangerous wastes. 
Other p ro jec t s  might be subject  t o  the  judgement of the  member 
s t a t e s ;  these include a c t i v i t i e s  concerning agr icul ture ,  ex t r ac t ive  and 
energy indust ry ,  processing of metals, manufacture of g lass ,  chemical, 
food, t e x t i l e ,  paper and rubber indust ry ,  i n f ra s t ruc tu re  projec ts  and 
others  (among which holiday v i l l ages  and hote l  complexes). 
This summary should be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  focus on the R&D a c t i v i t i e s  
which might be promoted by the  need t o  comply with the  obl igat ions  
l a i d  down by the Directive.  
4. R&D ACTIVITIES 
The J o i n t  Research Centre of the Commission of the  European Communi- 
t i e s  i s  involved i n  many R&D a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t ed  t o  re levant  aspects  of 
the  management of r i s k s  connected both with nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s  and 
with hazardous i n d u s t r i a l  ones, i . e .  r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  data acquisi-  
t i on  and decision making. However, since the  JFC i s  not d i r e c t l y  in-  
volved i n  the p a r t i c u l a r  decis ional  processes,  i t s  research programme 
i s  mainly aimed a t  providing decision makers ( indus t r i e s ,  control  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  e t c . )  with decision support systems (DSS) and val idated  
data ,  models and procedures f o r  r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and assessment. 
A s  f a r  a s  Decision Support Systems a re  concerned, the  IRIMS and SRA 
pro jec t s  should be mentioned. 
IRIMS ( I sp ra  Risk Management Support System) has been developed i n  
collaborationwithIIASA a f t e r  a comprehensive study of regulatory pro- 
cesses  /9/. Its goal i s  t o  look a t  the complete cycle of hazardous 
substances, including the  r i s k s  of manufacture, t ranspor ta t ion ,  use 
and ult imate disposal  of waste. The system / l o /  has three  main pa r t s :  
a number of data bases containing information re levant  t o  environmental 
impact, r i s k  ana lys i s  and optimization; and a decis ion support t oo l  
which the  decision maker uses t o  shape h i s  decisions.  A t  present,  
IRIMS i s  a demonstration prototype version designed t o  show the  fea- 
s i b i l i t y  of in t eg ra t ing  da ta  bases and simulation models through an 
i n t e l l i g e n t  i n t e r f a c e ;  a f i r s t  operational  too l  i s  expected a f t e r  com- 
p le t ion  of a case study of the  r i s k s  associated with the  production, 
t ranspor ta t ion  and use of chlorine i n  The Netherlands, which i s  being 
performed i n  col labora t ion with the  VROM Ministry and IIASA /11/. 
Whereas IRIMS i s  a support  t oo l  f o r  s e c t o r i a l  o r  reg ional  r i s k  mana- 
gement, the  SRA (System Response Analyzer) is being developed a s  a 
genera tor  of mul t ip le  i nc iden t  scenar ios  i n  which various combinations 
of  f a i l u r e s  a r e  accounted fo r :  machine f a i l u r e s ,  human f a i l u r e s  and 
procedure f a i l u r e s ;  it is ,  therefore ,  aimed a t  improving DSS's f o r  
opera tors  of hazardous p l an t s .  The concept has been developed with 
reference  to  nuclear  systems by s t a r t i n g  from a dynamic p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
s a f e t y  ana lys i s  methodology /12/ and by including s imula t ive  models of  
human ope ra to r s  /13,14,15,16,17/. 
As f a r  a s  da t a  acqu i s i t i on  i s  concerned, the  reader  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  
the  a l ready mentioned MARS /6/ f o r  chemical i nc iden t s  and t o  the  
European R e l i a b i l i t y  Data System /18/ which c o l l e c t s  and harmonizes 
component r e l i a b i l i t y ,  i nc iden t  and p l a n t  a v a i l a b i l i t y  da t a  from nuclear  
power p l a n t s  i n  Europe. 
As f a r  a s  assessment of methods and procedures f o r  PSA a r e  concerned, 
comparative s t u d i e s  performed independently by d i f f e r e n t  teams on a 
same reference  o b j e c t  (Benchmark exe rc i se s )  have proved t o  give deep 
i n s i g h t  i n t o  models, procedures and unce r t a in t i e s  l inked with r e l i a b i -  
l i t y  assessment /19/ and t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  con t r ibu t e  t o  the  e s t ab l i sh -  
ment of a common awareness on a l l  r e l evan t  problems (advantages, l im i t a -  
t i o n s ,  cos t -ef fec t iveness  of the  d i f f e r e n t  methods, s ta tes -of - the-ar t  
i n  t he  model and i n  t he  da ta  f i e l d ,  e t c . ) .  
Indeed, a major i s sue  i n  any PSA i s  cons t i t u t ed  by the  problem of 
the  a s soc i a t ed  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  and of t he  r ep roduc ib i l i t y  and compara- 
b i l i t y  of the  r e s u l t s ,  e spec i a l l y  when analyses,  performed a t  d i f f e r e n t  
times and/or by d i f f e r e n t  exper ts ,  must be used f o r  dec is ional  purposes 
(optimization,  back - f i t t i ng  of o l d  p l an t s ,  choices among a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
accep tab i l i t y ,  e t c . ) .  Consequently, there  has been an important  e f f o r t  
t o  t r y  t o  develop guide l ines  and common PSA procedures. Rather than 
s t a r t i n g  from e s t a b l i s h i n g  normative guidance, JRC has s e t  up an RBE 
programme with t he  f i r s t  goal  being eventua l ly  t o  obta in  commonly 
agreed s ta te-of - the-ar t  procedures. The approach followed i s  t o  de f ine  
a common study case  and have t h i s  analyzed by d i f f e r e n t  teams. The 
teams happen t o  r ep re sen t  indus t ry ,  a u t h o r i t i e s  and research cen t r e s  i n  
a r a t h e r  well-balanced way and, thus,  t he  RBEs he lp  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a 
b e t t e r  d ia logue  and common language between t h e  v a r i o u s  p a r t i e s  involved 
i n  PSA. 
The program s t a r t e d  i n  1982 w i t h  an e x e r c i s e  on systems r e l i a b i l i t y  
a n a l y s i s .  The a u x i l i a r y  feedwater  system o f  t h e  EDF p l a n t  P a l u e l  was 
chosen a s  a r e f e r e n c e  and 11 teams (10 from t h e  EC and one from Sweden) 
c a r r i e d  o u t  a q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  (FMEA) and a q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  
( f a u l t  t r e e  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  and a n a l y s i s )  , s t r u c t u r e d  t o  
i d e n t i f y  s o u r c e s  and magnitude o f  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  The spread  i n  t h e  
r e s u l t s  was found t o  be  l a r g e r  than expected.  T h i s  was f o r  a n  impor tan t  
p a r t  due t o  model l ing;  hence, i t  was concluded t h a t  s y s t e m a t i c  q u a l i t a -  
t i v e  a n a l y s i s ,  a more p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  d e c i s i o n  framework f o r  
which t h e  a n a l y s i s  has  t o  be  performed ( l i c e n s i n g  v e r s u s  b e s t  e s t i m a t e )  
and t h e  use  o f  (computer ized)  model l ing procedures cou ld  h e l p  t o  i m -  
prove robus tness  and c r e d i b i l i t y .  A second conc lus ion  was t h a t  t h e  
common cause f a i l u r e  and human f a i l u r e  i s s u e s  needed deeper  considera-  
t i o n  and s o  they  were chosen a s  t o p i c s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  RBEs /20/. 
The Common Cause F a i l u r e  RBE (CCF-RBE) s t a r t e d  i n  mid-1984. T h i s  
time a German p l a n t  (Grbhnde) o f  KWU des ign  was chosen. The r e f e r e n c e  
systems were those  prov id ing  a u x i l i a r y  feedwater  i n  c a s e  o f  a l o s s  o f  
p r e f e r r e d  power ( a  2 ~ 1 0 0 %  s t a r t - u p  and shut-down system and a 4 ~ 1 0 0 %  
emergency f e e d  sys tem) .  This  t ime 10 teams ( i n c l u d i n g  one from Sweden 
and one from t h e  USA) p a r t i c i p a t e d .  The CCF-RBE he lped  t o  ach ieve  f i r s t  
a common unders tand ing  of  v a r i o u s  types  of  dependent f a i l u r e s ,  then  
an agreement on t h e  domain of  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  e x p l i c i t  and 
i m p l i c i t  (paramet r ic )  models and t o  a s s e s s  t h e  m e r i t s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  
of t h e  l a t t e r  /21/. 
Cur ren t ly ,  a benchmark e x e r c i s e  is under way on human r e l i a b i l i t y  
assessment .  Two d i f f e r e n t  s tudy  c a s e s  a r e  be ing  analyzed:  p o t e n t i a l  
o p e r a t o r  e r r o r s  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  r o u t i n e  f u n c t i o n a l  t a s k s  based on 
w r i t t e n  procedures,  and human r e l i a b i l i t y  a s p e c t s  involved  i n  o p e r a t o r s  
responding t o  an emergency /22/. 
The o v e r a l l  exper ience  w i t h  t h e  benchmark e x e r c i s e s  h a s  proven t h a t  
t h e  approach fol lowed was very  powerful f o r  a g r e e i n g  on s ta te -of - the-  
a r t  procedures and methods; t h e r e f o r e ,  it i s  b e i n g  now extended t o  
non-nuclear hazard  a n a l y s i s  /11/.  Reference system w i l l  be an ammonia 
s t o r a g e  f a c i l i t y  l i n k e d  w i t h  a s e a  t e r m i n a l  and a p r o c e s s  p l a n t .  
Par t i c ipa t ion  from indus t ry ,  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  exper t  and research  organiza- 
t i ons  w i l l  provide a frame s imi l a r  t o  t h a t  of the nuclear  PSA p ro j ec t s .  
However, t he  e x t e n t  of the  ana lys i s  w i l l  be a complete r i s k  assessment 
(from q u a l i t a t i v e  hazard i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  up t o  t he  evalua t ion  of r i s k  
contours) .  The f i n a l  r e s u l t s  a r e  expected by the  end of 1989. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Independently of t he  assessment c r i t e r i a  t h a t  w i l l  be f i n a l l y  
adopted by the  member s t a t e s ,  t he  EEC Direc t ives  a r e  c e r t a i n l y  improving 
the  general  awareness of the  publ ic ,  a u t h o r i t i e s  and indus t ry  on the  
need f o r  implementing concrete measures t o  prevent  acc idents  and t o  
p r o t e c t  the  environment; concrete measures a r e  a l ready opera t ive .  
They a l s o  open a g r e a t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  R&D: se l ec t ed  examples of 
Commission-sponsored a c t i v i t i e s  r e l evan t  t o  t he  aims of t h i s  workshop 
have been presented  which can cont r ibute  t o  the  establishment of a common 
way of th inking  among a l l  p a r t i e s  involved i n  t he  r e a l  dec i s iona l  
process.  
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1.3. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS 
M. Hayns, G. Meggitt, W. Nixon 
UKAEA, Safety and Reliability Directorate 
Culcheth, Cheshire, United Kingdom 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The expressed goal of this workship is to design a research 
agenda for work related to safety issues and to the control 
and management of accidents. Therefore, this paper 
approaches the topic of emergency planning and preparedness 
by posing the question "what research needs can be 
identified to assist in both the planning of emergency 
response, and in its implementation". Thus, emergency 
planning and preparedness requires organisation of a wide 
range of services for rapid and co-ordinated response to a 
variety of emergency situations. There are problems at two 
levels: 
i) anticipating the types of emergency and the challenges 
they pose for pre-planning purposes and 
ii) ensuring that an adequate system exists for evaluating 
the actual emergency when it occurs to decide upon 
appropriate counter measures. 
In its broadest interpretation, emergency planning and 
preparedness requires input from a very diverse range of 
expertise, these include, for example, firefighting and 
medical treatment of casualties, decontamination of people 
and places, operation of remote surveillance equipment and 
dose assessment. Much work is underway in these existing 
and identifiable areas of expertise - it is a real 
difficulty to bring it together with a co-ordinated 
programme on emergency planning but this is not addressed 
further here. In order to identify where research might be 
directed, it is useful to break the topic down into five 
headings. Each of these will be addressed in the 
presentation, but here are only very briefly mentioned. 
Further, many of the topics are directly related to nuclear 
emergencies. Rather than try to generalise, the nuclear 
application is used to provide the structure, but many of 
the topics covered will also be pertinent to other related 
hazards. 
2. TRAINING 
Whilst the training of nuclear plant operators has long been 
recognised as an important item, training for emergency 
response has usually be restricted to "practices" and 
"handbook" reading. We believe that there is a good case 
for the development of "simulator software" which would 
mimic telemetry and other input data. Noting that this type 
of simulator could absorb lots of resources, it is 
nevertheless considered that investment in the development 
of cost effective systems is worthwhile; particularly if it 
is recognised that co-ordination of development has the 
potential to bring substantial returns. 
3. MONITORING 
The monitoring of releases and their consequences have been 
the subject of a great deal of work; instrumentation systems 
which telemeter results back to base stations for rapid 
assessment have been vigorously developed. Whilst a great 
deal of data may be generated by networks of such 
instruments, the collation and interpretation of that data 
has yet to receive equivalent attention. 
4. DOSE PREDICTION AND INTERPRETATION 
The interpretation of this data would be greatly assisted by 
improved computer based dose prediction systems. These 
employ models of the release of radioactivity, and its 
subsequent dispersion, either in the atmosphere, or 
aquasphere, and provide more or less complicated interactive 
facilities to cope with incoming telemetry data. A wide 
range of models have, or could be developed whose complexity 
shall be determined by their desired end use. 
5. COMMUNICATIONS 
One crucially important area which is common to many 
emergency and other management systems is that of 
communications. This involves not only the actual 
communication medium, but also the acquisition and 
presentation of the data. Other associated problems include 
optimising the location of emergency planners, the use of, 
say, satellite radiolocation finders for continual 
monitoring of emergency teams and the nature of the 
information links needed between all relevant personnel. 
There is no doubt that the electronic revolution offers the 
basic technology - what is needed now is the definition of 
detailed requirements to take best advantage of it, taking 
cost-benefit matters into consideration. 
6. HUMAN FACTORS 
Just like the plant itself, any emergency response depends 
to a greater or lesser extent upon the actions of human 
beings. Planning, may be subject to human error, but it is 
to be hoped that review and availability of time would make 
its intrusion acceptable. However, the highly stressed 
situation during an actual emergency could lead to errors 
and misinterpretation. Methods have been developed which 
can identify weak spots in operations, so far as human 
actions are concerned and it would be valuable to apply 
these to the emergency response case. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have tried to steer clear of proposals 
which fall into "main stream" technical topics, even though 
they are highly pertinent to emergency planning and 
procedures. Our concern there would be to re-evaluate and 
focus such work for the benefit of emergency situations. 
Rather, we have concentrated on areas where attention to 
data processing, information management and communications 
could yield substantial benefits for relatively little cost, 
and which have not received a great deal of attention as 
yet. We believe that the wealth of information potentially 
available now could be made much more accessible and useful 
and could argue for cost effective research efforts in these 
areas. 
1.4. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
C. J. van Kuijen 
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment 
Directorate-General for Environmental Protection 
The Netherlands 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For over  150 y e a r s  The Netherlands has had l e g i s l a t i o n  aimed a t  t h e  
p revent ion  of nuisance and danger caused by i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
A f t e r  i t s  most r e c e n t  r e v i s i o n  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  (The Nuisance Act)  i s  
an e f f e c t i v e  t o o l  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t  c o n t a i n s  a  
p e r m i t t i n g  system a l lowing  t h e  canpe ten t  a u t h o r i t i e s  - v i z .  t h e  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  o r  t h e  p rov inces  - to  dec ide  whether a  c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t y  
i s  a c c e p t a b l e  a t  a  c e r t a i n  p l a c e  and which c o n d i t i o n s  should be 
a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  permit  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  popula t ion  
and t h e  environment. The a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  and t h e  d r a f t  of t h e  permit  
a r e  open t o  p u b l i c  i n s p e c t i o n .  The p u b l i c  can o b j e c t  t o  t h e  d r a f t  both 
i n  w r i t i n g  and i n  p u b l i c  meet ings.  Moreover, a  canparab le  l e g i s l a t i o n  
f o r  p h y s i c a l  p lann ing  o f f e r s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  c r e a t e  and main ta in  
s u f f i c i e n t  d i s t a n c e  between i n d u s t r i e s  and t h e  popula t ion .  
However, t h e s e  systems of l e g i s l a t i o n  do n o t  o f f e r  any e x p l i c i t  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  judgement by t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  o r  t h e  p u b l i c  of t h e  
r i s k s  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  So, t h e y  a r e  o n l y  t o o l s  f o r  t h e  
implementation of a  d e c i s i o n  concerning r i s k y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  n o t  a  t o o l  
f o r  t h e  decision-making process  i t s e l f .  
The same ho lds  f o r  o t h e r  r i s k s  t h a t  can endanger t h e  popula t ion  o r  t h e  
environment, a s  t h e  presence of ca rc inogenic  subs tances  i n  t h e  
environment o r  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  of  dangerous subs tances .  
This  l e d  t h e  Dutch government t o  t h e  fo rmula t ion  of  a  p o l i c y  f o r  r i s k  
management w i t h i n  t h e  framework of an environmental po l icy .  This  
p o l i c y  has  been approved by Par l i ament  i n  1985 ( r e f .  1 ) .  
2. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
The aim of an environmental  p o l i c y  is  t o  d e f i n e  and t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  
environmental  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  ensure  a  good environment. These 
c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  o f t e n  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  Netherlands a s  a  whole. Achieving 
and main ta in ing  t h i s  genera l  environmental  q u a l i t y  is t h e  most 
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important object ive  of environmental policy a t  t he  nat ional  l eve l .  In 
addi t ion ,  spec i f i c  conditions w i l l  be necessary i n  p a r t s  of the  
country i n  order t o  protec t  spec ia l  l i v i n g  communities o r  species o r  
forms of use t o  o f f e r  opportunit ies fo r  development. Environmental 
policy must be direc ted  a t  achieving and maintaining such a pa r t i cu la r  
environmental qua l i ty  a s  well. 
In the  l i g h t  of these object ives ,  the  required changes i n  the  
behaviour of diverse q o u p s  of producers and consumers can be 
established.  These a r e  the  t a rge t  groups of environmental policy. 
Depending on the  t a r g e t  group i n  question,  it w i l l  have t o  be 
determined what "mix" of regulatory,  s t h u l a t o r y  and camunicatory 
instruments is most e f fec t ive  i n  achieving the  necessary change i n  
behaviour. The choice regarding t h e  package of measures w i l l  have t o  
be made jo in t ly  by the  environmental policy sec to r  and other  policy 
sec to r s  of the  government. 
So, t h i s  "s t ra tegic"  environmental pol icy  is formulated and 
implemented along two tracks:  an effect-oriented and a source-directed 
policy. 
The effect-oriented policy must make c l ea r  which object ives  a re  being 
pursued with respect  t o  the  qua l i ty  of the  environment and t h e  t a sks  
f o r  t a r g e t  groups implied by these objectives.  This w i l l  have t o  be 
based a s  much a s  poss ib le  on ins igh t s  i n t o  the  environmental 
condit ions necessary t o  be able  t o  manage r i s k s  f o r  the  environment 
on the  one hand, and i n t o  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  environmental renovation 
and t h e i r  cos t s  on the  other.  
The intended environmental qua l i ty  w i l l  be formulated with the  help 
o f ,  of ten ,  quan t i t a t ive  descr ip t ions  of the  required environmental 
condit ions,  such a s ,  fo r  example, t he  highest  allowable concentrations 
of substances i n  water, s o i l  and a i r ,  o r  the  highest  allowable 
exposure of organisms or  goods t o  noise or  radia t ion.  Ultimately, the  
environmental qua l i ty  w i l l  have t o  be such t h a t  the  r i s k s  t o  the  
i n t e r e s t s  t o  be protected a re  negl ig ib le .  This qua l i ty  l eve l  is 
designated a s  t h e  t a r g e t  value. 
For most environmental condit ions (concentrations of substances e t c . )  
t h e  t a r g e t  value can only be reached i n  the  long term. In  such a 
s i t u a t i o n  t h e  t a r g e t  value has t o  be reached i n  severa l  smaller s t eps ,  
taken i n  an interim period. This w i l l  be done with the  help of 
environmental qua l i ty  object ives  which can be r ea l i zed  i n  t h e  shor t  o r  
medium term and which reasonably  guarantee t h a t  t h e  r i s k s  w i l l  remain 
l i m i t e d  t o  on accep tab le  l e v e l .  Such q u a l i t y  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  
of a t rade-of f  between what is d e s i r a b l e  from an environmental  
view-point and what is  t e c h n i c a l l y ,  economically and o therwise  ( f o r  
example, from a land-use p e r s p e c t i v e )  p o s s i b l e .  The space which wi th in  
t h i s  t r a d e - o f f  can t a k e  p lace  (= t h e  "grey a r e a " )  i s  bounded on one 
s i d e  by t h e  l e v e l  a t  which t h e  r i s k  f o r  people ,  animals ,  p l a n t s ,  goods 
and forms of use  i s  maximally a l lowable  and on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  by t h e  
l e v e l  a t  which t h e  r i s k  i s  n e g l i g i b l y  small .  Th is  approach is 
p r e s e n t e d  i n  f i g u r e  1. 
As a f i r s t  s t e p  a long  t h i s  p a t h  both l e v e l s  have been determined f o r  
people.  E s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  l e v e l s  f o r  o t h e r  kinds of r i s k s  
- f o r  example, t o  p l a n t s ,  animals  and goods - is an even more 
c a n p l i c a t e d  t a s k ,  e s p e c i a l l y  because of t h e  canplex r e l a t i o n s h i p s  ( f o r  
example, i n  popula t ions  and l i v i n g  communities) and r e a c t i o n s  ( f o r  
example, photochemistry)  t h a t  p l a y  a r o l e .  Never the less ,  it i s  
expected t h a t ,  wi th  t h e  h e l p  of r e s e a r c h  i n t o  eco-systems and 
e c o l o g i c a l  p rocesses ,  more p a r t s  of  t h e  in tended  r i s k  management 
system can g r a d u a l l y  be f i l l e d  i n .  
In  add i ton  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t - o r i e n t e d  p o l i c y ,  a source-or ien ted  p o l i c y  i s  
necessary  t h a t  makes c l e a r  t h e  way and t h e  tempo i n  which t h e  
behaviour of t a r g e t  groups w i l l  be "corrected",  wi th  a t t e n t i o n  p a i d  t o  
t h e  environmental  q u a l i t y  o b j e c t i v e s  and t a s k s  formulated i n  t h e  
framework of t h e  e f f e c t - o r i e n t e d  p o l i c y .  Such a p o l i c y  w i l l  have t o  
e s t a b l i s h  p r i o r i t i e s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  measures t o  be i n s t i t u t e d ,  i n  
c a s e  a t a r g e t  group runs  t h e  r i s k  of  be ing  conf ron ted  wi th  a t o t a l  of 
requirements  t h a t  exceed i t s  t e c h n i c a l  o r  economic p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
Knowledge about  t h e  c i r c u n s t a n c e s  under which t h e  t a r g e t  group 
o p e r a t e s  and about  its motives and p e r s p e c t i v e s  i s  ind i spensab le  i n  
determining an adequate package of r e g u l a t o r y  and s t i m u l a t o r y  measures 
f o r  t a r g e t  groups. Research and d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  communication wi th  
t h e  t a r g e t  groups w i l l  be of  g r e a t  importance. This  two-track p o l i c y  
i s  p r e s e n t e d  s c h e m a t i c a l l y  i n  f i g u r e  2. 
3.  DEALING WITH RISKS 
Within t h i s  framework an e x t e r n a l  s a f e t y  p o l i c y  has  been worked o u t .  
This  p o l i c y  is  d i r e c t e d  t 0 ~ r d  prevent ing  unusual  i n c i d e n t s  wi th  
undes i rab le  consequences f o r  t h e  surrounding a r e a  involv ing  a c t i v i t i e s  
wi th  dangerous subs tances  and toward l i m i t i n g  t h o s e  consequences a s  
much a s  p o s s i b l e .  Managing t h e  so-ca l led  " m a 1  p r o b a b i l i t y - l a r g e  
consequence" r i s k s  r e q u i r e s  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n .  
3 . 1 .  Risk and r i s k  management 
The concept  r i s k  connects  t h a t  what w e  do wi th  t h e  undes i red  
consequences t h e r e o f .  Risk is def ined  a s  t h e  chance of undes i red  
e v e n t s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x t e n t  of t h e  even ts1  
consequences f o r  t h e  populat ion.  
There a r e  a  number of s e q u e n t i a l  s t e p s  i n  t h e  p rocess  of d e a l i n g  w i t h  
r i s k s  : 
1. I d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  dangers  t o  people o r  t h e  environment* 
2. Est imat ing  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e s e  dangers. Both t h e  chance and e x t e n t  
of exposure a s  w e l l  a s  an a g e n t ' s  d e t r i m e n t a l  p r o p e r t i e s  p l a y  a  
r o l e  i n  t h i s .  
3. Determining t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  r i s k  of t h e  a c t i v i t y  and t h e  
d e s i r e d  r i s k  reducing measures: r i s k  assessment .  
4 .  Control :  main ta in ing  a  s i t u a t i o n  of accep tab le  r i s k .  
Rlsk f o r  people can be expressed  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
I n d i v i d u a l  r i s k :  t h e  chance t h a t  a  person spending 24 hours  a  day 
d u r i n g  a  year  on a  c e r t a i n  s p o t  w i l l  d i e  a s  a  consequence of i n c i d e n t s  
wi th  t h e  a c t i v i t y  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
Group r i s k  ( o r  s o c i e t a l  r i s k ) :  The chance t h a t  a c c i d e n t s  w i l l  occur  
which cause t h e  dea th  a t  t h e  same t ime of more t h a n  a  c e r t a i n  number 
of people.  This  concept  i s  used e s p e c i a l l y  i n  determining t h e  r i s k s  
from a c c i d e n t s  of which t h e  s o c i e t a l  consequences can be s i z a b l e .  
*"Risk t o  people" r e f e r s  i n  t h i s  paper  on ly  t o  people l i v i n g  o u t s i d e  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t .  For decision-making concerning t h e  s a f e t y  and 
h e a l t h  a t  work o t h e r  procedures a r e  i n  f o r c e ,  based on t h e  Work 
Environment Act. 
Applicat ion of t h e  group r i s k  concept makes it pos s ib l e  t o  t a k e  t h e  
s i z e  of t h e  group of people who can be s imultaneously v i c t ims  of an 
undes i red  event  b e t t e r  i n t o  account i n  t h e  dec is ion  regard ing  r i s k  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  Recent a cc iden t s  such a s  those  i n  Bhopal and Mexico 
Ci ty  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  importance of t h i s  approach. 
3.2. Risk i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
In t h e  c a se  of e x t e r n a l  s a f e t y  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  hazard is 
mostly r a t h e r  obvious ( f o r  i n s t ance ,  f i r e  o r  explosion o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  
of t o x i c  ga se s ) .  For o t h e r  r i s k s ,  which have a l e s s  d i r e c t  
cause-ef fec t  r e l a t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t ance  t h e  e f f e c t s  of long-term exposure 
t o  t o x i c  subs tances ,  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  r equ i r e s  much more s tudy.  
3.3. Risk es t imat ion  
In  o rde r  t o  be a b l e  t o  eva lua t e  r i s k s  a g a i n s t  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  
fonnula ted  environmental condi t ions ,  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of t he se  r i s k s  i s  
requi red .  
A t  t h i s  manent q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  r i s k  of " d i s a s t e r  type" i nc iden t s  
i s  completely f e a sab l e .  I n  t h i s  f i e l d  t he  progress  of sc ience  a ided  by 
t h e  progress  i n  d a t a  process ing  c a p a b i l i t y ,  has been remarkable. So, 
i n  1982 my Minis t ry  decided t o  i n i t i a t e  a  p r o j e c t  t o  develop a 
canputer ized  r i s k  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  scheme using t h e  most r e cen t  
information a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  of t h e  d i spe r s i on  of heavy gases ,  
unconfined v a p u r  cloud explos ions  and f i r e  b a l l  r a d i a t i o n ,  and t h e  
response of man t o  exposure t o  l a r g e  concent ra t ions  of t o x i c  chemicals 
du r ing  a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  per iod .  This  canputer  model is  now 
ope ra t i ona l  ( r e f .  2 ) .  It enables  c a l cu l a t i ons  t o  be made from b a s i c  
d a t a  such a s  p l a n t  l ayout ,  populat ion dens i t y  d a t a  and meteoro logica l  
da t a .  These d a t a  a r e  processed v i a  e f f e c t  and consequence c a l c u l a t i o n s  
toward t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t :  t h e  i nd iv idua l  r i s k  curve and t h e  group r i s k  
curve ( o r  FN-curve) . 
The accuracy of t h i s  model has r e cen t l y  been sy s t ema t i ca l l y  ana lysed  
( r e f .  3 ) .  The i nhae ren t  unce r t a in ty  i n  t h e  modell ing has been found t o  
be a f a c t o r  3 and t h e  unce r t a in ty  i n  t h e  es t imated  f requenc ies  about  
10.  Although t h i s  unce r t a in ty  is s t i l l  l a r g e ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  model 
a r e  cons idered  t o  be r e l i a b l e  enough and c lo se  enough t o  observed 
e f f e c t s  and f requenc ies  t o  be usab le  f o r  dec is ion  making. 
3.4. Risk Assessment 
For t h i s  s t e p  i n  t h e  decision-making process t h e  two l e v e l s  mentioned 
above ( f i g .  1 )  had t o  be determined with t h e  two aims of e x t e r n a l  
s a f e t y  po l i cy  i n  mind, v i z .  t h e  p ro t ec t i on  of t h e  i nd iv idua l  aqa in s t  
undue r i s k s  and t h e  prevention of d i s a s t e r s  i n  which many a r e  k i l l e d  
a t  t h e  same t ime.  
m e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  determining t h e  maximum acceptab le  l e v e l  f o r  
i nd iv i dua l  r i s k  i s  t h e  frequency pe r  year of dea th  from n a t u r a l  
causes.  This  number i s  t h e  lowest f o r  ch i ldren  between 10 and 15 years  
o l d ,  v i z .  lom4. Recently my government has decided t h a t  a new 
loca t i on - spec i f i c  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  not  be allowed i f  it 
imposes an  a d d i t i o n a l  r i s k  of more than 1 percent  of t h i s  base va lue  
( s e e  a l s o  r e f .  4 ) .  
The maximum acceptab le  l e v e l  f o r  i nd iv idua l  r i s k  is  thus  10-6. 
It seems reasonable  t o  s e t  t h e  range i n  wich r i s k  l i m i t a t i o n  can be 
r equ i r ed  ("grey a r ea " )  a t  two o rde r s  of magnitude. S o ,  t h e  n e g l i g i b l e  
l e v e l  f o r  i nd i v idua l  r i s k  i s  10'~. 
For t h e  maximum acceptab le  group r i s k  l e v e l  a chance of 10'5 p e r  year  
of  an i n c i d e n t  with maximum 10 dea ths  has been chosen. 
A chance of lo-' p e r  year  with 10 dea ths  is t aken  a s  n e g l i g i b i l i t y  
l e v e l  f o r  group r i s k .  
Fur ther ,  a heavier  weight must be ass igned  t o  t h e  l a r g e r  consequences 
of  a cc iden t s .  It has been decided i n  t h i s  connection t h a t  a 
consequence n t imes g r e a t e r  must correspond t o  a chance n2 sma l l e r ,  a s  
it appears  from l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  t h e  se r iousness  of t h e  s o c i e t a l  
consequences of an i n c iden t  is judged t o  i nc r ea se  with t h e  square of 
t h e  number people k i l l e d .  
These r i s k  c r i t e r i a  a r e  depic ted  i n  f i g u r e  3. 
A d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  p o l i c y  is d e s i r a b l e  f o r  both i nd iv idua l  and group 
r i s k s  f a l l i n g  wi th in  t h e  grey a r e a ,  t o  w i t :  r i s k s  from new i n d u s t r i a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  f a l l i n g  i n  t h i s  a r e a  a r e  on ly  acceptab le  a f t e r  
. adequate r i s k  reduc t ion  measures have been i n s t i t u t e d  o r  s a f e r  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  have been chosen, aimed a t  reaching  t h e  t a r g e t  va lue  of 
f o r  i nd i v idua l  r i s k ;  
. t h e  pe rmi t t i ng  a u t h o r i t y  has weighed t h e  r i s k s  and disadvantages of 
t h e  a c t i v i t y  involved aga in s t  its b e n e f i t s  and is  convinced t h a t  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r i s k s  and b e n e f i t s  is acceptab le :  
. t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and percept ions  of t h e  populat ion l i a b l e  t o  t h e  r i s k  
of t h e  a c t i v i t y  have been considered by t h e  pe r mi t t i ng  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
an  balanced and respons ib le  way. 
Risk reduca t ion  can be achieved along two t r a cks .  F i r s t  of a l l  i n  
s i t u ,  by measures such a s  t h e  layout  of t h e  p l a n t ,  t h e  app l i c a t i on  of 
a d d i t i o n a l  s a f e t y  devices  and t h e  use of a l e s s  hazardous a c t i v i t y .  
Secondly, by zoning. Often a combination of both types  of reduc t ion  is 
wanted. Limit ing t h e  s i z e  of t h e  zones by means of measures on t h e  
i n s t a l l a t i o n  and main ta in ing  s u f f i c i e n t  d i s t ance  t o  s e n s i t i v e  a r e a s  
promote both prudent  space use and t h e  good " f i t t i n g  i n "  of 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  where a c t i v i t i e s  with dangerous subs tances  take  p l ace .  
(he of t h e  major advantages of r i s k  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s ,  t h a t  it can 
provide information about  t he  c o s t  e f f ec t i venes s  of d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of 
r i s k  reducing measures, and t h a t  it provides a t o o l  f o r  zoning. 
3.5. Risk c o n t r o l  
When it has been decided what an acceptab le  l e v e l  of r i s k  is,  
d e c i s i o n s  have t o  be made and implemented t o  sa feguard  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n .  Which s p e c i f i c  measures have t o  be taken  w i l l  depend on t h e  
type  and s c a l e  of t h e  a c t i v i t y  involved.  
General ly speaking t h e  fo l lowing  a c t i o n s  w i l l  o r  may be requi red .  
1. For s t a t i o n a r y  sources  t h e  l i c e n s e  under t he  Nuisance Act w i l l  have 
t o  sp e c i fy  what s a f e t y  provis ions  have t o  be taken  and what 
procedures should be followed t o  t e s t  t he se  s a f e t y  devices.  
2. The municipal  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  have t o  achieve t h e  implementation 
of t h e  r e q u i r e d  zoning-measures and t o  maintain them. 
Where necessary d i s t a nce s  between t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  and t h e  
popula t ion  cannot be achieved,  removal of vu lnerab le  dwell ings o r  
t h e  hazardous i n s t a l l a t i o n s  w i l l  have t o  be considered.  
3. I n  c a se  of r i s k s  a s so c i a t ed  with t h e  t r a n s p o r t  of hazardous 
m a t e r i a l s  again a c t i o n  w i l l  be promoted e i t h e r  by improving t h e  
s a f e t y  of t h e  means of t r a n s p o r t  o r  by means of r ou t i ng  and zoning, 
o r  both. 
4.  APPLICATIONS 
4.1 .  Implementation of t h e  P o s t  Seveso-Directive 
Recently t h e  concept of an  admin i s t r a t i ve  order  has been publ i shed  by 
my government t o  implement t h i s  EEC-Directive on t h e  major-accident 
hazards of c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  
This  new l e g i s l a t i o n  w i l l  r equ i r e  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  concerned t o  provide 
t h e  canpe ten t  a u t h o r i t i e s  with a n o t i f i c a t i o n  canp r i s i ng  a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s .  For t h e  decision-making concerning new 
a c t i v i t i e s  t h e  approach mentioned above w i l l  be followed. 
For e x i s t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  about  which n o t i f i c a t i o n  has t o  be presented  
a t  t he  l a t e s t  on 8 Ju l y  1989, t h e  f u r t h e r  po l i cy  concerning measures 
t o  be t aken ,  w i l l  be formulated a f t e r  t h a t  da te  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  
i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  s a f e t y  t h a t  w i l l  than be ob ta ined  from 
t h e  n o t i f i c a t i o n s .  
A s  f a r  a s  t h e  s a f e t y  and h e a l t h  a t  work is concerned, t h e  D i r ec t i ve  i s  
a l r e a d y  imbodied i n  t h e  Work Environment Act. 
4 .2 .  Natura l  gas  p i p e l i n e s  
Over t h e  years  t h e r e  has been a cons iderab le  a r g m e n t  about t h e  
d i s t a n c e  t h a t  should be kept  between n a t u r a l  gas l i n e s  and housing 
developments. In  The Netherlands land  use has  t o  be a s  opt imal  a s  
p o s s i b l e ,  s o  every meter counts .  Yet t h e  s a f e t y  of t h e  popula t ions  has 
t o  be quarded. It was t o  s e t t l e  t h i s  d i spu t e  t h a t  i s  was decided t o  
make a r i s k  a n a l y s i s  of t hose  l i n e s ,  and s i z e  s a f e t y  d i s t ance s  on t h e  
b a s i s  of t h e  r i s k  c r i t e r i a  p u t  forward. It was concluded t h a t  t h e  
group r i s k  c r i t e r i o n  could no t  be appl ied  f o r  t h e  very  reason t h a t  t h e  
frequency of i nc iden t s  grows with i nc r ea s ing  length  of t h e  l i n e ,  while 
on t h e  o t he r  hand t h e  people a f f e c t e d  a r e  d i f fe ren t -ones  a long  a l i n e  
(and  no t  t h e  same-ones a s  i n  t h e  case  of a p l a n t ) .  It was t h e r e f o r e  
decided t h a t  t h e  s a f e t y  d i s t ance s  should be based on i nd iv idua l  r i s k  
a lone .  The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  a r e  i n  p a r t  dep ic ted  i n  f i g u r e  4.  
The s o l i d  l i n e s  r ep r e sen t  t h e  b e s t  es t imate  of t h e  r i s k .  The shaded 
a r e a s  r ep r e sen t  t h e  es t imated  95% confidence i n t e r v a l .  
A s  can be seen ,  a t  sane i n s t ances  t h e  r i s k  may be twice  a s  high a s  t h e  
b e s t  e s t i ma t e ,  bu t  a l s o  may be zero.  Yet p a r t i e s  involved f e l t  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  conf ident  t o  accept  t h e  b e s t  e s t ima t e  a s  t h e  va lue  t o  use 
i n  determining t h e  s i z e  of t h e  s a f e t y  z6nes. As a r e s u l t ,  a d i r e c t i v e  
concerning zoning a long  main t ransmiss ion  l i n e s  f o r  n a t u r a l  gas  has 
been publ i shed  by my Minis te r  i n  1984 ( r e f .  6 ) .  
4.3. Liquef ied  petroleum gas  (LPG) 
The approach I have presen ted  here  was a l s o  adopted i n  t h e  LPG po l i cy .  
In  1978 t h e  l a r g e  o i l  companies i n  t h e  Netherlands expressed 
t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  market f o r  LPG a s  motorfuel  and feeds tock  
would s e e  a s p e c t u l a r  growth. Within a few years  import and t r a n s p o r t  
were expec ted  t o  grow from 1 m i l l i o n  t o n s  a year  t o  10 m i l l i o n  tons  a 
year .  And t h e s e  t r a n s p o r t s  would pass  t rough  dense ly  populated a r e a s  
and c i t i e s .  The s a f e t y  of t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  was a s u b j e c t  of  genera l  
concern f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  and t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
The Dutch government c o w i s s i o n e d  a s tudy  t o  examine t h e  s a f e t y  of a l l  
p a r t s  of t h e  cha in  of a c t i v i t i e s  from t h e  impor ta t ion  i n  t h e  s e a  
harbors  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a t  g a s - s t a t i o n s  s e l l i n g  LPG ( r e f  . 7 ) .  
The r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  s t u d i e s  formed t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  s ta tement  
of t h e  government t o  Parl iament  i n  1984 ( r e f  . 7 ) .  
I n  t h i s  "LPG-nota" t h e  r i s k  con tours  a r e  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  s a f e t y  
d i s t a n c e s  t o  be a p p l i e d  t o  unloading f a c i l i t i e s ,  depots  and s t o r a g e  
tanks ,  and measures a r e  p resen ted  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s a f e t y  of  barges  and 
road tankers  . 
Because of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  r i s k  t h a t  was c a l c u l a t e d  between s t a t i o n s  
s i t u a t e d  w i t h i n  c i t y  limits and t h o s e  a t  t h e  s i d e  of highways a t  
s u f f i c i e n t  d i s t a n c e  from houses,  it was decided t h a t  t h e  opening of  
new s t a t i o n s  s e l l i n g  LPG w i l l  only be allowed o u t s i d e  c i t y  l i m i t s ,  a t  
a minimum d i s t a n c e  of 80 meters  from t h e  n e a r e s t  houses. E x i s t i n g  
s t a t i o n s  which a r e  l o c a t e d  wi th in  15 m d i s t a n c e  from dwel l ings  w i l l  be 
c losed .  
For t h e  o t h e r  e x i s t i n g  s t a t i o n s  l o c a t e d  a t  l a r g e r  d i s t a n c e s  ( u p  t o  
120 m from dwel l ings)  a program of r i s k  p revent ing  measures w i l l  be 
executed. The c o s t s  of t h i s  ( about 125 m i l l i o n  g u i l d e r s )  w i l l  be 
beared by t h e  LPG s e l l i n g  companies. 
Another example is  t h e  canparison of t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i n  barges and 
o t h e r  means of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  From t h i s  comparison it was concluded 
t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  by barges  can be al lowed,  provided t h a t  some 
c o n s t r u c t i v e  changes w i l l  be r e a l i s e d .  L e g i s l a t i o n  concerning t h e s e  
changes is  i n  p repara t ion .  
4.4. DSM (Dutch S t a t e  Mines) 
- 
This  is a l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t y  i n  t h e  s o u t h  e a s t  of The 
Netherlands.  Within t h e  framework of  a s t u d y  concerning i n t e g r a l  
zoning around DSM, a r i s k  a n a l y s i s  has  been made. The r e s u l t i n g  r i s k  
con tours  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  about  t h e  expansion of e x i s t i n g  
d w e l l i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  and t h e  e r e c t i o n  of new ones ( f i g .  5 ) .  
4.5. Transpor t  of dangerous substances 
Recently i n  t h e  Rijnmond a r ea  t h e  r i s k s  of t h e  t r a n s p o r t  of ch lo r i ne  
and ammonia have been t a ck l ed .  
From t h e  r e s u l t s ,  t h e  i s - r i sk  contours  and F-N curves f o r  t he  va r i ous  
rou t e s  and modes can be examined. 
5. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE 
The development of t he se  computer a s s i s t e d  methods has a l s o  been a 
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  more advanced developments. My Minis t ry  is 
p r e s e n t l y  engaged i n  a co l l abo ra t i ve  exe r c i s e  with t h e  J o i n t  Research 
Centre of t h e  EEC and IIASA, t o  develop a dec i s i on  suppor t  system. 
This system w i l l  a l low t o  combine da ta  on t h e  r i s k s  of d i f f e r e n t  modes 
of import ,  production,  s t o r age ,  t r a n s p o r t  and use ,  with da ta  on 
economics e t c .  t o  h e l p  t h e  dec is ion  maker t o  seek an optimal  s o l u t i o n  
f o r  complicated problems. 
Other l i n e s  of developments a r e  groundwater t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  models, 
long term atmospheric models and t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n c i d e n t s  with nuc lear  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  
It may be remarked t h a t  t h e  methods descr ibed  above a r e  aimed a t  
dea l i ng  wi th  r i s k  problems only ,  not  with problems connected wi th  t h e  
percept ion  of r i s k  o r  with d i f f e r e n t  views on t h e  f u r t h e r  development 
of our  soc i e ty .  The nuc lear  power problem i s  an example of such a 
still more caup l i c a t ed  i s s u e .  
In t he se  s o r t  of problems it is tempting t o  devote a l l  e f f o r t s  t o  
so l ve  t h e  r i s k  i s s u e  on ly ,  t o  f i n d  ou t  l a t e r  t h a t  so lv ing  t h e  r i s k  
i s s u e  d i d  no t  so lve  t h e  problem. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In  t h i s  ad r e s s  I have presen ted  t h e  framework of our  approach toward 
t h e  problem of r i s k  management. I have t o  admit t h a t  t h i s  approach i s  
not  unchallenged. In p a r t i c u l a r  from t h e  s i d e  of i ndus t ry  much 
s cep t i c i sm  regard ing  t h e  u se fu l l ne s s  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  assessment 
i n  decisionmaking is made known. 
F i r s t l y ,  it is being argued t h a t  t h e  da t a  needed f o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r i sk-ana lyses  i n  many ca se s  a r e  t o o  s c a t t e r e d  t o  j u s t i f y  a c a s u i s t i c  
approach. We agree  t h a t  t h e  data-base needs f u r t h e r  improvement. This  
w i l l  be one of our  main ob j ec t i ve s  f o r  t h e  near  f u t u r e .  On t h e  o the r  
hand t h e r e  remains t h e  f a c t  t h a t  dec is ions  have t o  be made about t h e  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of r i s k ,  o f t e n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  very  cunplex s i t u a t i o n s .  
In our opinion such dec i s i ons  w i l l  have a more s o l i d  b a s i s  i n  case  a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i sk - ana ly s i s  is disposable ,  how i n p e r f e c t  our  da t a  may 
b e ,  than  i n  case  when such dec is ions  a r e  taken  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
q u a l i t a t i v e  assessment only.  Of course t he  d e c i s i o w a k e r  should be 
aware of t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  involved and accomodate t he se  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
i n  h i s  f i na l -dec i s i on .  To quote my former Minister  P i e t e r  Winsemius: 
"There is no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  th ink ing" .  
Secondly, q u i t e  a number of people i n  i ndus t ry  f e a r  t h a t  t h e  use of 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  d a t a  may jeopardize t h e  w i l l i ngnes s  of t h e  pub l i c  t o  
accept  a d d i t i o n a l  hazards,  even i f  t h e  r i s k  involved is very 
marginal .  On t h i s  p o i n t  we don ' t  agree.  Of course ,  we a l s o  do 
recognize t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  pub l i c  a t t i t u d e  is determined by 
r i sk-avers ion ,  e s p e c i a l l y  where non-voluntary r i s k s  a r e  involved.  
However it is j u s t  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  we p r e f e r  a normative 
approach. In  t h e  view of my government it is on ly  by means of 
p o l i t i c a l l y  e s t ab l i shed  s tandards  t h a t  endless  d i spu t e s  about t h e  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of a s p e c i f i c  type  of hazard can be avoided. We a r e  s u r e  
t h a t  u l t i ma t e l y  i ndus t ry  w i l l  recognize t h a t  t h i s  i s  t o  h i s  i n t e r e s t  
too. 
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1.5. WAYS TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY: USSR POINT OF VIEW 
V. Demin, I. Kuzmin, and V. Legasov 
Institute of Atomic Energy, 
Moscow, USSR 
In the current century, the development of industrial power 
in the USSR as in many other industrially developed countries took 
place with a notable increase of oil, gas condensate and gas 
share, and a relative decrease in the share of coal. For example, 
oil and gas share in the national energy balance in 1961-1980 
exceeded 80%. The USSR organic fuel reserves are the largest in 
the world. The USSR natural gas reserves are the largest; more 
than half of the known world coal resources are in the Soviet 
Union. The USSR takes the first place in oil production (includ- 
ing gas condensate) and the second place in coal production in 
the world. Thus, the USSR power development is secured by nation- 
al natural resources for a long-term period. Moreover, oil and 
gas are exported to Eastern and Western Europe. Nevertheless, we 
are confronted with the necessity of changing the structure of 
the USSR fuel and energy balance to decrease the share of organic 
fuel. The necessary changes are caused not by resource depletion, 
but by the ever increasing geographic disproportion in fuel pro- 
duction and consumption locations. 
A major factor determining the prospects of USSR power devel- 
opment is a continuous transition of its raw materials base into 
Eastern regions of the country. The organic fuel reserves located 
close to consumers in the European part of the country are being 
depleted. Most of the organic fuel reserves are sitrvdted in the 
Asian part of the country, but 80% of their sonsumption takes 
place in the European part. As a rcsult, the average fuel trans- 
portation distance is cnsstantly increasing. For example, the 
gas transportation distance increased from 530 km in 1956-1960 to 
2530 km in 1981-1988, and will further increase in future. The 
cds main length reaches 150,000 km, and the total capacity of gas 
pumps at compressor stations is 23 CW. About 40% of the Soviet 
railway freight turnover is due to the transportation of fuel 
(mainly coal) from Eastern regions to the European part and to 
the Urals. It should be noted that to use new resources of or- 
ganic fuel, it is necessary to develop vast remote areas with 
severe climatic and complex geological conditions. As a result, 
the specific cost of organic fuel production increase in the 
1980's will be on average three times higher than a decade ago. 
For oil, the cost will be still higher. 
Thus, the remoteness of organic fuel deposits from energy 
consumers in the USSR, large capital investments, long lead time, 
and large labor requirements will limit the prospects of this 
energy source. 
Nuclear power opens a way to a practically inexhaustible 
energy source that is not connected with a geographical region of 
fuel extraction. Its large-scale introduction into the national 
fuel and energy balance enables large economic savings and con- 
siderable reduction of disproportions in increased fuel production 
and fuel consumption. 
The energy program of the USSR provides for an accelerated 
development of nuclear power. In order to have a better national 
fuel and energy balance, it is planned to increase at least 5 
times the electricity production at nuclear power plants by the 
end of the century. Electricity production increases in the 
European part and partially in the Urals will be provided mainly 
by nuclear power plants alone. As a rule, it is planned to build 
large nuclear power plants with the electrical power of several 
GW(e). 
The serious accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
that occurred on April 26, 1986, has made us once more critically 
review both our plans of nuclear power development and measures 
to ensure its safety. 
I will not go into details of causes and consequences of the 
accident; detailed information in all its aspects was presented 
by Soviet specialists at the special IAEA expert meeting in Vienna 
and other international conferences and discussed by international 
specialists and the general public. 
Naturally, the Soviet Union studied very carefully the les- 
sons of Chernobyl. We have drawn the following main conclusions: 
1. The reasons that caused the accident are primarily related 
to mistakes of nuclear power plant personnel and violations 
of the plant operating regulations. These reasons are not 
specific for a nuclear facility, and therefore they cannot 
be considered fatal for nuclear power development. 
2. The accident analysis did not identify any physical phenome- 
non which had not been previously studied within safety 
analysis either theoretically or experimentally. The analy- 
sis showed that the safety of nuclear power facilities of 
all types could be further improved by well-known physical 
and technical methods and a more accurate account of the 
human factor. 
3. The analysis of the Chernobyl accident showed that, though 
its consequences are rather large from the point of view of 
both the number of fatalities and the economic damage, these 
consequences are comparable with other analyzed large in- 
dustrial and transportation catastrophes. 
4. If nuclear energy sources are replaced by traditional ones, 
the risk to human health and environment will increase by an 
order of magnitude if we do not consider radio-chemical 
reprocessing of spent fuel, and it will be several times 
higher still if we include the risk of the whole nuclear 
fuel cycle. 
5. The motives that forced the Soviet Union to develop nuclear 
power have not disappeared; on the contrary, they will mani- 
fest themselves even more strongly in future. The necessary 
modernization of industrial plants in the European part of 
the country requires increased electricity generation, natur- 
ally along with its more efficient use. Town development in 
our Northern climatic zone is impossible without nuclear- 
based electricity and heat generation; otherwise, we will be 
unable to solve ecological and transportation problems. 
Thus, the analysis of our attitude to nuclear power after 
the Chernobyl accident does not lead to any changes in our prin- 
ciple position. We remain convinced of the necessity of its 
development for the benefit of the economy of the USSR and of the 
world as a whole. Our plans for nuclear power plant introduction 
did not change. 
However, the Chernobyl accident as well as other nuclear 
power plant accidents in many countries demonstrate that nuclear 
power safety problems have not been fully solved. The lessons of 
these accidents for us and for the world community are that safety 
and reliability of new complex technology as a result of scien- 
tific and technological revolution requires a very careful at- 
titude and that the technology does not forgive negligence. 
After the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet Union realized a 
number of measures of organizational and technical nature aimed 
at a substantial increase in nuclear power safety. 
First priority technical measures were developed and imple- 
mented to exclude the possibility of a Chernobyl-like accident 
reoccurring at RBMK-type reactors. 
Based on the accident analysis, a complex set of measures 
was developed to improve the safety of nuclear power plants of 
all types. This includes implementing measures that have been 
developed earlier as well as ones developed as a result of recent 
advances in science and technology; accumulated operational ex- 
perience, for example, to improve the diagnostics of tube and 
equipment metal state, and to use more widely automatic control 
devices in technological processes. A critical analysis of nu- 
clear power plant siting problems is underway. 
Calculations and experimental results on nuclear power safety 
were revised and assessed; measures were developed for their 
improvement and more comprehensive application. 
Computer programs for nuclear power plant safety analysis 
have been updated for all possible transients and accidental 
conditions, including hypothetical accidents; simulating systems 
and components are under development. 
Studies have been intensified on the feasibility of a reactor 
with passive safety systems -- the so-called inherently safe 
reactor, the core of which cannot disrupt in any accident. 
More efforts ill be directed towards quantitative probabilis- 
tic safety analysis, nuclear power risk analysis, development of 
a conceptual and methodological base for radiation safety op- 
timization and comparison of radiation danger with other dangers 
in industrial activities. 
The existing Soviet regulatory system covers all main aspects 
of ensuring nuclear power plant safety and continues to be im- 
proved. In 1985, under the auspices of the State Committee on 
Supervision of Safety in Nuclear Power, a combined list and plan 
of regulations development in nuclear power was created, which 
coordinates and directs all ministries in developing and sys- 
tematizing relative scientific and technological documentation. 
The existing safety regulations basically do not require 
revision. However, their practical implementation should be moni- 
tored more carefully. It is necessary to improve the quality of 
personnel training and retraining, to strengthen the designer 
verification activities of equipment quality, assembly, and start- 
up operations and their responsibility for subsequent efficient 
and safe operation of nuclear power plants. 
In order to improve the administration and responsibility 
for nuclear power development and for plant operation, an All- 
Union Ministry of Atomic Energy has been established. 
A number of measures have been taken to strengthen the stat.e 
supervision of safety in nuclear power as well as the respon- 
sibility of personnel for the quality of nuclear power plant 
operation. 
One of the critical problems in nuclear power as in other 
modern technologies is the optimization of man-machine interac- 
tions. The task of improving the personnel skills and training 
techniques is closely related to the task of developing more 
easily controlled reactors and ensuring optimum working conditions 
for operators. 
In the process of mitigation and elimination of consequences 
of the Chernobyl accident, Soviet specialists and authorities are 
confronted with many particular scientific, technical and or- 
ganizational problems. We have learned lessons from Chernobyl. 
This experience is very important from the point of view of deci- 
sion-making regarding nuclear power safety. We are ready to 
share the experience with the international community. We are 
sure it will be useful, particularly in the area of nuclear power 
plant de-commissioning. 
At present, the activities to eliminate the consequences of 
the Chernobyl accident have been almost finished. 
The accident unit has been encased. Its encasement is a 
unique engineering structure with all the necessary equipment, 
diagnostic and monitoring devices. About 300,000 mJ of concrete 
and over 6000 tons of metal structures were used during its con- 
struction. 
The plant territory has been decontaminated. The radiation 
situation has been normalized. 
The units No. 1 and No. 2 of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant have been put into operation. 
The population has been provided with continuous medical 
supervision. Medical examination of all persons in the contami- 
nated zone showed no new cases of disease, and there is now no 
danger of radiation sickness for anyone. 
The country provided significant material assistance to the 
population; compensation for the damage is being paid. The total 
amount of money for this purpose is about 800 million rubles. 
Moreover, much money has been invested in the construction of 
homes and social and cultural facilities. 
We continue to believe that a wide introduction of nuclear 
power into the world economy may have a stabilizing effect on 
international economic and political relations due to a sufficien- 
cy of its required raw material base and the possibility in prin- 
ciple to reach a high level of safety and ecological cleanliness. 
However, besides the benefits in the area of energy genera- 
tion and natural resources preservation, the world nuclear power 
development is accompanied by dangers of international character. 
These include trans-boundary radioactivity transport, in par- 
ticular, as a result of large radiation accidents, the problem of 
nuclear weapons proliferation, the danger of international ter- 
rorism, and the specific danger of nuclear facilities during mili- 
tary conflicts. All these factors necessitate deep international 
cooperation in developing nuclear power and ensuring its safety. 
The establishment of an international regime for the safe 
development of nuclear power, proposed by the Soviet Union at the 
special session of the IAEA General Conference in September 1986, 
will contribute to deepening international cooperation in peaceful 
uses of atomic energy and to making it more systematic. The 
proposed program provides to establishing material, scientific 
and technical bases for nuclear power safety development, accom- 
panied by international legal norms and agreements. We are con- 
vinced that the realization of our proposals will contribute to 
achieving the common goal of the international community -- to 
exclude the possibility of peaceful atomic energy doing harm to 
anyone. 
We are satisfied to note that an essential part of the system 
of an international regime for the safe development of nuclear 
power is already operating. 
It includes, for example, international conventions on early 
notification of a nuclear accident and on assistance in case of a 
nuclear accident or radiological emergency that have recently 
come into force. 
The experience of the draft conventions development within a 
limited time shows that with good will complicated problems of 
international cooperation can be solved quickly and effectively. 
It is necessary to make every effort for the early implementation 
of other elements of the international regime for the safe devel- 
opment of nuclear power. 
An important element of the system should be the creation of 
an international data bank on radiation background levels in some 
agreed upon geographic points. These data could be used for the 
purpose of comparison. 
It is necessary to agree internationally on standards of 
emergency radionuclide concentrations and on land radioactive 
contamination levels. Such international norms and standards 
could be used by all countries to take protective measures and to 
justify claims relative to damages as a result of trans-boundary 
radioactivity release. 
Another component of the regime could be an agreement that 
while developing, designing, constructing and operating nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear facilities, all countries shall 
follow IAEA recommendations, containing a minimum set of principle 
requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities. To give prac- 
tical assistance in safety assessment and improvement, the IAEA 
could intensify its activities by sending to member-states at 
their request groups of highly qualified experts in nuclear safe- 
ty. 
An important element in the system of measures aimed at 
accident prevention is the collection, processing and exchange of 
information on nuclear power plant accidents, their causes, se- 
quences, and consequences. The IAEA information system on inci- 
dents at nuclear power plants forms a good basis for a data bank 
on nuclear accidents. It is necessary to further widen and im- 
prove this system. 
We should cast a new look at the safety of nuclear power 
based on present reactors and find ways to improve both the nu- 
clear reactors themselves and all stages of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. This necessity was summarized by M. Gorbachev, Secretary- 
General of the Central Committee of CPSU, in his proposal on 
international cooperation in the development of a new generation 
nuclear reactor. 
What is the conceptual basis of the reactor? 
It is now impossible to present a specific reactor design 
which will satisfy all the requirements of a "completely safe 
reactor," though some work in this area has already been done by 
different research teams in our country and abroad. Active inter- 
national cooperation at this stage can largely contribute to 
these studies. 
The following principles for such studies can be formulated: 
1. The studies should deal not only with reactor design, but 
with its fuel cycle. Otherwise, the "total" safety of the 
system might not increase; on the contrary, it could de- 
crease. For example, should a safe reactor require an in- 
creased volume of fuel reprocessing and refabrication, its 
transportation could create large quantities of radioactive 
wastes. 
2. The reactor system to be developed should ensure an effective 
nuclear fuel utilization, i.e. its fuel cycle should meet 
modern requirements on uranium reserves. 
3. The economic aspects of the nuclear power system should not 
be worse than those of coal power. Economic comparisons 
should be carried out taking into account the costs of gen- 
eral and ecological safety. 
As far as the safety criteria of the reactor itself are 
concerned, the following aspects could be underlined even now: 
a) minimum burn-up reactivity margin; 
b) optimum of all reactivity effects; 
C) rejection or limited use of chemically active materials, 
exclusion of the possibility of exo-thermal reactions; 
d) wide use of passive safety features such as natural convec- 
tion in all circuits, external cooling-down of vessels, etc. 
Naturally, the list is not complete; it may be supplemented 
by joint efforts of specialists from all over the world. 
Taking into account the concerns of the general public about 
the consequences of nuclear power development and the experience 
obtained as a result of analyzing the consequences of nuclear 
power plant accidents over the last years, work on developing the 
new generation reactor should be accelerated. 
The Chernobyl accident as well as other accidents with radio- 
activity releases demonstrated once more the dangerous consequen- 
ces of a possible intentional destruction of nuclear facilities. 
In this connection, the Soviet Union proposes to develop a reli- 
able system of measures to prevent attacks on nuclear facilities. 
It is necessary to finalize an appropriate international conven- 
tion according to which all states will undertake not to attack 
nuclear facilities. 
A reliable system of measures should be developed against 
all forms of nuclear terrorism. Radiation danger and high toxi- 
city of nuclear materials require their reliable protection 
against criminal encroachment. The possibility of utilizing 
stolen nuclear materials to create a simple nuclear explosive 
device with an aim to subversive and terrorist acts cannot be 
excluded. We are ready both to reach a separate agreement and to 
solve this problem within the framework of a general struggle 
against international terrorism. 
We believe the delay in ratifying the convention on physical 
protection of nuclear material is unjustified. It is necessary 
to make additional efforts for early entry into force of this 
important convention. The Soviet Union was one of the first to 
sign and ratify the convention. We call other states to do the 
same in the near future in order that the convention can begin to 
act as one of the factors to ensure nuclear safety. 
The problem of liability for nuclear damage should not be 
neglected. Despite efforts aimed at international legal regula- 
tion in this area, up to now the problem of material and moral- 
political. damage in case of accidents at nuclear facilities has 
not been sufficiently resolved; this leads sometimes to attempts 
to use nuclear accidents to create tension and distrust in rela- 
tions between states. A possible multi-lateral international 
legal document could provide for the liability of states both for 
the damage as a result of trans-boundary nuclear accident conse- 
quences and for inflicting moral and political damage as a result 
of unjustified actions carried out under the pretext of protection 
against nuclear accident consequences (distribution of unconscien- 
tious information, introduction of unjustified limitations, etc.). 
In establishing the regime for the safe development of nu- 
clear power, the leading and central role should undoubtedly by 
played by such an organization as the IAEA. It is necessary to 
use its experience in nuclear safety activities more widely, to 
increase its role and capabilities. 
As essential contribution to establishing such a regime 
could be made by other UN specialized agencies and naturally such 
organization as the Council of Europe. 
The following coordinated studies and exchange of experiences 
in different areas of ensuring nuclear power development should 
be carried out with the active participation of states and inter- 
national organizations: 
* development of methods for accident prevention and elimina- 
tion of their consequences; 
* analysis of events initiating accidents and the development 
of emergency situations, including probabilistic analysis; 
* development of robots, machines and equipment to be used to 
eliminate nuclear accident consequences; 
* creation of effective decontamination techniques, machines 
and devices for this purpose, reliable means for protecting 
people from radiation; 
* development of medical preparations, means and methods to 
cure radiation sickness; 
* development of a methodology for training personnel operating 
nuclear power plants. 
It should be remembered, however, that in our interdependent 
world besides the problems of the peaceful atom, there are the 
problems of the military atom. Nuclear safety on our planet is 
unthinkable without stopping the material preparation of nuclear 
war and completely eliminating warfare means. 
The Soviet Union will continue to do everything possible to 
implement the proposed program of complete and comprehensive 
eliminate of nuclear weapons. The twentieth century should end 
under the sign of nuclear disarmament and with the creation of a 
reliable basis for a safe world in which safe and reliable nuclear 
power will play an increasing role in satisfying the energy needs 
of mankind. 
1.6. INDUSTRIALIZATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, RISK MANAGEMENT: THE CASE 
OF THE CUBATAO AREA IN BRAZIL 
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Companhia de Technologia de Saneamento Bdsico - CETESB 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The selection of Cubatgo, in the early 50rsr as the site for 
building an industrial district was due mainly to its favorable 
geographic location near a bay and close (50km) to the Sso Paulo 
Metropolitan Area with its present population of 10 000 000 people. 
Old and new infrastructures like roads linking the coast to the 
highlands where the city of S ~ O  Paulo is located, a residual 
estuarine formation which allowed the construction of a port to 
serve the new industrial facilities and the availability of 
abundant and cheap hydroelectric power and fresh water were the 
main parameters considered in the selection of that site to 
house the first modern industrial complex in the recent history 
of the country. 
Following the investments made by the Federal Government through 
its major state owned companies, other intlustries both national 
and multinational were attracted to Cubatso as well as workers 
seeking job opportunities. 
Today, Cubat50 has over 23 industrial complexes with 110 units 
for production of chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers and 
steel products clustered in an area of less than 20 km2 with a 
population of 100 000 people living between chimneys, polluted 
streams and zones subjected to periodical tidal flooding. 
The area is a narrow strip of land lying between the foothills 
of the Brazilian coastal ranges covered by tropical forests 
and the ocean. Industries, urban, commercial and administrative 
facilities as well as residential areas and illegal squatters 
settlements are jammed in this strip of land. 
Apart from the unsuitability of the microregion of Cubatso to 
house all its present industrial plants, particularly with 
respect to the adverse meteorological conditions prevailing 
there, the enforcement of pollution control legislation was not 
duly considered when most of these units were erected. 
Furthermore, none of the major plants operating there incorporated 
in their design stage the necessary equipment for pollution 
abatement and other risk prevention measures. As a consequence, 
risk to human health, to the environment and to property reached 
unacceptable levels in Cubatgo. 
2. 
MAJOR RISKS AT SITE LEVEL 
In the late 60's air pollution levels in cubatso where already 
well above those set up by the World Health Organization - WHO. 
Brazilian pollution control legislation which followed WHO 
standards went into effect only in the 70's when systematic 
measurements of air pollutants began. Fluorides, ammonia, sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulates were identified as 
the main air pollutants in Cubatgo. 
The combination of a weak wind dispersion pattern due to the 
unfavorable topographic conditions in the Cubatio area, high 
levels of atmospheric contamination and heavy rainfall promoted 
a continuous and massive fallout of phitotoxic pollutants, such 
as flucrides, on the steep scarps of the coastal range around 
Cubatao, causing disruption of the fragile subtropical ecosystem 
prevailing there. Thus, scattered destruction of the vegetation 
cover totalized, in the early 8O1s, an area of 60km2 of damaged 
forest. That fact, combined again with the local heavy rainfall 
put at risk extensive areas down at the foothills of the 
mountains where a network of pipelines, petrochemical and 
chemical storage tanks and industrial units are located, due 
mainly to the risks of land and mudslides and flooding. 
Figure 1 shows a map of the Cubatso area with the main watersheds 
formed by creeks coming down the mountains encircling the area. 
These watersheds, numbered in the map as sectors, have been 
individually investigated to assess their potential risks for 
mud and landslide with disastrous consequences to the industrial 
facilities located down at the foothills of the mountains. 
Figure 2 exemplifies the extension of damage to the vegetation 
in one of the watersheds. The uncovered soil of this old 
geologic formation became a potential risk for sudden and 
uncontrolled mud and landslides. 
The interdependence among several of the 110 industrial units 
which form the CubatZo complex, relaying on the supply either 
of chemicals, water, energy or byproducts produced by other 
units on the site increased the risks for some of them in the 
event of a sudden and partial shutdown of a particular unit 
compromising the safe operation of a downstream plant. 
Furthermore several of the existing large storage tanks of 
toxic compounds like ammonia and chlorine scattered in and 
around the facilities add to the overal risk for major accidents. 
FIGLIRE 1 
THE C U B A T ~ O  AREA SHOW1 NG MA1 N WATERSHEDS D l  V I  DED BY SECTORS. 
FIGLIRE 2 
THE SCARPS 0,F THE MOUNTA1I.I RAflGE AROUND C U B A T ~ O  SHOWIf4G THE 
AREAS WHERE DAMNAGED VEGETATION BY PWITOTOXIC FALLOUT I S  NOW 
SUBJECTED TO LAFID AND MUDSLIDES, 
REF, : ( 2 )  
3 .  
EMERGENCY RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
To cope with all those potential risks to human health, to 
the environment and to property (Cubatso contributes with 
2,58 of the Gross National Product of Brazil which is 
presently at US$ 290 billions) the government of the State 
of Sao Paulo through its environmental control agency (CETESB), 
launched, in 1983, a crash risk management emergency plan based, 
among others, on the following key points: 
a air pollution emissions reduction program at plant level; 
a special program for building dams along the main drainages 
of the local watersheds to hold mud and other debris from 
landslides; dredging of brooks down at the valley to reduce 
the flooding risks near each industrial plant; 
recover the affected forest through a long range reforestation 
program to minimize the intensity of landslides; 
strengh local Civil Defense bodies through installation of 
modern communication systems and a network of automatic 
meteorological and hydrological stations to monitor rainfall 
levels in each sector and waterflows in every major brook. 
3.1 
Air Pollution Abatement Program 
Due to the unfavorable dispersion conditions prevailing in 
Cubat20 there is a high probability of occurrance of critical 
episodes of air pollution particularly in winter time. 
Anticyclones associated to natural thermal inversions make it 
difficult for pollutants to disperse Figure 3 shows the 
recording of a typical air pollution episode which took place 
in June 1985 (1). 

The air pollution abatement program set forth by CETESB 
established that each plant should take the responsability 
for preparing its own emission control plan based on the 
following items: 
a adoption of the best practical technology; 
a observance of pollutant emission standards; 
a submission to CETESB of a schedule with implementation 
deadlines; 
a respond with its own capital resources to the needs for 
implementing the control systems. 
After individual control plans were approved goals have been 
set up for emissions reduction. Figures 4 through 8 present 
the results of the emissions reduction schedules for fluorides, 
ammonia, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and total particulates 
for the entire area of Cubatso. 
Table 1 shows the frequency of air pollution episodes which 
ocurred in Cubatgo during the 1984186 period. The data on 
Table 1 indicate the positive results of the program reflected 
in the reduction in the frequency of such episodes. 
Table 2 presents the standards adopted by CETESB for classification 
of the severity of each episode. 
3.2 
Land and Mudslide Control Program 
Recognizing the impossibility of quickly reverting the critical 
situation created by the loncj term effects of the phitotoxic 
fallout of pollutants on the vegetation cover of the mountains 
scarps,CETESB initiated plans for construction of mud holding 
dams along the main drainages of the mountain range. The capital 
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF A I R  POLLUTION EPISODES 
- C u b a t Z o ,  S P ,  B r a z i l  - 
YEAR N OF EPISODES 
ALERT EMERGENCY TOTAL 
R e f . :  (1) 
TABLE 2 
STANDARDS FOR CLASSIFICATION OF AIR POLLUTION STATUS 
- CUBATAO, SP, BRAZIL - 
STATE OF 
PARANETER UNIT 
OBSERVATION ALERT EMERGENCY 
3 
S02 /rg/m 8 0 0 1600 2100 (24h average) 
PARTICULATES (a) pg/m3 375 625 87 5 
(24h average) 
so2 x TSP - 65 x lo3 261 x lo3 393 x lo3 
g ~ m 3  17 x lo3 34 x lo3 46 x 10 3 
4 8 h  average) 
g/m3 200 
/;~h average) 
NOTE : 
( a )  - As Total Suspended Particulates - TSP 
Ref.: (1) 
c o s t  f o r  implementing t h e  program was o b t a i n e d  from t h e  
companies whose p l a n t s  were a t  r i s k  a t  each  p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a t i o n .  
F i g u r e  9 e x e m p l i f i e s  t h e  e x t e n t  of  t h e  c i v i l  works i n  one 
o f  t h e  major  problem a r e a s .  
3 . 3  
R e f o r e s t a t i o n  Program 
A r e f o r e s t a t i o n  program f o r  t h e  a f f e c t e d  mountain s c a r p s  was 
i n i t i a t e d  i n  1985 us ing  s e e d s  of  a  s p e c i a l  r e s i s t a n t  gramineous 
( B r a c h i a r i a ) .  The p i l o t  exper iment  demonst ra ted  a  r ecove ry  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  4 0 %  i n  t e s t  p l o t s .  I n  a second phase ,  i n i t i a t e d  
i n  t h e  second semes te r  o f  1985, n a t i v e  a rbo reous  s p e c i e s  have 
been p l a n t e d .  P r e l i m i n a r y  r e s u l t s  show encouraging  r e sponse  
s i n c e  most o f  t h e  t e s t e d  s p e c i e s  sp rou ted .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it i s  s t i l l  t o  soon t o  e v a l u a t e  i f  t h i s  ongoing 
program w i l l  be s u c c e s s f u l  i n  r educ ing  t h e  impact  of  r a i n f a l l  
i n  t h e  renewed f o r e s t  cove r .  
3 . 4  
S t r e n g h t e n i n g  o f  C i v i l  Defense Bodies 
With in  t h e  scope  f o  t h e  c r a s h  r i s k  management emergency p l a n  
launched by t h e  S t a t e  Government o f  Szo Paulo  t h e  program f o r  
s t r e n g h t e n i n g  t h e  C i v i l  Defense system o f  Cubatgo r e c e i v e d  
s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n .  
Among t h e  key i s s u e s  of  t h a t  program t h e  r e l o c a t i o n  o f  people  
l i v i n g  i n  i l l e g a l s q u a t t e r s  s e t t l e m e n t s  b u i l d  around some o f  
t h e  p l a n t s  was t h e  one o f  g r e a t e s t  impact .  The a f f e c t e d  
communities r e f u s e d  a t  f i r s t  t o  move o u t  t h e  a r e a .  Although 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r e  s t i l l  under way most of  t h e  more exposed 
people  ag reed  t o  s e t t l e  e l s ewere  i n  new hous ing  developments 
provided  by t h e  l o c a l  government. 
FIGURE 9 
MUD H O L D I N G  DAMS ALONG ONE OF T H E  M A I N  D R A I N A G E S  
OF THE MOUNTAINS ENC I RCL I NG CUBATLO 
R E F , :  ( 2 )  
To anticipate the necessary steps to be followed by civil 
defense personnel the event of severe flooding, some main criteri 
have been established for switching levels of action during 
the rainy season. Figure 10 presents a summary of those 
criteria which were divided in two categories namely 
hydrological and geotechnical. 
Depending on the degree of seriousness of the expected 
flooding consequences (i.e. observation, attention, critical 
or emergency) civil defense personnel would act at two 
distinct levels: 
a Plant level action 
- Order partial or complete shutdown of plants. Decision is 
taken considering each one of the sectors in which the 
area of cubatso was divided (See Figure 1); 
- Closing of pipeline valves; 
- Reduce inventory of main storage tanks of dangerous products; 
- Activate emergency energy supply systems. 
a Population level action 
- Organize and conduct pre-prepared evacuation plans to 
withdraw plant personnel and people from endangered areas: 
- Provide transportation, health assistance and shelter to 
affected people. 
4 .  
FUTURE PROGRAM TARGETS 
Figure 11 presents a summary of an integrated approach for 
risk assessment and management in highly industrialized regions 
in a country. Inspection of that figure shows what has been 
completed in Cubatso and what is still in progress or should 
be initiated in order to further reduce risks in the area. 
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Among the future targets of the plan conventional risk 
assessment and management studies at individual plant level 
will be conducted. 
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1.7. THE ACCIDENT OF CHERNOBYL: ISSUES IN LOCAL RISK MANAGE- 
MENT 
M. Deicher, G. Lindner, E. Recknagel (Department of Physics, 
University of Konstanz, FRG), A .  Ernst (Department of Biol- 
ogy, University of Konstanz, FRG), H. Hofs&ss and C. Hohenem- 
ser (Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA) 
Fallout in the days after the accident at 
Chernobyl reached levels 30 to 40 times na- 
tural background at locations as far as 1500 
km from the accident. In the absence of 
coordinated government responses, spontaneous- 
ly generated risk management was undertaken 
in many places. Described here are risk 
management efforts in a locally "hot" region 
of southern West Germany. Based on the 
achievement of high credibility with the 
local population, and the establishment of 
effective local countermeasures, it is argued 
that decentralization of risk management is a 
key to coping with future radiological disas- 
ters. 
The reactor accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Ukraine on 
April 25-26, 1986, led to the largest release of radioactivity 
ever recorded in one technological disaster. The event involved 
a "worst case" accident scenario in which a large reactor with a 
mature fuel inventory breached containment and released several 
percent of its radionuclide inventory. 
Dry weather, favorable siting, evacuation of 130,000 people, 
and the dispersion of early releases to high altitude all con- 
tributed to holding prompt casualties to a small number -- 31 at 
last report [I]. Air concentrations and ground deposits as far 
away as 1000-2000 km, however frequently exceeded protective 
action guidelines applicable to the ingestive pathway. Since 
European risk management institutions were unprepared for an 
accident of the magnitude and transnational character of Cher- 
nobyl, it was necessary to improvise appropriate responses to the 
fallout. 
In some countries, such as Sweden [21 and the Netherlands 
[3], improvisation was prompt because radiation monitoring labor- 
atories coupled quickly to relevant public officials. In other 
cases, such as West Germany, established monitoring stations took 
many days to map the fallout, publish the results, and institute 
adequate public information campaigns and appropriate counter- 
measures. The spectrum of immediate response ranges from Switzer- 
land, which established no early protective actions with respect 
to food, to the West German state of Hessen, which set a standard 
for 1311 in milk at the extremely low value of 20 Bq/l. 
If anything is clear from the European experience, it is 
that protective action planning at large distances from a reactor 
accident is an issue whose time has come. The need for such 
planning is not only driven by public fear and confusion, but also 
by estimates which place the collective dose in Europe at about 
80 million rem 1 4 1 .  Although for most individuals Chernobyl will 
impose an epidemiologically undetectable incremental cancer risk 
of 0.01% or less, it is predicted that the worldwide burden of 
cancer mortality will reach thousands to tens of thousands 
[1,4,5]. Thus, there can be little question that the public will 
demand appropriate protection. 
We review here what is now known about the physical charac- 
teristics of Chernobyl fallout, and describe our experience in 
developing a response in the Konstanz area -- a locally "hot" 
region in southern West Germany. We also compare the responses 
of local, state, and federal governments in West Germany and the 
United States, and discuss optimal risk management designs for 
future radiological disasters. 
1. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHERNOBYL FALLOUT 
The accident has been described in some detail at a review 
conference sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). According to Soviet scientists 1 1 1 ,  the accident occurred 
during a series of tests designed to establish whether the reac- 
tor's turbines could provide emergency power to cooling pumps 
after a sudden loss of steam. To simulate this situation, opera- 
tors ran the plant at 700 MWth prior to a sudden planned shutdown. 
In the course of the test, they inadvertently dropped to 200 
MWth, where they encountered instability due to xenon poisoning. 
Instead of shutting down altogether, as required by safety 
regulations, operators continued the test. Since the reactor has 
a positive reactivity coefficient at low power, the instability 
triggered a "runaway" condition in which local temperatures shot 
to over 2000 C in a few seconds. This resulted in a steam ex- 
plosion that severed the tops of most of the 1661 vertical pres- 
sure tubes, and dropped the fuel changing crane onto the core. 
The steam explosion was followed by a second (hydrogen) explosion 
and a vigorous fire that burned for several hours. 
The initial explosions and fire began at 1:23 am on April 
26, and carried radioactive debris to an altitude of 2-5 km. 
Release of radionuclides continued for over nine days, and reached 
peak values during the first and ninth days. The first peak was 
caused by the initial explosion, the second originated from heat 
accumulation in the destroyed core, which had been covered with 
5000 tons of sand, clay, boron, and lead to contain the fire. 
The release of activity was ultimately stopped by pumping liquid 
nitrogen into the destroyed core. 
According to Soviet scientists 1 1 1 ,  radionuclide deposits in 
the Soviet Union measured 50 MCi as of May 6. Not included are 
about 40 MCi of gaseous laaxe and 0.6 MCi of gaseous asKr, as 
well as activity deposited outside the Soviet Union. Since the 
reactor core contained about 1400 MCi of radionuclides on May 6, 
the ground deposits in the Soviet Union amounted to 3.5% of the 
core. Adding gaseous fission products brings the release to 
6.4%; adding surface deposits outside the Soviet Union may place 
the total release fraction as high as 8-10%. 
The release fractions for various isotopes differed substan- 
tially from those expected in a worst case pressurized water 
reactor (PWR) accident. In particular, owing to the initial 
explosion, Chernobyl had a lower fraction of some volatile fission 
products and a higher fraction of less volatile fission products 
than a corresponding TWR accident involving core melting and loss 
of containments [6,11. To illustrate, Fig. 1 depicts the release 
fractions as a function of volatility class for the two cases. 
Exposure rates, E, expressed as a multiple of normal back- 
ground, are plotted as a function of the distance, r, from Cher- 
nobyl in Fig. 2. Results for Soviet locations are from the Soviet 
report to the IAEA [I]; other data are from our own compilation 
171. As indicated by the straight line, the dispersion may be 
fitted by the relation - 4 .  Despite scatter in the data, 
caused by timing of the cloud's passage, non-uniformity of release 
and dispersion, Fig. 2 permits a rough interpolation for non- 
measured stations. 
The data fall into two families -- those involving fallout 
deposition by rain and those representing dry deposition. At a 
given distance, rainfall locations have exposure levels 15-20 
times higher than dry locations. Because dispersal was dominated 
by long-range transport of small particles, considerably further 
fractionation of radionuclides occurred during dispersal. Thus, 
fallout in Western Europe showed a marked relative deficiency in 
alkaline earths (Ba, Sr) and transuranics (Np, Pu), implying that 
Western Europe was largely spared the most dangerous radionu- 
clides. The same can, unfortunately, not be said about regions 
of the Soviet Union close to the accident. 
2. EVOLUTION OF LOCAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE KONSTANZ REGION 
In the days immediately following the accident, the concise 
technical description of the fallout we have given was, of course, 
beyond the reach of anyone. To track how risk management devel- 
oped in this context, we recall the situation in Konstanz, a city 
of 100,000 on the West German-Swiss border. 
2.1. Early Discoveries 
When Sweden announced the arrival of radioactive cloud on 
Monday, April 28, few of us were concerned. We discussed making 
fallout measurements on Tuesday, April 29, when the Soviet news 
agency TASS announced a serious reactor accident in the Ukraine. 
Despite prevailing easterly winds, we were quite skeptical that 
significant quantities of radioactivity could be measured 1500 km 
from the accident. 
On Wednesday, April 30, thunderstorms and heavy rainfall 
occurred along the northern frontier of the Alps, including the 
Konstanz region. Out of curiosity, we carried a portable geiger 
counter outside after the rain had stopped. The counter, which 
read 8-10 counts/s inside the building, jumped to 250-400 counts/s 
outside. After some checks, we concluded that we had been sho- 
wered with radionuclides in amounts equivalent to 30-40 times 
natural background. 
By nightfall, we had begun measuring with a high resolution 
Ge counter, and by morning, we had a "textbook" gamma ray spectrum 
from which we could identify more than 15 well known fission 
products (see Fig. 3). It became clear that environmental con- 
tamination was at levels, which, had it occurred inside our build- 
ing, would have required closing the laboratory on legal grounds. 
For example, we found combined concentrations of 1311 and 132Te 
in rainwater of 90,000 Bq/l, and surface concentration of 137Cs 
of 8,000-12,000 Bq/ma. The latter exceeded by a factor of 10-15 
the 137Cs deposition in the peak year of weapons testing fallout 
[ T I .  
In the first few days after April 30, almost all detailed 
information about the Konstanz fallout came from our own measure- 
ments. Fallout constituents were identified with a Ge detector; 
food contamination was checked with NaI detectors; ground activity 
was determined with portable geiger counters designed for detect- 
ing gross beta activity; contamination of persons was checked 
with a stationary personnel monitor. These measurements were 
supplemented by gross-beta measurements conducted by the Konstanz 
fire department. 
We were puzzled because our results indicated much larger 
radionuclide burdens than given in scattered press reports for 
other regions of West Germany. The situation was finally clari- 
fied on May 8, eleven days after the accident, when the state 
government of Baden-Wurttemberg published a composite map of 
gross-beta activity measured by local fire departments. As seen 
in Fig. 4, this sows radiation levels near Konstanz as much as a 
factor of 15 higher than in Stuttgart and the northwest part of 
the state. Subsequently, we were able to explain this through a 
strong correlation of radiation levels with rainfall, as also 
shown in Fig. 4 .  
Our information during the first week was far from complete. 
We had no data on radioactivity of air, size and composition of 
fallout particulates, and the abundance of the most dangerous 
pure beta and alpha emitter (e.g., a*Sr, *oSr, and "~Pu). Our 
conjecture that these radionuclides were largely absent was con- 
firmed only a month later [ a ] .  
2.2. The Structure of Local Risk Management 
According to the West German constitution, state and local 
governments have the legal responsibility for setting protective 
action standards and establishing emergency management. Evacua- 
tion planning for West German nuclear plants is conducted by the 
affected county (Landkreis) under the supervision of the state. 
The federal government sets evacuation guidelines, but has only 
advisory power in this context. At the time of Chernobyl, emer- 
gency plans existed only in counties with nuclear plants, whereas 
"non-nuclear" counties, like Konstanz, had made no plans or pre- 
parations. 
In this policy vacuum, the structure of local risk management 
developed spontaneously and independently of state and national 
authorities. During the first three days, the local daily news- 
paper, Der Sudkurier, and our group at the University of Konstanz 
dominated local action. On May 2, the county commissioner (Land- 
rat) formed an advisory committee, which subsequently became the 
center for decision-making and information exchange. 
We interpreted our measurements in terms of the "minimum 
principle" (Minimierungsprinzip) of federal radiation protection 
guidelines [9]. Freely translated, this demands that efforts be 
made to keep exposure "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA). 
In the West German regulatory context, the ALARA principle is 
intended to guide licensing of new nuclear facilities and has no 
specific role in establishing emergency management. In the novel 
situation confronted in Konstanz, the principle effectively guided 
our search for countermeasures. 
The first contact with the state government came on May 5, a 
week after the beginning of the crisis in Konstanz. At that 
time, we were asked officially to monitor radiation in food, as 
we had been doing for a week. Subsequently, there was no sig- 
nificant change in the self-evolved local decision-making, though 
contact with higher levels of government and trans-regional media 
increased. Financial support from the state government eventually 
made possible expansion of monitoring capacity. 
2.3. The Content of Local Risk Management 
Our public statements made during local risk management 
efforts were guided by three themes: (1) rapid publication of 
data; (2) description of physical phenomena in terms understan- 
dable to the public; (3) warnings to avoid ingestion and breathing 
of radioactivity. In this way, it became possible for people to 
self-design protective actions. For example, with information 
about radio-isotope levels in food and knowledge of annual intake 
standards (Grenzwerte), citizens could decide what to eat and 
what to avoid. 
Guidelines published during the first week are given in 
Table 1. Many of these were supported by specific experiments. 
Thus, we found washing removed only 10-20% of activity from shoes, 
asphalt, and vegetables; hence, we advised that shoes be removed 
on entering houses and that locally grown vegetables be avoided. 
We found air filters had high radio-particulate content, and thus 
recommended that children minimize outdoor play. Via experiments, 
we learned that the bulk of activity lay on the ground, whereas 
only about 20% adhered to growing vegetables. For this reason, 
we suggested decontamination be achieved by plowing under the 
crop, rather than by harvesting and disposing of contaminated 
vegetables. 
The most significant intervention in Konstanz was the moni- 
toring and control of milk. Consistent with an annual 1311 limit 
of 1800 Bq [ 9 ] ,  raw milk collected from dairy farmers was sampled 
and accepted for processing only if it measured below 100 Bq/l. 
Because dairy farmers heeded local and state warning to avoid 
releasing cattle to pasture and to feed only stored hay, raw milk 
levels remained, for the most part, under 100 Bq/l. In contrast, 
the neighboring canton of Thurgau, Switzerland, experienced milk 
levels that peaked at 1500 Bq/l, because it instituted no counter- 
measures. Despite low levels of 1311, milk demand in Konstanz 
dropped drastically during the crisis. 
A second important intervention in Konstanz concerns locally 
grown vegetables, of which the environs of Konstanz are a major 
regional supplier. Due to information distributed via the news- 
paper, citizens knew early in the crisis that leafy vegetables 
had 1311 contamination well above the eventually announced federal 
guideline of 250 Bq/kg (See Fig. 5). As a result, the vegetable 
market had already collapsed by May 4, when an official ban on 
vegetable sales was instituted by the state. With no market 
available and the hope of federal compensation, farmers accepted 
local recommendations to plow under their crop. Over 2 million 
heads of lettuce, 65,000 kg of spinach, and 1.3 million kohlrabi 
were destroyed. The vegetable market was reopened on May 20, and 
after some weeks demand returned to normal levels. 
In addition to milk and vegetable controls, the county com- 
missioner and his advisory board opened special repositories for 
contaminated grass cuttings, issued guidelines for handling con- 
taminated air filters, and took actions to prevent the use of 
contaminated sewage sludge in the community composting plant. 
Not all proposed control measures were feasible. For ex- 
ample, we knew that the first hay cutting in May would be con- 
taminated and issued an early warning to that effect [lo], but 
our advice to cut and dispose of grass before maturity was unwork- 
able because a large enough disposal area was unavailable. As a 
result, a second period of milk contamination occurred in Winter 
1986-1987, when contaminated hay cut in May reached milk cattle. 
Its effect turned out to be less severe than expected, since our 
group's feeding experiments with contaminated hay established 
hay-milk transfer factors as a factor of 4 less than reported in 
the literature [Ill. 
2.4. Risk Communication 
After the first reports of the accident, the population 
developed an almost insatiable appetite for information. The 
most important means for communication with the public was the 
local newspaper, Der Sudkurier, which opened its pages to exten- 
sive and accurate discussions of the situation. To help the 
paper in its effort, we contributed considerable material oursel- 
ves, including composite answers to 500 letters of inquiry, as 
well as articles on the accident sequence, the radio-isotopes in 
food, and the risk of radiation. 
Public meetings, sponsored by a wide range of interest 
groups, were a second key source of information. These meetings 
featured individuals involved in measurements, risk assessment, 
and public policy, and generated a high level of public con- 
fidence. The first occurred on May 2, and attracted over 2000 
townspeople. Our group eventually presented more than 100 public 
programs on radiation risk, with many talks given by graduate 
students involved with the measurements. The public generally 
had many questions and demanded a high level of technical detail. 
Throughout the process, we were repeatedly amazed by people's 
willingness to confront complex and ambiguous issues, e.g., the 
problems involved in extrapolating high dose data to low dose. 
Telephone communication, conducted through a special "hot 
ine," was a third means of reaching the public. In our respon- 
es, we sought to calm fears with specific suggestions for reduc- 
ing exposure or explanations of the rather small individual risks 
of local fallout. As the work proceeded, regional and national 
media showed in increasing interest in Konstanz and became a 
fourth outlet for our results. 
2.5. Evaluating Local Risk Management 
Whereas it seems clear that local people felt satisfied with 
the local risk management effort, a number of criticisms of the 
effort have been aired. Most often heard is that local risk 
managers over-reacted, that guidelines and interventions were too 
numerous and far-reaching, and that they failed to consider econ- 
omic losses. On the other hand, some say that we were too lax 
and did not do justice to the ALARA principle. Though it is hard 
for us to judge our own activities, we can respond to these is- 
sues. 
An important source of concern was the paucity of early 
information. In the first week of May, we did not know whether 
to expect further emissions from Chernobyl. It was also unclear 
whether QoSr or Pu were present in the local fallout. Our concern 
was heightened by our use of federal radiation protection guide- 
lines [ 9 ] ,  which set forth annual isotopic organ dose-limits 
based on expected cancer incidence. This approach is more con- 
servative than the concept of "effective equivalent dose" used by 
the International Commission on Radiological Protection [12,131. 
For example, the ICRP approach weighs organ doses with factors 
that reflect expected cancer fatalities and accordingly gives 
thyroid doses a nearly negligible weight of 0.03. 
A specific case of caution which has been questioned concerns 
the recommendation that pregnant women avoid eating local fish, 
which in July 1986, surpassed the 137Cs/la4Cs import standard of 
600 Bq/kg set by the European Community. Even though this is 
relatively low compared to the annual intake limit of 21,000 Bq, 
we justified our caution because fish from Lake Konstanz often 
forms a large part of the diet, and because the further increase 
in cesium levels was expected. As it turned out, fish contamina- 
tion stabilized in late summer at 137Cs/lJ4Cs levels of 300-6b0 
Bq/kg. 
The discovery in late May that the faliqut contained particu- 
lates with high specific beta activity [10,14] suggests that we 
may not have exercised scfficient caution in relation to inhala- 
tion dose. Thus, it might have been wise to warn more extensively 
against open air activities and to recommend more intensive street 
washing efforts. 
Finally, our information campaigns provided the means for 
autonomous decisions by citizens. This, in turn, created a power- 
ful market mechanism for ensuring radiation protection, albeit 
with some losses for affected merchants and producers -- losses 
which were eventually almost fully compensated by the federal 
government. 
3. THE IMPACT OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL ACTIONS 
It is interesting to compare the actions of state and federal 
governments to the local risk management just described. As seen 
in Table 2, the Bonn government adopted import limitations on the 
first day after the cloud and protective action guidelines (Grenz- 
werte) for milk and leafy vegetables on the third and fifth day. 
Early in the fallout episode, however, it announced that there 
was no reason to limit outdoor activity. In contrast, citizens 
in Konstanz were warned to limit outdoor play of children. This 
recommendation was based on local radiation levels which the 
federal government did not consider when it issued its statements. 
The state government in Stuttgart converted the non-binding 
federal guidelines into concrete emergency actions. On the day 
of the cloud, it warned against iodine tablet use, and three days 
later, it warned against open pasture feeding of milk cattle and 
recommended washing of leafy vegetables. On the fourth day, it 
warned against sale of unprocessed milk, and on the fifth day, 
with the recognition that washing was futile, it banned the sale 
of locally grown leafy vegetables altogether. 
Compared to state actions, local risk management in Konstanz 
moved more rapidly and effectively. Local warnings against con- 
sumption of leafy vegetables were published on the third day 
after the cloud so that by the time the state banned sales on the 
fifth day, the market had already collapsed. Local warnings 
about vegetables recognized the ineffectiveness of washing and 
thus avoided the confusion created by the state's washing direc- 
tive. Finally, local efforts established milk control at one 
fifth of the federal standard, suggesting that the federal stan- 
dard was locally inconsistent with the ALARA principle. 
Some states set standards that were considerably stricter 
than federal guidelines. For example, whereas Bonn advised an 
1311 milk standard of 500 Bq/l, the state of Hessen enforced a 
local standard at 20 Bq/l. This apparently large inconsistency 
was a source of confusion for the public and has been interpreted 
in terms of attitudes toward nuclear power, which are "pro- 
nuclear" at the federal level and "anti-nuclear" in the state of 
Hessen. An equally reasonable explanation, however, is that in a 
federal system different radiation environments naturally imply 
different local standards under application of the ALARA prin- 
ciple. For the small state of Hessen, which was spared heavy 
fallout, 20 Bq/l was a reasonable standard; in Konstanz, with 
much heavier fallout, 100 Bq/l could be enforced without serious 
losses; and in southern Bavaria, where the heaviest fallout oc- 
curred, a value approaching the federal standard of 500 Bq/l may 
have been necessary. 
Individuals also set their own standards. For example, 
despite the fact that milk I content was nearly everywhere 
below the federal guideline, milk sales dropped precipitously 
during the crisis. In the case of l3.C~ and 137Cs, Bonn set no 
guideline. As a result, a variety of implicit guidelines were 
expressed through the market behavior of the public. In Konstanz 
milk, la.Cs/l~7Cs levels higher than 30 Bq/l were found unaccep- 
table for small children, whereas berries up to 200 bq/kg and 
meat up to 600-1000 Bq/kg were marketable. 
Perhaps the largest point of contrast between federal and 
state actions and the local work in Konstanz was the absence of 
quantitative data in early state and national pronouncements. 
Instead, central authorities made qualitative statements which 
had the apparent intent of minimizing the danger of the crisis. 
This approach may have been counterproductive, leading directly 
to the loss of credibility that occurred -- particularly among 
individuals who have the ability and tools to form their own 
judgement. In any case, we attribute the high credibility of 
local risk management in Konstanz to early publication of quan- 
titative radiation data for food, and comparison of these to 
federal annual intake guidelines. We also note that, in contrast 
to the early days of the crisis, the state government recently has 
been more forthcoming with specific data, presumably in recogni- 
tion of the fact that this enhances its credibility. 
4. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The most important lesson of Chernobyl is that large scale 
toxic releases to the atmosphere can have extensive transnational 
impacts. For disaster management, this is a major insight which 
is currently fuelling an effort to develop systems that can cope 
with comparable future events. An obvious approach to such an 
event is immediate and complete exchange of information, coupled 
with aid to countries that require it. Such responses are best 
assured through prior international agreements, which are current- 
ly under discussion at the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
the World Health Organization, the Commission of European Com- 
munities, and the World Meteorological Organization. Individual 
nations are also taking steps to improve their planning. 
A second key lesson of Chernobyl is that atmospheric trans- 
port disasters lead to highly variable impacts that are strongly 
dependent on local weather and terrain. Details of such impacts 
are largely unpredictable via existing atmospheric models, which 
at best provide general dispersion patterns [15]. At this time, 
the lessons for risk management are still being absorbed. In our 
view, one implication is that detailed local exposure data must 
rapidly be made available to local risk managers. This suggests 
that successful management must have a largely decentralized 
structure. 
4.1. Weet German Planning 
In West Germany, the delay and confusion associated with 
Chernobyl have served as impetus for significant action. In 
particular, the need for improving food chain protection outside 
established emergency eones is widely recognized. The fact that 
West Germans regard their reactors as safer and better than those 
of other countries plays little role here, largely because West 
Germany is surrounded by numerous nuclear power plants in neigh- 
boring nations. 
The first major institutional response to Chernobyl came at 
the federal level when Bonn established a new Ministry for En- 
vironment, Nature Conservancy, and Reactor Safety. The next 
step, taken in October 1986, was federal legislation to provide 
improved radiation protection for the public [16]. The new law 
is intended to deal with the problem of conflicting state and 
local standards in the recent crisis. It foresees centralized 
collection, analysis, and evaluation of data via an expanded 
monitoring system capable of accommodating local variability. 
State and local governments are to monitor and, if necessary, 
take action on local food chain problems. At the same time, they 
must follow federal guidelines and refrain from independent com- 
mentary and interpolation of data. In effect, the new law places 
the federal government into the role of "chief risk communicator," 
even while state and local authorities retain their constitutional 
responsibility for emergency management. 
Bonn's de facto exclusion of autonomous local action reflects 
the government's concern with establishing a uniform standard. 
For at least three related reasons, such an approach may not be 
optimal. First, it is in conflict with the highly variable dis- 
tribution of fallout, which by itself demands a localized res- 
ponse. Second, the danger exists that decision-making will be 
delayed because it is difficult to deal with local complexity 
from a national platform. Third, and most important, there is 
little hope that a centralized response will lead to the kind of 
risk communication success that is possible when local officials 
are informed locally and communicate directly with local con- 
stituents. Overall, it is likely, therefore, that the new law 
will create more problems than it solves. 
4.2. United States Planning 
Like West Germany's, the U.S. risk management system is 
constitutionally decentralized. Under federal guidelines issued 
through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), reactor licensing 
requires state and local governments to develop an emergency 
evacuation plan over a 16 km radius emergency zone around each 
nuclear power plant. In addition, states are required to develop 
emergency plans for controlling exposure through the food chain 
in an 80 km radius ingestion pathway planning zone. 
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, questions surfaced at the 
state level (e.g., in Massachusetts and Ohio) whether the existing 
16 km emergency evacuation zones and the 80 km ingestion zone 
should be enlarged. So far, these questions have not been trans- 
lated into action, and in contrast to West Germany, there is no 
plan to institute a nationwide monitoring system having a suffi- 
cient density to deal with the kind of local fallout variability 
experienced in the aftermath of Chernobyl. 
If anything, the dominant reaction in the United States has 
been that "Chernobyl can't happen here," because U.S. light water 
moderated reactors are fundamentally safer than Soviet carbon 
moderated types [17,18]. In fact, in one state, New Hampshire, 
the utility and the state are currently seeking to reduce the 
emergency evacuation zone to 1.6 km radius, so that the zone lies 
entirely within the state [19]. At the root of this proposal is 
a political conflict with neighboring Massachusetts, which would 
contain a significant fraction of the 16 km zone. Massachusetts 
has declared that effective evacuation to 16 km is unfeasible 
because of inadequate roads, and therefore will not participate 
in the emergency plan or assent to the licensing of the new reac- 
tor. If successful, the New Hampshire initiative may trigger 
similar initiatives elsewhere in the U.S. 
Thus, the issue in the United States is not centralization 
vs. decentralization, but whether the existing decentralized 
system needs improvement. At the moment, the dominant view seems 
to be that improvement is unnecessary; and there is a change that 
through the New Hampshire initiative, emergency planning will be 
weakened. In this situation, one can expect that a major nuclear 
reactor accident, even with a release much smaller than Chernobyl, 
will produce at least as chaotic a result in the United States as 
occurred in most of Western Europe in the aftermath of Chernobyl. 
4.3. Extended Emergency Planning 
Based on the experience in Konstanz, we think it desirable 
for all countries involved with nuclear power to plan beyond 
emergency evacuation zones around nuclear power plants. Part of 
this planning should include the establishment of monitoring 
stations at sufficiently close intervals to permit rapid assess- 
ment of local fallout variability. The issue is not whether 
Chernobyl can recur, but whether any significant nuclear reactor 
accident can occur. Even a release equal to 1% of Chernobyl may, 
in the case of rain, require food-chain protection at 100 km. 
This can be seen from Fig. 3 by noting what happens if the line 
describing rainfall locations is moved downward by a factor of 
100. 
For coping with radiological protection beyond evacuation 
zones, we recommend establishing extended emergency planning 
zones managed by local government commissions who should handle 
most issues confronted in Konstanz during the recent episode. 
Local government should directly receive information from monitor- 
ing stations, report in detail to the public, and make decisions 
about local countermeasures. General guidelines, distribution 
and financing of standardized monitoring equipment, and handling 
of predominantly state and national issues, such as import limita- 
tions, should remain the responsibility of regional and national 
governments. 
Because we can expect significant food chain problems out to 
100 km, even for relatively small nuclear reactor accidents, 
extended emergency planning should cover all regions in which 
nuclear reactors are sited. Based on the observed variability of 
Chernobyl fallout, we estimate that the optimal size of these 
zones is larger than present evacuation zones, but not much larger 
than a few thousand square kilometers. 
The advantages of local government commission managing local 
zones lie in their capability to respond rapidly and flexibly to 
exposure patterns with high spatial and temporal variability. An 
additional advantage is that local commissions can provide rapid 
and accurate communication with locally affected populations. 
This will forestall the loss of credibility that so often accom- 
panies the delays of centralized organizations that attempt to 
handle too much complexity in a short time. 
In establishing local commissions, thought should be given 
to the notion that universities and other organized centers of 
learning are among the best places for making unbiased measure- 
ments and analyzing risk management options. Alternatively, 
monitoring might be done by meteorological stations, as in the 
Soviet Union. 
An important condition for the success of local zones is a 
framework for establishing protective action guidelines within 
each of several exposure regimes. The framework should rest on 
national or international guidelines that define annual intake 
limits. In the case of unavoidably large exposures, in which 
annual limits must of necessity by surpassed, prior planning 
should identify a series of emergency exposure regimes, within 
each of which the ALARA principle of the radiation protection 
guidelines can be applied. That different local zones may es- 
tablish different protective guidelines is to be expected and is 
a logical consequence of applying the ALARA principle to a highly 
variable radiation environment. The public should be informed in 
advance that this is an expected and desirable result which deals 
in an optimal way with a complex situation. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chernobyl constituted the largest release of radioactivity 
ever recorded in a single technological accident. It produced a 
highly variable pattern of fallout, strongly correlated with 
local rainfall. Even at 1500 km, fallout in some places far 
exceeded the peaks recorded in the 1960's during the period of 
atmospheric weapons testing. 
Chernobyl demands reconsideration of emergency planning for 
nuclear power stations. Even if one assumes that accidents as 
large as Chernobyl will not recur, our experience with local risk 
management in West Germany suggests that response to large radio- 
logical accidents should involve a strong decentralized component 
with sufficient autonomy to make local measurements, conduct 
local risk assessments, inform the local population, and design 
effective local countermeasures. 
Although both the U.S. and West German federal systems are 
ideally suited for establishing decentralized risk management 
efforts, it is doubtful whether either nation will be successful 
if it continues on its present trajectory. West Germany, with 
most of the rest of Europe, has accepted the need for an extended 
monitoring system, but is in the process of strengthening central- 
ized authority at the expense of local government. The United 
States, through its several states, is discussing the need for 
better monitoring systems outside established evacuation zones, 
but is moving very slowly toward adoption. 
In this situation, we can predict that future nuclear acci- 
dents -- even if they are much smaller than Chernobyl -- will 
reproduce the chaos and confusion that Chernobyl brought to Wes- 
tern Europe in the spring of 1986. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY LOCAL HAZARD 
MANAGERS DURING THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE EMERGENCY. 
1. Dairy cows should not be permitted to graze on open pasture.' 
2. Vegetables should be washed; later prohibition of vegetable 
sales, and that all vegetables be plowed under rather than 
harvested . 
3. No rainwater collected on April 30 should be consumed. 
4. Children should be kept indoors as much as possible. 
5 .  Children should wash thoroughly (especially the eyes) after 
being outdoors. 
6. Kindergartners should avoid sandbox play. 
7. Sporting events on hardtop surfaces should be curtailed 
because of dust formation. 
8. Schools should monitor children during recess in order to 
avoid injuries. Schools should consider indoor sport. 
9. Sidewalks should not be swept. 
10. Street cleaning with sprinkler trucks should be increased. 
11. Lawn mowing should be postponed. Later recommendation to 
mow and follow instructions for disposal of grass cuttings. 
12. Children should not engage in gardening chores in order to 
avoid injury and dust build-up. 
13. People should not wear street shoes indoors. 
14. Hunting season should be postponed.* 
Also recommended by the state government of Baden-Wurttemberg. 
TABLE 2: CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRST TEN DAYS 
DATE 1-TI- FEDERAL STATE E A L  
4/26 lkplosion at 
Chernobyl , 
emission begins 
4/27 Evacuation 
at reactor 
4/28 Detection of Activation of 
radiation monitoring 
in Sueden, 
USSR annoUN3es 
accident 
4/29 Emission Issuance of Activation of Article in paper 
continues public statement monitoring on accident 
4/30 Radioactive Formation of Formation of Activation of 
cloud crosses working units working units monitoring, 
West Germany rainwater mea- 
sured 
5/1 Continued Import quotas Ress release, Monitoring of 
emissions in & border control establish re- g r O d  
Chernobyl established search program contamination 
5/2 No further Radiation protec- Recamnend Publication of 
fallout in tion guideline no open grazing, monitoring 
South Germany for iodine-131 wash vegetables results in 
set at 500 Bq/l press r~arn 
in milk against leafy 
vegetables, 
open form at 
University 
5/3 Continued 
emissions 
Warn against Press report on 
direct milk sale, leafy vegetable 
advise dairies contamination 
hold to federal 
iodine standard 
5/4 Continued Guideline for Prohibit Begin control 
emissions iodine-131 for sale of leafy of milk at 
vegetables set vegetables local dairy 
at 250 Bq/kg 
5/5 lhission at 
Chernobyl 
terminate 
Universities Monitoring ve- 
asked to make getables, state 
measurements measuring 
begins 
FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Be 1 Release fraction under three conditions as a function 
of volatility class. The solid curve (1) described a 
theoretical reference accident for a pressurized water 
reactor. The broken line (2) describes the Chernobyl 
release. The dotted curve (3) describes the radioac- 
tivity measured in Konstanz normalized to Chernobyl at 
Class 3. Volatility classes are defined as follows: 
1-noble gases, 2-iodines, 3-cesiums, 4-telluriums, 5- 
alkaline earths, 6-volatile oxides, and 7-nonvolatile 
oxides. 
Fig. 2 Exposure levels due to Chernobyl in Eastern and Western 
Europe, measured 7-10 days after the accident. The 
open symbols describe dry deposition whereas the closed 
symbols describe rain deposition. The exposure, E, is 
measured as a multiple of the natural background, as- 
sumed to be 0.01 mrem/h. 
Fig. 3 Gamma spectrum obtained from a grass sample in Konstanz 
on May 9, 1986, showing gamma ray lines of numerous 
fission products. 
Fig. 4 Illustration of the correlation of activity level with 
rainfall. The numbers indicate ground level 13'I con- 
tamination in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg on May 8, 
1986, in Bq/cmz. The shading scheme indicates rainfall 
in mm during the period of April 30 to May 3, 1986. 
Fig. 5 Time dependence of "11 in lettuce in Konstanz. The 
bars indicate scatter of daily measurements, the heavy 
line the daily average. 
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2. MANAGEMENT O F  ENVIRON- 
MENTAL CO N SEQ U ENCES 
2.1. RISK STRUCTURES AND PERCEPTION PROBLEMS 
Prof. Boris Segerstdhl 
JJASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
Introduction 
"Bhopal", "Chernobyl", "Basel", to name a few of the serious technological accidents 
of the last decade, have become symbols of the destructive and catastrophic potential of 
modem technology. In addition to pollution risks, these accidents have generated a 
credibility gap over the risk associated with several modem technologies. An early topic in 
risk research was quantifying the probability of environmental and public harm from tech- 
nological activities, and ordering risks and priorities for their reduction. The problem of 
main concern today seems to be how societies can cope with the large scientific uncenain- 
ties in the consequences of their actions. The numbers estimating risks are imponant for 
technical design purposes, but of limited relevance for policy setting. 
Risks are far reaching in the world of today. Accidents such as those at Chernobyl or 
in Basel have created an acute need for international cooperation on risk and crisis manage- 
ment. Traditional organizational procedures are not adequate in handling large-scale emer- 
gencies. Too many organizations are involved; no common command structure can be es- 
tablished; common goals are vague or nonexistent; the time frame involved is too large; 
economic, political and social conflicts emerge; the dynamics and structure of the event as 
a whole is not understood. 
Our purpose here is to draw a preliminary sketch of the systemic structure of a large- 
scale crisis management system. We don't give a recipe for a management system design. 
That would be futile as all new disasters are unique. We try, however, to point out a few 
basic facts about the structure and interactions in a typical, more or less ad hoc, crisis manage- 
ment system with special emphasize on the characteristics of risk perception. 
Dimensions of the system 
We start with a few definitions to indicate how the total system can be structured and 
analyzed. There are many dimensions to the problem and no commonly accepted terminol- 
ogy exists. The terminology used in this paper is not in any way definite. It is, however, an 
effort to create internal consistency in this presentation. We will look at three different 
dimensions of the system - time, type and actors. 
Time. The event which is the object of our investigation is called a disaster. Over time 
a disaster goes through different stages: 
Precatastrophe 
Catastrophe 
- Crisis 
Reconstruction 
Monitoring 
The first stage - pre-catastrophe - is often neglected in crisis management systems. 
The reason is simple: you never know about a catastrophe before you are in the middle of 
it. One common fact should, however, be noted. In many cases the transfer from normal 
operating conditions to a catastrophe is not direct. The prelude to a disaster is often aperiod 
of maintenance, testing, changes in operating procedures, or other activities which cannot 
be considered as an integral part of the steady state operation of the plant. In Chemobyl the 
accident was mggered by badly planned tests and ignorance of safety requirements. In a 
recent train accident in Sweden the accident was preceded by maintenance of the safety and 
signal system. 
To use an analogy from the military environment; instead of either having normal 
operating conditions - complete peace - or a catastrophe - war - a military organiza- 
tion uses a sequence of alert levels. This is routinely done on airports when a plane has to 
land after having reported abnormal operating conditions. A system of alert levels automati- 
cally introduces a system of checks and clearances for non-routine activities in an industrial 
plant. This type of pre-catastrophe alertness can eliminate the accident in some cases. When 
an accident occurs the preparedness would be better and consequently the damages should 
be smaller. 
Precatastrophe conditions are easy to identify when an accident with possible but 
avoidable catastrophic consequences has occurred. One well known case is the Mississauga 
evacuation in Canada. The accident itself never reached the proportions of a catastrophe, 
but the evacuation of more than 220.000 people took on all the characteristics of a crisis. 
The cat-sm;.' e stz;e r:7-ger o\ t7r e-yth;~: from ten seconds to several days. The h r -  
der line to the next stage is fluid. One way to identify a transition from catastrophe to crisis 
is to judge whether there is any immediate unavoidable danger for loss of life caused direct- 
ly by the original catastrophe. Another indicator showing that the catastrophe has mutated 
into a crisis is that outside agencies and organizations become involved and the geographi- 
cal dimensions of the event have grown beyond what can be controlled by plant manage- 
ment. In the case of Chernobyl the crisis continued less than three months and was preceded 
by a catastrophe period ranging over five to fifteen days. 
Reconstruction is on one hand technical and economic reconstruction of damaged 
property and structures and on the other hand rehabilitation of destroyed credibility includ- 
ing introduction of new regulations and standards. Pan of thereconstruction after Chernobyl 
(excluding local work) was the passing of two international conventions prepared by the 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). These conventions define procedures and 
guidelines for early notification and emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear accident 
or radiological emergency - specifically, in the event of "a release of radioactive material 
which occurs or is likely to occur and has resulted or may result in an international transboun- 
dary release that could be of radiological safety significance" (4). Draft agreements on the 
conventions were signed in September 1986. The convention on early notification entered 
into force on 27 October 1986 and the convention on emergency assistance entered into 
force on 26 February 1987. 
Type. There are many ways to classify technological risks. One of the more ambitious 
efforts to generate a taxonomy was done by Hohenemser and his colleagues (3) at Clark 
University. Risk taxonomies which order risks according to causes of hypothetical acci- 
dents, are not suitable for classification of disasters. For this purpose we suggest a classifica- 
tion which puts most of the emphasis on the physical and chemical characteristics of the 
catastrophe itself. One of several possible classifications according to type is: 
Contamination of large areas 
River and lake pollution 
Gas releases 
Explosions and fires 
It should be noted that a particular disaster can exhibit, simultaneously or sequentially, 
characteristics from several of these types. In addition the characteristics of a specific dis- 
aster are different depending on the geographical position of your point of reference. In 
Chemobyl the catastrophe was an explosion and fire. In other European countries the crisis 
emerged as a consequence of large scale contamination. 
The main reason for including a typology as one dimension of a crisis management sys- 
tem is that it puts the system on a fast learning curve. A complete classification system has 
to include severs1 stages of refinement. After an indication that gases have been released a 
need arises to determine whether the gases are heavy or light and what the concentrations 
and toxicity levels are. This information guides protective measures for the crew working 
on the site of the catastrophe. Combined with meteorological data the information gives a 
basis for the team which has to make the most difficult decisions of all in an emergency. 
Should an evacuation be ordered? And if so: when, how, and what scope? 
Actors. A minor or "routine" emergency is taken care of by the plant or company being 
affected. In a major disaster it is inevitable that several different societal actors become in- 
volved. The main actors are: 
Plant and company staff 
Fire departments, police, military, hospitals 
Industry, insurance companies 
Government and local agencies 
Regulatory agencies 
Press and TV 
Political system and general public 
To organize coordination and communication between these actors is a formidable task. 
In many cases the structures are semi random and nondeterministic. It is natural that nobody 
is completely in control in a large-scale crisis management system. The control function is 
with the plant staff during the first stage of the catastrophe. This control will be transferred 
as soon as fire departments and police are on site. After a crisis has replaced the initial 
catastrophe, events can occur rather randomly depending on the power structure in society 
as a whole and on the regulatory framework. The importance of a well designed regulatory 
framework is not in its ability to provide exact rules but in its ability to create predictable 
patterns for interaction among different actors in the crisis management system. 
System structure 
The general structure of the system is shown in Figure 1. The system is driven by the 
case specific information available. The structural behavior of the system is influenced by 
earlier experience, the general knowledge base available, and by the regulatory framework 
within which the activity takes place. As a vertical structure the system is straightforward: 
Identification 
Assessment 
Decisions 
Communication 
Perception 
Actions and reactions 
It is, however, clear that the system behaves in a nonhierarchical manner. Connections 
between levels are created, bypassed, and destroyed depending on the dynamic changes in 
the overall situation. The situation is funher complicated by the fact that analysis and 
management of a large-scale disaster cannot be based on the assumption that only one sys- 
tem is in operation. In cases where several countries are affected, each country has its own 
system. The connections between national systems is one of the main problems for efforts 
to manage a disaster efficiently. These connections between parallel systems exist mainly 
on the communication level. It is obvious that coordinated connections on several levels 
might be preferable in an ideal case. In reality temporary, and often informal, links between 
national systems are created for coordination of decisions and actions. 
Identification and assessment 
Identification of the characteristics of a major disaster range from the immediate and 
trivial to the vague and confusing. The first indication that a nuclear accident might have 
happened came in western Europe when increased radiation Ievels were measured at the end 
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Figure 1: Structure of a risk management system 
1 GENERAL 
of April, 1986. At that time there was no clear information available from the USSR on what 
the source for this radiation might be. The identification process proceeds in parallel with 
emergency actions. Its main purpose is to serve as input for the assessment process which 
in turn creates a base for decision-making. The identification process is in the case of a 
nuclear accident to a large extent based on measurements. In addition, atmospheric transport 
models can be used to design an optimal monitoring strategy. 
It became very clear after the Chernobyl accident that many counmes in Europe were 
unprepared for monitoring of nuclear contamination on the scale required. Two problems 
dominated: a need for immediate information which lead to an overload on measurement 
systems and laboratories, and unforeseen problems with big local variations in contamina- 
tion levels. The effect of rain on fallout was much higher than expected and lead to big local 
variations in contamination levels. A lot of confusion and distrust emerged as the system 
was unable to cover these aspects of the situation adequately. 
From a management point of view two requirements are important for the identifica- 
tion process. National and international consistency have to be ensured. Varying standards 
and very uneven quality of instruments and professional skills in different counmes have 
lead to repeated argumentsconcerning real radiation levelsin different countries. The second 
requirement is, that the relevant substances are monitored and measured. Ln the case of the 
recent fallout in Europe this was no problem. From past experience it was known that cesium 
and iodine were the important substances to monitor. 
We will not discuss the scientific aspects of risk assessment or the methodological 
problems and technical priorities, but concentrate on the problems which arise when this ac- 
tivity enters the emergency management process. 
Experts are in a very difficult position with respect to their credibility during an emer- 
gency - real or imagined - as has emerged in the last years. As pointed out by Krohn and 
Weingart in a recent paper (5),  the expert has to represent a scientific "consensus" which 
has to be presented in the political context as fixed, irreversible. and final. This is the expert's 
chief conmbution to the transformation of probabilistic knowledge into knowledge for 
political decision-making. 
The situation is contradictory and clearly impossible. How can an assessment be fixed, 
irreversible, and final, when it has to be based on information which is vague, contradic- 
tory, and constantly changing. It is not possible to escape this dilemma with the knowledge 
we have today of the overall crisis management system. A serious effort is needed to create 
procedures which would enable us to harmonize the entire process. 
Communication 
The communication process and its deficiencies are at the core of much of the confusion 
and many of the conflicts which emerge during and after a catasmophe. Let us first separate 
between "professional communication" and "public communication". Professional com- 
munication is taking place between organizations and units collaborating in the rescue and 
salvage operations during a catastrophe and crisis. This type of communication follows es- 
tablished rules and procedures. It can be predefined, organized and rehearsed. This does not 
ensure that the professional communication system functions properly in all situations. In- 
compatible equipment; confusion with radio frequency usage; overloaded switchboards 
which prevent telephone communication; conflicting terminology and many other problems 
create serious communication problems within the professional system. 
The real quagmire is in the field of communication with the general public. This com- 
munication process changes with time and is dependent on local circumstances and culture. 
The public broadcasting systems can be included in the professional communication system 
during the initial stage - the catastrophe - of a disaster. Instructions to the public and un- 
edited news bulletins from the management center are transmitted without distortion. This 
means in many cases that the messages are also transmitted without clarification. 
The dialogue between crisis management staff and the public can break down within a 
few minutes when the mode of communication reverts to the traditional style where the 
media are expected to be the watchdogs and deliverers of the "real truth" . To this is added 
the confusion generated by the use of "concerned scientists" and other sources which see as 
their main objective to correct the disinformation spread to the public by the officials in 
charge. 
Credibility and consistency are the two main requirements on communication to the 
public. It is often impossible to fulfil these requirements completely. Information becomes 
available gradually and leads to reassessment of the situation. As a consequence a need will 
arise to upgrade or downgrade the level of alertness which is required by the public. 
Harry Otway (6) has made an important point in differentiating between two kinds of 
communication. The fvst is intended to persuade people to accept policies or technologies 
and the risk they imply; in essence it encourages passive compliance with the intentions of 
those providing the information. It is fundamentally manipulative. The second tells people 
how they can avoid or mitigate risks, or gives information which helps them to form their 
own opinions; it supports the needs of the audience rather than those of the communicator. 
The difference is subtle, perhaps sometimes more a question of intent than content, but with 
this choice between a technocratic or a democratic path, risk analysis stands at a crossroads. 
After the Chemotyl accident, sit~iiltic::~ \.SIC c L T . s ~ \  i d  \'here tliz inlent ~f con~n~.i~:I, 3- 
tion fell into the second category -- efforts to help the public form their own opinions; but 
due to several factors and specific circumstances the communications were interpreted as 
manipulation and turned out to be counter-productive. After statements by specialists on 
television that there was no need to take iodine pills, pharmacies were crowded with people 
buying these pills. The technical and professional implementation of communication 
strategies is still far from adequate and often looks like a sequence of mals and errors. 
The public was at the center of what is sometinles called the "Chernobyl experiment." 
Assumptions about its behavior, however vague and unfounded, were also the basis for all 
measures planned and implemented after the accident. These assumptions should now be 
tested and conclusions drawn. 
Perception 
The way people perceive, order and react to risks is often a mystery both to scientists 
trained in the natural sciences and to decision-makers with a professional involvement in 
the control and management of a crisis. 
While scientists rely on risk assessment to evaluate hazards and risks in an objective 
way, the majority of people rely on intuitive, subjective risk judgments. We use "subjec- 
tive" and "objective" not as a way of indicating any superiority of one compared to the other, 
but as a way to stress the point that we deal with two different views of reality and of the 
relationship between scientific absmctions and real societal phenomena. 
The difference between risk assessment and risk perception is often considered as being 
equivalent to the difference between knowledge (based on assessments) and belief (based 
on perception). The solution to this problem suggested by experts is to change belief into 
knowledge through a process of communication. Real world efforts in this direction have, 
however, a consistent tendency to fail. 
Let us first make a few short comments on the philosophical foundation of this 
dichotomy. In philosophy the standard approach is based on the so-called possible-worlds 
approach first proposed by Hintikka (2). The idea is, that besides the m e  state of affairs, 
there are a number of other possible states of affairs, or possible worlds. Some of these pos- 
sible worlds may be indistinguishable from the true world. A person is said to know or believe 
a fact if this fact is true in all the worlds he thinks possible. Possible-world semantics fail to 
model human reasoning in an adequate way because it assumes that a person is so intelligent 
that his knowledge is complete and closed under implication, so that if he knows fact a, and 
knows that this fact implies b,  then he must know fact b. Hintikka calls this the problem of 
logical omniscicncc. 
People are certainly not omniscient in real life. Possible-worlds proponents stress that 
this approach assumes an ideal and rational reasoner, with iniinite computational power. 
Various approaches have been proposed to the theoretical problem stemming from the fact 
that our world is inhabited by non-ideal mortals. One approach is syntactic: aperson's beliefs 
are described by a set of formulas, not necessarily closed under implication, or by the logi- 
cal consequences of a set of formulas obtained by using an incomplete set of deduction rules. 
Fagin and Halpern (1) have pointed out that previous efforts to solve the problem of 
logical omniscience have failed because they have ignored the fact that it  arises from several 
different sources. Some of these are: 
Lack of awareness 
People are resource-bound 
People don't always know the relevant rules 
people don't focus on all issues simultaneously 
The practical implication of work done in logic and philosophy is, that truth can be a 
multivalued function depending on where you stand and depending on your set of possible- 
worlds. 
1 Evaluation I 
Figure 2: Model of evaluation process 
Perceivedrisks are real phenomena. Even in cases where thereis a substantial difference 
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Let us mention one example. The value of land around a planned chemical plant is deter- 
mined not by the outcome of probabilistic risk assessments, but by the perceived risk of the 
plant. It is difficult to imagine that a promotional campaign aimed at communicating results 
of risk assessments could have any noticeable influence on what developers are willing to 
pay for land in the immediate vicinity of the plant 
Research on risk perception is shedding more light on what people mean when they say 
that something is risky, and on what factors and processes underlie those perceptions. The 
basic motivation for this work lies in the fact that both for regulation related to health and 
safety and for crisis management, a better understanding of the risk perception process is 
needed. 
The basic process leading to ordering, acceptance, or rejection of risks is indicated by 
the flowchart in Figure 2. Ln a risk assessment exercise done by experts evaluation is 
equivalent to e.g. probabilistic risk assessment. Risk perception is a more intuitive process 
of evaluation. It should be noted that even if assessment and perception are functions of data, 
theory, and experience, both the structure of the function, and the sources and structure of 
the inputs are different 
Figure 3: Assessment space and perception space 
In assessments the generating function is based on theories derived from natural scien- 
crs and technology. Data is generated through experiments and statistics on component 
failures. Experience is imbedded in data and theory. In most cases it does not influence the 
assessment directly. 
In perception we deal with a very fluid and to a large extent subconscious theory about 
society and technology. Perceptions are to a high degree invariant to data for the simple 
reason that the conceptual theoretical model used is more qualitative than quantitative. As a 
consequence of the structure of the imbedded theory, perceptions are very much dependent 
on experience - direct and indirect 
The facts mentioned above lead to a rather pessimistic conclusion. The theory behind 
risk assessment is quantitative while the theory behind risk perception is qualitative. An as- 
sessment is highly dependent on data while data is of minor relevance to the formation of a 
risk perception. Risk assessments use experience indirectly while risk perception is strong- 
ly influenced by experience and personal, empirical evidence. As a consequence evaluation 
and ordering based on assessments can be expressed as vectors and semiordered sets in an 
assessment space while evaluation and ordering based on perception are vectors and semi- 
ordered sets in a completely different perception space. 
Substantial movements in the assessment space can go unnoticed in the perception 
space. This is illustrated by Figure 3. Risk communication can according to this model be 
considered as a transformation of dimensions and movements in the assessment space to 
corresponding dimensions and movements in the perception space. In an extreme the as- 
sessments and perceptions form orthogonal hyperplanes. This is equivalent to a manifesta- 
tion of mutually excluding concepts of rationality in the group representing assessments and 
the group committed to perceptions. It should be emphasized that the words "assessment" 
and "perception" in this case have to be interpreted as labels of identification for different 
approaches without indicating superiority of one over the other. What has been stated here 
is to vague and intuitive to offer more than a starting point for more thorough investigation. 
It is, however, obvious that a fum fundament of theory is required before the relationship 
between assessment and perception is well understood. 
The situation is recognizable in work on risk perception. Risk analysis describes the 
impact of an event in terms of direct or indirect, short- or long-term harm to the population. 
Risk perception seems to be more concerned with what Slovic (7) calls the signal potential 
of an event. The signal potential of an event, and thus its potential social impact, appears to 
be systematically related to the characteristics of the hazard and the location of the event 
within a factor space defined by one factor labeled "dread risk" and one factor labeled "un- 
known risk." 
Slovic is actually working with a multidimensional perception space which he then tries 
to reduce to a two-dimensional hyperplane in the way described above. A more complete 
list of words describing the (not orthogonal) dimensions in this example of a perception 
space is: observable, known to those exposed, effect immediate, old risk, riskr known to - 
science, controllable, not dread, not global catastrophic, consequences not fatal, equitable, 
individual, low risk to future generations, easily reduced, risk decreasing. At the other ex- 
treme on the scales of these dimensions we find the opposites of the expressions listed. 
Slovic gives a list of thirty risks ordered by four different groups. The list is given for 
reference in Appendix 1. Figure 4 shows in graphical form the variety of ordering given by 
the four groups. It is obvious that different groups give very different evaluations of rela- 
tive risks. It can be seen from the chart that a broad trend exists. This means of course that 
the ordering is not completely random but is based on a common rationality expressed by 
the implicit use of theory, data and experience as mentioned earlier. 
One important interpretation of the signal concept is that effort and expense beyond 
levels indicated by a cost-benefit analysis might be warranted to reduce the possibility of a 
"high-signal accident". Another important implication is that a reduction in the potential im- 
pact of an accident does not influence its position in the signal-factor space. If the wrong 
conclusions are drawn from these two implications, we are in danger of promoting policies 
which lead to very low accident probabilities while the impact of one of these very im- 
probable accidents could be enormous. 
The important implication for the crisis management framework into which we put risk 
perception is that communication is a translator between the "assessment space" and "per- 
Figure 4: Ordering of risks by four groups according to Slovic (7) 
ception space". If we learn how to do this translation, many of today's communication and 
credibility problems could be, if not eliminated, at least reduced to manageable proportions. 
Actions and reactions 
Actions and reactions occur as an integral part of the decision-rnkg process when 
decisions made and actions taken in the same organization. These actions are not being 
discussed here. Problems arise when a decision-maker has little or no control over the or- 
ganizations or groups that should act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with his 
decisions. The general public can not easily be forced to act according to decisions unless 
these decisions are perceived as being in the best interest of the individual person. If an 
evacuation is ordered the implementation depends to a large extent on the level of credibility 
transmitted through communications to the public. Unpredictable and counterproductive ac- 
tions can follow on instructions from the authorities if there is a lack of credibility. The ear- 
lier mentioned example of pharmacies crowded by requests for iodine pills is a typical ex- 
ample of a situation where a reaction instead of a non-action followed a specific 
communication. 
In extreme cases the reactions generate perturbations which affect the whole crisis 
management system. Staff changes and transfers of responsibility can be initiated through a 
political process driven more by demands from the public than by a need to minimize the 
effects of the disaster. All this boils down to the earlier mentioned need for consistency, 
clarity and credibility in communication. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1. Ordering of perceived risk for 30 activities and technologies. The ordering 
is based on the geometric risk ratings within each group. Rank 1 represents 
the most risky activity or technology (from Slovic, 1987). 
Activity 
or 
technology 
Nuclear power 1 1 8 20 
Motor vehicles 2 5 3 1 
Handguns 3 2 1 4 
Smoking 4 3 4 2 
Motorcycles 5 6 2 
-- 6 .  
Alcoholic beverages 6 7 5 3 
General (private) aviation 7 15 11 12 
Police work 8 8 7 17 
Pesticides 9 4 15 8 
Surgery . . lo-- 11 9 5 
Fire fighting 11 10 6 18 
Large construction 12 14 13 13 
Hunting 13 18 10 23 
Spray cans 14 13 23 26 
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29 
Bicycles 16 24 14 15 
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16 
Elecmc power (non-nuclear) 18 19 19 9 
Swimming 19 30 17 10 
Contraceptives 20 9 22 11 
Skiing 2 1 25 16 30 
X-rays 22 17 24 7 
School and college footbail 23 26 2 1 27 
Railroads 24 23 29 19 
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14 
Food coloring 26 20 30 2 1 
Power mowers 27 28 25 28 
Prescription antibiotics 28 21 26 24 
Home appliances 29 27 27 22 
Vaccination 30 29 29 25 
League of 
Women 
Voters 
College 
students 
Active 
club 
members 
Experts 
2.2 .  ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL EMEROENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENTS 
M a r v i n  H. D i c k e r s o n  
Lawrence  L i v e r m o r e  N a t i o n a l  L a b o r a t o r y ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  USA 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to  suggest elements for a general emergency response 
system, employed at  a national level, to  detect, evaluate and assess the consequences of a 
radiological atmospheric release occurring within or outside of national boundaries. These 
elements are focused on the total aspect of emergency response ranging from providing an 
initial alarm t o  a total assessment of the  environmental and health effects. Elements of 
the emergency response system are described in such a way that  existing resources can be 
directly applied if appropriate; if not, newly developed or an expansion of existing resources 
can be employed. The major thrust of this paper is toward a philosophical discussion and 
general description of resources that would be required for implementation. If the major 
features of this proposal system are judged desirable for implementation, then the next 
level of detail can be added. 
The philosophy underlying this paper is preparedness - preparedness through plan- 
ning, awareness and the application of technology. More specifically, it is (1) establishment 
of reasonable guidelines including the definition of reference and protective action levels for 
public exposure to  accidents involving nuclear material; (2) education of the public, gov- 
ernment officials and the news media; and (3) the application of models and measurements 
coupled t o  computer systems to  address a series of questions related t o  emergency planning, 
response and assessment. It is the role of a proven national emergency response system t o  
provide reliable, quality-controlled information to  decision makers for the management of 
environmental crises. 
EDUCATION 
Clearly defined reference and action levels should exist for various dose pathways ex- 
pected from a n  accidental release of nuclear or toxic material. These levels should represent 
values below which there is no health concern, values above which there are health con- 
cerns, and an area in-between where discretionary actions may be appropriate depending 
on the circumstances of the accident and exposures. An example of these levels is given for 
nuclear accidents by the International Commission on Radiological Protection publication 
(ICRP) 40-which suggests 0.5 Rem whole body dose as the lower limit number where no 
action is required and 5.0 Rem as the upper limit above which protective actions would 
be required. 
Once the reference and protective action levels have been established then the educa- 
tional process should begin first with government officials not directly involved in estab- 
lishing the reference and protective action levels, followed by the news media and then by 
the general public. The absolute values of the reference and protective action levels are 
not as important to convey to the public in the beginning as is the methodology used to 
develop the guidelines and plans for implementation during an accident. 
As part of an education and training process the national center can be used to help 
plan and execute exercises and drills that  test the components of the system. This process 
will help various government agencies to communicate with each other and interpret the 
advisories produced by the center. 
TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS 
Radiologicd Measurements 
Three levels of ground based environmental monitors used for measuring airborne and 
deposited radioactivity are suggested for the emergency response system. These levels are 
national, regional and local. 
a. National System. This is a real-time continuous measurement system with a cen- 
tralized data col,lection, interpretation and data basing facility. The major purpose 
of this system is to provide a %rst alertn for either a national or international inci- 
dent that  releases nuclear material. Through the use of modeling, climatology, land 
use and terrain studies a limited number of measurement stations can be located 
near facilities within the c ~ u n t r y  that have a potential for an atmospheric release 
of nuclear material and in other areas for intercepting nuclear material crossing 
international borders. A minimal number of stations should be deployed and the 
number of parameters measured should be limited to a selected group to  identify 
and initiate an alarm. 
b. Regional System. The next level should be designed to supplement the national 
system, provide more spatial resolution, and quantify the measurements more than 
would be practical for a national real-time system. The regional systems should 
be developed and implemented by laboratories, universities or other responsible 
agencies under the supervision of a central governmental agency. These regional 
offices would be responsible for purchasing instrumentation, calibration and distri- 
bution to  groups or individuals charged with making the measurements. Should 
an accident occur these regional centers would be responsible for monitoring the 
measurements, collecting the data, quality control and transmission to the central 
agency for further interpretation and inclusion in a master data base. 
c. Local System. These systems would be designed to address local concerns partic- 
ularly as they relate to more detailed definition of the space and time variability 
of material on the ground. The point of contact for calibration and data dissem- 
ination should also be under the control of but not necessarily in direct contact 
with the regional center. The path for information transfer between these measure- 
ment systems and the national agency in charge of the technical evaluation should 
involve the regional centers. The national agency should insure that a standard- 
ized protocol is established for all radiological measurements e.g., time intervals, 
calibration, etc. 
In addition to these ground based systems an airborne monitoring system supported 
and administered by the central authority should be available to (1) directly measure air- 
borne material emitted from nuclear facilities within the country and (2) measure ground 
contamination caused by etiher an accident within or outside the country. Through a com- 
bination of these systems the environmental measurements aspect of emergency response 
can be handled efficiently. 
Meteorological Measurements 
Two levels of meteorological measurements are suggested for an effective emergency 
response system. These levels are national and local. 
a. National System. This system is normally in-place and is managed by a national 
or federal meteorological service. In most cases hourly or 3 hourly surface wind 
speed and direction, temperature, pressure, humidity, visibility and cloud cover 
observations are reported through the national network to  a central office. In 
addition, 6 or 12 hourly vertical profile measurements of windspeed and direction, 
temperature and moisture are reported through the national network. A computer 
link from the national meteorological service to the central government agency 
responsible for estimating public health effects would be required. Agreements 
and procedures should be developed to increase the measurement frequencey, if 
required, for an accident assessment. 
b. Local System. Each nuclear facility within a given country should provide a mete- 
orological measurement system lbcated near the facility to provide wind speed and 
direction and temperature data. In case of an accident these data would be used 
to  define the path and diffusion characteristics of material as it moves away from 
the nuclear facility into a regional transport and diffusion regime defined by the 
national meteorological network. Data from these local sources would be required 
a t  the government facility responsible for assessing public health and safety as well 
as the local facility changed with implementing immediate actions to protect public 
health. 
Modeling 
The intent of the atmospheric transport and diffusion modeling aspect of this proposal 
is to act as a planning, real-time response and assessment tool (analysis) when effectively 
integrated into the national emergency response system. 
a. Planning. For areas around specific facilities, e.g. nuclear power reactors, modeling 
can be used in conjunction with land use and climatology studies to define mea- 
surement locations that  have a high probability of intercepting material released 
from a particular nuclear site, thus limiting the number of instruments required. 
(e.g., the state of Illinois, USA, has an excellent monitoring system around each 
nuclear power plant site in the state). In addition, if the same or similar model 
is used for the emergency response, then emergency response managers and staff 
members have the benefit of familiarity with the techniques employed for assess- 
ments. This planning activity also can help insure a compatibility between models 
and measurements, e.g. averging times of measurements that are suitable for com- 
paring t o  model calculations. A similar study, on a larger national scale, can be 
used to  define measurement locations for intercepting material, released in other 
countries, that  has crossed the border and poses a potential threat to  public health 
and safety. 
b. Real-Time Emergency Response. Models should be developed or transfered to a 
central agency's computers that  can provide the following functions to  the emer- 
gency response manager or decision member during an emergency: 
Determine the amount of material escaping into the atmosphere (source 
term). 
Provide guidance to  measurement teams as to  where measurements should 
be made. 
Bracket potential consequences using normalized calculations. 
Check consistency of measurements t o  determine extremes 
due t o  either measurement errors or unrepresentativeness of the measurements. 
Interpolate and extrapolate measurements. 
Provide updated time integral for total dose. 
Help implement protective action guidelines; if needed. 
c. Assessments. After an accident has terminated the government and the public 
need t o  know (through the news media) the total effects of the accident on public 
health and safety, and the economic impact. To help estimate the impact on public 
health and safety a combination of dose modeling and measurements is needed for a 
creditable assessment. The credible assessment should be made public by a single- 
government decision maker (e.g., Mr. Harold Denton, USA Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, during the TMI accident). For a radiological accident this assessment 
amounts t o  estimating both individual and person-rem doses for the affected public. 
Computers and Data Handling Systems 
To integrate the components of a national emergency response system into a reliable 
service for public health protection requires the development and implementation of a 
computer network devoted t o  data collection and analysis, model simulations and the 
publishing of health and safety advisories. Such a system could be developed and imple- 
mented largely through the use of technology that is presently available from commercial 
computer and research and development organizations. Attributes of such a system should 
include: 
Real-time Data Transmission 
Data Basing Techniques 
Quality Control Measures 
Analysis Techniques 
Model Simulations 
This system should focus on the integration of modeling and measurements through the 
use of modern analysis and graphical techniques. 
ADVISORIES 
The major output of such a national emergency response system is a series of health 
and safety and economic advisories regarding impacts associated with an industrial ac- 
cident that  releases radioactive (or toxic) material to the environment. These advisories 
should be easily understood by government officials and the public. They should be based 
on the established reference and guidance levels and provided to the public through the 
governmental agency charged with protection of public health. Close cooperation between 
governmental agencies responsible for the technical evaluation and those relaying the as- 
sessments to  the public will ensure a consistent and informative information flow to  the 
public sector through a single voice of authority. 
OTHER USES 
The national emergency response system can be used for other related purposes to 
enhance its utility beyond nuclear accident assessments. A natural extention of this system 
involves the direct inclusion of toxic chemical releases in the emergency planning, response 
and assessment aspects of the system. Although many features of toxic chemical releases 
are different than those for nuclear releases. many similiarities also exist. The release 
and atmospheric disperison of some chemicals can be modeled in a manner similar to 
that  employed for nuclear material while other toxic substances, e.g. heavy gases, could 
require different modeling techniques depending on the particular physics/chemistry of the 
release conditions. On the other hand measurement techniques for detecting an array of 
different toxic chemicals is considerably more complex than techniques used to measure 
radionuclides. 
Another extention includes monitors for measuring air concentrations of conventional 
pollutants which could be celocated with the national monitoring system. These mea- 
surements could be used to establish a baseline (background) for conventional pollutants, 
and then can be used in conjunction with models for future industrial planning and im- 
plementation studies. 
The data base established by this system can be used for managing responses to other 
emergencies, e.g. earthquakes and fires. These data bases can also be used for the  design 
and analysis of railways, communication systems and other studies requiring a knowledge 
of terrain, climatology, geography and river flow rates. 
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2.3. MANAGEMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOLLOWING THE CHERNOBYL 
ACCIDENT IN AUSTRIA 
Franz Schonhofer 
Federal Institute for Food Control and Research, 
Radiation Protection, Vienna, Austria 
Summary: 
- - - - - - - - 
- - - - -   - 
The surveillance systems in Austria are described 
and a survey of data which were collected after the Chernobyl 
accident is given. The countermeasures taken by the Austrian 
Ministry of Health and Environmental Protection are shortly 
reported. Some aspects of the actual management and difficulties 
are discussed. 
1. Surveillance Systems 
....................... 
....................... 
In Austria two networks for surveillance of the environment 
with respect to radioactivity exist. One ("early warning 
system") is based on measurement of the y-dose rate, the 
other one ("surveillance system") on nuclide specific 
analysis of aerosols, precipitation and other media. 
1.1 . "Early Warning System" 
........................... 
........................... 
All over Austria 336 permanent measuring y-dosemeters 
are spread (Fig.1). The measuring range is from natural 
acitivity (in Austria approximately 10 pR/h) to over 
30R/h and is divided into eight distinct ranges. The 
actual range of the y-dose rate is reported on line to 
"warning centers" in the respective county and to a 
"federal warning center". By this system information 
about the approximate distribution of the contamination 
of the country can be obtained and the external doses 
received by the population can be estimated. 
1.2. "Surveillance System" 
.......................... 
.......................... 
The fallout associated with the nuclear weapons tests in 
the late fifties and early sixties gave rise to the in- 
stallation of a surveillance system for environmental 
radioactivity. In 1979 nuclides specific measurements 
were introduced for routine analysis. The aim of this 
system is to monitor the level of artificial radioisotopes 
in the environment on a long term basis, but also to de- 
tect any emission from nuclear power stations in the 
vicinity of the Austrian border and emissions from installations 
of nuclear medicine or Austrian research reactors. One 
important task was to be prepared for nuclear accidents 
or explosions of nuclear devices - which can only be 
achieved when having laboratories doing surveillance work 
continously on a routine basis. 
The location of the sampling stations for aerosols and 
precipitation is given in Fig. 2, for surface water in 
Fig. 3. 
2. Situation in Austria - first measurements of contamination 
............................................................. 
............................................................. 
On the evening of April 28th, 1986 first informations about 
a nuclear accident at Chernobyl were spread by Austrian 
radio and TV. In the morning of April 29th first authentic 
informations about the contamination of air and ground in 
Finland and Sweden were obtained from the respective 
radiation protection institutes. Since information was given 
that the reactor was burning, contamination was likely to 
occur also in Austria at a later time and some kind of 
"first alarm" was given for increased alertness. In the 
early afternoon a small but significant rise of the dose 
rate in Vienna and north-eastern Austria was noticed as 
well as fresh fission products were detected in high 
concentrations in aerosols both in Vienna and Seibersdorf 
(south of Vienna) . 
2.1. Time dependency of contamination of the Austrian 
................................................ EerrIEory-ana-re910naI-aIsEr15uEion------------- 
................................... 
................................... 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the regional distribution of y-dose 
rates in Austria from April 29th, 16 h until April 30th, 22 h. 
Since the dosemeters are nearly exclusively located in the 
vicinity of more densely populated areas and therefore mostly 
in flat land and valleys, the contamination situation in the 
mountains is not reflected. It can be easily seen that 
contamination starte on April 29th afternoon in the north 
eastern part of the country, heading to the south and then 
turning to west. Local showers during early morning on 
April 30th caused in several small areas in the south and 
south west heavy contamination. A second wave arriving on 
April 30th covered mostly the north and north west of 
Austria and added more contamination. Fig. 6 shows the 
observed daily maxima of the dose rates from April 28th to 
May 1st. (Note that the dose rate values for different grey 
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s h a d e s  d i f f e r  from t h o s e  of  F i g .  4 a n d  5  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  
Heavy showers  on May 1 s t  i n  t h e  n o r t h w e s t  ( i n  t h e  c o u n t y  
o f  O b e r o s t e r r e i c h  - Upper A u s t r i a )  l e a d  t o  t h e  h i g h e s t  
c o n t a m i n a t i o n s  i n  A u s t r i a .  Though more c o n t a m i n a t e d  a i r  
m a s s e s  c o n q u e r e d  A u s t r i a  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d a y s ,  t h e  amount o f  
r a d i o n u c l i d e s  d e p o s i t e d  was low compared w i t h  t h e  d e c a y  
of  s h o r t  l i v e d  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s .  A f t e r  a  maximum on 
May 1 s t  a n d  2nd d o s e  r a t e s  d ropped  a n d  had  r e a c h e d  v a l u e s  
o f  less t h a n  50 D R / ~  a t  a l l  s t a t i o n s  by May 2 5 t h .  
From t h e  d a t a  and  t h e  t i m e  dependency o b t a i n e d  it i s  
o b v i o u s  t h a t  h i g h  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  o f  s o i l  and  g r a s s  o c c u r r e d  
when t h e  p a s s a g e  of  c o n t a m i n a t e d  a i r  m a s s e s  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  
heavy r a i n f a l l .  A  compar i son  o f  t h e  map o f  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  
shows f a i r l y  good agreement  w i t h  d a t e  f rom t h e  " e a r l y  
w a r n i n g  s y s t e m " .  
F i g . 7  shows t h e  d o s e  r a t e  a t  a  s t a t i o n  i n  n o r t h - e a s t e r n  
A u s t r i a .  T h e r e  no r a i n  o c c u r e d  a n d  o n l y  a  s m a l l  r ise  was 
o b s e r v e d .  Two d i s t i n c t  p a s s a g e s  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  d r y  d e p o s i t i o n .  I n  Vienna ( F i g .  8 )  a l s o  two d i s t i n c t  
p a s s a g e s  o f  c o n t a m i n a t e d  a i r  c a u s e d  rises,  f o l l o w e d  by 
a  s h a r p  r i s e  on  May 1 s t  a f t e r  a  v e r y  b r i e f  r a i n f a l l .  
O v e r a l l  o n l y  a  f o u r  f o l d  rise o c c u r e d  i n  Vienna t h o u g h  on 
A p r i l  3 0 t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  o f  a i r  i n  whole  o f  
A u s t r i a  was o b s e r v e d  (see 2.2.)  - b u t  it  d i d  n o t  r a i n  d u r i n g  
t h e  c r i t i c a l  t i m e .  A  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  i s  e x h i b i t e d  a t  t h e  
s t a t i o n  on  t o p  of t h e  mounta in  S o n n b l i c k  - 3105 m h i g h ,  i n  
t h e  s o u t h - w e s t  of  A u s t r i a  ( F i g .  9 ) .  A f t e r  a s h a r p  rise on 
A p r i l  3 0 t h  a n o t h e r  c l e a r  peak  i s  o b s e r v e d  on May 3 r d  a n d  
a  s m a l l  b u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  rise on  May 7 t h  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
p a s s a g e s  o f  c o n t a m i n a t e d  a i r  m a s s e s  a t  h i g h  a l t i t u d e  (see 2 . 2 . ) .  
2.2 .  C o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  i n  a i r  
............................................. 
............................................. 
A l r e a d y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t es t  r u n  o f  a  h i g h  volume a e r o s o l  
s a m p l e r  on A p r i l  2 9 t h  e a r l y  a f t e r n o o n  i n  Vienna f r e s h  f i s s i o n  
p r o d u c t s  were  d e t e c t e d  i n  h i g h  amounts .  I n  S e i b e r s d o r f  s o u t h  
ov  Vienna t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  g a s e o u s  r a d i o i o d i n e  was 
d e t e r m i n e d  t o  b e  a b o u t  t w i c e  t h e  a e r o s o l b o u n d  o n e .  I n  F i g .  10 
t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  J-131 and  Cs-137 i n  a e r o s o l s  i n  Vienna 
i s  shown. C l e a r l y  s e v e r a l  d i s t i n c t  p e a k s  c a n  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,  
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the most prominent ones occurring on April 29th and 30th 
(the latter one was the highest value observed in Austria) 
and smaller ones on May 3rd and 7th. In Klagenfurt (Fig. ll), 
south of the Alps a completely different pattern was 
observed with a rise on April 30th, a much slower decrease 
and a small rise on May 7th. 
2.3. Precipitation 
------------------ 
------------------ 
Fig. 12 shows the concentrations of 1-131 and Cs-137 in 
precipitation. The reference date is May 1st. The ratio 
of these radionuclides is in Bregenz, the most western 
sampling station completely different from the others. 
Due to lack of time more than 100 samples of a precipitation 
sampling network have not yet been measured. 
As it has been shown above in the case of dose rates at 
the Sonnblick mountain (2.1.) the pattern of contamination 
was in the mountains different from that in the valleys 
and in flat land. This was confirmed by measuring rain 
and snow samples collected from different heights. Fig. 13 
shows a logarithmic dependency at Rax, a mountain about 
80 km south of Vienna. In other cases it could be observed 
that the contamination level rose with hieght, but de- 
creased after a maximum again. 
3. Conclusions from environmental data 
...................................... 
...................................... 
During the passage of the radioactive clouds data on the 
contamination of air at eight sampling stations were 
available (with some delay), but information on the 
dose rate levels in and near the more densely populated 
areas was available at any moment. These data showed that 
the surface contamination of the Austrian territory was 
extremely inhomogeneous. The dose rates in excess to the 
natural background varied in Austria between 10 ~ R 7 h  to 
260 ~ R 7 h  at maximum on May 1st. From both sorts of data 
inhalation and external doses for the population could be 
calculated. 
4. Countermeasures 
------------------ 
 
Soon it became evident that the by far highest contribution 
to the dose absorbed by the population was to be expected 
from ingestion of contaminated food. 
At the time of the radioactive fallout grass had already 
grown in most parts of the country as well as the grazing 
season had started. Contamination of grass (or hay1 results 
very quickly in contamination of milk especially concerning 
5-131 and (slower) in contamination of meat with radio- 
cesium. Also fresh vegetables like spinach and lettuce were 
contaminated heavily by direct fallout and rainout. 
According to the Austrian radiation protection law any need- 
less exposure to ionizing radiation has to be avoided. The 
maximal permissible dose due to artificial radionuclides 
to the public is limited to 167 mrem per year. The Ministry 
of Health and Environmental Protection aimed in the first 
days after starting of the fallout to limit the dose by 
quick countermeasures toward values below this limit, 
though the radiation protection law is not strictly 
applicable in such a given situation. This was achieved in 
the first, socalled "iodine phase", by forbidding the sale 
of fresh vegetables and rigorous control of milk to ensure 
distribution of milk which was below the limit of 10 nCi/l 
for 5-131 (370 Bq7kg). After about a month this problem 
was over because 5-131 had decayed, but two weeks after 
fallout had started the concentration of Cs-137 and Cs-134 
rose in milk. Due to direct contamination of leaves and 
transport within the plants, vegetables and fruits were 
contaminated. Different pathways as well as extremely in- 
homogeneous geographical and height distribution made 
extensive control1 of food stuff necessary. Limits were 
set. Difficulties in export arose and with respect to 
some fruits and part of food a part of the production 
exceeded the given limits. All the following measurements 
and results on environmental and food samples as well 
as description of all problems arising cannot be discussed 
here and are not the aim of this paper, because what can be 
regarded as the acute crisis was over after about two to four 
weeks. 
5. Management of the consequences - difficulties 
................................................ 
................................................ 
(The following remarks reflect the personal view of the 
author who has been involved partly in compilation of data 
and providing basis for decisions of the Ministry of Health 
and Environmental Protection as well as performing measure- 
ments and has compiled the official report on the impact 
of Chernobyl on Austria.) 
From the description above it can be seen that some 
unofficial warning from other countries was obtained, that 
the contamination situation was very quickly known, that 
lots of data were available on the distribution of 
various radionuclides in environmental samples as well 
as in foodstuff. Excellent equipped laboratories existed 
with enough capacity to handle large numbers of samples. One 
problem was that all laboratories were situated in the east 
and south and transport of samples provided difficulties. 
For handling the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, 
this was only a basic requirement which was not at hand 
in all affected countries. Not lack of measuring capacity 
or too little information and data caused severe difficulties 
but a great variety of factors in the field of communication, 
data transmission, evaluation and political problems, not 
at least public opinion and psychological problems. In 
order to analyse this some basic aspects of the consequences 
of the Chernobyl accident have to be considered. 
. Reacting to a given situation involves several steps and 
many preconditions have to be fulfilled for effective 
management of a crisis. Both national and international 
aspects have to be considered in a case like the Chernobyl 
accident. 
In order to react one has to find out first of all, what 
the situation is like. After careful analysis and assessment 
of possible consequences in all respects there has to be 
decided whether countermeasures are necessary and justified - 
not only health aspects have to be considered, but also 
aspects like public opinion, economical and political con- 
sequences. In case of a decision for countermeasures, the 
most d i f f i c u l t  s t e p  is  t o  dec ide  w h  i c  h  ones  have 
t o  be  t aken .  The same a s p e c t s  a s  above apply  i n  t h i s  s t e p .  
A f o u r t h  s t e p  i s  t o  cove r  a l l  problems which a r i s e  from 
countermeasures  and t o  d e c i d e  when t h e y  should  b e  abandoned. 
5 .1 .  Aspects  a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  
................................... 
................................... 
The Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  showed t h a t  an  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
warning system would have been of g r e a t  advantage  - 
concerning  in fo rma t ion  abou t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  s e v e r e  
a c c i d e n t  occu r red  a s  w e l l  a s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of 
more a c c u r a t e  i n fo rma t ion  abou t  t h e  c i r cums tances .  Con- 
sequences  could  have been e s t i m a t e d  t o  some e x t e n t  f o r  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  advance and more t ime  f o r  p r e p a r i n g  
f o r  d e c i s i o n s  would have been a v a i l a b l e .  In fo rma t ions  
abou t  t h e  con tamina t ion  of Scandinavian  c o u n t r i e s  were 
a v a i l a b l e  soon,  b u t  i n f o r m a t i o n s  came f i r s t  v i a  massmedia 
(SO many s c i e n t i s t s  d i d  n o t  b e l i e v e  them ..... ) o r  v i a  
p r i v a t e  c h a n n e l s  from c o l l e g u e s .  Even i f  d a t a  were t r a n s -  
m i t t e d  by o f f i c i a l  channe l s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  whether  t h e  
competent  a u t h o r i t i e s  were reached quick  enough. 
It can  be  concluded t h a t  a t  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  t h e  
most impor t an t  t h i n g  would be  very  quick  and a s  com- 
p rehens ive  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n fo rma t ion  t o  t h e  competent 
a u t h o r i t i e s  o r  pe r sons .  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  could  be  imagined i n  t h e  
f i e l d  of quick  c a l c u l a t i o n  of d i s p e r s i o n  and d e p o s i t i o n .  
5 . 2 .  Aspec t s  a t  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  
.............................. 
.............................. 
The e x i s t e n c e  of a l a rm sys tems,  equipment and t r a i n e d  
pe r sonne l  p r o v i d e s  a  necessa ry  p r e c o n d i t i o n  a t  a  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l ,  b u t  many more f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c e  how a  c r i s i s  l i k e  
Chernobyl can  be  managed. Som of t h e  f a c t o r s  which caused  
t r o u b l e s  n o t  on ly  i n  A u s t r i a  should  be  mentioned. 
A l l  emergency p l a n s  which may e x i s t  can  on ly  assume c e r t a i n  
t y p e s  of a c c i d e n t s .  I n  A u s t r i a  emergency c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
were mainly d i r e c t e d  towards  an  a c c i d e n t  w i t h  a  s i n g l e  r e -  
l e a s e  i n  a  n u c l e a r  i n s t a l l a t i o n  n e a r  t h e  bo rde r  o r  t h e  c a s e  
of a  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k ,  bo th  r e s u l t i n g  i n  h igh  con tamina t ion  
e i t h e r  i n  a  l i m i t e d  a r e a  o r  a  uniform high con tamina t ion  
1 4 2  
over the whole country. It was not possible to foresee a 
situation like Chernobyl - continous (and varying) releases 
over about two weeks, uncertain future weather conditions, 
which made any precise prediction of the development 
of contamination of air, soild and food impossible and as 
a result an extremely ununiform deposition all over the 
country. In this respect the lack of a rigid detailed 
emergency plan which could have been followed strictly was 
no drawback. The number of radiation protection experts 
within the authorities was too low, because no nuclear power 
station is operating in Austria and naturally the probability 
of a severe accident like Chernobyl had been regarded as 
too unlikely to build up a big emergency organization with 
continous preparedness only for a purpose like this. This 
lack could be overcome by special efforts of the people 
involved. But everybody has a limited capacity for work and 
simply needs some rest after days of continous work, not 
to talk about the difficulties which stess puts for 
personal communication and ability to judge a situation 
correctly. More "human factors" like several personal 
interests of people involved occurr. Data transmission 
and evaluation provided difficulties - simply because 
telephone lines were blocked by the public and because 
too many data were transmitted by too many people and 
organisatons it was difficult to sort out the relevant ones. 
By giving information to the public analytical work on 
important samples was hindered. 
Difficulties with public opinion were clearly caused 
also by reports in the mass media, which gave the impression 
that risk was much higher than the authorities admitted. 
Easy to follow recommendations of the authorities to 
limit exposure to even lower levels were misinterpreted 
in the way that the situation was really very dangerous. 
The absolut correct mean values of contamination published 
by the authorities were doubted by several newspapers 
presenting data of selected samples from highly contaminated 
ares. 
Different opinions of experts published by papers led 
to even more confusion of the public. "Experts" presented 
measurement results which were achieved with absolute un- 
sufficient methods and instruments. 
It can be concluded that the management of the acute 
phase during May 1986 was possible due to several circum- 
stances: There was no acute danger, but it was even possible 
to reduce the absorbed dose considerably by rather simple 
countermeasures. Most difficulties could be overcome by 
the flexibility and personalefforts of the motivated and 
unselfish persons involved. 
It is the authors point of view that avoidance of r i s k 
from radioactivity was only one part and aspect of the con- 
siderations which had to be taken into account. At least a 
similar important role played also economic, political and 
psychological considerations. 
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Fig. 5: y-dose rate distribution in Austria, 
April 30th, 8h until April 30th, 22 h 
F i g .  7 :  Time dependency of  dos e  r a t e s  a t  P o y s d o r f ,  
n o r t h  e a s t e r n  A u s t r i a  
F i g .  8: Time dependency  o f  dos e  r a t e s  i n  Vienna 
150 
Fig. 9: Time dependency of dose rates at the mountain 
Sonnblick, south west Austria, 3105 m altitude 
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Fig. 13: Dependency of radiocesium contamination on 
height, Rax, May 4th, 1986 
2.4. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
L. B. Sztanyik 
"Frbderic Joliot-Curie" National Research Institute 
for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene, Budapest, Hungary 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Mankind was e v e r  e x p o s e d  t o  v a r i o u s  h a r m f u l  f a c t o r s  o f  
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .  H e  had t o  c o n t e n d  n o t  o n l y  w i t h  n a t u r a l  c a t a s -  
t r o p h e s ,  b u t  a l s o  w i t h  n u t r i t i o n a l  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  n a t u r a l  a i r  
a n d  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n s ,  p o i s o n o u s  c h e m i c a l s  i n  mushrooms a n d  many 
o t h e r  f o o d s t u f f s ,  a l l e r g i e s  t o  s u c h  a g e n t s  a s  r agweed  p o i l e n ,  
i n f e c t i o u s  and p a r a s i t i c  d i s e a s e s .  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
h a s  b r o u g h t  some a d d i t i o n a l  u n d e s i r a b l e  e f f e c t s .  The g r i m  f a c -  
t o r y  towns  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  c o n s u n e 5  men j u s t  a s  
s u r e l y  a s  t h e  c o t t o n  f i e l d s  a n d  c o a l  n i n e s  d i d  1 1 1 .  
Every  a g e  h a s  i t s  own t y p i c a l  h a z a r d .  
R a d i a t i o n  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  modern e n v i r o n m e c t a l  c o n t a r . i n a n x s  
t c  a r o u s e  a  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  a n x i e t y .  I t  i s  a n  u n f a ~ . i l i a r  tf- ,reat  
t n a t  i s  unsee:. and u n f e l t ,  a n d  wor ldwide  i n  i t s  c i s t r i b n t i o n .  
I t  i s  a f a , z t o r  c a p a b l e  o f  c a u s i n g  a c u t e  d e a t h s ,  inc iuc ing  c a n c e r  
i n  t w e n t y  o r  t h i r t y  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  and e v e n  h e r e d i t a r y  harr;. w h i c t  
r ,&y  b e  e x p r e s o e c  f o r  many g e n e r a t i o n s  t o  come / 2 / . 
T h i s  p u h l i c  a n x i e t y  i s  t h e  n a i ~  r e a s o n  why t h e  n n c l e a r  e n -  
e r g y  i n d u s t r y  h a s  p a i d  a n  e x c e p t i o n a l  and e x e m p l a r y  - f o r  o t h e r  
b r a n c h e s  o f  i n d u s t r y  - a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  t a s k  o f  e n s u r i n g  ad-  
e q u a t e  s a f e t y  and e n v i r o n n e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  f rom t h e  v e r y  b e g i n n -  
i n g  o f  i t s  deve lopment .  
1. A c c e p t a b l e  r i s k  o f  r a d i a t i o n  e f f e c t s  
R i s k  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  a  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  and s e v e r i t y  
-
o f  h a m ,  t o  human h e a l t h .  N o t h i n g  c a n  b e  a b s o l u t e l y  f r e e  o f  r i s k .  
A t h i n g  i s  s a f e  i f  i t s  r i s k s  a r e  judged  t o  b e  a c c e p t a b l e .  T h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n  i m ~ l i e s  t h a t  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i s 7 i t i e s  a r e  r e q u i r e ?  f c r  
d e t e r m i n i n 5  ~ D V :  s a f e  t h i n g s  a r e :  m e a s u r i n a  t h e  r i s k ,  an o b j e c t i v e  
b u t  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  p e r s u i t ;  and j u d g i n g  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h a t  r i s k ,  a  m a t t e r  o f  p e r s o n a l  and s o c i a l  v a l u e  judgement .  
I n  r a d i a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n  p r a c t i c e ,  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  r i s k  
h a s  been d e f i n e d  by  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commission o n  Radio- 
l o g i c a l  P r o t e c t i o n  a s  f o l l o w s :  
"The Commission b e l i e v e s  t h a t  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e  
a  v a l i d  method f o r  j u d g i n g  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
r i s k  i n  r a d i a t i o n  work i s  by comparing t h e  r i s k  w i t h  t h a t  f o r  
o t h e r  o c c u p a t i o n s  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  h a v i ng  h i g h  s t a n d a r d s  o f  
s a f e t y ,  which a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  t h o s e  i n  which t h e  
av e r ag e  a n n u a l  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e  due t o  o c c u p a t i o n a l  h a z a r d s  does  
n o t  ex ceed  
"From a  r e v i e w  o f  a v a i l a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l a t e d  t o  r i s k s  
r e g u l a r l y  a c c e p t e d  i n  ev e ry da y  l i f e ,  it c a n  b e  c on c l u de d  t h a t  
t h e  l e v e l  o f  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  f o r  f a t a l  r i s k s  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  pub- 
l i c  i s  an  o r d e r  o f  magnitucie lower t ha n  f o r  o c c u p a t i o n a l  r i s k s .  
-
On t h i s  b a s i s ,  a  r i s k  i n  t h e  r a ng e  o f  t o  i0-5 p e r  y e a r  
would be l i k e l y  t o  b e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  any i n d i v i d u a l  member o f  
t h e  p a b l i c .  " 
I n  i t s  b a s i c  fo rm,  t h e  r i s k  approach t o  s e t t i n g  r a d i a t i o n  
p r o t e c t i o n  s t a n d a r d s  may b e  fo rmu l a t e d  a s  f c l l o w s  : 
Exposure l i m i t  = Ac c e p t a b l e  r i s k  Risk  p e r  u n i t  e x p o s u r e  
Up t o  t h e  en d  o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 f s ,  it was e s t a b l i s h e C i  t h a t  some 
r a d i a t i o n  e f f e c t s  / a c u t e  m o r t a l i t y ,  s k i n  b u r n s ,  impai rment  o f  
f e r t i l i t y ,  etc.1 h ad  a  g e n u i n e  t h r e s h o l d  s o  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  b e  
c o m p l e t e l y  p r e v e n t e d  by s e t t i n g  do se  l i m i t s  be low t h i s  l e v e l .  
T h ese  a r e  now r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  n o n - s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s ,  t h e  s e v e r -  
i t y  o f  which v a r i e s  w i t h  d ose .  No t r u e  t h r e s h o l d  c o u l d  be  e s t a b -  
l i s h e d  f o r  some l a t e  s o m a t i c  and h e r e d i t a r y  c o nse qu e n c e s  f o r  
which t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o c c u r r e n c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  s e v e r i t y  was 
r e g a r d e d  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  d o s e .  The l a t t e r  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s .  Of t h e s e ,  c a r c i n o g e n e s i s  i s  considered t o  be 
t h e  c h i e f  s o m a t i c  r i s k  o f  i r r a d i a t i o n  a t  l o w  d o s e s  a nd ,  t h e r e -  
f o r e ,  t h e  main p ro b l em i n  r a d i a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n .  
The r i s k  o f  s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s  p e r  u n i t  e x p o s u r e  h a s  
b e e n  a d e q u a t e l y  s t u d i e d  and e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  human ep idemio-  
l o g i c a l  s t u d i e s  o v e r  t h e  p a s t  25-30 y e a r s  / 3 / .  
The d o s e  l i m i t s  recommended by t h e  c o m p e t e n t  i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  b o d i e s  a r e  d e f i n e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a b s o l u t e  s a f e g u a r d s  
a g a i n s t  a l l  i m m e d i a t e ,  n o n - s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s  o f  r a d i a t j o n  
and  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e l a y e d ,  s t o c h a s t i c  c o n s e -  
q u e n c e s  / c a n c e r ,  l e u k e m i a ,  g e n e t i c  harm/ t o  t h e  l e v e l  b e l i e v e d  
t o  be a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  w o r k e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  members o f  t h e  
p u b l i c .  
2 .  Risk  u n d e r  normal  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  
I n  o p e r a t i o n ,  a  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t  p r o d u c e s  huge q u a n -  
t i t i e s  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  l i m i t  t h e  r i s k  
c a u s e d  by t h e s e  s u b s t a n c e s  and t h e i r  r a d i a t i o n  t o  a  l e v e l  which 
i s  a c c e p t a b l e  b o t h  f o r  t h e  w o r k e r s  i n  t h e  p l a n t  and f o r  t h e  
p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e ,  e v e r y  measure  must be  t a k e n  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  - 
- t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  d e s i g n  p r o v i d e s  a d e q u a t e  b a r r i e r s  t o  
c o n t a i n  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s  p r o d u c e d  and  s u f f i c i e a t  
shielding t o  a b s o r b  t h e  r a d i a t i o n  e m i t t e d ;  
- t h e  site s e l e c t e z  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  r e c e i v i n g  r a d i o a c t i v e  
d i s c h a r g e s  w i t h o u t  a p p r e c i a b l e  r i s k  f o r  t h e  p u S l i c ;  
- t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and m a n u f a c t u r e  a r e  i n  keep in ;  wit?.  
t h e  d e s i g n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and accompanied by a p p r o p r l z t e  
q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l s ;  
- t h e  s a f e t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  c a r e f u l l y  f u l f i l l e c  d u r i r . ~  
comrniss ioninq and  m a i n t a i n e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  e n t i r e  o w e r a t i - "  ".. 
1 4 1  
The mos t  i m p o r t a n t  measures  t o  b e  t a k e n  a r e :  
- s e t t i n g  up p r o t e c t i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  
- l i c e n s i n g  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  and  p r o c e s s e s ,  
- r e g u l a t o r y  c o n t r o l  o f  a c t i v i t y ,  
- m o n i t o r i n g  and  m a i n t a i n i n g  s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  
- e d u c a t i o n  o f  w o r k e r s  and t h e  p u b l i c .  
I n  Hungary ,  d o s e  limits f o r  w o r k e r s  employed i n  n u c l e a r  
e n e r g y  a p p l i c a t i o n s  and f o r  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  l a r g e  h a v e  b e e n  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h  w i t h  d u e  a c c o u n t  g i v e n  
t o  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  r a d i a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n  l a i d  
down by t h e  ICRP i n  i t s  recommenda t ions  o f  1 9 7 7  / 5 /  and  by t h e  
IAEA, ILO, OECD NEA and WHO i n  t h e  B a s i c  S a f e t y  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  
R a d i a t i o n  P r o t e c t i o n  i n  1982 161. Based on  t h e  d o s e  l i m i t s ,  
r e l e a s e s  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  e f f l u e n t s  f r o m  t h e  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t  
i n t o  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  h a v e  a l s o  been  r e g u l a t e d .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s  " e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  e x p o s u r e s  o f  any  i n -  
d i v i d u a l  member o f  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s  re- 
l e a s e d  u n d e r  n o r m a l  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  f rom a  n u c l e a r  power 
p l a n t  o f  1000 m / e /  i n s t a l l e d  c a p a c i t y  mus t  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a n  
a n n u a l  e f f e c t i v e  d o s e  e q u i v a l e n t  e x c e e d i n g  0 , 2 5  mSv, o f  which 
213  may b e  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  a i r b o r n e  and 1 1 3  o f  l i q u i ?  r e -  
l e a s e s .  
T h i s  a p p r o a c h  r e l a t e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  e x p o s u r e  / i . e .  r i s k /  
assumed by  i n d i v i d u a l  member o f  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  
e l e c t r i c  e n e r g y  / i . e .  b e n e f i t  r e c e i v e d  by t h e  s o c i e t y /  and a l s o  
makes a l l o w a n c e  f o r  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  171 .  
M o n i t o r i n g  o f  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  i r ;  t h e  e f f l u e n t s  and t h e  e n -  
v i r o n m e n t  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  b o t h  t h e  n u c l e a r  p o x e r  p l a n t  
and  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Of t h e s e ,  a i r b o r n e  d i s c h a r g e s  
are c o n t r o l l e d  by  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Bureau  o f  E n v i r 3 n m e n t a l  P r o t e c -  
t i o n  and N a t u r e  C o n s e r v a t i o n ,  l i q u i d  d i s c h a r g e s  by t h e  K z t i o n z l  
Bureau  o f  Wate r  Economy, r a d i a t i o n  l e v e l s  and  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  by  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h ,  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and 
f o o d  p r o d u c t s  by t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  Food I n d u s t r y .  
T h i s  s t a t e  c o n t r o l  i s  i n  f a c t  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h a t  o f  t h e  o p e r -  
a t o r  and  i t s  p r i m a r y  a im i s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l s  
a r e  e f f e c t e d  a n d  t o  c h e c k  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
Da ta  p r o v i d e d  by  t h e  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t  i t s e l f ,  and  by t h e  
c o m ~ e t e n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  c o l l e c t e d  and c o l l a t e d ,  p r o c e s s e d ,  
e v a l u a t e d  a n d  s t o r e d  by  t h e  D a t a  C o l l e c t i n g ,  P r o c e s s i n g  and 
E v a l u a t i n g  C e n t r e  o p e r a t e d  by o u r  i n s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  Envi ronment -  
a 1  R a d i a t i o n  P r o t e c t i o n  S u r v e i l l a n c e  S y s t e m  o f  t h e  Author -  
i t i e s  IERPSSAI.  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  m o n i t o r i n g  r e s u l t s  o f  1985 ,  t h e  t o t a l  
a i r b o r n e  r e l e a s e  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  n o b l e  g a s e s ,  a n d  p a r t i c u l a t e s  
c o n t a i n i n g  i o d i n e  a n d  s t r o n t i u m  i s o t o p e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  less t h a n  
o n e  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i z e d  l i m i t .  G r o s s  b e t a  a c t i v i t y  o f  
l i q u i d  r e l e a s e s  d i d  n o t  e x c e e d  10 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i z e d  
l i m i t .  R e l e a s e  o f  tritium w i t h  l i q u i d  e f f l u e n t s  amounted t o  
a b o u t  9  TBq, which  i s  somewhat more r h a n  50% o f  t h e  a u t h o r -  
i z e d  l i n i t  115 TBqI. 
Maximum a n n u a l  whole  body d o s e s  r e c e i v e d  by i n d i v i d u a l  
mernbers o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g  a r e a  due  t c  t h e  
r a a i o a c t i v e  d i s c h a r g e s  f r o m  t h e  n u c l e a r  power s t a t i o n  i n t o  
t h e  e n v i r o ~ ~ e n t  were  c a l c u l a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  m o n i t o r i n g  
d a t a ,  p r e v a i l i n g  m e t e o r o l o g i c a l  p a r a m e t e r s  and w i t h  t h e  u s e  
o f  t h e  AIREN programme. The maxi mu^. i n d i v i d u a l  d o s e  o f  l e s s  
t h a n  0 , 3 5  uSv r e c e i v e d  a t  a  d i s t a n c e  o f  a b o u t  0 , 5  kr.  f r o 7  
t h e  s i t e  i s  z n e g l i q i b l e  i n c r e m e n t  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  d o s e  o f  
a b o u t  1 nSv r e c e i v e d  f r o r .  n a t u r a l  e n 1 7 i r o n m e n t a l  s o u r c e s .  ~ k 1 . e  
c o l l e c t i v e  d o s e  o f  t h e  p o p c l a t i o n  l i l ~ i n ~  i r .  t h e  a r e a  o f  2 3  kr: 
-, 
r a 2 i u c  was found. t o  be less t h a i ~  0 , 5 5 . 1 ~ 1 - '  ma>-Sv 18,'. 
Because  o f  t h e  s y s t e ~  o f  c o n t r o l  a p p l i e d  t o  e n v i r o n m e x t -  
a 1  r e l e a s e s  f rom n u c l e a r  power i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  doses t o  i n d i v i -  
d u a l  menbers  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  w e l l  below t h e  r e l -  
e v a r L t  d o s e  l i m i t s  and  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  l o x  l e v e l s  o f  r i s k .  I n Z i -  
v i d u a l  d o s e  l e v e l s  d e c r e a s e  r a p i d l y  w i t h  d i s c a n c e  frorr. a  g i v e n  
s o u r c e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  v a l u e s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  e f f e c t i v e  d o s e  e q u i v -  
a l e n t  p e r  u n i t  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  e n e r g y  g e n e r a t e d  t h u s  r e m a i n  l o o  / 9 i .  
3 .  R i s k  i n  a c c i d e n t a l  s i t u a t i o n s  
D e s p i t e  a l l  t h e  p r e c a u t i o n s  s p e c i f i e d  and  imposed ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a c c i d e n t s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  human e r r o r  o r  d e f e c t .  
i n  t h e  e q u i p m e n t  c a n n o t  b e  e x c l u d e d  by  a b s o l u t e  c e r t a i n t y .  
D u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  n u c l e a r  p l a n t s  c a n  g i v e  r i s e  t o  a c c i d e n t s  of 
a  p e r f e c t l y  c o n v e n t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a c c o u n t  must  
be  t a k e n  o f  t h e  r i s k  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  h a n d l i n g  o f  l a r o e  
m a s s e s  o f  w a t e r  a n d  s t e a m  a t  h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s  a n d  p r e s s u r e s .  
The s p e c i f i c  f e a t u r e  o f  n u c l e a r  p l a n t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e  p o s s i -  
b i l i t y  o f  damage c a u s e d  by r a d i o a c t i v e  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t  f r o m  a s e r i o u s  f a i l u r e  141.  
I n  t h e  case o f  a c c i d e n t s  and e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t a m i n a t i o n ,  
when e x p o s u r e s  may n o t  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  
d o s e  l i m i t s  ceases t o  be  m e a n i n g f u l .  I n s t e a d ,  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n s  ar i se ,  s u c h  as t h e  n e e d  t o  b a l a n c e  t h e  r i s k  f r o m  r a d i -  
a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s k s  f r o m  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s  o r  
i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  The t y p e  o f  a c t i o n  which  i s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  re- 
d u c i n g  t h e  e x p o s u r e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
v a r i e s  w i d e l y  d e p e n d i n g  o n  l o c a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  The m i t i g a t i o n  o f  
e x p o s u r e  f r o m  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r a d i o a c t i v e  c o n t a m i m t s  m i g h t  
r e q u i r e ,  e . g .  s h e l t e r i n g ,  s t a b l e  i o d i n e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  e v a c u -  
a t i o n ,  o r  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  f o o d  s u p p l i e s .  I n  s o r e  c i r c u r -  
s t a n c e s  s u c h  a c t i o n s  m i g h t  h a v e  f a r  r e a c h i n g  e f f e c t s  and i m -  
p o s e  new r i s k s  o n  t h e  community,  t h a t  c o u l d  be  p r e d i c t e d  o n l y  
v e r y  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  / l o / .  
Temporary i n t e r v e n t i o n  l e v e l s  f o r  n u c l e a r  a c c i d e n t s  were  
i n t r o d u c e d  i n  Hungary i n  1 9 8 0  and  amended i n  1 9 8 5  1121 .  
I n  a  r e c e n t  a c c i d e n t  a t  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  n u c l e a r  power s t z -  
t i o n  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s  have  e s c a p s s  
 fro^. t h e  damaged r e a c t o r  a n d  c a u s e 6  a s i g n i f i c a n t  e n v i r o n m e n t -  
a l  c o n t a r h i n a t i o n  o v e r  a l m o s t  a l l  o f  E u r o p e .  Some o f  t h e  e x p e r i -  
e n c e s  o b t a i n e d  by u s  i n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  t h i s  a c c i d e n t  a r e  
s w a r i z e d  h e r e  b r i e f l y  1111 .  
I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a t m o s p h e r i c  n u c l e a r  weapon t es t s  
a f t e r  t h e  2nd w o r l d  w a r ,  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m o n i t o r i n g  ne twork  
was set  up  i n  Hungary a t  t h e  beginning o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 s .  S i n c e  
t h a t  t i m e ,  a i r b o r n e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  h a s  b e e n  measured  by  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  M e t e o r o l o g i c a l  S e r v i c e ,  s u r f a c e  a n d  d r i n k i n g  w a t e r s  
monitored by t h e  N a t i o n a l  Wate r  A u t h o r i t y ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and  
f o o d  p r o d u c t s  by t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  Food I n d u s t r y ,  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l e v e l s  o f  r a d i a t i o n  and r a d i o a c t i v i t y  i n  g e n e r a l  
by t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h .  S e p a r a t e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m o n i t o r i n g  
s y s t e m s  were  e s t a b l i s h e d  a r o u n d  t h e  C e n t r a l  P h y s i c a l  R e s e a r c h  
I n s t i t u t e  i n  1959  and t h e  P a k s  N u c l e a r  Power S t a t i o n  i n  1980 .  
A l l  t h e s e  componen ts  and s u b s y s t e m s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  n a t i o n w i d e  
m o n i t o r i n g  n e t w o r k  t h a t  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  d e t e c t i n g  and m e a s u r i n g  
l e v e l s  o f  r a d i a t i o n  and r a d i o a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  b o t h  
u n d e r  normal  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  and i n  a c c i d e n t a l  s i t u -  
a t i o n s .  
The r a d i o l o g i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  C h e r n o b y l  a c c i d e n t  
were  f o l l o w e d  and a s s e s s e d  b y  t h i s  n e t w o r k  u n d e r  t h e  s u p e r -  
v i s i o n  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  commi t tee  made u p  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  t h e  c o m p e t e n t  n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and  i t s  a d v i s o r y  body 
1121. The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  m o n i t o r i n g  were  r e g u -  
l a r l y  communicated t o  t h e  IAEA, t h e  R e g i o n a l  O f f i c e  f o r  E u r o p e  
o f  hXO, and t o  t h e  governments  o f  t h e  n e i g h b o u r i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
s i n c e  t h e  1st o f  May, 1986 .  
T r a c e  amounts  o f  1-131, I/Te-132 and Cs-137 r a d i o i s c t o p e s  
w e r e  f i r s t  d e t e c t e d  i n  a e r o s o l  s a m p l e s  t a k e n  i n  t h e  morn ing  
o f  29 A p r i l .  I n  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  30 A p r i l  t o  10 Nay, t h r e e  s u b s e -  
q u e n t  p e a k s  i n  a e r o s o l  a c t i v i t y  w e r e  d e t e c t e d :  be tween  50 A p r i l  
and 2  May, o n  3-4 Kay and  7-9 May. I n  t h e  a r e a  o f  B u d a p e s t ,  
maxim7m c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  1-131 i n  a e r o s o l  and v a p o u r  wEre 
f o u n d  t o  b e  a b o u t  4 an6  10 ~ ~ . m - ~  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e a k ,  and 
a b o u t  2 and 7  B~  IT!-^ i n  t h e  t h i r d .  p e a k ,  r e s p e c t i v ~ l l , .  T~-,E 
s e c o n d  peak  was o n l y  s i a n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n  p a r t  o i  t h e  
c o u n t r y .  
A f r a c t i o n  o f  a i r b o r n e  p a r t i c u l a t e s  and r a d i o i o d l n s  vapD.;1- 
s e t t l e d  down t o  t h e  g round  s u r f a c e  by  wash-ou t  and d r y - o u t .  Ir. 
a c c o r d a n c e  t o  t h e  r a i n f a l l  p a t t e r n s  o f  t h a t  p e r i o d ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  
f a l l - o u t  a c t i v i t i e s  were  d e t e c t e d  i n  t h e  n o r t h e r n  and  n o r t h -  
w e s t e r n  r e g i o n s  be tween  29 A p r i l  and 3 May, w h i l e  somewhat low- 
e r  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  t h e  s o u t h e r n  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  o n  8-9 Flay. 
From 10 May, t h e  f a l l - o u t  a c t i v i t y  d e c r e a s e d  t o  a  n e g l i g i b l e  
l e v e l .  C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,  t h e  g round  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  l e v e l s  a s  w e l l  
as t h e  gamma d o s e  r a t e s  measured  i n  f r e e  a i r  a t  1 rn above  t h e  
g round  s u r f a c e  were  t h e  h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  n o r t h e r n  and n o r t h -  
w e s t e r n  r e g i o n s .  
No s i g n i f i c a n c t  c o n t a m i n a t i o n s  were  d e t e c t e z  i n  s u r f a c e  
and d r i n k i n g  w a t e r s .  About 40 s t a t i o n s  of  t h e  na t ionwide  
mon i to r ing  network and 1 0  s p e c i a l l y  equipped  l a b o r a t o r i e s  o f  
r e s e a r c h  c e n t r e s  and u n i v e r s i t i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and food  p r o d u c t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  m i l k ,  meat ,  
f r u i t  and v e g e t a b l e s .  S i m i l a r l y  t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o b t a i n e d  
from t h e  a tmosphe r i c  and ground s u r f a c e  measurements ,  v a r i o u s  
r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  c o u l d  c l e a r l y  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from 
t h e  p o i n t  of  view o f  con tamina t ion  l e v e l s  o f  f o o d - s t u f f s .  
Maximum a c t i v i t y  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  on v e g e t a b l e s  were found on 3  
May. I n  m i l k ,  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of  1-131 reached  maximum v a l u e s  
between t h e  2nd and 12th of  May, depending on t h e  r e g i o n  con- 
ce rne2 .  H ighes t  a c t i v i t y  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  Cs-134 and Cs-137 
i n  milk were obse rved  towards  t h e  end of  May. 
Based on t h e  r e s u l t s  of  env i ronmen ta l  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  r a d i -  
a t i o n  and r a d i o a c t i v i t y  l e v e l s ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  measures  were 
t a k e n  and a d v i c e s  t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  g iven :  
- t h e  use of s u r f a c e  w a t e r  f r o r .  t h e  Danube a s  a  dr inkin :  
w a t e r  supp ly  f o r  Budapest  was s topped ,  
- g r a z i n g  o f  cows was p r o h i b i t e s  f o r  t h e  l a r g e  s t a t e  f a r n n  
and a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  
- po ta s s ium i o d a t e  t a b l e t s  were p repa red  aad  s t o c k p i l e i i ,  
- peop le  were a d v i s e d  t h a t  i n t a k e  o f  s t a b l e  i o o i n e  p r e -  
p a r a t i o n s  was u n j u s t i f i e c i  and unneces sa ry ,  
- peop le  were a d v i s e d  t o  consume milk and milk p r o d u c t s  
c o l l e c t e d ,  b l ended ,  c o n t r o l l e d  and p u t  on t h e  marke t  by t h e  
d a i r y  i n d u s t r y ,  
- peop le  were informed t h a t  work and e n t e r t a i n m e n t  o u t -  
d o o r s  were s a f e  and s h e l t e r i n g  was u n j u s t i f i e d ,  
- pregnan t  women were informed t h a t  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  e n v i r o n -  
irental r a d i a t i o n  and r a d i o a c t i v e  con tamina t ion  were n o t  h igh  
enough t o  j u s t i f y  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  pregnancy.  
P r e l i m i n a r y  e s t i m a t e s  o f  exposure  show t h a t  r a d i o a c t i v e  
con tamina t ion  o f  Hungary from t h e  a e m o b y l  a c c i d e n t  h a s r e s u l t -  
e d  i n  an ave rage  t o t a l  / e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l /  e f f e c t i v e  dose  
e q u i v a l e n t  o f  abou t  1 nSv. T h i s  v a l u e  ma)? v a r y  by a  f a c t o r  of  
2  i n  bo th  d i r e c t i o n s ,  depending  on t h e  age and l o c a t j o n  of  
t h e  people  concerned .  
C o n c l u s i o n s  
1. I t  m u s t  b e  k e p t  i n  mind t h a t  n o t  a l l  h a z a r d s  a r e  manmade. 
Humankind was a l w a y s  e x p o s e d  t o  n a t u r a l  t h r e a t s ,  b u t  it i s  
t r u e  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  may b r i n g  some a d d i t i o n -  
a l  d a n g e r .  
2.  R isk  i s  i n s e p a r a b l e  f rom l i f e .  I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  however ,  
t h a t  s o c i e t a l  b e n e f i t  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  a  g i v e n  p r a c t i c e  s h o u l d  
e x c e e d  t h e  d i m e n s i o n  o f  r i s k .  
3 .  F u r t h e r  u s e  o f  n u c l e a r  power a s  a  m a j o r  s o u r c e  o f  e n e r g y  
i s  d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  a c t i o n s  i n t e n d e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  h i g h e s t  
p o s s i b l e  l e v e l  o f  s a f e t y  u n d e r  normal  o p e r a t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  
anC t o  improve  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  a c c i d e n t a l  
s i t u a t i o n s .  
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I n  modern s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e r e  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e n t i o n  g i v e n  t o  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  a n d  t h e  p l a n n i n g  f o r  emergencies .  Emergencies ,  s i m p l y  d e f i n e d ,  
are t h o s e  e v e n t s  which c a n n o t  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  by o r d i n a r y  measures  o r  
r o u t i n e s .  The n o t i o n  o f  p l a n n i n g  f o r  emergenc ie s  h a s  been  more r e c e n t l y  
e x t e n d e d  t o  d i s r u p t i o n s  i n  t h e  s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  w i t h i n  s o c i e t i e s .  
A good c a s e  c a n  be  made t h a t  s u c h  e v e n t s  d e r i v e d  f rom t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s  
w i l l  become t h e  n n a t u r a l "  d i s a s t e r s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e .  Even w i t h  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
c o n c e r n  w i t h  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s ,  however, t h e r e  is  stil l  a t e n d e n c y  t o  
examine them o n l y  as f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s y s t e m s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  s e e  
. . 
them as embedded i n  v a r i o u s  s o c i a l  sys t ems ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  o f  t h e  work 
f o r c e  a n d  o f  t h e  community c o n t e x t  o f  p l a n t s .  
T h e r e  c u r r e n t l y  e x i s t s  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  body o f  knowledge accumula ted  
o v e r  t h e  last  s e v e r a l  d e c a d e s  which h a s  been conce rned  w i t h  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  
b e h a v i o r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  e m e r g e n c i e s .  Even when t h e  " c a u s e s n  o f  t h e  p r e c i p a -  
t a t i n g  e v e n t  d i f f e r ,  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  u n i f o r m i t y  i n  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  
s o c i a l  sys t ems .  Some o f  t h o s e  u n i f o r m i t i e s  w i l l  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  h e r e  i n  
relation to response to technological risk. Of particular importance are 
assumptions which are made in planning. The whole notion of emergency 
planning, although oriented toward significant changes in the physical and 
material environment, is based on actions and activities in the social 
environment. Given that premise, there are certain persistent problems and 
principles which apply. 
1.  
routines. Most emergency planning anticipates new dramatic and unfamiliar 
situations. It also assumes that "emergencies" will be characterized by new 
and dramatic behavior and by significant social disorganization. In fact, 
the differentiation between emergencies and non-emergencies is often slight 
and requires social definition, not simply the observation of simplistic 
physical clues. Physical indications are initially usually "normalized".and 
discounted. Suspicious dial readings are attributed to malfunctioning of 
the dials, rather than to an accurate reading of internal malfunctioning of 
production. This also suggests that planning documents which make subtle 
distinctions between degrees of emergencies will often eventuate in 
attention being given to taxonomy rather than to the continual monitoring 
of threat. 
A derivative of the principle is that, planning should be based on 
what people are likely to do in an emergency, rather than trying to get 
people to behave according to plan. By contrast, a careful examination of 
planning documents usually reveals that assumptions are built in to create 
radically x u  znd u n f a ~ i l i a r  b ~ h a v i z r s .  I n  addition, most organizational 
plans are oriented toward making the emergency most convenient for the 
planning organization. 
2. Current models of emergency planninq contain a number of 
problematic assumptions. Much emergency planning is predicated on the 
assumption that emergencies create severe disruptions in the social systems 
which reduce their capacity to effectively respond. Planning efforts then 
focus on the development of mechanisms to control maladaptive behavior and 
to create ad hoc structures to replace natural ones. Ruth of that effort is 
directed toward "strengtheningn authority, since it is assumed that disaster 
agents severely weaken social structure and this needs to be overcome. The 
outcome usually created is some version of what is termed command and 
control. These structures are created to locate centralized communication 
and information systems to collect information which will a l l w  for 
centralized decision making. 
A more realistic behavioral assumption than the disintegrating effects 
on behavior by emergencies is the continuity of behavior. This means that 
the easy resolution of existing complexities in authority patterns will not 
be easily accomplished; that the centralization of communication may lead on 
the one hand to cause significant information to be lost in the new system 
and, on the other hand* to insure a rather meaningless information overload. 
In effect* a command and control model insures a "command post" view of the 
emergency which is more likely to be isolated from reality than it will be 
buffered from diversion. The fact that command and control models do not 
work well is usually attributed by their desig~ers to the stupidity of the 
participants rather than to question the desic~. In the technological 
systems, ,just as in the complex environments of community systems, the focus 
would be on the design for coordination by feedback to various elements in 
the system, rather than by one directional information flow toward one 
isolated location. 
3. I t  i s  impor tant  t o  g ive a t t e n t i o n  t o  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
emerqency p lann inq and emerqency manmaqement. I t  may be important t o  make 
t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  even though there i s  an obvious r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
planning and management. While poor planning i n e v i t a b l y  leads t o  poor 
management, good p lann ing does not  necessar i ly  l ead  t o  good management. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  intended here i s  s i m i l a r  t o  the  one m i l i t a r y  makes between 
s t ra tegy and t a c t i c s .  Strategy, i n  general, has reference t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  
approach t o  a problem, bu t  t a c t i c s  r e f e r s  t o  s i t u a t i o n a l  adjustments which 
have t o  be made t o  achieve the object ive.  Most t a c t i c a l  elements, however, 
can a l s o  be ant ic ipated.  O f  p a r t i c u l a r  importance i s  a d i f fe rence between 
aqent-qenerated demands and response-qenerated demands. Not a l l  problems 
stem from t h e  e f fec ts  of t h e  ncausaln agent, but  many problems emerge from 
the  response i t s e l f .  Almost a l l  major responses a re  mul t io rgan izat iona l ,  so 
t h i s  means the re  a r e  a number o f  ra the r  pred ic tab le  emergency management 
problems w i t h  regard t o  t h e  comnunication process, the  exercise o f  a u t h o r i t y  
and the  development of coordinat ion.  Only one aspect o f  those response- 
generated demands w i l l  be mentioned below. 
I .  What i s  use fu l  orqan izat iona l  in format ion i s  no t  necessar i ly  
use fu l  p u b l i c  informat ion.  many organizat ions which have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
i n d u s t r i a l  processes which can create r i s k ,  o f t e n  see and p lan  as i f  the 
"publ ic"  were ou ts ide  the  emergency system. Consequently, they o f ten issue 
pub l i c  statements and o f f i c i a l  informat ion which i s  devoid of re levan t  
in format ion f o r  t h e  pub l i c .  The statement t o  evacuate a p a r t i c u l a r  
geographical area i s  o f t e n  lack ing  w i t h  ideas about t h e  extent  of t he  
danger, what i s  requ i red  i n  evacuation, and where i t  i s  safe t o  re locate .  
m i l e  t ha t  type of information may ex is t  i n  the no t i f y ing  organization, the 
publ ic  i s  o f ten forced t o  develop t ha t  information on t h e i r  own t o  make 
re levant  decisions f o r  t h e i r  own behavior. The issue s h i f t s  from "why don't 
people pay a t t en t i on  t o  my messages," t o  "how can we comnunicate messages 
which provide meaningful and useful messages t o  st imulate act ionn on the 
pa r t  o f  the publ ic.  While a  p lan t  can be seen as a system, i t  i s  also pa r t  
o f  a  number o f  other systems, some o f  which include the public. 
Summary 
The no t ion  o f  emergency planning f o r  technological r i s k s  i s  
increasingly important i n  the modern world. Such planning should be based 
on a problematic assumptions. 
It i s  important t o  make the d i s t i n c t i on  between emergency planning 
and emergency management. This i s  pa r t i cu l a r l y  important since many o f  
the management problems are not re la ted  t o  the "agent" but t o  the response 
i t s e l f .  It i s  a l so  important t o  see the "public" as a pa r t  of the soc ia l  
system f o r  the response and thus t o  emphasize the di f ference t h a t  might 
ex i s t  between pub l i c  and organizat ional ly-relevant information. 
2 . 6 .  LARGE SCALE ACCIDENTS AND P U B L I C  ACCEPTANCE O F  R I S K  
G e o r g e  Y a d i g a r o g l u  
S w i s s  F e d e r a l  I n s t i t u t e  o f  T e c h n o l o g y ,  Z u r i c h  
H e c t o r  A .  M u n e r a  
T e c n i c o n t r o l  L t d ,  B o g o t a ,  C o l o m b i a  
"As t h e  l e n g t h  a n d  q u a l i t y  o f  l i f e  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d ,  a n d  t h e r e b y  its v a l u e ,  
s o c i e t y  h a s  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  a v o i d i n g  r i s k s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  imposed  w i t h o u t  o f f s e t t i n g  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  r i s k  t a k e r "  
(Rowe, The  Anatomy o f  R i s k ) .  The p u b l i c  s e e m s  t o  be  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  The  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t e d  a v e r a g e  number o f  f a t a l i t i e s  o r  o t h e r  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c  m e a s u r e s  o f  damage f r o m  l a r g e  a c c i d e n t s  c o u l d  b e  much 
smaller t h a n  t h o s e  f r o m  numerous  small a c c i d e n t s  d o e s  n o t  seem t o  be  a n  
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  mind.  I n d e e d ,  w h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  w h e t h e r  a 
t e c h n o l o g y  is a c c e p t a b l e  f r o m  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  r i s k s  t o  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  
seems n o t  t o  be t h e  e x p e c t e d  a v e r a g e  number o f  f a t a l i t i e s  o r  i n j u r i e s  
t h a t  it w i l l  c a u s e ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  u n l i k e l y ,  b u t  v e r y - h i g h -  
c o n s e q u e n c e  e v e n t s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  p u b l i c  mind h a s  n o  good p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
v e r y  small p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a n d  i s  n o t  c o n v i n c e d  f r o m  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
a r g u m e n t s  a d v a n c e d  t o  p r o v e  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  The  c o n t r o v e r s y  
r e g a r d i n g  n u c l e a r  power a n d  its a c c e p t a b i l i t y  p r o v e s  w e l l  t h i s  f a c t .  
S i n c e ,  i n  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e  p u b l i c  is t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r ,  
a n d  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  c a n n o t  b e  i g n o r e d ,  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  a s p e c t  o f  p u b l i c  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  r i s k s  must b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  i n  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g ,  e v e n  
t h o u g h  t h e r e  may b e  n o  " r a t i o n a l "  t h i n k i n g  b e h i n d  i t .  We a d o p t  h e r e  t h e  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w  t h a t  r i s k y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  c a n n o t  b e  compared  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  only. 
I n  a r e c e n t  s t u d y  (Munera ,  i n  R i s k  A n a l y s i s  a s  a  D e c i s i o n  T o o l ,  G.  
Y a d i g a r o g l u  a n d  S .  C h a k r a b o r t y ,  e d i t o r s ) ,  t h e  r i s k  was d i s s o c i a t e d  i n t o  
t w o  c o m p o n e n t s :  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  u n d e s i r a b l e  e v e n t s  a n d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  ( p d f )  f o r  t h e  number o f  f a t a l i t i e s  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon 
t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  s u c h  a n  e v e n t .  ( W i t h i n  t h i s  f r a m e w o r k  a l o w e r  c u t o f f  
l i n e  f o r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  i s  n e e d e d ;  o n l y  a c c i d e n t s  w i t h  a  number o f  
f a t a l i t i e s  l a r g e r  t h a n  1 0  h a v e  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d ) .  
It was f o u n d  t h a t  i f  o n e  p l o t s  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ( o b t a i n e d  f r o m  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a )  f o r  v a r i o u s  t y p e s  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s  ( m a r i n e ,  a v i a t i o n ,  e x p l o s i o n s  a n d  f i r e s ,  e t c . )  a s  
w e l l  a s  f o r  n a t u r a l  d i s a s t e r s  ( h u r r i c a n e s ,  f l o o d s ,  e a r t h q u a k e s ) ,  o n e  
o b t a i n s  some c l u s t e r i n g  o f  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  ( c c p d f )  i n  t w o  d i s t i n c t  r e g i o n s  s e p a r a t e d  by a 
g a p :  T h e  c c p d f ' s  f o r  n a t u r a l  c a t a s t r o p h e s  l i e  a n  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i t u d e  a b o v e  
t h e  c c p d f ' s  f o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
T h e  p u b l i c  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  l a r g e  n a t u r a l  c a t a s t r o p h e s  a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
d r e a d f u l ,  b u t  t h e y  h a v e  t o  b e  a c c e p t e d  a s  " a c t s  o f  god". S i n c e  " o r d i n a r y "  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s  seem t o  b e  a t  l e a s t  t o l e r a t e d  by s o c i e t y ,  o n e  is  
t e m p t e d  t o  p r o p o s e  t h e  u p p e r  e n v e l o p e  o f  t h e  c l u s t e r  o f  c o n d i t i o n a l  
c c p d f ' s  f o r  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l - a c c i d e n t s  as a r e g u l a t o r y  l i m i t  l i n e  f o r  
maximum t o l e r a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  T h u s  o n e  e s s e n t i a l l y  l i m i t s  
t h e  d a m a g i n g  p o t e n t i a l  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s  t o  l e v e l s  t h a t  h a v e  
b e e n  h i s t o r i c a l l y  o b s e r v e d  a t  l eas t ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  f r o m  t h e  a c c i d e n t  
rate. One c a n  a s s o c i a t e  t o  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  a s e c o n d  c r i t e r i o n  l i m i t i n g  t h e  
a b s o l u t e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
It i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  a d o p t i o n  o f  s u c h  c r i t e r i a  l i m i t i n g  t h e  maximum 
p o t e n t i a l  d a m a g e s  f r o m  v a r i o u s  t e c h n o l o g i e s  w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  r e n d e r i n g  
t h e s e  p u b l i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e .  
It is  hoped  t h a t  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  more  l i k e  a 
p r o p o s a l  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a f i r m  c o n v i c t i o n ,  may l e a d  t o  some 
u s e f u l  c o n c l u s i o n s .  
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Abstract 
The intention of this contribution is to outline a basis for 
improvements of risk management against the background of Bhopal, 
Challenger, and Chernobyl. The treatment of this subject covers 
first some philosophical principles of dealing with incom- 
patibilities in complex systems. Particular attention is called 
to the role of non-technical factors which can be handled only by 
the proper application of such non-scientific disciplines as 
.sociology, psychology, and business administration. This leads 
to a plea for the development of a certain managerial approach. 
BACKGROUND, SCOPE, MESSAGE 
I t  i s  n o w a d a y s  w i d e l y  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n d  s a f e t y  of m a t e r i a l s  
are m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y  phenomena. What t h i s  means  in  p r a c t i c e  a n d  i n  t h e o r y  
wi l l  be i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  cons ide ra t ion  of t w o  a s p e c t s  of t h e  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  p e r -  
fo rmance  of ma te r i a l s .  One  i s  a n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a c t u a l  e v e n t s  - n o t a b l y  t h e  
T h r e e  Mile I s l and  a c c i d e n t  and  t h e  Che rnoby l  c a t a s t r o p h e  - a n d  t h e  o t h e r  i s  a n  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  n a t u r e  of knowledge  a b o u t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
a n d  compos i t i on  of ma te r i a l s ,  o n  t h e  o n e  hand, a n d  o n  t h e  o t h e r  hand  t h e i r  
p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  performance.  
Most of t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  on which t h i s  t r e a t m e n t  of s a f e t y  a n d  r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  
b a s e d  comes  f rom n u c l e a r  technology.  T h e  conf idence  i n  nuc lea r  power ,  b a s e d  
on t h e  p r o g r e s s  m a d e  b y  t h e  e a r l y  s c i e n t i s t s ,  h a s  l a r g e l y  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  t hanks  
t o  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  p o o r  pe r fo rmance  of t h e  technology.  I t  m a y  b e  e a s y  then  t o  
p u t  t h e  b l ame  on t h e  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  of t h i s  t echno logy  only .  T h e  p o i n t  I w a n t  t o  
make th rough  t h i s  l e c t u r e ,  however ,  is t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  p r in -  
c i p l e s  a n d  d e s i g n s  of e a r l y  s c h e m e s  f o r  t echn ica l  p r o d u c t s  m a y  a l s o  l a y  t h e  
foundat ions  f o r  l a t e r  f a i l u r e s  of t h e  t echno logy  i n  ques t ion .  
FOUNDATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY O F  SCIENCE 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  you  migh t  a s k  y o u r s e l v e s  wha t  t h i s  l e c t u r e  r e a l l y  i s  about .  Does  
it conce rn  y o u r  work  a s  s c i e n t i s t s  o r  i s  it ju s t  o n e  of t h o s e  t a l k s  a b o u t  t h e  
d a n g e r s  of uncon t ro l l ed  d e v e l o p m e n t  of t echno logy?  In o r d e r  t o  p l a c e  t h e  i s s u e  
i n  i t s  s c i e n t i f i c  con tex t ,  I w a n t  to c a l l  y o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  some  fundamenta l  
p rob lems  of s c i e n c e  t h a t  I h a v e  m e t  i n  m y  a t t e m p t s  t o  f ind  r e a s o n s  w h y  
s c i e n c e  o f t en  f a i l s  to s e r v e  its p u r p o s e  t o  d e v e l o p  technology.  
In e s s e n c e  I t h ink  w e  h a v e  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m s  w e  a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i n  
complex  t echno log ie s  c o n t a i n  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  t o  a n  e x t e n t  t h a r  w e  a r e  
u sua l ly  n o t  a w a r e  of. Our  a b i l i t y  t o  o v e r c o m e  s u c h  p r o b l e m s  i s  d e v e l o p e d  a l -  
r e a d y  a t  school .  T a k e  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of t h e  c i r c u m f e r e n c e  of a c i r c l e ,  f o r  
example .  No school  t e a c h e r  t e l l s  h i s  or h e r  p u p i l s  a b o u t  t h e  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  o r  
t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  n a t u r e  of n. T h e  r e s u l t  of a c a l c u l a t i o n  of t h e  l e n g t h  of t h e  
c i r cumfe rence  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be a n  e x a c t  number.  
A s i m i l a r  c a s e  i s  t h e  ca l cu l a t ion  of t h e  l eng th  of t h e  hypo tenuse  f rom t h e  
l e n g t h  o f  t h e  ca theses .  Again  w e  a r e  i nduced  t o  th ink t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  c o n f l i c t  
b e t w e e n  t h i s  c a l c u l a t i o n  and,  fo r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  p h y s i c i s t ' s  o r  t h e  c r y s t a l l o -  
g raphe r ' s  v i e w s  a b o u t  t h e  e x a c t n e s s  of t h e  measu re  of t h e  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  
a t o m s  a long  d i a g o n a l s  i n  a c u b i c  l a t t i c e .  
In  t h e  s a m e  w a y  w e  a r e  accus tomed  i n  school  t o  a c c e p t  e q u i v a l e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
d i f f e r e n t  phys i ca l  phenomena, f o r  i n s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  mass  a n d  e n e r g y ,  be tween  
c h a n g e  of e n e r g y  a n d  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  of t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  w a v e  motion, 
b e t w e e n  m a s s  a n d  a c c e l e r a t i o n  etc. I t  i s  o n l y  when w e  l e a r n  a b o u t  s t a t i s t i c a l  
mechan ic s  a n d  quantum p h y s i c s  a t  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  t h a t  w e  migh t  r e a l i z e  t h a t  
such  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  i n d e e d  v e r y  puzzl ing .  But e v e n  t h e n  f ew s t u d e n t s  c a r e  
a b o u t  t h e  ph i lo soph ica l  q u e s t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  unde r s t and ing  of incom- 
p a t i b i l i t i e s  i n  o u r  s y s t e m s  f o r  e x p l a i n i n g  complex i t i e s .  
COMPLEXITY OF TECHNOLOGY 
In  conven t iona l  p h y s i c s  a n d  chemis t ry ,  o u r  i gno rance  a n d  l a c k  of i n t e r e s t  i n  
t h e  n a t u r e  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  u sua l ly  of l i t t l e  impor t ance .  We can  d e a l  w i t h  
i r r a t i o n a l  a n d  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  number s  w i thou t  d i f f i cu l ty ,  a n d  t h e  s a m e  i s  t r u e  
f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  c o n s t a n t s  we  a p p l y  t o  make  u p  equa t ions  a n d  models.  
In  technology,  however ,  w e  h a v e  t o  c o n s i d e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which e x t e n d  
b e y o n d  o u r  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  expe r i ence .  In  new deve lopmen t s ,  t h e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  o u r  p r o j e c t i o n s  c a n n o t  a l w a y s  be p r o v e d  b u t  h a s  t o  b e  e s t i m a t e d  
on  t h e  b a s i s  of o u r  judgement .  
Fo r  ma te r i a l s ,  t h i s  k ind  of u n c e r t a i n t y  becomes  c r i t i c a l  when w e  p r o c e e d  f rom 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  performance.  We t h e n  m o v e  
f rom o n e  l e v e l  of c o m p l e x i t y  t o  a h i g h e r  one. T h i s  means  n o t  on ly  t h a t  new 
a n d  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r s  a r e  i n t roduced ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  new r u l e s  m a y  t a k e  over. 
T h e  ph i lo soph ica l  f r amework  t h a t  I h a v e  now o u t l i n e d  i s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  m y  
v i e w s  on f a i l u r e s  a n d  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
t echno logy  i n  g e n e r a l  a n d  of e n g i n e e r i n g  m a t e r i a l s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  The  p r o b l e m s  
I a d d r e s s  a r e  t hose  t h a t  o c c u r  a t  t h e  s t a g e  when fundamenta l  d i s c o v e r i e s  
unde r  s imp l i f i ed  o r  s t r i c t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  t o  be a p p l i e d  i n  c i r cum-  
s t a n c e s  which c a n n o t  e a s i l y  be p r e d i c t e d  o r  hand led  us ing  r u l e s  a n d  me thods  
fo r  l e s s  c o m p l e x  s i tua t ions .  
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T h e r e  a r e  n u m e r o u s  e x a m p l e s  of f a i l u r e s  d u e  to t h e  e f f e c t s  of f a c t o r s  o t h e r s  
t h a n  t h o s e  p r e v a i l i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T o  m e n t i o n  j u s t  
o n e  t y p i c a l  case, c o r r o s i o n  i s  a f a c t o r  w h i c h  i s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  o f t e n  over- 
l o o k e d  a n d  d i f f i c u l t  to p r e d i c t  w i t h  respect to i t s  c a u s e s  a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  - if 
ever r e c o g n i z e d .  
NON-TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
So f a r  I h a v e  c o n s i d e r e d  o n l y  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  aspects of 
f a i l u r e  of m a t e r i a l s  u n d e r  p r a c t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  E x p e r i e n c e  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  
d e m o n s t r a t e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  it is l a c k  of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of - or r a t h e r  respect 
f o r  - t h e  n o n - t e c h n i c a l  c o n t e x t  w h i c h  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c a u s e  of f a i l u r e  of ma- 
t e r i a l s .  I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  w e  h a v e  w i t n e s s e d  s u c h  f a i l u r e s  o n  a g r a n d i o s e  s c a l e  
i n  c a s e s  l i k e  C h a l l e n g e r  a n d  C h e r n o b y l ,  b u t  w e  c a n  f i n d  t h e  s a m e  b a s i c  p r i n -  
c i p l e  of n o n - t e c h n i c a l  c a u s e s  of f a i l u r e  b e h i n d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of s o - c a l l e d  t e c h -  
n i c a l  m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e s .  
Now I c o m e  to t h e  core of m y  m e s s a g e  to you.  When f a c e d  w i t h  a r g u m e n t s  
a b o u t  t h e  r o l e  of f a c t o r s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e i r  t e x t b o o k s ,  m o s t  
s c i e n t i s t s  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i s t s  t e n d  to d r a w  a d e m a r k a t i o n  l i n e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t e c h -  
n i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  n o n - s c i e n t i f i c  or n o n - t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n s  or 
d i s c i p l i n e s ,  s u c h  a s  s o c i o l o g y ,  p s y c h o l o g y ,  b u s i n e s s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  etc. T h e  
n a t u r a l  t e n d e n c y  of m o s t  s c i e n t i s t s  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i s t s  or e n g i n e e r s  i s  to d i s -  
s o c i a t e  t h e m s e l v e s  f r o m  t h e  o u t s i d e  w o r l d  w h e n  i t  i n t r u d e s .  
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS 
I n  f a c t ,  as f a r  as I c a n  u n d e r s t a n d  f r o m  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  of s t u d i e s  of p r a c t i c a l  
cases of m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e s ,  t h e  root of t h e  p r o b l e m  i s  n o t  p r i m a r i l y  t h e  c o m p -  
l e x i t y  of m a t e r i a l s  p e r f o r m a n c e  b u t  t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of t h o s e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g y  t o  c o n s i d e r  a n d  h a n d l e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t e c h n i c a l  f a c t o r s  a n d  
o t h e r  n o n - t e c h n i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  of t h e  m a t e r i a l s  i n  
q u e s t i o n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  b e h i n d  t h i s  r e l u c t a n c e  a n d  n e g l i g e n c e  t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  a 
l a c k  of r e s p e c t  f o r  o t h e r  t h i n g s  i n  l i f e  t h a n  t h o s e  w h i c h  c a n  b e  q u a n t i f i e d  o r  
e x p r e s s e d  b y  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  models .  
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  I would l i k e  t o  c a l l  y o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  a pa radox .  T h e  i n t e r p r e t a -  
t i on  of t h e  u l t i m a t e  c a u s e  o f  m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e s  I h a v e  now g i v e n  - b a s e d  on a n  
a n a l y s i s  of p r a c t i c a l  c a s e s  u s ing  a r g u m e n t s  f rom s y s t e m s  t h e o r y  a n d  t h e  
t h e o r y  of s c i e n c e  - s u g g e s t s  t h a t  s c i e n t i s t s  a n d  t echno log i s t s  a r e  r a t i o n a l i s t s  
a n d  p o s i t i v i s t s .  But a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e y  s e e m  t o  c u l t i v a t e  opinions  a b o u t  
t h e i r  own profess ional  work t h a t  s t r e s s  t h e  impor t ance  of o t h e r  qual i f ica t ions ,  
s u c h  a s  In tu i t ion ,  imaginat ion ,  c r e a t i v i t y  etc. When o n e  s c i e n t i s t  i s  t hough t  t o  
b e  s u p e r i o r  when c o m p a r e d  w i t h  h i s  co l l eagues ,  t he re fo re ,  i t  i s  ma in ly  h i s  
non-scientif ic,  non-rational a b l l i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  s t r e s s e d .  
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 
When c o n s i d e r e d  f rom t h e  p o i n t  of v i e w  of s y s t e m s  incompa t ib i l i t i e s ,  t h e  in- 
t r i g u i n g  p rob lem of m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e s  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  o u r  w a y s  
of d e a l i n g  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  be tween  s c i e n c e  and  t echno logy  on t h e  one  hand, 
a n d  on t h e  o t h e r  hand soc i a l  and  psycho log ica l  r e a l i t i e s .  One popu la r  a rgu -  
men t  i s  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  of a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i gence ,  AI. In v i e w  of 
t h e  c r i t i c a l  r o l e  p l a y e d  b y  non-rational f ac to r s ,  i nc lud ing  t a c i t  knowledge, A1 
may  l e a d  u s  t o  p a r t i a l  so lu t ions  only .  
T h e  v i e w s  on m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e s  t h a t  I h a v e  p r e s e n t e d  u p  t o  now s e e m  r a t h e r  
pess imis t ic .  T h e r e  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  some  hope  of r e s o l v i n g  t h e  d i lemma of 
s y s t e m s  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  u s ing  c o n c e p t s  d e v e l o p e d  b y  ph i lo sophe r s  a n d  
a p p l i e d  b y  p r a c t i o n e r s  i n  q u i t e  a d i f f e r e n t  f ie ld ,  name ly  t h a t  of management .  
In s i m p l e r  t e rms ,  t h e  phi iosophica l  p r i n c i p l e  i n  q u e s t i o n  c a n  b e  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  
t h e  p rob lem of b lowing u p  a ba l loon f rom ins ide .  T h e  d i f f i cu l t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  
d e a l i n g  wi th  i ncompa t ib i l i t i e s  i n  t echn ica l  s y s t e m s  c a n  b e  s o l v e d  o n l y  b y  
means  f rom o u t s i d e  or ,  i n  s y s t e m s  t e rmino logy ,  b y  cons ide ra t ion  f rom ano the r  
l e v e l  o r  f rom a n o t h e r  c o n t e x t u a l  point .  
Actual ly ,  t h i s  i s  wha t  P y t h a g o r a s  d i d  when h e  s o l v e d  t h e  p rob lem of i r r a t i o n a l  
numbers.  He t r a n s f e r r e d  t h e  p rob lem from t h e  l i n e a r  d imensions  of t h e  
hypo tenuse  a n d  t h e  c a t h e s e s  t o  t h e i r  squa re s .  Such a m o v e  c a n  b e  m a d e  i n  
s i m p l e  g e o m e t r y  w i t h  n o  v i o l a t i o n  of l og i ca l  ru l e s .  If y o u  g o  t o  h ighe r  o r d e r s  
of complex i ty ,  however ,  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  on a h ighe r  l e v e l  
canno t  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e  b a s e d  on t h e  r u l e s  o r  l a n g u a g e  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  t h e  l o w e r  
l eve l .  T h i s  i s ,  b y  t h e  way,  a n o t h e r  l imi t a t i on  of A1 i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  
t o  cons ide r  non-ra t ional  f ac to r s .  
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Management, t h e  p r a c t i c a l  p a r a l l e l  t o  t h i s  phi losophical  p r inc ip le ,  a l s o  ope-  
r a t e s  f rom a po in t  o u t s i d e  t h e  s y s t e m  of  non-compatible e lements .  In a 
company, t h e  manager ' s  posi t ion a b o v e  e v e r y b o d y  e n a b l e s  him not  on ly  t o  
v i e w  t h e  d i f f e ren t  a c t i v i t i e s  f rom a l e s s  egocen t r i ca l  p e r s p e c t i v e  than  t h o s e  
of t h e  d i f f e ren t  un i t s  making u p  t h e  organisa t ion.  S ince  one  of h i s  major  t a s k s  
i s  t o  d i r e c t  a n d  g o v e r n  t h e  work, h e  i s  a l s o  in  a pos i t i on  t o  e s t a b l i s h  g o a l s  
a n d  t o  make t h e s e  g o a l s  unde r s t andab le  t o  a l l  p a r t i e s ,  inc luding t h e  s h a r e -  
h o l d e r s  a n d  t h e  boa rd .  Fur thermore ,  a manager  h a s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t s  and  profess ional  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of t h e  d i f f e ren t  uni ts ,  such  a s  pur-  
chas ing,  s a l e s ,  des ign,  product ion,  admin i s t r a t ion  etc. 
ROLE OF MANAGEMENT 
Now you  might  a s k  y o u r s e l v e s  wha t  t h i s  h a s  t o  d o  wi th  m a t e r i a l s  fa i lure .  T h e  
r eason  w h y  I h a v e  made  t h e  ana logy  be tween  management  of business  and  
management of m a t e r i a l s  f a i l u r e  p rob lems  i s  not  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s c i en t i f i c  a n d  
technological  r e s e a r c h  a n d  deve lopmen t  should  be organ ized  a n d  admin i s t e red  
l i k e  commercia l  companies.  My po in t  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of goals .  
Success fu l ly  managed companies  h a v e  o n e  th ing  in  common, namely a well-  
de f ined  goal  i n  t e r m s  of a so-cal led  business  idea .  Th i s  i s  wha t  I want  t o  
s u g g e s t  a s  t h e  conclus ion of m y  reason ing  a n d  a rgumen t s  abou t  m a t e r i a l s  
fa i lure :  t h a t  i n  p r o j e c t s  i nvo lv ing  complex m a t e r i a l s  sys t ems ,  t h e r e  should  b e  
no t  o n l y  a s c i e n t i f i c  a n d  technological  idea ,  b u t  a l s o  a c l e a r  i d e a  a b o u t  how t o  
hand le  f a i l u r e s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  mater ia ls .  
RISK HANDLING 
Final ly ,  I wil l  s a y  a f ew w o r d s  a b o u t  r i sks .  In common usage,  f a i l u r e  i s  i n  
p r i n c i p l e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  r i sks .  Fo r  t h e  p u r p o s e  of t h i s  l e c t u r e  i t  i s  t h e n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  make a d i s t inc t ion  be tween  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  of r i sks .  T h e r e  
a r e  c e r t a i n  r i s k s  for  which w e  know bo th  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a n d  consequences  f a i r l y  
well ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  t r a f f i c  a c c i d e n t s  a n d  normal f a i l u r e s  of e l e c t r o n i c  compo- 
nents.  In bo th  t h e s e  c a s e s  t h e r e  a r e  s t a t i s t i c s  on  which w e  c a n  b a s e  ou r  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s  abou t  how t o  hand le  t h e  r i s k s  i n  quest ion.  
On t h e  o t h e r  ex t r eme ,  t h e r e  a r e  r i sks  of which w e  know v e r y  l i t t l e ,  if 
anything.  One e x a m p l e  i s  AIDS. Before  t h e  o u t b u r s t  of t h e  p r e s e n t  epidemic ,  
t h e r e  w a s  p r a c t i c a l l y  no p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  fo resee  i t s  development .  
T h e  f a i l u r e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  m a t e r i a l s  t h a t  I h a v e  had i n  mind i n  my  p r e v i o u s  
discuss ion a r e  t h o s e  t h a t  may be fo reseen  i n  p r inc ip le ,  b u t  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c  terms.  From my e x p e r i e n c e  a s  an  a n a l y s t  of f a i l u r e s  of compo- 
n e n t s  i n  nuc lea r  r e a c t o r s  I c a n  c i t e  numerous c a s e s  of f a i l u r e s  t h a t  should  
h a v e  been  foreseen,  a l though no t  on t h e  b a s i s  of p r o b a b i l i s t i c  assessments .  I t  
i s  i n  o r d e r  t o  f ind t h e  means  of handl ing such  f a i l u r e s  - o r  r a t h e r  t o  a v o i d  
them - t h a t  I h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  t h e  a rgumen t s  f o r  management  ju s t  sugges t ed .  
As you  c e r t a i n l y  know, r i s k  i s  nowadays  t h e  s u b j e c t  of sys t ema t i c ,  s c i e n t i f i c  
s t u d i e s  from a number  of p o i n t s  of v iew.  In a br ief  r e v i e w  l i k e  t h e  p r e s e n t  
one, t h e  fo l lowing a s p e c t s  of r i s k  c a n  be ident i f ied:  
- r i s k  r ecogn i t ion  
- r i s k  imaging 
- r i s k  p e r c e p t i o n  
- r i s k  a s ses smen t  
- r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  
- r i s k  a c c e p t a n c e  
- r i s k  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
- r i s k  management  
T h e  l i s t  e n d s  wi th  t h e  key-word of t h i s  l ec tu re .  Only  b y  means  of p r o p e r  
management  c a n  a cohe ren t  a n d  comprehens ive  handl ing of r i s k s  of m a t e r i a l s  
f a i l u r e  work t o  t h e  sa t i s f ac t ion  of t h o s e  u l t ima te ly  concerned,  t h e  end-users  of 
t h e  t echn ica l  s y s t e m s  and  t h o s e  who make dec i s ions  on t h e i r  behalf. 
For your consideration a s  top ic s  for the  discuss ion I want t o  c l o s e  b y  adding 
the  fo l lowing phenomena or concepts  invo lved  in the  management of risks: 
at t i tudes  
bureaucracy 
contex t  
c r e a t i v i t y  
fragmentation 
hollsm 
imaglng 
Inconceivable  e v e n t s  
mental i ty  
paradigm 
so f t  factors  
surprise  
surrealism 
tac i t  knowledge 
two  cultures  
2 . 8 .  QUANTITATIVE R I S K  ANALYSIS AND REDUCING THE R I S K  
D r .  B. J .  M. A l e  
M i n i s t r y  of H o u s i n g ,  P h y s i c a l  P l a n n i n g  and E n v i r o n m e n t  
L e i d s c h e n d a m ,  N e t h e r l a n d s  
ABSTRACT 
S i n c e  t h e  beg inn ing  o f  t h i s  decade  t h e  d u t c h  government h a s  s p e n t  much 
e f f o r t  i n  t h e  development a f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  t h a t  c o u l d  a s s i s t  
i n  making t h e  s i t i n g  and zoning d e c i s i o n s  f o r  and around chemica l  
complexes.  
I n  its p r e s e n t  form t h e s e  t e c h n i q u e s  a r e  aimed l a r g e ,  r e l a t i v e l y  long 
r a n g e  e f f e c t s .  I n c o r p a r a t i o n  o f  s h o r t  r ange  e f f e c t s  is n e c e s s a r y  t o  
s u p p o r t  a  f u l l y  ba lanced  r i s k  r educ ing  s t r a t e g y .  
INTRODUCTION 
The chemica l  a c c i d e n t s  i n  te  mid s e v e n t i e s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  EEC 
d i r e c t i v e  n r .  L230, " t h e  Seveso d i r e c t i v e n  l e d  t h e  Dutch a u t h o r i t i e s  
t o  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r  r i s k  b e a r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h i s  was even  more 
impor t an t  s i n c e  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  complexes and h e a v i l y  p o p u l a t e d  
a r e a ' s  were l o c a t e d  c l o s e  t o g e t h e r  a l r e a d y .  
I t  was and s t i l l  is o f  v i t a l  impor t ance  t o  t h e  d u t c h  economy t h a t  
i n d u s t r y  and p o p u l a t i o n  c a n  c o e x i s t  i n  harmony. It  was d e c i d e d  f a i r l y  
e a r l y  t h a t  zoning was o n e  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  t o  be used and t h a t  t h e  
e x t e n t  o f  t h e  s a f e t y  zones  shou ld  be based on q u a n t i t a t i v e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  a t  t h e  t i m e  no c o h e r e n t  methodology 
e x i s t e d  f o r  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  o f  chemica l  p l a n t s  a s  opposed 
t o  f o r  i n s t a n c e  n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t i e s .  
The P u b l i c  V u l n e r a b i l i t y  Model o f  t h e  US Coas t  Guard was a s  c l o s e  one 
c o u l d  g e t  to t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,  and t h a t  was q u a n t i f i r a t i o n  o f  
e f f e c t s  o n l y .  I t  is noteworthy t h a t  t h i s  PVM s t i l l  forms t h e  backbone 
o f  t h e  ha rbour  s a f e t y  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  US Coas t  Guard and t h a t  a  l o t  o f  
t h e  mode l l ing  p r i n c i p l e s  still a r e  used even  i n  t h e  S a f e t i  package t o  
be d e s c r i b e d  below. 
The t e c h n i q u e s  s i n c e  t h a n  deve loped  r a p i d l y .  The p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
"Yellow Bookn, t h e  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b i n g  ag reed  methods  o f  c a l c u l a t i n g  
e f f e c t s  was a  f i r s t  m i l e  s t o n e  i n  t h i s  development .  
The Yellow Book is still a v a i l a b l e ,  now i n  a  r e c e n t l y  updated form,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  recommendations o f  t h e  DIERS working p a r t y .  
The n e x t  m i l e s t o n e  was t h e  COW s tudy .  As f a s e  a s  we know is t h e  f i r s t  
i n t e g r a l  c u n p l e t e  r i s k  a n a l y s i s  o f  chemica l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  ( 2 ) .  
It was from t h i s  s t u d y  t h a t  t h e  Dutch a u t h o r i t i e s  l e a r n e d  t h a t  a  lo t  
o f  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  t h a t  comes w i t h  pe r fo rming  a  q u a n t i f i e d  
r i s k  a n a l y s i s  c a n  be automated and t h e  D i r e c t o r a t e  Genera l  f o r  
Environmental  P r o t e c t i o n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  Rijnmond A u t h o r i t y  embarked 
on a  p r o j e c t  to  d e v e l o p  what is now known a s  t h e  S a f e t i  package.  
COMPUTER ASSISTED RISK ANALYSIS 
A suite of computer programs was developed by Technica to form a 
package now known as SAFETI (3). It consists of some 35 separate 
programs that assist the risk analyst in the quantification of the 
risks of chemical plants and the associated transport. Prom a data 
base of vessels, and process conditions for a particular plant a set 
of potential failure scenario is generated. The frequency of these 
accidents is derived from a data base which contains information on 
the frequency of failure of process plant components. The 
consequences are calculated using a built in physical property data 
base for the substances involved. These consequences can result from 
outcomes of accidents such as fires, explosions (including BLEVES) 
and toxic vapour clouds. An ellaborate set of models to calculate 
the various phenomena that occur as the initial accidents scanario 
develops is available. The results of the consequence calculations 
are combined with data on the local weather conditions, population 
distribution, ignition source locations to calculate the final 
impact of the scenario's on the population. These results are 
finally aggregated into the individual risk contours around a plant 
or a site and the group risk lines. The use of advanced computing 
techniques allowed the incorporation of an appropriate level of 
canplexity in the modelling at each stage in the risk quantification 
procedure. This results in enhancing the precision of the 
calculation when canpared with methods used previously (4). The 
current estimate of the uncertainty in calculating the consequences 
is about a factor of 2. (5). 
The uncertainty in the frequency numbers is largely due to the 
limited availabity of historical data and is currently estimated as 
a factor 3(better or worse) than the best estimate. 
THE POLICY 
While techniques to estimate the risks evolved decisions on risk 
bearing activities had to be taken. In this daily proces of managing 
risks a general risk management policy emerged which was laid down 
as a policy statement of the dutch central government in the 
multiyear plan for the environment 1986-1990 (1). 
Here risk management is formulated in a four stage cyclic process. 
The four stage being indification, quantification, reduction and 
control1 as in figure (1). 
In the identification phase it has to be established whether there 
is a threat and what is it's nature. This is done on the basis of 
established or suspected ill effects. At the present state of 
environmental policy these threats usually are aimed directly or in 
directly to humans. The incident with the river Rhine showed that 
treats to the environment itself need attention as well. 
In the estimation stage the magnitude of the risk is established, 
preferably in quantitative terms. It is clear that risks associated 
with the frequent incidents can be more readily estimated than rare 
events, be it with large consequences. 
These large consequence-low probability risks however are the most 
difficult and sometimes the most important in the risk decision 
process. The dutch government has chosen to apply quantitative risks 
analysis in those cases as well. This week the concept general 
administrative measure to implement the post Seveso directive together 
with a positive advise form the central Environmental counsil will be 
sent to parliament. It is expected to be in force in the first half of 
next year. It will demand from those industries that fall under the 
terms of article 5 of the Seveso directive to submit a quantitative 
risk analysis to the canpetent authorities. 
After this stage a decision has to be taken whether to accept a risk 
or do something about it. 
The environmental plan distinquistes between group risks or F-N curves 
and individual risks or risk contours. The group is defined as the 
chance of exceding a certain number of casualties, and the individual 
risks a defined a the change of exceeding a lethal level at a certain 
place. 
For these two measures of risk limits are indicated below which a risk 
is deemed to be acceptable, limits above which a risk is deemed to be 
unacceptable and between those limits a so called grey area in which 
the decision merely is influenced by economical, social and other 
factors. The numerical values of these limits are given in fig. (2). 
Then a decision has been taken whether measures are required to reduce 
the risk or the risk is accepted. 
In the last phase of the process the established situation of 
acceptable riks is maintained by inspection, zoning requirements etc. 
REDUCING THE RISK OFF-SITE 
The policy as described above itself reduces the off site to people, 
or at least does limit it to a politically accepted level. However one 
can go beyond zoning and try to find measures on the plant to reduce 
the offsite risk. It is an easy task to sort the contributing events 
in order of their contribution to the risk. In practice one can sort 
with respect to the contribution to the group risk of a certain 
magnitude to the individual risk at a certain place. It is quite a 
common result that only a few possible events are dominant in a broad 
range of accident sizes and in the individual risk as well. It is thus 
possible to seek for the parts of the installation from which these 
incidents might emerge and consider risk reducing measures there. An 
example. 
From the risk analysis of the whole of the DSM site in the south east 
of the Netherlands the conclusion resulted that the risk for the 
population was caused mainly by the ammonia ringline, a system to 
supply various installation with pressurised liquid ammonia. From the 
analysis at proved to be worthwile to study measures for this line in 
more depth including the technical feasability of closing down a 
section of the line closest to the population. These studies are 
presently underway. 
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BALANCING ON-AND OFF-SITE RISK 
The techniques described above are explicitely aimed at larger range 
effects and therefore not suited to quantly the whole of the one site 
risk without addition of shortrange effects. However the on-site risk 
has to be considered even when developing an off-site risk policy. 
There is a distinct class of meassures that reduce the offsite risk of 
toxic vapours that increase the onsite risk namely enclosure. These 
containment type constructions have to be considered very carefully 
even if the effect on the offsite risk is beyond discussion. As has 
been stated elsewhere, it is impossible to develop objective, 
technical criteria to weigh the risk to employees against the risk to 
the popuplation especially if the former are killed one at the time 
and the latter in larger groups at the same incident, as is usually 
the case. This weighting is a political decission. At this stage of 
development of safety policies it is not clear whether a generalised 
policy can be the developed or that case to case decission making is 
the maximum achievable. 
CONCLUSION 
Quantification techniques are now accepted in the Netherlands as a 
common basis for siting and zoning policy. 
Their usefullness in finding risk reducing measures on the plant is 
increasing with the increasing capabilities of analysis of the details 
of the risk picture. However care must be taken where the proposed 
measures reduce of site risk while increasing onsite risk. 
When this is born in mind however quantitative techniques can be of 
great beneficial value in reducing the risk. 
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2.9. COMPARISON OF DECISION ALTERNATIVES WITH REGARD TO RISK AND 
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
0. I. Larichev 
VNIISI, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The evolvement of large-scale technologies gave rise to a 
problem of choice between complex technological projects with 
regard to risk factors. The problem is quite specific and is 
commonly referred to as risk analysis. A partial case of this 
problem is the siting of a complex engineering system such as a 
nuclear power plant, a chemical factory, liquefied Bas terminal, 
gas pipeline, and the like. 
The problem of site selection with due account of the risk 
factor has been studied in many papers. IIASA approached it from 
the descriptive standpoint (how the choice is exercised) by con- 
ducting four case studies into the selection of sites for li- 
quefied gas terminals.1 Some papers' treated the problem from 
the normative standpoint. G. Ford et a13 compared a number of 
methodological approaches to the nuclear power plant siting. The 
comparison ended with selection of the two best methodologies. 
In line with the latter and following the elimination of clearly 
unacceptable alternatives, the quantitative method of utility 
function construction was used to evaluate each alternative. 
We believe the methodological specifics of the considered 
problem require some other approach. Further, we shall consider 
the distinguishing features of the problem of complex technologi- 
cal system siting. 
2. SPECIFICS OF THE CONSIDERED PROBLEM 
According to the descriptive research, subject to analysis 
is the multiple participants (many active groups) and multi-at- 
tribute problem. What is more, the multiple criteria estimates 
are highly uncertain and the opinions of the experts producing 
the estimates are often conflicting. The decision process as 
such comprises several steps resulting both in an acceptable deci- 
sion or no decision at all.1 Besides, there are the following 
specifics: 
1) Inhomo~eneous Criteria: Of course, there are many criteria 
characterizing the preferable alternatives for different 
decision choice participants. The additional complexity is 
that the criteria are inhomogeneous. They characterize 
economic, social, ecological, and organizational aspects of 
each decision alternative. 
2) Criteria Estimates are in a Different Form: It is worth 
pointing out that because of the different nature of crite- 
ria, the criteria estimates are in different languages. 
Some of them may be quantitative (cost, distance estimates, 
etc.), others qualitative (environmental impact, earthquake 
probability). The lack of precise probabilistic estimates 
implies elicitation of the expert information only in the 
form of verbal event probability statements. What is more, 
the lack of necessary information sometimes results in rela- 
tive rather than absolute criteria estimates. Thus, in 
comparing the gas pipeline alternatives with respect to the 
safety criterion, use was made only of qualitative methods,' 
i.e. which alternative is the safest for the population. 
We believe that the primary language the estimate is formu- 
lated in is very important for all subsequent stages of 
alternative evaluation. Only the language customary for 
experts may ensure the measurement reliability. Of course, 
more often than not the measurements are conducted on strong 
quantitative scales. Nevertheless, the transition from the 
primary qualitative estimates to the secondary quantitative 
ones is methodologically incorrect as it engenders an unjus- 
tifiable arbitrariness. 
3) Difficulty of Comparing Estimates by Some Criteria: Apart 
from the usual difficulties relating to comparing in- 
homogeneous estimates, there are additional complexities 
such as the comparison of the amount of electric power gene- 
rated by a nuclear power plant and the number of casualties 
in case of accident. One can hardly imagine a manager cap- 
able of finding an explicit trade-off between the estimates 
by the above criteria. The assignment of criteria weights 
is psychologically incorrect. 
4) Necessity of Accounting for Criteria Relating to Different 
Moments in Time: In making decisions on siting the complex 
technological systems, three groups of estimates must be 
taken into consideration: 
a) estimates of the area and place of location; 
b) estimates of the operating system's environmental im- 
pact ; 
C) estimates of an accident's implications (highly unlike- 
ly, though). 
The three groups of estimates relate, in effect, to different 
projects: the one under construction, a normally operating pro- 
ject, and a damaged one. 
5 )  Difficulty of a Reliable Assessment of the Decision Implica- 
tions: The book1 convincingly shows that the expert es- 
timates of probabilities of different events relating to the 
future can vary considerably (the probability of an aircraft 
hitting a liquefied gas terminal, probability of liquefied 
gas-carriers colliding, etc.). The variance is probably due 
to the fact that people perceive poorly and assess very low 
probabilities.' The low probability estimates (10-4 and the 
like) are, therefore, hardly informative for accidents, both 
trivial and disastrous, which do take place from time to 
time. More informative is the matching comparison (quantita- 
tive and qualitative) of different safety control systems. 
6) Difficulty of Harmonizing Conflicting Estimates: Of course, 
harmonizing opinions of different active groups is a compli- 
cated process. Even if all of them strive toward an accep- 
table decision, the alternative estimates of individual 
criteria and on the whole may vary considerably. 
3. REQUIREMENTS TO DECISION TECHNIQUES 
The above specifics make it possible to formulate several 
requirements on evaluating technological system siting alterna- 
tives. First, practice shows the desirability of approaching the 
choice problem from a more general standpoint: not to be confined 
to comparing the available alternatives, but to look for new ones 
and compare (sometimes modify) them with the existing alterna- 
tives. In other words, it is a consistent specification of re- 
quirements for the complex project siting by analyzing the avail- 
able alternatives, determining the range of alternative estimates, 
searching for new sites (if necessary), etc. 
Second, each active group must be able to verify any es- 
timate. Hence, the latter must be easily understood and formu- 
lated in an adequate language. 
Clearly, the axiomatic techniques based on quantitative 
scales, comparison of all criteria, and construction of the deci- 
sion-maker's utility function do not meet the requirements. 
4. THE SUGGESTED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The first characteristic of the suggested approach is the 
search for a dominant alternative. The psychological research7 
indicates that in selecting the best alternatives, the decision- 
maker first pinpoints a preferable alternative and then tries to 
substantiate its superiority over the others. 
It is possible to develop a normative method also oriented 
toward the search for domination. In comparing the decision 
alternatives, one has first of all to remove the inferior ones. 
Then, in the course of a pair-wise comparison, one looks for 
superiority of one alternative over the other. 
There is, as a rule, a small number of decision alternatives 
(not more than 10). The suggested approach implies a pair-wise 
comparison of project siting alternatives. The three aforemen- 
tioned groups of estimates (those of site, of environmental im- 
pact, and of accident implications) are not compared with one 
another. The estimates of only two alternatives in each of the 
three groups are subject to comparison. The purpose of comparison 
is to determine which alternative is preferable and by what cri- 
teria group. With this in mind, use is made of the compensation 
techniques and the improvement of some estimates of some estimates 
at the expense of others. The second feature of the approach is 
that the decision alternatives are not viewed as fixed and invari- 
able, but rather as a type of alternative with possible modifica- 
tions within the limits of the type. The point is that in design- 
ing certain projects (industrial buildings,6 gas pipelines,' 
cities), it is possible to improve some criterion estimates at 
the expense of others. Thus, with additional investments we may 
improve the quality of a nuclear plant site. By installing a new 
power line, we may place the plant farther from settlements, etc. 
In case the alternatives are incomparable, it makes sense to 
define requirements to an alternative which is superior to the 
two available alternatives by all criteria. Account must be 
taken of the opinions of different active groups. The decision- 
maker's job boils down to a search for the required alternative 
and to demonstrating the lack of an opportunity for developing 
one. 
The pair-wise comparison may end up in the selection of an 
alternative acceptable to all active groups or in a lack of accord 
between the active groups if no best alternative can be found. 
In the latter case, however, there arises a host of requirements 
for the project design and the desirable site which is in effect 
a guide to future actions. 
We employed this approach in comparing the alternative routes 
of a gas pipeline.' 
At the preliminary stage of research, three variants of pipe- 
line route have been selected: maritime, median, and piedmont. 
The comparison of variant was made on criteria given in the table. 
Of the parties involved in the actual pipeline selection 
procedures, four major participants can be singled out. First, 
there is the customer organization which determines the design 
task and performs pipeline maintenance; secondly, the organization 
that designs the pipeline; thirdly, any project has to be agreed 
upon with the regional authorities which represent the interests 
of the local population; and finally, the route selection is 
influenced by the contractor who will actually construct the 
pipeline. 
When comparing the routes, each participant in the selection 
process is primarily concerned with a definite subset of the 
given criteria. For example, the project organization draws 
attention to criteria C, C1, C2, IN, R, and S; regional authori- 
ties are concerned with criteria RP, IN, S, R, and C2; and the 
customer is naturally interested in criteria C, M I  R, and S. 
Finally, the contractor gives primary consideration to criteria 
T.i n and S. 
The selection procedures adopted are as follows. The project 
organization analyzes all possible pipeline routes. Using the 
initial basic outlines, the route direction in each version is 
then specified as that minimizing the presented costs. Then the 
project organization aelects a version and transfers this proposal 
together with information about all the other versions to the 
customer and then to the regional authorities for approval. The 
contractor's representatives also take part in these discussions. 
In this example, the project organization preferred the maritime 
version. When considering the various versions, the regional 
authorities pointed out the comparison between the far superior 
evaluations of the median veraion on criteria C2, RP, and R and 
the "best" evaluations of the maritime version on criteria IN and 
S. During the analysis, the regional authorities asked the cus- 
tomer and the project organization to find new technical solutions 
to improve the evaluations of the median version on criteria IN 
and S in order to bring them nearer to the maritime version eva- 
luation. As a result of investigations towards this end, the 
project organization suggested the possibility of cutting down 
the guarding zone, combined with an increase in reliability ef- 
fected by increasing the thickness of the pipe wall. It was 
found that with such an improvement the number of buildings re- 
quiring demolition would be considerably reduced and the presented 
costs of the median and maritime versions would become closer, 
despite the increase in the amount of metal required and in the 
cost of the pipeline. In the table, evaluations of the versions 
after incorporating this improvement are given. 
With these improvements, all the participants in the selec- 
tion process chose the median version as the most acceptable, and 
so this version was selected. 
The example given above is typical in gas pipeline route 
selection. Each active participant in the procedure is at first 
guided by his own subset of criteria, working through from the 
more to the less important ones. This is characteristic of a 
satisfactory decision search according to Simon. We must point 
out that usually no single version is superior on all criteria; 
it is almost always necessary to look for a compromise. A typical 
feature of an actual comparison process is a series of attempts 
to reviae some of the versions, in order to improve their assess- 
ments on particular criteria. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We believe that the successful selection of a project site 
depends on the following factors: 
1 )  understanding by all active groups of the necessity to solve 
the problem the technological project is being built for 
(e.g., additional power supply); 
2) opportunity for all active groups to elicit information 
about all feasible alternative ways to solve the problem; a 
joint selection of one of the ways is desirable; 
3) opportunity for the joint assessment and comparison of the 
project sites; 
4) development of a convenient and effective tool for comparing 
the alternatives; a man-machine collective decision support 
system best serves the purpose. 
Order of Preference 
Criterion Designation Maritime Median Piedmont 
Presented costs C 8 9 9 9 , 5  10,8 
(million roubles) 
Cost of laying the C1 3 1 4 0 4 6 
main route (mil- 
lion roubles) 
Cost of laying C2 
prospective pipe- 
line branches to 
consumer (million 
roubles ) 
Construction time T.i . 
Convenience of M 
maintenance 
Reliability of R 
maintenance 
Influence on the IN 
environment 
Connection with RP 
regional develop- 
ment plans 
Construction condi- B 
tions 
Population Safety S 
Second 
best 
Inferior 
Best 
Best 
Second 
best 
Second 
best 
Best 
Best Worst 
By far Inferior 
the best 
Inferior By far 
the worst 
Inferior By far 
the worst 
By far Worst 
the best 
Best By far 
the best 
Inferior Inferior 
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Bureau for Systems Analysis, State Office for Technical 
Development, Budapest 
In our industrialized society, the hazards and risks of 
accidents and other undesirable occurrences are omnipresent: at 
work, in traffic and even at home, during leisure time. Accord- 
ing to general opinion, factories and plants belong to the most 
dangerous places from the viewpoint of accidents and damages. It 
is somewhat contradictory that the frequency of home injuries is 
higher compared with occupational and traffic ones. For instance, 
in Hungary only one third of the yearly 7000-7500 fatal accidents 
originate at work or in traffic. Nearly the same rates can be 
found in social insurance statistics, too. 
Facts show that the consequences of industrial accidents and 
catastrophes are more serious than others. This is connected 
with the complexity of new technologies, the substantial con- 
centration of production and the several kinds of hazardous tech- 
nologies and materials. This is strikingly apparent in the pro- 
cess industries.' 
The purpose of occupational safety and work planning in 
general is to minimize accidents. Special attention is, of 
course, draw to the well-educated engineers and other specialists. 
In Hungary, the Budapest Polytechnical University was one of the 
initiators and founders of instructing university students in 
labor safety (Prof. V. Wartha, 1870) and in "professional dis- 
eases" (Prof. K. Muller, 1879). In compliance with a decree 
issued by the Ministry of Education, instruction in labor safety 
in every Hungarian institute of higher education has been univer- 
sal and obligatory since 1963. The subject called labor safety 
is taught for one semester at every Hungarian university and 
college of technology, and the students have to take an examina- 
tion, too. But instruction on labor safety is not confined merely 
to this independent subject, for it is also taught within the 
framework of the different subjects, exercises and practice ses- 
sions in the laboratories and workshops. This compulsory subject 
cover a wide field in system-approach from the classical tasks of 
organization to the risk analysis methods. 
IInsuring and Managing Hazardous Risks: From Seveso to 
Bhopal and Beyond. IIASA Executive Report 11, Laxenburg, April 
1986. Editors: Kleindorfer, P. and Kunreuther, H. 
Connected with this, ergonomics takes part in the labor 
safety teaching programme. We have a recent Hungarian Standard 
on ergonomic principles in the design of work systems,a which 
substantially correspond to the international IS0 standard.= 
This constitutes the basis of exposition of such topics as, for 
example, the main factors in the person's environment, the stres- 
ses and conflicts between the man and his organizational environ- 
ment, increasing human performance, the hazards of stressful 
events and work overloads, the dangers of repetitive machining 
work, monotony and tiredness, consideration of human information 
processing,4 and possibilities of automation, cybernetic systems, 
etc. 
We use multi-variate analyses to suggest socio-technical 
design and generally system-approach risk prevention methods for 
future engineers and participants of post-graduate courses. The 
system analysis is one of the background materials,S but the role 
and significance of this must be increased. 
There are monetary interests at the industry and insurance 
companies to decrease accidents and damages. The economic effects 
of these are unnecessary expenditure, production losses of the 
manufacturing organization. In consequence of accidents and 
damages, the profit of a productive organization in Hungary de- 
creases, the atmosphere of the plant becomes impaired, and the 
reputation of the institution vitiated. For this reason, the 
industry makes new demands on institutes working in the discussed 
fields. We hope that the new demands will raise the resources 
for further research, on which both modern education and preven- 
tion can be based equally. 
'Hadas, J.: Cybernetic Model of Human Perception and Obser- 
vation; Information-channels for Sampling. First prize winning 
competition study, 5th National Labor Safety Competition, Miskolc, 
August 1973. 
SKiss, I.: Systems Theory - Systems Technics. NIM IGUSZI, 
Budapest, 1970. 
2.11. TECHNOLOGICAL RISK AND THE POLICYMAKER 
Ing. Jan Neumann 
Energy Commission 
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague 
The policy-maker who is responsible for decisions concerning 
construction of large energy complexes (for example, coal burning 
or nuclear power stations with capacities of several thousand MW) 
must be aware that he is deciding about the development not only 
of energy, but also of economics for the next 50 years, that he 
is deciding about great changes of the area where the construc- 
tion will be situated, about future influences of the environment. 
The risk of his decisions must be minimized by scientific know- 
ledge, by respecting the interests of the whole society and inter- 
national obligations of the state. He should never be influenced 
by local interests or possible pressure from political or economic 
groups. 
Experiences concerning the centralized economic planning 
that has been applied in Czechoslovakia during the last 40 years 
confirm that. We passed several peripetias of scientifically 
non-justified decisions, leading to difficulties in energy supply, 
and seemingly economically advantageous burning of cheap brown 
coal had a serious impact on ecology. But it seems this is not 
only our problem; in our country prevailing west winds carry more 
sulphur dioxide from our Western neighbors than from us to them. 
Czechoslovakia, as a state with advanced industry and inten- 
sive agriculture, consumes a considerable amount of primary energy 
resources. In 1985, the total consumption reached 104.2 mil tce, 
or 6.7 tce per capita. Approximately 60% of this consumption is 
solid fuels (brown and hard coal), 35% liquid and gaseous fuels 
(crude oil and natural gas) and 5% primary electricity (from 
hydraulic and nuclear power stations). While the consumption of 
solid fuels is covered in a great majority by Czechoslovakia's 
own mining, a preponderant majority of liquid and gaseous fuels 
are imported from the Soviet Union. Crude oil is transported by 
the pipeline "Druzba," which leads from the east border of Cze- 
choslovakia to all Czechoslovakian oil refineries and further to 
the west border to the petrochemical works near the city of Most. 
The natural gas is transported by a whole system of gas pipelines, 
constructed not only for Czechoslovakia's own consumption, but 
also for the transport of Soviet natural gas to neighboring coun- 
tries. At present, the transit of natural gas across Czechos- 
lovakia is as high as 50 GmS per year and is continuously in- 
creasing. 
The production of electricity in Czechoslovakia in 1985 
reached the level of 80.63 TWh, or 5200 kwh per capita. Eighty 
percent thereof were produced in thermal, 5% in hydraulic and 15% 
in nuclear power stations. In 1985, the import of electricity to 
Czechoslovakia was higher by 3.54 TWh than the export, so that 
the Czechoslovakian consumption of electricity was 84.17 TWh, or 
5430 kwh per capita. The installed capacity of the power stations 
in 1985 was 20.3 CW. 
The production of electricity, steam and hot water for large 
systems of the centralized heat supply were covered until 1980 
mostly by Czechoslovakian brown coal and by heavy heating oil. 
Both those resources contain sulphur: brown coal on average 1.7% 
(1.7 b S.MJ-l) and heating oil about 3% (0.8 g S.MJ-I 1 .  Combus- 
tion of these fuels has led to the significant pollution of the 
whole Czechoslovakian territory by emissions of fly-ash and sul- 
phur dioxide, and consequently causes acid rain and water and 
soil pollution, dangerous for the whole biosphere. Especially 
the forests have been seriously damaged. Particularly affected 
are industrialized and densely populated areas: North Bohemia, 
Prague, and others. 
The state is solving this problem by various means. The 
most important is decreasing brown coal mining from the level of 
100 million tons in 1985 to 80 million tons by the year 2000 and 
changing the processing of crude oil. The residual oil with high 
sulphur content will be partly cracked and partly gasified for 
further use in the chemical industry; at the same time, sulphur 
will be produced as an accessory product. Two large cracking 
units are under construction at present, and one gasification 
unit already works producing water gas and hydrogen. The import 
of crude oil will slowly decrease between the years 1985 and 2000. 
The whole increase of electricity and heat production will 
be covered until the year 2000 by the increased import of natural 
gas and especially by the construction of nuclear power stations. 
In accordance with the approved conception, the installed capacity 
of the nuclear power stations should reach 11,000 MWe by the year 
2000, and nuclear energy should cover more than 50% of Czechos- 
lovakian electricity consumption by the same time. All nuclear 
stations will be equipped with pressurized light water reactors 
of 440 MWe and 1000 MWe capacities according to the Soviet pro- 
jects; the majority of equipment at these power stations will be 
produced by the Czechoslovakian machine industry. 
Another means to decrease the negative influence of brown- 
coal-burning power stations on the environment is the absorption 
of sulphur dioxide from combustion waste gases. At the power 
plant "Tusimice" in North Bohemia, a de-sulferization unit is 
under construction for a 200 MW unit. The principle of sulphur 
removal is a wet absorption and regeneration method, using mag- 
nesium oxide connected with the production of sulfuric acid. The 
technology was developed in the Soviet Union and the plant equip- 
ment was delivered by Czechoslovakian and Soviet machine works. 
the de-sulferization unit should be in operation by 1988. If the 
tests are successful, the technology will be used for the next 
three units of this power plant. In this case, the Tusimice 
power plant should produce in addition to 3.5 TWh an additional 
200,000 tons of sulfuric acid annually. It is also considered 
that the power plant "Prunerov" in North Bohemia with its five 
200 MW units will be equipped with a similar de-sulferization 
technology. The more simple additive limestone method will be 
tested in already operating power plants with 100 MW units. 
Using this technology, the majority of sulphur bound to calcium 
leaves the boiler as a component of ash. 
By the year 2000, brown coal ought to be used to a great 
extent for producing heat both for industry and for communal and 
house-building (in the form of steam or hot water). Therefore, 
steam boilers equipped with a fluid-bed gasification generator or 
a fluid-bed furnace are being tested. Both types, each with a 
capacity of 25 tons of steam per hour, are in operation. The 
additive limestone technology is being tested for the steam boiler 
with a fluid-bed furnace. Negotiations have been started with 
several German and Swedish firms concerning the possibilities of 
buying the equipment and know-how for producing steam boilers 
with fluid-bed furnaces and limestone de-sulferization at a capa- 
city between 100 and 200 tons of steam per hour. 
An important measure, leading to a decreased negative in- 
fluence of energy installation on the environment and at the same 
time to a substantial increase in power plant efficiency, will be 
the reconstruction of condensation power plant, both coal-fired 
and nuclear, on the combined production of electricity and heat. 
In such a way, all large power plants situated in the North Bohe- 
mian coal basis will be reconstructed, and a large system of 
centralized heat supply for all big cities will be formed. 
Prague's atmosphere will also be significantly improved. The 
heat delivered from the power plant "Melinik," 30 km outside 
Prague, will allow a decrease in the consumption of coal and 
heating oil in the city's heating plants. In the historical 
center of the city, the coal used for local heating will be re- 
placed by natural gas and electricity. All the working and con- 
structed nuclear power stations will provide hot water into a 
network of centralized heat supply to distances as much as 50 km 
from the source. The hot water pipeline from Jaslovske Bohunice 
to Trnava is already under construction; the others, from Mochovce 
to Nitra, from Dukovany to Brno, from Temelin to Ceske Budejovice, 
are projected. 
The gradual conversion of the energy supply structure from a 
coal basis to the nuclear one will represent a significant de- 
crease in negative influences of energy production on the environ- 
ment. Czechoslovakia is aware, however, of certain risks con- 
nected with developing nuclear energy, especially from the stand- 
point of radiation exposure of the biosphere. Therefore, the 
state is paying an extraordinary amount of attention to the pro- 
blems of safety and reliability of the whole nuclear energy com- 
plex. Responsible for the safe operation of all units of this 
complex are operators - national enterprises, supervised by the 
Federal Ministry of Fuel and Energy. 
Under the corresponding laws, the following state authorities 
supervise the construction and operation of nuclear power plants: 
a) Offices of Labor Safety of Czech and Slovak socialist repu- 
blics, responsible for supervision of technical safety for 
all pressurized systems and transport devices; 
b) Ministries of Health of Czech and Slovak socialists repu- 
blics, supervising radiation safety inside and outside the 
enterprises of the nuclear energy complex; 
c) Czechoslovakian Commiesion of Atomic Energy, supervising 
nuclear safety of nuclear power plants and of transportation 
and disposal of nuclear fuels and radioactive wastes. 
Czechoslovakia pays a great deal of attention to human fac- 
tors in nuclear energy. It represents, above all, the choice and 
training of qualified engineers, technicians and skilled workers 
for the nuclear energy complex, especially for projection, con- 
struction, equipment production and operation of nuclear power 
stations. 
In particular, operators and shift-leading engineers in 
attendance at nuclear power stations have to undergo a demanding 
system of training. They are all graduated from technical univer- 
sities and take part in a special post-graduate course, completing 
a practical and theoretical state examination using the simulating 
machine VVER-440 at the training center in Trnava. Their constant 
ability at their function is verified every two or four years by 
a repeated state examination before the state examination com- 
mission. 
As present, great attention is devoted to caring for the 
psychological and physical condition of operators and shift-lead- 
ing engineers. On the initiative of the Czechoslovakian Atomic 
Energy Commission, a research project for the Medical Faculty at 
the Charles University in Prague has been included in the State 
Plan of Research, concerning research of risk factors during 
specific psychological stress of operators and shift-leading 
engineers, especially the factors influencing their cardiovas- 
cular system. 
At present, the responsible planning authorities in Czechos- 
lovakia are elaborating a prognosis of economic and social devel- 
opment through the year 2000. Thie work aims to increase the 
national income by more than two-thirds in comparison with 1985. 
This means that the growth rate of the national income should be 
3.5-4.03 per year. An important question is what growth rate of 
consumption of primary energy resources, necessary for the econo- 
mic growth mentioned above, would be optimal. The value of the 
coefficient of the national income energy elasticity (i.e. the 
ratio of the annual growth rate of consumption of primary energy 
resources to the annual growth rate of national income in percent) 
in Czechoslovakia was 0.9 between 1950 and 1960, and 0.5 between 
1960 and 1980. For the period 1985-2000, the value of 0.2 has 
been determined. This is a very important decision, limiting the 
investment expenditures for the development of the complex includ- 
ing fuels and energy to approximately 30-35% of the total in- 
dustrial investment; the risk connected with this decision is 
balanced by the extensive state program of fuel and energy con- 
sumption rationalization. This program demands a decrease of 
specific energy consumption for all branches of the national 
economy. 
The Czechoslovakian state, as the "policy-maker" in energy 
policy, leaning on contemporary scientific knowledge, cares that 
the future development of the energy base be in harmony not only 
with the development needs of the national economy, but also with 
the principles of the present struggle to protect and preserve 
the environment. 
2.12. RISK MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON PRACTICES AND APPROACHES 
Saburo Ikeda 
Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of 
Tsukuba, Sakura, Japan 
Kaeuhiko Kawamura 
Management of Technology Program 
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA 
This paper is principally based on the study conducted by 
the "Joint U.S.-Japan Workshop on Risk Management in the 
U.S. and Japan," funded by the U.S. National Science Founda- 
tion, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Japan 
Society for Promotion of Sciences 
1. Introduction 
The management of technological risks has emerged not only 
just as sclence/technology policy but also as one of the most 
important policy issues in public policy confronting all 
industrial nations. While the technical challenges of regulating 
risks are often similar in most industrial countries, each 
country may have a different management approach and practice due 
to a different context of cultural, political, and institutional 
backgrounds in which regulation process must operate. A cross- 
national perspective in approaches or practices of risk 
management may provide a wide spectrum of knowledge from which we 
can compare the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to 
technological risk management issues (1,2). 
In 1983, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) supported 
a twenty-month exploratory research project on a cross-national 
comparison on technological risk management between US and Japan, 
which was conducted by Vanderbilt University, USA, with a 
cooperation from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Later in 
1983, the Japan Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS) announced 
a support to the University of Tsukuba for Japan-US joint 
workshop on "Comparative Study of Risk Management in Japan and 
the US" under the bilateral science cooperation with the US coun- 
terpart, the NSF. 
This joint workshop was an important working event in 
conducting the study which was held on October 28-31, 1984, at 
Tsukuba Science City, Japan. The meeting was organized in such 
way that both Japanese and the U.S. risk professionals ( about 30 
experts) were allocated in equal number to working groups to 
discuss a selected number of technological risk cases, provided 
the background data and information prepared by the joint study 
team from both countries (3). 
The criteria of selecting the technological risk cases were: 
- simplicity of the issue in both countries, 
- representativeness of risk management practices, 
- sufficiency of the issue duration time, 
- extensiveness of the issue to other risk problems, and 
- availability of the data and information. 
Based on these criteria, we chose the following four topics 
which have the different risk characteristics as shown in Table 1: 
1) environmental risks from chemical detergents; 
2) human health risks from exposure to airborne lead; 
3) human and ecological risks from agricultural chemicals; and 
4 )  human and socletal safety rlsks from the nonusage of seat belts. 
This paper summarizes the flndings of both the NSF Study (4) 
and outcomes of the jolnt workshop focusslng on those four cases. 
The major objectlves of our cornparatlve study were: 
1) to conduct a systernatlc comparison of risk management on the 
basis of "structural characteristlcs" of rlsk problems In 
terms of scientific knowledge, technological optlons and 
socletal perceptlons, and finally of declslon processes In 
confllct arena; 
11) to suggest possible cross-cultural lessons In lmprovlng the 
rlsk management practlces whlch cover Information gatherlng, 
monltorlng, regulatory declslon rnaklng as well as communl- 
cation among Interested groups, taklng account of dlfferent 
hlstorlcal, soclo-economlc,and cultural background In both 
countrles. 
2. Framework for The Study 
For the past two decades, major changes have been taken 
place In Japan and the U.S. in the nature of technological risks, 
as well as In the practlces of managlng such rlsks In the 
dlfferent context of social, political and cultural conditlons. 
For example, In both countrles the leading causes of major death 
or fatal accidents have been shifted from lnfectlous epidemics or 
from natural hazards to chronic degenerated dlseases of cancer, 
braln stroke and heart disorder or to automobile accidents 
Including other high-speed transportations that are highly 
assoclated with the development of modern technological society. 
In addition, there have been dramatic increases In the 
number of health, safety and envlronmental laws and regulatory 
agencies in charge of managing those increased rlsks. The 
increase of national or federal lnvolvements In regulatlng 
technologlcal rlsks, despite the recent tendency of de-regulation 
in both countries, has shown a broad array of the factors has to 
be taken Into consideration in the current risk management 
pollcy. Beside soclo-cultural factors such as a rise of 
envlronmental consciousness, a decline of public confidence in 
business practice of dealing with economic externality and 
emergence of publlc Interest movements, some of speclflc 
science/technology-oriented factors which lead to the continued 
natlonal regulatory Involvement are: 
- an accelerating rate of technological change in terms of 
physical and temporal scale and complexlty of rlsks; 
- a shorter time lag between sclentific discovery or 
- an increased role of public sectors as a producer of risks 
through Its sponsorship of scientlfic and technological 
research and development; 
- a rising cost of risk control and damage compensations ( 5 ) .  
In this context, it is reasonable to use a kind of policy 
research framework which consists of four major components in 
analyzing the risk management: They are "Science", "Technology", 
"Society" and "Politics" (6) . Figure 1 illustrates our framework 
for analysis of the issues in managing technological risks. 
For example, in environmental risk problem, "Science" 
provides the data and findings on items such as: 
- types of risks and their sources, 
- pathways, and climatic and topographic impacts on 
transportations, 
- dose and exposure vs responses of living organisms, 
- health and ecological effects to human and fauna and flora, and 
- Factors and judgemental criteria of uncertainty. 
"Technology" provides information and evaluation on items: 
- technical options for abating or mitigating risks, 
- institutional or administrative options for regulating risks, 
- monitoring or surveillance schemes for identifying risks, 
together with consideration of economic costs and benef its, 
resource constraints, and ecological or biological capacity. 
"Society" transmits: 
- experiences on hazardous events and catastrophe, 
- perceptions, values and attitudes on risk issues. 
Finally, "Politics" of environmental arena, interpreting either 
objectively or subjectively the inputs from "Science", 
"Technology" and "Society" in view of such political feasibility 
and acceptance as: 
- urgency of the problems, 
- efficiency of resources allocation and utilization, 
- equity of distribution in benefits and damages, 
- accommodation to a existing legislative and administrative 
framework, 
will make a decision how to institute a new action or to remain 
in status quo. 
Next step of the comparative analysis is to look at the 
dynamics of risk management process in which actual decision 
practices have been developed in the following three stages of: 
i) risk acknowledgment, 
ii) risk engagement, 
iii) risk resolution. 
Figure 2 shows a two-dimensional scheme of generic risk 
management (7). The dynamics of generic risk management are 
represented by the specified actions of four actors: actlvists, 
secondarilly engaged social groups, primary producer and user 
network, and legislative system. 
3. Findings In Four Case Studies 
Given the study framework in the preceding section, a broad 
array of literature and data have been surveyed and summarized as 
background reports to the workshop participants for thelr 
discussion and comparlson. All cases show that there are a 
number of complicated chains of dynamic Interactions among actors 
that have different perceptlons, beliefs and decisions, In each 
phase of risk management process. Generally speaking, most cases 
demonstrated a large degree of common features in risk assessment 
(risk acknowledgment, and engagement), but several important 
differences in risk management (risk resolution) were found. 
Detergent 
In this particular case, both countries have shared a number 
of close similarity in risk acknowledgment and engagement, 
although Japanese responses as to reducing the phosphorus 
contents in detergents were largely learned from U.S. experiences 
in 1960s and 1970s: The issues have been how to manage aesthetic, 
eutrophication and health risks in bodies of water which might be 
increased by the intensive use of synthetic detergents. 
The emergence of synthetic detergents in 1950s had compelled 
natural soaps because of efficlency and conveniences as well as 
of economical advantage in cleaning laundry and dishes. The 
first issue came up from the use of alkyl benzene sulfonate (ABS) 
in detergents which had been acknowledged as the major causes of 
unpleasant foaming In waterways due t o  slow degradability in 
sewage treatment facilities. In 1963, Wisconsin became the first 
State in U.S. to ban the use of "non-biodegradable" detergents. 
In early 1960s, the detergent industry responded by substituting 
another chemicals of linear alkylbenzene sulfonate (LAS) for ABS 
in detergents which are more rapidly biodegradable in water. 
This substitution, however, brought the second issue of 
eutrophication of water bodies, in particular, in the large lakes 
and reservors . The excess eutrophication of increasing 
phosphorus content in water originated from LAS detergents 
stimulates algae blooms, and subsequent decay, depletes oxygen in 
water, and finally deteriorate aquatic ecosystem. But, the next 
industry's response to water eutrophicatlon problems in 1970s of 
introducing non-phoshorus detergents ( nitrilo tri-acetic acid: 
NTA) has encountered with the third issue of health safety 
problem, that is, possible carcinogenic risks from the NTA used 
in substituted detergents. 
The U.S. management response has indicated a variety of 
efforts to regulate sources of phosphorus beyond detergents 
including other sources of nutrients loadings into waters, but 
most of the attention has been focussed primarily on detergents 
because of quick and effective solution for reducing the level of 
phosphorus content in water. To date, a comprehensive consensus 
on the appropriate regulatory strategy on these three issues has 
not emerged. 
Japan also responded to the eutrophication problem by 
focussing primarily on phosphorus in detergents, but rather in 
different ways. In particular, eutrophication of surface waters 
has affected greatly the water quality problem for municipal 
water supply in urban area. The issue of phosphorus-bearing 
detergents has become one of the major pollution problems in 
environmental politics in late 1970s. 
For example, the Lake Biwa, the largest lake in Japan which 
supplies drinking water to more than 12 million people, suffered 
frequent outbreak of "algae blooms'' and subsequent deterioration 
of water quality in the late 1960s. Mostly because of 
construction delay of secondary treatment facilities for waste 
water, it was regarded as reasonable and feasible for pollution 
control to directly reduce the phosphorus load from household use 
of detergents which accounted for 18 % of total contribution to 
the lake water. 
The political outcomes resulted in local legislation in 1979 
to ban the sale and use of domestic detergents containing 
phosphorus which was strongly assisted by the local women and 
consumers movements. Since then, non-phosphorus detergents have 
become dominant in Japanese market even in areas where there is 
no such regulation requiring non-phosphorus detergents, together 
with the industry's response of reducing zeolite of NTA as much 
as possible in their substitute (8). 
Table 2 summarizes the comparison of risk management 
approaches in the U.S. and Japan as uncovered by the working 
group of detergent case study at the Tsukba workshop (9). 
Lead 
The approach of risk management of lead additive in gasoline 
may illustrate some differences in more drastic way. In 1970, the 
Ushigome-Yanagicho incident in one of the busiest intersections 
in Tokyo made it clear that there exists the risk of exposure to 
lead, when the mass media revealed the data of elevated blood 
lead levels in the residents monitored by local political and 
environmental groups. Although health officials found later no 
significant evidences for the direct causal relationship, the 
issue became one of the most important environmental pollution 
problems in the early 1970s. 
The progress of reducing lead contents in gasoline in both 
countries is shown in the following figures (unit: grams 
Pb/liter): 
Year Japan U.S. 
8.96 
3.28 
0.21 
0.05 
unleaded 
-- 
The governmental council for promoting the use of unleaded 
gasolin set up in 1970 called for a immediate lowering of high 
lead content in gasoline from 8.96 to 3.28 grams Pb/l in 1974. 
Later the expert committee outlined a schedule for reduction of 
lead content to the level of 0.15 grams Pb/l in line with the 
U.S. target level by 1975 with heavy administrative regulatory 
guidance ("gyousei-shidou") to the oil refinery industries to 
increase the production of less-leaded or unleaded gasoline. A 
total ban of lead in gasoline was finally adopted in 1976. 
Beside health safety, this decision was also supported by the 
additional requirement in compliance with the exhaust gas 
regulation from automibiles with catalytic converters. 
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency was sued in 
1975 for its action to list lead as a pollutant under the Clean 
Air Act. This action was challenged, but eventually listed as a 
pollutant, and the air quality criteria and standards for lead 
additives were developed. The energy crisis in 1974 and 
subsequent economic recessions delayed the reduction of the lead 
content in gasoline in comparison with the Japanese case. 
Table 3 summarizes approaches of managing risks from lead 
additives in gasoline in the U.S. and Japan conducted by the task 
group in Tsukuba workshop (10). 
Beside the very similar process in risk acknowledge process, 
there is a clear distinct characteristic in risk engagement and 
resolution processes. The U.S. system of evaluating risks 
appears to be nore open, with greater transfer of information 
promotes a lengthy process with the opportunity for different 
views to be heard. By contrast, the Japanese system does not 
seem to provide an opportunity for such a variety of information 
to be made available to the outside groups or interested 
individuals. Rather such information is restricted to the 
expert committee for their scientific evaluation of risks. 
Pesticides 
The use of synthetic pestlcldes increased rapidly in both 
countries since the late 1940s. Partly because of geographical 
and climatic differences, the magnltude of pesticides use in 
Japan has been markedly larger than that In the U.S. in terms of 
average consumption per unlt arable land. During the 1970's 
Japanese farmers were using some 31 pounds of pesticides per 
hectare; by comparison American farmers were uslng an average 
1.19 pounds per hectare, though total annual consumption of 
pesticides amounted to 350 million pounds by 1980 in the U.S. 
This fact has added additional acute and chronic health or 
accidental safety problems to Japanese farmers besides a number 
of well known environmental pollution problems such as toxic 
residue formation in crops and soils, acute and chronlc toxicity 
in wild life and other ecological organisms. 
The contents of technical studies undertaken In each 
country's management process is largely same in terms of testing 
procedures (acute and chronic studies), and evaluation criteria 
and methodologies that are now internationally standardized. Each 
country utilizes basically a two-step management system. Prior 
to commercial sale in market, pestlcides are subject to 
registration review and assessment. Secondly post-monitoring 
assessment continue as warranted. For examples, registration 
status and conditions may be revised or ultimately cancelled as 
new evidences on effectiveness and adverse impact of the use in 
fields become available. 
Instead, the management process in each country has 
different approach which has been deeply embedded in the 
political and cultural landscape. Strong pro and con interests 
and conflicts among various actors contend in a different way for 
influence on pesticide policy formulation. Foremost among the 
differences is the formal procedures of risk assessment which is 
accorded to so-called risk-benefit studies in pesticide 
assessment. In the U.S., the special review procedure of 
quantitative risk-benefit studies is required as a formal process 
in the management practice. There is, however, no such legal and 
administrative procedure in Japan. Rather such analyses, when 
conducted informally in advisory committees, tend to be 
judgmental in character. 
Table 4 summarizes the outcomes of task group discussion as 
to approaches to risks from pesticides problems in terms of risk 
acknowledgment (assessment), risk engagement (policy 
formulation), and risk resolution (technology development) (11). 
Seat Belt 
--
Traffic fatalities in both countries increased during the 
1960s. By 1970, Japan hit an all-time high of 16,765 as Japan 
moved into a highly motorized society. The number of cars 
registered had trippled between 1965 and 1970. The number of 
traffic fatalities in the U.S. passed 50,000 in the middle of the 
1960s and reached an all-time high of 54,589 in 1972. Both 
figures have decreased in the subsequent years, but not 
substantially in numbers, and again began to increase slightly in 
the early 1980s. 
Although wearing seat belt is perceived as one of the most 
effective means of reducing the traffic fatalities, seat belt 
usage in both countries has been low until the time of the study 
in 1984: average usage in both countries was under 20 percent. 
Despite successful mandatory seat belt law in most European 
countries, neither the U.S. and Japan had passed an enforceable 
mandatory seat belt law by 1984. 
Japanese development of seat belt began in the mid 1950s 
with initial attention of seat belt concept by assessing its 
effectiveness in vehicle safety systems. By the mid 1960s, the 
standards for seat belt designs and associated joint mechanisms 
were developed, and mandatory installation of seat belts in 
Japanese cars began in 1968. While seat belt equipped cars, 
later expanded to rear-passengers and even trucks, have become 
standard in Japan, it has been left to individuals whether they 
use the seat belts or not. Although the compulsory use of seat 
belts on the express highways was added In the Road Traffic 
Regulation Law (RTRL) in 1971, there was no penalties specified 
for enforcement. 
In 1977, the National Public Safety Commission proposed a 
revision of the RTRL to include the mandatory usage of both 
helmets for motorcycle riders and seat belts for automobiles 
passengers. The matter of mandatory use of seat belts on all 
roads was postponed by 1986 mainly because of low public 
acceptance for mandatory usage with any penalties. 
In the U.S., the government responses to reducing traffic 
fatalities began in the mid 1960s including a requirement for 
safety devices on automobiles. The first federal standards for 
automobile seat belts and a requirement for installation of sest 
belts in new cars were issued in 1968, and the first proposal for 
mandatory automatic restraints of seat belts emerged In 1969. A 
strong, negative public reaction, however, resulted in simple 
requirement for presence of manual seat belt. 
Since that time, an array of legistlatior:, regulatory 
standards, and industrial proposals have been tried for 
acceptance or rejection, and often replaced by further 
legislation, standards and proposals. In general, the U.S. has 
avoided federal laws or regulations for mandatory usage of seat 
belts In nationwide, except for child safety seats now requlred 
in all 50 states. 
Table 5 summarizes the approaches taken to seat belt usage 
by the major actors involved In management system in both 
countries by the members of the task group In Tsukuba workshop 
( 1 2 )  
There exists obvious parallels in the attitudes and activi- 
ties of government police and traffic safety agencies against the 
passage of legislation for mandatory use of seat belts. This 
reflects the public reluctance of restricting individual freedoms 
in spite of increasing public concern over traffic safety as 
seen in various recent polls. The insurance and legal systems 
have not been significant sources of motivation for increased 
seat belts usage in both countries. In Japan, auto liability 
system which imposes a heavier burden of liability compensation 
on the lesser-injured party who actually wear seat belts. The 
mixed insurance system of the U.S. carries no great motivation 
for higher usage of seat belts as well. 
4 .  Concluding Remarks 
All four case studies of risk management practices in the 
U.S. and Japan suggest a strong similarity on scientific studies 
for risk acknowledgment, but a substantial difference on 
regulatory approaches in the process of risk engagement and 
resolution processes. It would be too easier to attribute major 
reason that has made such distinctive differences in regulatory 
approaches, to cultural differences rooted in both countries. 
Nevertheless, in the area of risk management in which regulatory 
decisions have to be made under high public involvement and high 
uncertainties in risk assessment, political and cultural factors 
are the ones dominated among others. 
Governmental bureaucracy and agencies in Japan still retain 
a strong paternalistic character (13). Given such a deep 
cultural tradition of keeping legitimacy and authority in 
overseeing broad social interests of society as a whole, their 
policy making has tended to a centralized process and closed to 
influences outside the point of view held by the governmental 
bodies. This credibility and accepted responsibility are 
underlied in their ways of orientating the concerned parties 
toward consensus building in decision makings with emphasis on 
non-legal approaches in implementing policies or achieving 
conforming social behaviors. Japanese approaches of risk 
management draw heavily on these traditions (6). 
By contrast, the U.S. government and agencies are more 
formal and open, but viewed with some suspicion by the interested 
groups. This attitude, along with the belief in the underlying 
social rationality of adversarial competition among idears and 
interests, promotes open and adversarial ways of political 
decision making process in which contention and disagreement are 
often aggressively pursued. Technological risk management 
process of acknowledgment, engagement and resolution is fought in 
this political and cultural background. Because of this 
institutionalized processes, government policy making is often 
subject to the decentralized influences and is prone to intense 
advocacy and fragmentation in outcomes, and resulted in a 
coercive and legal bent of political relationship between 
"gainer" and "loser". 
The followings are the some of the important recommendations 
that were agreed in workshop participants for improving current 
practices of technological risk management in the U.S. and Japan 
( 4 )  : 
1 .  The use of full and open disclosure when investigating 
sclentlflc data relating to a risk. Such an open atmosphere 
allows for the Input of all affected parties and the 
examlnation of scientlfic data. 
2. The use of cooperation and consensus rather than antagonism 
and conflict. After the data has been examined, the use of 
consensus would reduce the lengthy process between 
recognition and action as exlsts In the U.S. This could 
manifest Itself In compromise for a common goals. 
3. The use of incentives as opposed to enforcement. Economlc 
incentives and non-regulatory lncentlves may be more 
effective than regulation and enforcement. Incentives may 
also require less administratlon. 
4. The development of rlsk assessment techniques, such as cost- 
benefit analysis. Because Japan does not have formal rlsk 
assessment procedures, these techniques should be explored in 
a cultural context. Risk assessment In the U.S. is not a 
standardized process and requires additional investlgation, 
especially in the case of hazardous wastes. 
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Tab le  1 Case s t u d y  t o p i c s  and r l s l :  t y p e s  
Case  S t u d y  Risk  Type Nature  o f  I n f e r a c e  Task 
D e t e r z e d  Long-term D i r e c t ,  o r i g i n a l l y  from 
env i ronmen ta l  v i s u a l  ev idence  
Leed Chron ic  human I n d i r e c t ,  from human 
P o i n t  s o u r c e  measurezeslt, mon i to r ing  
P e s t i c i d e s  Acute human I n d i r e c t ,  from human and 
Long-term o t h e r  m e a s u r g e n t ,  mon i to r ing  
env i ronmen ta l  l a b o r a t o r y  t e s t i n g  
Non-point s o u r c e  
S e a t  Belts Acute  human D i r e c t ,  from e x p e r b e n t a l  
ev idence  
- 
- 
T a b l e  2 Comparison o f  approac!!es t o  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k  from d e t e r g e n t s  
Detergents  U.s. 
1. Regulat ion Law 
Japan 
Administrative g u i d e l i n e s  
2.  Levels  of  Gov't Federal ,  s t a t e ,  l o c a l  Mostly c e n t r a l  
3. Laws B r o a d - ~ a t e r  q u a l i t y  Nonexistent o r  narrow 
6 human hea l th  
4. Agencies Strong Weak 
5 .  Indus t ry  Role Increas ing Not s i g n i f i c a n t  
6 .  P u b l i c  Role Large, Secondary Large, Primary 
7. S c i e n t i f i c  Large 6 improving Se lec t ive ly  appl ied  
Community Role 
8.  I n t e r a c t i o n  6 Large 6 increas ing Limited; even r e s t r i c t e d  
Info-sharing 
9.  Risk Assessment Emerging Not c l e a r l y  focused 
10. RiskManagement Separate  Focussed 
11. Source of Data Al l  Limited; no indust ry  
12.  Media Ref l ec to r /de t r ac to r  Major a c t o r  
Source :  E .  V l a c h o s  and T.  S u e i s h i ,  "Summary o f  t h e  D e t e r g e n t s  Task Group", 
P r o c .  o f  t h e  F i r s t  U . S .  lis!r 'lanagement Workshop, Tsuk.uba S c i e n c e  C i t y ,  
Oc t .  1934. 
Tabl.e 3 COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGICAL RISK FOR LEAD PROBLEMS 
P h a s e  - U.S. J a p a n  
~ c k n o w l e d g m e n t /  L o c a l  c i t i z e n  g roup  L o c a l  c i t i z e n  g r o u p  
R e c o g n i t i o n  L a r g e  c i t i z e n  g roup  Mess media  i m p o r t a n t  
Respond t o  problems Respond t o  b r o a d l y  
d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t i n g  i m p l i e d  problems 
i n d i v i d u a l s  
~ n g a g e m e n t l  
h a s u r e n e n t  and 
E v a l u a t i o n  
Re s o l u t i o n /  
C o n t r o l  
A d v e r s a r i a l  
Open 
F o n n a l  R i s k  
Assessment  
Committee sys t em 
Closed ,  Ad HOC 
No Forma l  R i s k  
Assessment 
S t a n d a r d s  D i r e c t i v e s  
L e g a l  Guidance  
Enfo rcemen t  Non-puni t ive  
Encourage  r e g u l a t i o n  Co-opera t ive  
Compl iance  vs  . Consensus  
problem s o l v i n g  
Source :  P a r k e r ,  F. a n d  M. Tanaka ,  "Summary o f  t h e  Lead T a s k  Group," 
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  F i r s t  U.S.-Japan R i s k  Management Workshop, 
Tsukuba S c i e n c e  C i t y ,  J a p a n ,  Oc tobe r  28-31, 1984. 
Table 4 Comparison of approacnes to technological risk for pesttcides problems 
- . . . . . ... 
--- - 
U.S. 
- JIpan 
Scientific Studies Proper interpretation of animal Proper interpretation of animal 
and Risk Assessment toxicological data toxicological data 
Better identification of differential Conduct of risk assessment studies-- 
exposures among populatlons groups particularly for very low level, exposures 
Knowledge of mechanisms of pesticide Assessment and cmunlcation of 
biodegradati on appropriate precautlons to users of 
household and garden pesticides 
Process and Policy Determination of acceptable exposure More extensive review and use of 
1 eve1 s toxicological data 
Priori t les for assessing pestlcides that Achlevemnt of a better balance between 
are contaminating ground waters technical assessments and pOlitical needs 
in pollcy formation 
Improvements fn the speed and Generation of greater public awareness of 
effectiveness of the operation of the toxicological information 
regulatory system Shift of the dominant cultural Orlentation 
for "safety" assessment more toward 
toxicity assessment 
Techno1 ogy Development of pesticides with Development of nmre effective pestlcldes 
Development acceptable performance and environmental --particularly to meet the needs of small 
charactenstlcs land areas 
Capabilities for effective management of 
pesticide run-offs into water 
- - - . - -. - . . - - - . . . - . . - 
SOURCE: Pesticide Task Group discussion a t  the U.S.-Japan Yorkshop on Risk Management. 
Table  5 
Sunmary of Approaches t o  S e a t  Be l t  Uanagement 
i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and Japan 
I N S U R A A C E ~  
LEGAL 
-
U .S. J apan  
Avoid r e g u l a t i o n  Avoid r e g u l a t i o n  ( b u t  fo l low 
the  lead  of f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s )  
P e r i o d i c  i n f o r m t i o n  Pe r iod ic  i n fo rma t ion  canpaigns  
conpaigns  
50 S t a t e  c h i l d  r e s t r a i n t  No c h i l d  r e s t r a i n t  laws 
laws 
S t a t e  + l o c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  P re fec tu re  + l o c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  
Xixed: So f a u l t  I f  f a u l t  u n c l e a r ,  a s s ip r !  
3rd p a r t y  l i a b i l i t y  t o  l e s s e r  Lnjured 
Lover r a t e s  f o r  pas s ive  No p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e  b u t  sone 
r e s t r a i n t s  + a i r  bags higher damage awards ( f o r  
(bu t  m a l l  s a v i n g s )  death)  
Some h i g h e r  conpensat ion  
awards 
R e s i s t  r e s l a t i o n  I n i t i a l  r e l u c t a n c e ,  then 
n e u t r a l i t y  
No market ing  i n i t i a t i v e  No marketing i n i t i a t i v e  
U g h  p e r c e p t i o n  of High pe rcep t ion  of 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
Opposi t ion  t o  mandatory Opposit ion t o  mandatory u s e  
u se  
C o n f l i c t  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  C o n f l i c t  w i th  i n d i v i d u a l  
freedom freedom 
R e l a t i v e l y  f l a t  use  r a t e s  S l i g h t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  ( ? )  u s e  
(10-15 X )  r a t e s  (5-102) 
Source: R. Kasperson and N. S a k a s h i t a ,  "Seat Be l t  Usage i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
and Japan. A  Sumsary of Conclusions from the  Sea t  B e l t  Task Group,' 
3. MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION 
3.1. MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION 
Bjorn Wahletrom 
Technical Research Centre of Finland 
Espoo, Finland 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There has r e c e n t l y  been a  number o f  spec tacu la r  i n c i d e n t s  where human 
e r r o r s  have been an impor tan t  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f ac to r .  A t  t h e  Three M i l e  
I s l a n d  nuc lear  power p l a n t  i n  1979 t h e  opera to rs  d i d  n o t  complete ly  
understand t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e i r  p l a n t  and they made a  number o f  e r r o r s ,  
which r e s u l t e d  i n  a  l o s s  o f  coo lan t  acc iden t  and a  p a r t i a l  m e l t  down o f  
t h e  r e a c t o r  core. I n  Bhopal i n  1981 a  se r i es  o f  opera t ions  l e d  t o  t h e  
re lease  o f  t o x i c  gas t h a t  k i l l e d  about two thousand and i n j u r e d  severa l  
thousand people. L a t e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t he  sa fe t y  
management o f  t h e  p l a n t  was n o t  a t  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  l e v e l .  The Chal lenger  
acc iden t  i n  1986 k i l l e d  t h e  crew o f  as t ronauts  and was caused by a  
l e a k i n g  seal known t o  produce t r o u b l e  i n  weather cond i t i ons  l i k e  those 
t h e  morning o f  t h e  launch. The Chernobyl acc iden t  i n  1986, which k i l l e d  
about t h i r t y  persons and caused a  l a r g e  f a l l o u t  i n  Europe, was caused 
by a  number o f  d e l i b e r a t e  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  sa fe t y  r u l es .  The re lease  o f  
t o x i c  substances f rom the  Sandoz f a c t o r y  i n t o  t h e  Rhine should have 
been poss i b l e  t o  avo id  by appropr ia te  f i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  equipment and a  
cons ide ra t i on  o f  t h e  poss i b l e  consequences o f  a  f i r e .  
The acc iden ts  may seem d i f f e r e n t  b u t  they a l l  have i n  common a  
breakdown o f  same aspects o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  between man and t h e  t echn i ca l  
system. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Three M i l e  I s l a n d  i n c i d e n t  i d e n t i f i e d  
c o n t r o l  room design, emergency ope ra t i ng  procedures and opera to r  
t r a i n i n g  as t he  main c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  t h e  human e r ro r s .  A t  t he  Bhopal 
p l a n t  t he re  had been a  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  t he  opera t iona l  s t a f f  and no 
ac t i ons  had been taken on i d e n t i f i e d  sa fe t y  t h rea t s .  I n  t he  space 
s h u t t l e  programme t h e  problem w i t h  t h e  l e a k i n g  seal had been i d e n t i f i e d  
severa l  years e a r l i e r ,  b u t  a  redesign had been considered t oo  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  c a r r y  o u t  w i t h o u t  a  ser ious  delay. The Chernobyl opera to rs  were 
apparen t l y  n o t  aware t h a t  t h e i r  ac t i ons  were dangerous and they were 
t oo  eager t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  t e s t s  they had been assigned t o  do. The 
Sandoz management should have been aware o f  t h e  r i s k s  w i t h  t h e  storage 
o f  chemicals b u t  they chose n o t  t o  fund improvements i n  f i r e  
p ro tec t i on .  
The i n c i d e n t s  have b rought  o u t  a  d i s t r u s t  o f  t h e  t echn i ca l  systems and 
t h e  decision-making process l ead ing  t o  t he  cons t r uc t i on  and opera t ion  
o f  such systems. Th i s  d i s t r u s t  has been most c l e a r l y  seen i n  t h e  
nuc lear  power f i e l d ,  where dec is ions  n o t  t o  c o m i s s i o n  even ready b u i l t  
nuc lear  power p l a n t s  have been taken. Some o f  t h e  d i s t r u s t  i s  c l e a r l y  
based on emotional f ee l i ngs ,  b u t  the  more o b j e c t i v e  oppos i t i on  i s  based 
on a  cons ide ra t i on  o f  t h e  r i s k s  associated w i t h  complex technology. Any 
human a c t i v i t y  w i l l  i n v o l v e  d i f f e r e n t  k i nds  o f  r i s k s  and t h e  use o f  a  
t echn i ca l  system i s  j u s t i f i e d  on l y  i f  t he  b e n e f i t s  o f  i t s  use ou twe igh t  
t h e  r i s k s .  'The dec i s i on  e i t h e r  t o  adopt o r  abandon a  technology should 
t h e r e f o r e  be based on an assessment o f  b e n e f i t s  and r i s k s  assoc ia ted  
w i t h  t h a t  technology. The r i s k s  f o r  a  technology i n  use should 
n a t u r a l l y  be b rought  t o  a  l e v e l  as low as i s  reasonably achievable.  
Th i s  means t h a t  requirements have t o  be p u t  on t he  systems a l so  w i t h  
respec t  t o  how t he  human and system i n t e r a c t i o n s  a re  arranged. The 
ques t ion  here i s  whether o r  n o t  i t  i s  poss i b l e  t o  b u i l d  complex 
systems which are safe enough. 
2. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MAN AND MACHINE 
Man w i l l  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  machine i n  several d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  a  
complex t echn i ca l  system. The f o l l o w i n g  general r o l e s  f o r  t h e  human i n  
t h e  system may be i d e n t i f i e d  
- t h e  dec i s i on  maker 
- t h e  designer  
- t he  cons t r uc to r  
- t h e  safety  a n a l y s t  
- t h e  opera to r  
- t h e  ma in ta i ne r  
- t h e  manager 
The cons t r uc t i on  of any l a r g e  p l a n t  w i l l  be preceeded by a  d e t a i l e d  
ana l ys i s  o f  t h e  technology, t he  resources needed, t ime  schedules, 
costs,  s t a f f i n g ,  e tc .  I n  t h a t  process a  number of dec i s i on  makers have 
t o  make up t h e i r  minds on t he  s i z e  o f  t h e  p l a n t ,  t h e  s i t e  o f  t he  p l an t .  
vendors e tc .  The c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n t  i s  o f t en  a l so  connected w i t h  
d i f f e r e n t  pe rm i t s  granted by a u t h o r i t i e s .  A  sa fe t y  ana l ys i s  i s  u s u a l l y  
c a r r i e d  o u t  as a  p a r t  o f  the  p redec is ion  assessment. As t h e  dec i s i on  
makers a r e  human, i t i s  poss i b l e  t h a t  they make suboptimal dec is ions  
w i t h  regard  t o  t h e  technology, t h e  vendors, t h e  s i t e  se lec ted  etc .  The 
dec is ions  w i l l  a l s o  have a  l a r g e  i n f l uence  on t he  requi rements p laced 
on t h e  design o f  t he  completed p lan t .  
The designers are u s u a l l y  work ing w i t h  a  f i x e d  budget and a  f i x e d  t ime  
schedule. The design o f  a  complex i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  i s  always based on 
e a r l i e r  design, where t h e  proof o f  p r i n c i p l e s  have been obtained. The 
e a r l i e r  designs a r e  then changed i n  t he  design p r o j e c t  and scaled t o  
g e t  a  b e t t e r  performance f o r  t h e  new p l an t .  Design i n  general can be 
very  compl icated where a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  has t o  be sought i n  
response t o  severa l  c o n f l  i c t i n g  requirements. To improve t h e  qua1 i t y  
and e f f i c i e n c y  o f  design, a  number o f  design guides have been 
developed. Consider ing t he  human i n  the  system, t he  design p r o j e c t  
should be ab le  t o  a r r i v e  a t  an acceptable s o l u t i o n  w i t h  respec t  t o  eg. 
c o n t r o l  room design, procedures and opera to r  t r a i n i n g .  
The cons t r uc t i on  o f  a  l a r g e  p l a n t  can r e q u i r e  the  coopera t ion  o f  
thousands o f  people and i nvo l ve  m i l  1  i ons  o f  drawings. Dur ing t he  
cons t r uc t i on  process d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  design may be detected and 
they  should be co r rec ted  w i t hou t  d i s t u r b i n g  t he  o v e r a l l  schedule o f  t h e  
cons t ruc t ion .  It should be poss i b l e  t o  check t he  q u a l i t y  o f  t he  
components and t he  work done i n  a1 1  phases of t he  cons t r uc t i on  p ro j ec t .  
A l l  des ign s o l u t i o n s  should a1 so be documented as t h e  p l a n t  i s  
constructed.  When t he  cons t r uc t i on  has been completed, then t he  p l a n t  
should be s t a r t e d  up sec t i on  by sec t i on  a f t e r  t he  complet ion f i n a l  o f  
t e s t s  f o r  t he  components, subsystems and systems. When t he  s t a r t - up  has 
been completed, a  pe r i od  of t e s t  ope ra t i on  i s  i n i t i a t e d ,  t h i s  a iming a t  
i d e n t i f y i n g  a l l  t he  ope ra t i ona l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  p lan t .  
Any p o t e n t i a l l y  dangerous i n d u s t r i a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n  should go through a  
systemat ic  s a f e t y  assessment procedure. Depending on t h e  s i z e  and t y p e  
o f  p l an t ,  t he  procedure w i l l  be c a r r i e d  o u t  by one o r  several sa fe t y  
engineers. 
Dur ing t h e  procedure, hazardous process s t a tes  and sequences o f  even ts  
a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  The l i k e l i h o o d  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  sa fe t y  t h r e a t s  a re  then 
assessed and b a r r i e r s  a re  then b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  process, the  automation, 
t h e  c o n t r o l  room and t h e  procedures. 
The ope ra t i on  o f  an i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  i s  u s u a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  on a  
r e g u l a r  s h i f t  basis, t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  s h i f t  depending on t h e  type  o f  
p l a n t  and t h e  se lec ted  l e v e l  o f  automation. The opera to rs  a re  u s u a l l y  
h i r e d  i n  due t ime be fo re  t h e  s t a r t - up  o f  t h e  p l an t ,  and they a re  g iven  
bo th  t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  t r a i n i n g .  I n  modern automated p l a n t s  t h e  
opera t ions  a re  u s u a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  f rom a  c e n t r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  room w i t h  
on l y  a  few tasks  i n  t h e  p l a n t  performed by rowing operators.  The main 
t o o l s  o f  ope ra t i on  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  room are  c o n t r o l  boards and panels 
equipped w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  k i nds  o f  d i sp l ays  and con t ro l s .  Today most new 
p l a n t s  use computers i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  room. I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  techn ica l  
equipment, t h e  c o n t r o l  room opera to rs  have access t o  d i f f e r e n t  k i nds  o f  
p l a n t  documentation such as procedures, system desc r i p t i ons ,  drawings 
e t c .  
Tes t  and maintenance i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  as a  r e g u l a r  a c t i v i t y  a t  a l l  
i n d u s t r i a l  p lan ts .  When sa fe t y  i s  a  s p e c i f i c  concern, p reven t i ve  
maintenance i s  adopted as a  p o l i c y  i e .  a  component i s  mainta ined o r  
changed e i t h e r  r e g u l a r l y  o r  when r e g u l a r  t e s t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
maintenance i s  necessary. Tes t  and maintenance a t  a  complex p l a n t  w i l l  
r e q u i r e  coo rd i na t i on  w i t h  t h e  c o n t r o l  room t o  ensure t h a t  c o r r e c t  
components a re  worked on e tc .  Maintenance o f  t he  very  many d i f f e r e n t  
components and systems w i l l  r e q u i r e  good documentation and procedures. 
The management w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  be respons ib le  f o r  t h e  performance o f  
t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  Th i s  means t h a t  management should be ab le  t o  mo t i va te  
t h e  personnel t o  use agreed procedures t o  i nsu re  t h e  sa fe t y  i n  a l l  
stages o f  design, cons t ruc t ion ,  ope ra t i on  and maintenance. The 
management should a l s o  be ab le  t o  de tec t  degradat ions i n  performance 
and t o  r a p i d l y  b r i n g  t h e  o rgan i za t i on  back t o  t he  r equ i r ed  performance 
l e v e l .  The management should a1 so be s e n s i t i v e  t o  weak s i g n a l s  o f  
approaching problems t o  i n i t i a t e  development o r  t r a i n i n g  programnes 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  ea r l y .  
3. HUMAN ERRORS 
Any e r r o r ,  human o r  t echn i ca l ,  can be seen as one p o i n t  i n  a  cha in  o f  
events. Th is  means t h a t  t he  e r r o r  w i l l  have d i f f e r e n t  causes and i t can 
l ead  t o  d i f f e r e n t  consequences. A  search f o r  t h e  causes helps t o  
i d e n t i f y  p laces where remedies can be appl ied.  A  search towards 
d i f f e r e n t  poss i b l e  consequences o f  one o r  a  combinat ion o f  e r r o r s  w i l l  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  importance o f  t h e  e r r o r s  w i t h  respec t  t o  p l a n t  safety .  
A  human e r r o r  can be de f ined  as an a c t  ou t s i de  some range o f  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  A  human e r r o r  should never be accepted as an 
explanat ion,  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r i b u t i n g  causes should be sought i n  
t h e  same way as f o r  t echn i ca l  e r r o r s .  Th i s  means t h a t  exp lana t ions  
should be sought where remedies cou ld  be i nse r t ed ,  eg. c o n t r o l  room 
design, procedures and opera to r  t r a i n i n g .  The system design should aim 
a t  s o l u t i o n s  where un to l e rab le  e r r o r s  can be avoided. 
I n  o rder  t o  improve system design one has t o  aqu i r e  some understanding 
o f  human behaviour. Human e r r o r s  can be sa i d  t o  be a  p a r t  o f  human 
nature,  t r i a l  and e r r o r  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  bas i s  o f  human learn ing .  Where 
e r r o r s  can n o t  be t o l e ra ted ,  b a r r i e r s  have t o  be b u i l t  i n ,  e i t h e r  by 
p r o v i d i n g  procedures f o r  a  c o r r e c t  opera t ion  o r  by b u i l d i n g  i n t e r l o c k s  
t o  p reven t  i n c o r r e c t  operat ion.  C o l l e c t i o n  and ana l ys i s  o f  human e r r o r s  
can g i v e  a  more accura te  p i c t u r e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  causes o f  human e r ro r s .  
Consider ing d i f f e r e n t  human e r ro r s ,  one has t o  i s o l a t e  e r r o r s  o f  
i n t e n t i o n ,  sabotage and cheat ing  being examples. A  human be ing  
i ncapac i t a t ed  by a lcoho l  o r  drugs i s  another case where t h e  e r r o r  cou ld  
be considered i n t e n t i o n a l .  For  non in ten t i ona l  e r r o r s  t h e  d i v i s i o n  
between s l i p s  and mistakes has been suggested. A  s l i p  i s  then  a  case 
where t h e  human d i d  know b e t t e r ,  b u t  made an e r r o r  which was 
immediately recognized. A  s l i p  w i l l  then be observed f rom t h e  o u t s i d e  
o n l y  when t h e  s l i p  can n o t  be co r rec ted  be fo re  t he  p l a n t  has been 
d r i v e n  t o  a  p o i n t  o f  no re tu rn .  A  mistake i n  t h i s  connect ion i s  an 
e r r o r  committed i n  cons ider ing  t he  a c t  as a  c o r r e c t  one a l though a  
thorough ana l ys i s  would have revealed i t  as i n c o r r e c t .  A  mistake w i l l  
then i n d i c a t e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  understanding t h e  p l an t ,  which again 
cou ld  be due t o  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  c o n t r o l  room design, procedures, 
t r a i n i n g ,  e tc .  
Human e r r o r s  can be committed i n  a l l  phases o f  design, cons t r uc t i on ,  
ope ra t i on  and maintenance. As human e r r o r s  can no t  be avoided 
complete ly ,  t h e  c r u c i a l  t h i n g  i s  t o  de tec t  e r r o r s  committed be fo re  t hey  
i n f l u e n c e  t he  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  p lan t .  One p o s s i b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  connect ion 
i s  t o  i n c l ude  d i f f e r e n t  checks t o  ensure t h a t  eve ry th i ng  has been done 
accord ing t o  standards be fo re  t he  p l a n t  i s  s t a r t e d  up. Th i s  should be 
done as a  r e g u l a r  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  procedure where independent checks 
a re  in t roduced.  I n  a  s i m i l a r  way t he  sa fe t y  assessment should be 
c a r r i e d  o u t  as an independent procedure t o  search f o r  poss i b l e  weak 
p o i n t s  and t o  i n t r oduce  improvements where weak p o i n t s  a re  found. One 
type  o f  human e r r o r ,  which a c t u a l l y  p o i n t s  towards d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  
management, i s  connected w i t h  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  qua1 i t y  c o n t r o l  and 
s a f e t y  assessment func t ions .  
Organ iza t iona l  d e f i c i e n c i e s  can be in t roduced as a  separate category o f  
human e r r o r s  where t he  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  severa l  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  
considered. I n  t h i s  connect ion one may see cases where i n f o rma t i on  i s  
n o t  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t h e  o rgan i za t i on  i n  a  proper  way. One a l s o  f i n d s  
cases where s a f e t y  has sho r t - s i gh ted l y  been t raded  i n  favour  o f  
economic cons idera t ions .  Ma in ta i n i ng  preparedness f o r  unexpected events 
i s  a l so  an impor tan t  t ask  o f  t he  o rgan iza t ion .  
4. THE MAN I N  THE SYSTEM 
There a re  many d i f f e r e n t  and o f t e n  c o n f l i c t i n g  requi rements placed on 
an i n d u s t r i a l  p l an t .  The requi rement  t o  take  t h e  a b i l i t i e s  and 
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  human i n t o  account i n  system design i s  a c t u a l l y  
de r i ved  from t h e  more general requi rements o f  t h e  p l a n t  economy and 
sa fe ty .  The design process i s  supposed t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  t echn i ca l  
s o l u t i o n  which i s  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  compromise between t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
requirements. Th i s  means t h a t  t h e  t echn i ca l  s o l u t i o n  w i l l  r e f l e c t  some 
requi rements b e t t e r  than others,  where t h e  designer has g i ven  an o rde r  
o f  p r i o r i t y  f o r  t he  requirements. It i s  important ,  however, t h a t  a l l  
r e l e v a n t  requi rements are i nc l uded  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  design 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  t o  be considered. 
The requi rement  t o  a l so  take  t h e  man i n t o  cons ide ra t i on  seems t o  have 
been f o r g o t t e n  i n  many o f  t he  p l an t s ,  i n  t h e i r  maintenance procedures 
and management systems. Man i s  c l e a r l y  f a l l i b l e ,  though as a 
system component can be very  ingenious when g iven app rop r i a t e  t o o l s  and 
a nonhos t i l e  environment. The o b j e c t i v e  i n  t h e  system design i s  then  t o  
be a b l e  t o  b u i l d  i n  t h e  b a r r i e r s  aga ins t  i n t o l e r a b l e  human e r ro r s ,  b u t  
a t  t h e  same t ime g i v e  t h e  humans i n  t h e  system the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  do 
t h e i r  best .  Th is  o b j e c t i v e  p laces requi rements bo th  on t h e  p l a n t  and 
t h e  o rgan i za t i ona l  design. 
Automation has been one of t h e  means by which t he  harmonizat ion o f  man 
and machine has been pursued. E a r l y  automation t r i e d  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  
t o  remove t h e  man from t h e  system as a response t o  t he  need f o r  
improved work ing cond i t i ons ,  and t o  observed human shortcomings i n  t h e  
opera t ion  o f  t h e  processes. Automation has been developed by c o n t r o l  
engineers, who have n o t  always had an understanding o f  human behaviour. 
Some o f  t h e  problems have, however, been i d e n t i f i e d  and d i f f e r e n t  
gu i de l i nes  f o r  t he  design of man machine systems have been developed. 
The problem, however, seems t o  be t o  i n t e g r a t e  such gu ide l i nes  i n t o  t h e  
ac tua l  design p ro j ec t s .  
The design o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  and i ns t r umen ta t i on  o f  a p l a n t  embraces t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  automation concept, t h e  c o n t r o l  room design and t h e  
design of t h e  i ns t r umen ta t i on  and t h e  p l a n t  computer systems. The exac t  
d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  design a c t i v i t i e s  depends on t h e  coun t ry  and 
company t r a d i t i o n .  The man-machine gu ide l  i nes  developed have t o  a 1 a rge  
e x t e n t  concentrated on c o n t r o l  room design. The gu ide l i nes  a re  o f ten  
w r i t t e n  i n  t he  fo rm o f  a c h e c k - l i s t  o f  questions, t o  which i t  should be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  answer w i t h  a yes i n  o rder  t o  meet t h e  requirement. The 
gu ide l i nes  seem, however, t o  r e f l e c t  a t  t h e  same t ime bo th  requi rements 
and s p e c i f i c  design t r a d i t i o n s .  Th is  makes i t d i f f i c u l t  t o  u t i l i z e  t he  
gu ide l  i nes  i n  one place, i f  they  have been developed somewhere e l  se. 
Guide l ines  f o r  w r i t i n g  procedures have a l s o  been developed and s i m i l a r  
problems i n  how they  a re  used can be observed as f o r  o t he r  gu ide l ines .  
The cor rec tness  o f  t h e  procedures i n  a l l  poss i b l e  opera t iona l  
cond i t i ons  of t he  p l a n t  i s  t he  main problem and t h i s  cannot be so lved  
us i ng  t h e  guide1 ines .  Recommendations f o r  t r a i n i n g  opera to rs  o f  a  p l a n t  
have a l s o  been developed. T r a i n i n g  s imu la to rs  are commonly accepted as 
be ing  very e f f i c i e n t  t o o l s  f o r  opera to r  t r a i n i n g  and t h i s  approach i s  
used r e g u l a r i t y  i n  t h e  aerospace and t h e  nuc lear  i n d u s t r i e s .  
Wi th regard  t o  what i s  known about t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  how t o  account 
f o r  t h e  man i n  t h e  system, t h e  main problem seems r a t h e r  t o  be how t o  
i n t e g r a t e  t h a t  knowledge i n t o  system design than t o  generate new 
knowledge. Th i s  i s  a l so  r e f l e c t e d  i n  a  comnonly seen a t t i t u d e  t h a t  
improvements o f  t h e  design process are unnecessary and d i f f i c u l t  if n o t  
imposs ib le  t o  c a r r y  out.  The s t r i v i n g  f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  has a1 so imp1 i e d  
t h a t  t he  subsystem designers do no t  u s u a l l y  have t h e  broad overview o f  
system and human behaviour necessary i f  somewhat general design r u l e s  
a re  used. The problem seen here i nvo l ves  the  need t o  cope w i t h  t he  
complex i t y  o f  a  modern i n d u s t r i a l  p lan t ,  where very  s t r i c t  f i n a n c i a l  
l i m i t s  f o r  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  are given. 
The o n l y  way o f  cop ing  w i t h  t h e  complex i t y  o f  a  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  
i s  t o  b u i l d  up several independent feedbacks i n  t h e  design, 
cons t r uc t i on ,  ope ra t i on  and maintenance o f  the  p l an t .  The feedbacks 
should d i r e c t e d  t o  de tec t i ng  and c o r r e c t i n g  e r r o r s  observed a t  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  Th is  means t h a t  i n  t he  design p r o j e c t  t he re  should 
f o r  a l l  des ign a c t i v i t i e s  be an independent checking and a u t h o r i z a t i o n  
mechanism by which t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  each a c t i v i t y  i s  maintained. 
Feedbacks should a1 so be b u i l t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  t o  
ensure t h a t  performance on a  system l e v e l  i s  a  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  r e s u l t  o f  
accepted subsystem performance. S i m i l a r  systems o f  feedbacks should 
a l s o  be b u i l t  on a  na t i ona l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  where a  cont inuous 
eva lua t i on  o f  t he  performance o f  t he  system takes p l ace  and necessary 
a c t i o n s  a re  i n i t i a t e d  when degraded performance i s  i d e n t i f i e d .  
One o f  t h e  main problems i n  t h e  cons ide ra t i on  o f  humans i n  t h e  system 
i s  associated w i t h  t he  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  making p r e d i c t i o n s  regard ing  t h e i r  
behaviour based on system c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Th is  means t h a t  i t  i s  ve ry  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n c l u d e  t he  human ac t i ons  i n  a  systemat ic  s a f e t y  ana lys is .  
The methods developed so f a r  can g i ve  q u a l i t a t i v e  guidance f o r  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  importance of some o f  t h e  sequences o f  events, b u t  a l l  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  es t ima t i ons  w i l l  be very un re l i ab l e .  A  p o s s i b i l i t y  here 
i s  t o  adopt a  s a f e t y  management approach, where exper ience on system 
behaviour  i s  c o l l e c t e d  a t  each l e v e l  and compared w i t h  a v a i l a b l e  s a f e t y  
ana lys is .  I n  t h i s  approach a l l  events w i l l  be analysed t o  decide i f  
they  a re  expected w i t h i n  t h e  normal v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  t echn i ca l  system 
o r  t he  human. I f  an event  i s  accepted as be ing  something normal, then 
no a c t i o n  w i l l  be taken. I f  t h e  event  occurs t o o  f r e q u e n t l y  then i t  
should l ead  t o  a  change i n  the  system. The sa fe t y  ana l ys i s  should 
always be l i v i n g  i n  t he  sense t h a t  changes i n  t h e  process, t he  
i ns t r umen ta t i on  o r  t he  o rgan i za t i on  should be updated i n  t he  sa fe ty  
ana l ys i s  and i t s  assumptions. 
5. TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS AND THE SOCIETY 
Technology w i l l  undoubtedly b r i n g  w i t h  i t  new r i s k s ,  which have n o t  
been a  p a r t  o f  t h e  l i f e  i n  a  p re techn ica l  soc ie ty .  The mot ives behind 
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  technology a re  t h e  b e n e f i t s  which a re  considered t o  
be 1  a rger  than t he  costs.  The problem w i t h  i n t r o d u c i n g  new technology 
i s  t h a t  some b u t  n o t  a l l  r i s k s  a r e  seen i n  t h e  beginning.  Th i s  i s  
c l e a r l y  due t o  t he  f a c t  t h a t  new technology can have drawbacks and can 
a f f e c t  t he  soc i e t y  i n  many d i f f e r e n t  ways which a re  n o t  immediate ly  
seen and t h e  persons respons ib le  f o r  t h e  development o f  new technology 
cannot  have t h e  r e q u i r e d  broad overv iew t o  cons ider  a l l  secondary and 
t e r t i a r y  e f f e c t s .  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new techno1 ogy o f t e n  occurs 
g radua l l y ,  which means t h a t  i t  i s  poss i b l e  t o  adapt  i t  w i t h  respec t  t o  
r i s k s  observed l a t e r .  
The r i s k s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  t he  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  technology have been 
r a i s e d  as a  p o l i t i c a l  argument i n  many count r ies .  The r i s k s  are i n  some 
cases based on new exper ience and i n  o t he r  cases problems which expe r t s  
have been aware o f  f o r  a  cons iderab le  t ime. I n  t h e  case o f  new 
exper ience i t  may t ake  a  cons iderab le  t ime  t o  develop new so lu t i ons ,  i f  
t h e  new technology has t o  be abandoned. If exper ts  have been aware o f  a  
problem assoc ia ted  w i t h  new technology, then u s u a l l y  a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t i a l  
s o l u t i o n  ex i s t s .  I n  bo th  cases, however, t he  dec i s i on  regard ing  how t o  
cope w i t h  t h e  r i s k s  w i l l  be based on economic cons idera t ions .  Economic 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  b rough t  i n t o  a framework o f  p o l i t i c a l  
d e c i s i o n  making where c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  and t h e  
p r i o r i t i e s  a r e  se t .  
A p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  t a k i n g  p o s i t i o n  on a ques t ion  concern ing r i s k s  
shou ld  be based on a systemat ic  ana lys is .  T h i s  means t h a t  d e c i s i o n  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  shou ld  be assessed w i t h i n  a comnon framework w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  d i f f e r e n t  scenar ios  o f  events. The d i f f i c u l t y ,  however, i s  t o  c r e a t e  
a re1  i a b l e  model o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  scenar ios t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a v a l i d  
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  r i s k s ,  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s .  The problem i s  a l s o  t o  be 
a b l e  t o  u t i l i z e  a v a i l a b l e  exper ience i n  a l l  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  f i e l d s  o f  
knowledge. Another problem i s  t o  communicate t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  r i s k  
a n a l y s i s  t o  t h e  decision-maker i n  a comprehensible form. 
The h a n d l i n g  o f  t h e  problems o f  complex technology i n  p o l i t i c a l  
dec is ion-making depends on t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between e x p e r t s  and laymen. 
As no s i n g l e  person can manage t h e  knowledge needed t o  understand a l l  
aspects  o f  any s p e c i f i c  technology, t h e  d e c i s i o n s  have t o  be made by a 
group, where each i n d i v i d u a l  has h i s  own f i e l d  o f  e x p e r t i s e .  To render  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  accep tab le  i t  has t o  be p o s s i b l e  t o  s c r u t i n i z e  i t  
independent ly ,  which means t h a t  i t  shou ld  be p o s s i b l e  t o  communicate t o  
laymen. Here an understanding between e x p e r t s  and laymen i s  needed and 
t h i s  r e q u i r e s  t r u s t  o f  another  person 's  judgement. T h i s  t r u s t  can be 
ma in ta ined  o n l y  i f  reasons f o r  t h e  judgement can be comnunicated 
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  an account o f  one 's  own mot i ves  i n  a comprehensive form. 
One o f  t h e  problems r e g a r d i n g  new technology i s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  t h e  
b e l i e f s  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r i s i n g  from it. When a new technology i s  
i n t r o d u c e d  i t  i s  ve ry  comnon t h a t  i t  i s  marketed w i t h  o p t i m i s t i c  
expec ta t ions .  The expec ta t ions  c r e a t e  be1 i e f s  i n  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  
technology and i f  t h e  expec t ions  cannot  be f u l f i l l e d  i n  a c e r t a i n  
t imeframe a f e e l i n g  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  can be created.  I f  such a 
f r u s t r a t i o n  i s  combined w i t h  f e a r s  o f  something unknown and i s  
accompanied by a s u p e r i o r  a t t i t u d e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  exper ts ,  i t  i s  
ve ry  l i k e l y  t h a t  an e a r l i e r  p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  may be changed i n t o  one 
o f  oppos i t i on .  Tak ing i n t o  account t h e  tendency o f  humans t o  b u i l d  
t h e i r  b e l i e f s  on ev idence and t o  c o l l e c t  new evidence o n l y  i n  suppor t  
o f  o l d  b e l i e f s ,  i t  i s  easy t o  understand, t h a t  a p o l a r i z a t i o n  can 
occur. The deadlock over  t h e  debate o f  t h e  pros and cons o f  n u c l e a r  
power can a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  be exp la ined  by such a model . 
To a r r i v e  a t  a balanced view i n  s o c i e t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  new technology,  
i t  has t o  be supported w i t h  p o p u l a r i z a t i o n ,  which enables an 
en1 igh tened  1 ayman t o  understand it. Th is  means, t h a t  simp1 i f i e d  models 
should be developed t o  e x p l a i n  how technology works. The models should 
be suppor ted w i t h  a c l e a r  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y  
i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  t h e i r  abuse. Models should a l s o  be developed t o  
p r o v i d e  a b e t t e r  unders tand ing  o f  how technology and s o c i e t y  i n t e r a c t  
t o  be a b l e  t o  suppor t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  decision-making. A lso  those models 
should be p o p u l a r i z e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a b a s i s  f o r  debate on t h e  goa ls  f o r  
s o c i a l  development. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Man w i l l  always be a p a r t  o f  any t e c h n i c a l  system as a des igner ,  
c o n s t r u c t o r ,  s a f e t y  assessor, opera to r ,  m a i n t a i n e r  and manager. Man i s  
a l s o  f a l l i b l e ,  which means t h a t  p r o v i s i o n s  should be b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  and t h e  manageri a1 systems t o  d e t e c t  e r r o r s  b e f o r e  a n y t h i n g  
ser ious  occurs. The problem o f  today i s  n o t  what we do n o t  know, b u t  t o  
u t i l i z e  what we do know. A p a r t  o f  t h i s  problem can be so lved  by 
adap t ing  t h e  e x i s t i n g  t o o l s  t o  s p e c i f i c  des ign and work p r a c t i c e s ,  
w h i l e  ano ther  p a r t  can be so lved  by t r a i n i n g  and educat ion.  There i s ,  
however, a gener i c  problem i n  t h e  des ign o f  complex processes, which i s  
connected w i t h  t h e  managerial  system i n  use. Th is  problem concerns t h e  
development o f  new t o o l s  f o r  t h e  design, because t h e  c o s t  o f  such a 
development cannot  be j u s t i f i e d  w i t h o u t  a c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o j e c t ,  b u t  
when such a p r o j e c t  has been s t a r t e d ,  t h e r e  i s  no l o n g e r  t i m e  t o  
develop t h e  t o o l  s needed. 
The impor tance o f  t h e  man i n  t h e  system as an opera to r  and a m a i n t a i n e r  
i s  w e l l  understood today. The impor tance o f  t h e  des igner ,  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t o r  and t h e  sa fe ty  a n a l y s t  i s  a l s o  w e l l  understood, a l though  
human e r r o r s  i n  those tasks  a r e  seldom analyzed i n  t h e  same way as 
o p e r a t i o n  and maintenance e r r o r s .  The importance o f  t h e  management i s  
s t i l l  l e s s  understood and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  e r r o r s  a re  u s u a l l y  n o t  even 
used as a category i n  a n a l y z i n g  events. The i d e a  t h a t  t h e  layman i n  
s o c i e t y  has an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  decision-making r e g a r d i n g  new 
techno logy 's  adop t ion  o r  abandonment i s  something new i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  o f  
today. The i d e a  t h a t  p o l i t i c i a n s  a r e  f a l l i b l e  humans w i t h  t h e i r  own 
goa ls  and ambi t ions,  work ing i n  an u n s t r u c t u r e d  decis ion-making 
environment has t o  come i f  we want t o  avo id  c o s t l y  human e r r o r s  i n  t h e  
s o c i a l  d e c i s i o n  making process. 
One o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  t h i n g s  i n  a v o i d i n g  human e r r o r s  w i l l  be how w e l l  we 
a r e  a b l e  t o  handle t h e  comp lex i t y  o f  t h e  systems. The decision-makers 
have t o  suppor t  t h e i r  own understanding w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  models 
p rov ided  by t h e i r  t r a i n i n g  and t h e  d e c i s i o n  suppor t  systems used. The 
requi rement  o f  human understanding w i t h i n  t h e  span o f  c o n t r o l  f o r  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  maker may a c t u a l l y  s e t  a  1 i m i t  on t h e  manageable comp lex i t y  o f  
a  system. 
Looking a t  t h e  records  o f  h i g h - r i s k  i n d u s t r i e s ,  one may g e t  t h e  
p e s s i m i s t i c  impress ion  t h a t  t h e  acc iden ts  are necessary b e f o r e  any 
system i s  improved. It i s  t rue ,  t h a t  many o f  t h e  problems revea led  i n  
acc iden ts  have been r e a l i s e d ,  b u t  t h i s  f a c t  r a t h e r  p o i n t s  towards a 
p o s s i b i l i t y  than  a problem. I f  we a r e  a b l e  t o  s o l v e  t h e  managerial  
problems o f  u t i l i z i n g  a v a i l a b l e  knowledge and i f  we a r e  a b l e  t o  
a l l o c a t e  enough resources then  i t  should be p o s s i b l e  t o  c r e a t e  s a f e  
systems b e f o r e  acc iden ts  f o r c e  us t o  do so. Wi th  an understanding o f  
t h e  problems t o g e t h e r  w i t h  an e f f e c t i v e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  experience, i t  
should a1 so be p o s s i b l e  t o  c r e a t e  s u f f i c i e n t 1  y  sa fe  complex systems. 
Manpower w i t h  a background b o t h  i n  systems eng ineer ing  and behav ioura l  
sc iences w i l l  have t o  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h i s  t o  be achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Computer generated display-control interfaces and computer 
based automatic control systems give us interesting new potential 
for supporting the human operators of high risk industrial proces- 
ses. They can also pose new difficulties, causing slow and error- 
prone activity. The new equipment6 and working methods are usual- 
ly designed in ignorance of the factors which affect human error 
rates, although many of these factors are well understood, and it 
is possible to design to minimize human error (e.g. Rasmussen & 
Rouse, 1981;  Rasmussen et al, 1 9 8 7 ) .  The main problem is one of 
"technology transfer," of drawing designers' attention to the 
relevant principles and data. Therefore, this paper outlines 
aspects of human factors which are well known and indicates how 
to design to reduce error, emphasizing issues which have not been 
widely discussed elsewhere. It is not possible to remove human 
error altogether, but it is possible to: 
1. reduce human error by an order of magnitude through ap- 
propriate design of equipment; 
2. use our understanding of human error and recovery to design 
error tolerant systems (e.g. giving rapid feedback about the 
results of actions, making actions reversible). 
If our knowledge of what affects human error is not used in 
design, then this raises serious questions about the attribution 
of responsibility for human error. If an operator makes a mis- 
take, but the equipment is designed in such a way that it is 
difficult not to make a mistake, then the responsibility lies 
with the designer of the equipment, not with the maker of the 
error (see e.g. Malone et al, 1980;  Reason, 1 9 8 7 ) .  
This whole area of designing equipment and work for human 
beings is a technical discipline in its own right. In this paper, 
we will look briefly at two main aspects: 
1 .  New display technologies: computer generated displays ironi- 
cally can display both greatly extended and greatly reduced 
information to the human operator. 
2. New control, decision, and advice-giving technologies: 
decision-making by computer allows increasing amounts of the 
process operators' task to be done automatically, while 
Expert Systems expand the possibilities for the operators to 
interact with intelligent advice-giving machines. 
How should these two types of new technology be designed to 
enhance human operation, rather than to make it more difficult? 
We will outline some of the basic human information processing 
characteristics. Designs should take advantage of high capacity 
processes, and minimize the use of low capacity processes and 
time pressures. 
The main human information processing characteristics are: 
A. High parallel processing capacity for: 
1. Visual and sound patterns and semantic context; 
2. Skills. 
B. Low serial processing capacity (which deteriorates further 
under distraction) for: 
3. Working memory; 
4. Time to translate from one form of representation to 
another (whether these are two different external dis- 
plays or one external display which is not compatible 
with the viewer's mental representation of the task). 
Reaction time shows a speed-accuracy trade-off. People can 
take a variety of lengths of time to do the same work. When 
we work slowly, we make minimum errors. But as we try to 
work faster, there comes a break point below which every 
increase in speed is paid for by an increase in errors. If 
people doing an easy task are put under pressure, they can 
work better. But when people doing a difficult job are put 
under pressure, their performance will deteriorate. 
I. NEW DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES 
There are three important themes in the use of computer 
generated multi-plexed displays: 
Expanded Information: 
1. "Anything" can be displayed, so what should be? 
Reduced Information: 
2. Any VDU shows a narrow "window" onto the potentially avail- 
able data about the process, so what information should be 
available at one time? There is a huge dynamic data-base of 
information about a process which the operator should keep 
track of. 
3. The information on any one VDU frequently changes, so how 
can users keep track of where they are in relation to the 
other potentially available data, and how to navigate around 
this data-base to find other information? 
1. Optimum Individual Display Formats: 
People react more quickly and accurately to display codes 
(e.g. magnitude, color, shape) if the codes are salient and dis- 
criminable (both these depend on human sense organ characteris- 
tics, VDT contrast and resolution are usually inappropriate for 
the human eye), and if they are compatible, unambiguous and con- 
sistent (i.e. each code has one and only one meaning). 
As an example of the effect of using a non-optimum design: 
Grether (1949) found that pilots made 17 times more errors and 
took over 4 times as long, when reading a "3-pointer" altimeter 
(the type to which many aircraft crashes have been attributed) 
than when reading the form of display which is now used. There 
are several US and European Standards and Guides for human aspects 
of control system design (e.g. Kinkade, 1984; Anon., 1985). The 
majority of these are oriented to conventional interface technol- 
ogy and hard-wired control, but are equally applicable to software 
based interfaces. They do no explicitly include the new problems 
posed by graphic or multi-paged limited-window interfaces, nor do 
they emphasize design for error recovery. But the information 
which we do have about human cognitive processes used in these 
tasks allows us to make strong design proposals for these new 
situations. 
Visual patterns, which are possible on graphic displays, are 
good for tasks involving comparing or relating. Comparing and 
relating tasks can become trivially obvious on a well designed 
pattern/graphic display, compared with an alpha-numeric, or ver- 
bal, presentation. 
Computer generated display technology means that information 
about any part of the process can be displayed in "any" format 
(compared with conventional hard-wired display-control inter- 
faces, on which each variable is linked to one display). There- 
fore, it could be possible to produce many individual displays, 
each optimum for a particular part of the operators' task. There 
are therefore practical questions about the optimum format of 
these representations. This is a specialist topic, concerned 
with optimum representations for different types of information 
(see e.g. Bainbridge, 1987; Goodstein & Rasmussen, in press). 
2. Multi-plexed Graphic Displays: 
In multi-plexed display systems, only one (or a small number) 
of the potential display formats (which run to several hundred in 
some systems) is shown on each VDT at any one time. The others 
can be "called up" when needed. Practical questions are therefore 
concerned with how many different display formats there should be 
and with how many should be viewable at the same time. 
Number of different display "pages:" 
In assessing the number of different formats, remember that 
people take time and may also have difficulties of understanding 
when translating from one representation to another. For example, 
people given an item in one layout and asked to find its pair in 
another layout take about 4 times longer and make about 4  times 
as many mistakes if the two layout patterns are random, compared 
with when the two layouts are the same (Fitts & Deininger, 1 9 5 4 ) .  
This implies that people would work more effectively if the number 
of different layouts is minimized as this will minimize cross- 
reference problems. 
Considering the ideal number of display pages, in summary we 
can say that increasing the number of pages (given a constant 
number of VDT's): 
A .  Reduces the user's: 
1 .  Need to remember process structure or functions; 
2. Time spent on individual problem-solving tasks (con- 
sidered in isolation); 
3. Amount learned about relations in the process and how 
to solve problems. 
B. Increases: 
1. The explicit task specific information; 
2 .  Coding and cross-reference problems; 
3. Problems of finding place in total data-base; 
4. Display accessing time; 
5 .  Software investment. 
Number of VDT's: 
If all the information that the operator needs is not all 
displayed on available VDT's, then the user must call up another 
page and compare the new page with memory of the previous one. 
The important cognitive limit here lies in the human ability to 
remember (numerical) information over short periods of time. 
This capacity is very limited (about 7 items) and is interrupted 
by doing other tasks. For example, if people have to do a clas- 
sification task between being given a number to remember and 
being asked to repeat it back, then they forget about 12% of the 
original numbers after 5 seconds and more than 30% after 30 se- 
conds (Posner & Roesman, 1965). This task is like using a VDT 
and having to interrupt thinking about the main task in order to 
remember how to and then carry out the actions needed to call up 
another display. To avoid this high rate of forgetting, all the 
information required in one decision should be available at the 
same time. This has strong practical implications for design. 
In summary, the minimum number of VDT's which can be used 
depends on: 
1. Size of the largest sub-unit in the process, all parts of 
which must be viewed at the same time. The method of divid- 
ing the process into functional sub-units is a question of 
process technology rather than of human factors. 
2. Worst case scenarios (e.g. if the two largest sub-units of 
the plant fail at the same time). 
3. Minimizing stress from not having immediate access to what 
is happening in all parts of the plant during fault manage- 
ment. 
4. Permissable inter-sample interval. 
5. Number of different types of information needed. 
6. Reducing visual clutter. 
Less: number of items which can be displayed on (high-speed) 
hard copy. 
Increasing the number of VDT's: 
A. Reduces the users'" 
1. Memory load; 
2. Distraction from accessing other pages; 
3. Time spent accessing other pages. 
B. Increases: 
1. Visual and arm reach distances; 
2. Hardware investment. 
3. Accessing the Data-Base 
There are two main problems here: 
1. Knowing what data and displays are potentially available and 
how to get from the current display to the next one wanted. 
2. Using the interface controls to interact with the displays, 
both for navigating around the data-base and for controlling 
the process. 
Knowing where one is in the data-base is a task involving 
relations: we have already mentioned that these are supported by 
pattern displays. New menu and summary map techniques are becom- 
ing available to help with this problem. 
The main human information processing characteristic that we 
need to mention in relation to optimizing control design is the 
development of skill. "Skilled" behavior is very efficient: a 
skilled person has developed an "automatic" or "open-loop" way of 
doing something; there is no need to work out consciously what to 
do or to monitor consciously that the task is being done correct- 
ly. This saves time and mental effort. The practical difficulty 
for design is that such skills can only develop in a consistent 
environment, one in which the result of a given action can be 
learned and then taken for granted. If actions will least inter- 
rupt the main task thinking when they are automatic, and this 
requires consistency, then this raises various questions for 
interface design. 
Stable position is one of the advantages of conventional 
control rooms. This is lost on a multi-plexed interface, so it 
may be difficult to develop automatic skills of using it. For 
example : 
1. When a given display or control is always in the same place, 
its location can act as an additional identity code, and the 
user can learn to aim eyes to a display or move hand to a 
control automatically. These are not possible with multiple 
layout VDT pages or with moving controls which change posi- 
tion, such as mice. 
2. Using the same device (mouse or keys), both for data-base 
search and for control actions, means that there is no con- 
sistency either in the meaning of a given action or in its 
display-control ratio. So all actions must be monitored 
carefully before and during execution. 
3. Using analogue controls, operators learn that a given size 
and timing of control movement has a given effect on the 
process. Using alpha-numeric keys to indicate size of con- 
trol action, there is no mapping between the nature of the 
action and its effect. This raises questions about how 
effectively people can learn control skills when using key- 
boards. 
The design implications are to maximize consistency, to use 
different devices for control actions and for interface actions, 
and perhaps to use analogue controls for analogue effects. 
11. AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING AND HELP FUNCTIONS 
Modern control system development is concerned with automat- 
ing decision-making as much as possible or with using "intel- 
ligent" expert systems to give the operator advice. 
People, however, are usually retained in these automated 
eystems to deal with un-anticipated situations. A key problem 
with automation is that the more the easy parts of an operators' 
task are automated, the more difficult the tasks which still have 
to be done by the operator become (Bainbridge, 1983). This is 
not only because when the operator takes over during fault manage- 
ment, the system which has gone wrong is more complex, involves 
several technologies, and is less observable. It is also due to 
four further characteristics of human information processing: 
1. Vigilance: it is humanly impossible to concentrate attention 
effectively on something which rarely changes; this sort of 
attention cannot be maintained by will-power. The rate of 
missing rare signals can double after about half an hour. 
The standard solution to this is to use audible alarms (see 
e.g. Rasmussen & Rouse, 1981). 
2. Maintenance of Skills: Human beings not only need a consis- 
tent environment to develop automatic skills; we also need 
recurring practice to maintain them. This applied to "cogni- 
tive" skills of understanding what is happening, solving 
problems, making decisions, remembering things, etc., as 
well as to the perceptual-motor skills mentioned above. 
Therefore, the less an operator is involved directly in 
operating the plant, the greater the need for good training 
to maintain skills and knowledge. Also, it is important to 
design the equipment so that the operator can use familiar 
interface: using skills when doing infrequent tasks under 
the pressure of fault management. 
3. Human beings work moat efficiently in a known context of: 
a) the current state of the process. This awareness takes 
some time to develop and is not available to people who 
are expected rapidly to take over manual control from 
failed automatics. 
b) the current activities of other members of the control 
team (including the automatics) and the allocation of 
responsibility between them. 
4. Maintaining attitudes: Much work in the area of "job satis- 
faction" shows that using skills, seeing how one's work 
makes a contribution to the enterprise, and being responsible 
for the final outcome, all affect both self-esteem and at- 
titudes to work. These attitudes affect economic factors 
such as absenteeism, labor turnover, and rate of spoilt work. 
Historically, approaches to automation have gone through a 
series of stages: 
a. Automate everything. 
b. Allocate function between people and machines according to 
whether person or machine is best at doing the task. This 
is the "Fitts list" approach, named after the first person 
to produce comparative lists of human and computer abilities. 
c. The most recent approach is to allocate function and to 
design the work to take account of the human characteristics 
above, so ensuring that skills, attitudes and alertness are 
maintained. For discussion, see Price (1985), Rouse & Morris 
(1986), Sage (1983). 
This third approach represents a change from thinking in 
terms of removing the human operator to recognizing that: 
a. in most economic systems, this is impractical or impossible; 
b. a human operator will do tasks which have not been automated 
more effectively when working with the computer, in col- 
laboration and for support. 
Design for collaboration means thinking of computer and 
person as a team with interdependent responsibilities. The com- 
puter should be used especially to support the person when a task 
is too fast or accurate for a human being or poses too high a 
workload. Failures to consider collaboration and what the com- 
puter can best do for the enterprise are more well known in the 
area of office automation, e.g. Eason (1982). 
Collaboration raises questions about the most effective use 
of Expert Systems in supporting the human operators' most dif- 
ficult tasks (see Hollnagel et al, 1986). Expert systems and 
intelligent interfaces have been suggested for: alarm suppres- 
sion, interpreting the process sate and diagnosing faults, giving 
explanations, and suggesting what to do in fault management. 
Most of these ideas come in the category of "blue sky optimism" 
compared with what is currently actually possible with a large 
complex industrial process. It would be useful, however, if 
expert systems could: 
1. pull together large amounts of information about the plant 
and make inferences and explanations; 
2. make decisions based on mathematically optimum use of limited 
information. There are many interesting biases in the way 
in which human beings make use of evidence in decision- 
making. Both interface design and training could be used to 
counter some of these biases, see Sage 1981, Moray (1986). 
We will mention some of these biases of human judgement, as 
they affect the way in which people accept collaborative computer 
support systems: 
1. Human beings tend to make judgements based on first experien- 
ces. 
2. Human beings tend not to think in terms of probabilities, 
but assign events a "probability" of 1 or 0. If there is a 
very low probability of computer failure, operators will see 
no reason for maintaining adequate take-over skills. On the 
other hand, if there is a noticeable computer failure rate 
(the computer makes conclusions or suggestions which the 
operator knows are inadequate), then the operators will 
ignore the computer's output and do all the task for them- 
selves, which add to workload and communication problems. 
These points suggest that it is important to introduce a 
good and fully working system, rather than an experimental one, 
to operators. 
CONCLUSION 
This short paper has introduced some of the main principles 
of designing complex industrial processes in a way which takes 
account of human operators, so that the combined person-machine 
system will give optimum performance. 
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3.3 .  PROBLEM SOLVING, RISK AND TECHNOLOGY 
David D .  Woods 
West inghouse R & D C e n t e r  
P i t t s b u r g h ,  P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  U S A  
T h e  Role of H u m a n  Related Issues i n  t h e  Risky Technologies 
Human-Technical Systems 
There are two major perspectives on activities in the design, operation and 
regulation of various risky technologies: the engineered system, which can be 
subdivided into various pieces of the system or engineering points view such as 
thermodynamic, mechanical, electronic - typically called the "technical" system, and 
the human role in maintaining, operating, designing the engineered system, which 
can be subdivided into sociebehavioral points of view such as physiological, 
cognitive, organizational, motivational - the human systems. 
The state of the technical process in question (e.g., nuclear power plant, chemical 
plant, etc.) changes in a series of interactions between the human and technical 
systems. Ln general, designers have been successful in reducing the exposure to  
catastrophic outcomes (given normal conditions to begin with, single failures cannot 
lead directly to significant radiation releases). As a result, accidents develop or 
evolve through a conjunction of actions/failures that involve a series of interactions 
between the human and technical systems. One of the two acts; the other responds 
which generates a Gxresponse from the first and so forth. The evolution towards 
different negative consequences can be broken at  any point. Accident evolution 
points out that there is some initiating event in some human and technical system 
context, but there is no one clearly identifiable cause of the accident. However, 
points during the accident evolution can be identified where the evolution can be 
stopped or redirected away from undesirable outcomes. 
The behavioral rcience view of this process emphasizes the demands and 
environment that the technical rystem creates around the human. The extreme view 
is that the technical system must anticipate all human deficiencies and compensate 
for them. The technical view emphasizes the pernisciousness of people in 
shortcircuiting an otherwise safe technical system. In the extreme the source of poor 
performance is the person who must be aided or eliminated. Svenson (1987) points 
out a Catch 22 that arises if there is a gulf between the human and technical 
views of the rystem: if the behavioral rcientist/practitioner attributes the source of 
poor human performance to  factors created by the technical ride, then he is no 
longer an a p e r t  in how to correct the situation; rimilarly, if the physical 
rcientist/engmeer attributes the rource of poor system performance to  the human 
element, then he is no longer an expert in how to correct the situation. As a result 
each camp can fall prey to recommending/pursuing changes that are very general 
and non-professional, e.g., improve technical subsystem Aireduce the number of ..., 
or improve operator training/provide maintenance aids. 
What this means is that effective research, development, and operation of complex 
risky technologies depends on a synthesis of how the technical and human systems 
interact. The NPP is not just a technical system, is not just a human system, and 
is not a simple addition of these two views. To date the purely technical view has 
dominated. Failures to  conceive of the system as both technical and human has 
retarded the formulation of useful research questions and the transfer of results to 
the field in mci~technical systems. 
TMI: A fundamental surprise  -- technology alone i s  no t  enough 
On March, xx, 1979 the nuclear industry and technologists wre rocked by the 
Three Mile Island accident. The consternation that resulted was only in small part 
due to the fict that it was the worst nuclear accident up to  that time or due to  
the radiological consequences per se. Rather the accident is a case of what Lanir 
(1986) terms "fundamental surprise."' A fundamental surprise, in contrast to  
situational smprise, is a sudden revelation of the incompatibility between one's self- 
perception and his environmental reality. Examples include Pearl Harbor for the 
U.S. (Wohlstdter, 1962), the launch of Sputnik on the U. S., and the Yom Kippur 
war for Israel (Lanir, 1986) among many examples. The TMI accident was more 
than an unexpected progression of faults; it was more than a situation planned for 
'See Appro& 1 for a mbort excerpt from h i r ,  1986 that ~ a p b i c d l y  illuatratea the concept d fundamental 
murprue. 
but handled inadequately; it wan more than a rituation whose plan had proved 
inadequate. The TMI accident constituted a fundamental rurprise in that it 
revealed a basic incompatibility between the nuclear industry's view of itself and 
reality. Prior to TMI the industry could and did think of nuclear power M a 
purely technical system where all problems were in the form of rome enginnering 
technical area or areas and the rolutions to these problems lay in those engineering 
disciplines. TMI graphically revealed the inadequacy of that world view because the 
failures were in the socio-technical rystem and not due to pure technical (a single 
equipment or mechanical flaw) nor pure human factors (incompetency or deliberate 
error). The pre-planning for emergencies had consisted of considering large 
equipment failures and not a series of small failures and interacting inappropriate 
human sssessments of the rituation and therefore erroneous actions. This kind of 
interaction between human and technical factors was inconceivable prior t o  TMI12 
although all rignificant nuclear power plant incidents involve this interaction (e.g., 
Brown's Ferry; the incidents examined in Pew et al., 1881; Ginna; Davis-Besse; and 
others) and most significant accidents in other worlds also involve this interaction. 
The postTMI U.S. nuclear industry has struggled to cope with and adjust to the 
revelations of TMI. The process of adjustment has involved the phases associated 
with fundamental surprise described by Lanir. First, the surprise event itself occurs. 
Second, reaction spills over the boundaries of the event itself to include issues that 
have little to do with the triggering event - social and cpistcmological crises. 
Third, these crises can lead t o  fundamental learning, although this may be partial 
and ineffective. For example, the fundamental surprise often is denied by 
approaching the incident as if it were only a situational surprise that requires only 
a local response. Fundamental learning, in turn, produces practical changes in the 
world in question - morphogcncsis. Finally, the changes are absorbed and a new 
equilibrium is reached. 
The immediate investigations of the accident focused heavily on the mutual 
interaction between technical systems and people and proposed changes that 
addressed the basic character of the joint human-machine system (classic ways to 
cope with problem solving breakdowns such as multiple ways to  represent the state 
of the plant (function oriented displays in safety parameter display systems), 
 herno no by^ .khou#h mom u v e n  accident doa mot u r r ~  the u m e  fnndunentd aurprlc, a t  h u t  for the U.S. 
k u n m e  TMI M y  rrveded the n n c k u  power pLnt u hnmm/technld  qmtem. The R u L D a ,  m d  prhapm the 
Europmm k d  mot bccn forced to c o n h n t  TMI Lo the u m e  r a y  u h d  the U.S. T h u ,  they could deny itm 
rrlermce. .o ( L t  Chernobyl ma7 have conntltuted a hndunentd rurprh for them. 
institutionalize people with multiple views of the situation (rhift technical advisor), 
rymptom management ae well ae fault identification approaches to emergency 
response (new procedures). 
However, in the process of carrying through on these and other "lessons learned" 
the industry began to treat the accident as a mere situational surprise and began 
to apply purely technological solutions. While the post-TMI changes clearly have 
improved aepects of the rocio-technical system through ruch things ae new rensors, 
new analyses of possible accident conditions, new guidance on how to respond to 
certain accident conditions, changes in emergency notification procedures, the basic 
socio-technical rystem for operating and responding to failures has not changed. 
Symptoms of this are the long delays and apparently uneven implementation of 
post-TMI changes such ss new instrumentation, new procedures and computer 
based display systems (the SPDS), judging from the results of the NRC audits 
conducted to date. However, the revelations of TMI continue to re-occur in other 
major incidents (e.g., Davis-Besse, NUREG-1154; San Onofre, NUREG-1190; Rancho 
Seco, NUREG-1195; and most tragically Chernobyl). 
The U.S. nrrlear industry and other risky industries as well continue to treat a 
socio-technicd system as if all issues are merely technical issues in some engineering 
discipline: if decision support systems are needed, the question is what language it 
should be programed in; if following guidance contained in procedures is important, 
then computaization in and of itself is the answer. All investigations of problems 
in complex technologies show that "human error" is a major source of difficulties 
(figures vary from 40 to 80%). In other words, human related aspects are a major 
part of virtually all issues. The temptation to  treat socio-technical systems as 
purely technical is particularly seductive because the technical disciplines alone can 
create the sjntem at some level of abstraction. 
The behavioxal sciences do not presently have all of the answers (or perhaps not 
even very  my) that industry needs. However, the behavioral sciences do have 
knowledge and approximate models on human-technical systems that can in the 
short run begin to influence research, design and evaluation. Furthermore, the 
current base of knowledge needs to be stimulated and grown so as to  able to  
provide stronger answers in the future. Knowledge from the behavioral sciences is 
needed became new technological disciplines are and will produce new systems for 
applicatim in risky technologies that can repeat the errors of the past. What is 
clearly needed is research and application of research on socio-technical systems to 
complex &ky technologies. 
Complex Technologies a s  Problem Solving Systems 
Introduction 
Here 1 will cover rome of the Mpects of a rocietechnical rystem considered a 
problem rolving rystemS . When looking at a problem solving system one is 
concerned with what knowledge is used, the conditions under which it is accessed, 
and the ways knowledge is packaged and delivered. 
At the center is the operational part of the technological world. This refers to all 
of the activities that people carry out that make direct physical contact with the 
components and systems that make up the technological process itself. This includes 
maintenance of equipment, test k calibration of rystems and instrumentation, 
startup/shutdown, normal operations, detecting and responding to  abnormal 
conditions. This area includes various kinds of people: technicians, supervisors, 
awillary operators, licensed operators, those who staff awillary facilities, 
engineering personnel (either on-site or with access to on-site personnel during some 
activity). This area applies to activities carried out a t  various locations in the 
plant, control room activities, and activities in awillary facilities. Design, 
management, organization,and regulatory activities represent aspects that surround 
the operational plant. They are of concern in how they can affect the above 
activities. For example, how organizational factors affect the way that people on 
the operational front lines make decisions under risk. 
What do operational people do? They work the front lines of societechnical 
systems; they are the ones who must act on the system directly; they are the ones 
who see the trystem as cm integrated whole rather than a bounded piece (e.g., a 
system dsigner) or a single point of view (e.g., regulatory). Those who direct, 
organize, regulate, and design for operational people, in one sense, deploy knowledge 
about the technical system to  the operational personnel. Knowledge can be deployed 
internal to people (inherent capabilities, education, training, experience) or in 
external form (encoded in different media and organized for retrieval in different 
ways) and the knowledge can be available during task performance (via memory, 
another persm, or a knowledge delivery system) or on call (a human engineering 
specialist or a special engineering analytical model). 
'E.s., the rh h m  the S e l L  of cognitive pwcholoa, cognitive mclence, .rtVicW htelli#ence, dechiom theory. 
Managing t rouble  
It is very useful to  distinguish between coordination by pre-planned routines and 
coordination by resource management. In the former, knowledge is packaged in 
terms of what situations are to be recognized, what evidence signals that these 
situations have arisen, and what response should follow (Rumussen's rule bmed 
behavior; e.g., Rumussen, 1986). This knowledge is delivered in the form of 
education about the routines, training (exercise and drill) in carrying out the 
recognitions and responses, and on-line systems to help prompt and retrieve the 
guidance (either paper or computer based). When human behavior is to guided by 
pre-planned routines, human performance aiding is to teach the person about the 
knowledge encoded especially the background for the routines (Brown et al., 1982), 
to  practice the person on the routines, and t o  provide retrieval aids so that the 
person uses the correct guidance for the current situation. 
For example, the new emergency procedures that have been developed in response 
t o  TMI include new categories of situations t o  be recognized by operators, i.e., 
safety functions (this is not t o  say that operators never thought of emergency 
situations in these terms prior to  the new procedures, but only that education, 
training and on-line retrieval mechanisms for these categories were increased), the 
evidence to recognize them was specified, and response strategies were planned 
should they occur. 
However, coordination by pre-planned routines is inherently brittle (e.g., Fischhoff 
e t  al., 1986; Brown et  al., 1882). When the pre-planned routines are rotely 
followed, performance breaks down in the face underspecified instructions, special 
conditions or contexts (boundary conditions such as in the incidents described in 
NRC Information Notice 83-30 or impasses where assumptions about the world in 
the routine are not true), human execution errors, bugs in the routines, multiple 
failures, novel situations (incidents not planned for or multiple failures). While some 
types of worlds or parts of worlds are more prone to  these factors than others and 
the quality of the pre-planning effects the frequency with which these arise in 
particular worlds, research in a variety of worlds consistently has shown that these 
factors can never be completely eliminated by expanding and refining pre-planned 
routines (for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons) and that these factors are 
ubiquitous in actual serious accidents in nuclear power plants and other industries 
(see Woods et al., 1987). 
The challenge is t o  develop problem solving architectures that are not brittle in the 
face of unanticipated variability, to define problem solving systems that function 
well even when the exact nature of the problems to be handled are not known in 
advance. Usually, people think that the only alternative to coordination by pre- 
planned routines is creative problem solving (e.g., the Browns Ferry fire) but that 
operators are not selected for capabilities in this area. However, there is an 
alternative type of behavior which does fit within the scope of operational 
personnel. In coordination by resource management, an =tor "at the scene of the 
crime" does more than deploy pre-planned strategies; he also monitors the response 
to see if it is going according to plan (e.g., are the relevant goals met?). 
Departures from plan (from expectation) signal that more knowledge needs to  be 
brought to  bear on the problem. What happens is that there is a gradual unfolding 
of more and more of the background knowledge behind the pre-planned material 
including the written background information for procedure steps, specialist 
knowledge about system design, specialist knowledge about accident analysis. In 
some cases the relevant knowledge is potentially available if a delivery path is 
known (i.e., the operational personnel must know enough to ask the right question 
and they must know where or who can provide answers); in other cases the 
knowledge must be generated , e.g., from engineering analyses. Aiding human 
performance in this aspect of operational knowledge addresses recognizing departures 
from plan, what additional knowledge is needed, and how to call on that 
knowledge. 
Both kinds of coordination are necessary for effective human performance at  the 
operational f o n t  lines: expanding and refining available guidance expands the 
amount of routine problem solving; supporting knowledge resource management 
addresses situations that have not been or cannot be completely anticipated - a 
kind of cognitive defense in depth. In other words, after you have tried to  think of 
and plan for all possible contingencies, plan for the fact that you have probably 
missed some things. 
Research on how to manage trouble is essential in technological worlds that have 
proven again and again that not all factors can be anticipated in advance. This 
research will have a significant effect on how new computational technologies (e.g., 
artificial intelligence) should be utilized and on how to avoid errors in their 
deployment. I t  is essential for the both the operators of complex technologies and 
for those who design and regulate complex technologies. Psychologists are fond of 
discovering biases in human decision making. One judgemental bias is the 
overconfidence bias where people at all levels of expertise overestimate how much 
they know ( tg ,  Wagenaar, 1986). Sometimes we forget that these biases can apply 
to design problem solving as well as to operational problem solving. The 
ovevconfidence bias means that the designer of a system is likely to  overestimate 
histher ability to capture all relevant aspects of the rituations that can occur. For 
example, this has occurred often with the design of forms of automation and 
support systems - the designer of the the system fails to appreciate all of the 
complexities of the operational retting so that the system fails to  support or even 
hinders the operator in achieveing histher goals. Again, provisions must be made 
about how to build problem solving rystems that are robust in the face of 
unanticipated variability. 
T h e  cognitive system triad 
One can think of problem solving rituations in terms of interactions among a set of 
three mutually constrained factors (Figure 1): the world to be acted on, the agent 
or agents who act on the world, and the external representations through which 
the agent experiences that world. Each of these factors contributes to the 
performance of the agent in the relevant domain (cf., Edwards k von Winterfeldt, 
1986, p. 664677 for a particularly engaging demonstraton of the interaction of 
these factors). Understanding the interactions among these factors is the target of 
the psychology of human behavior in complex systems. When we better understand 
the nature of a broad sample of the problem solving situations people face, we can 
better understand the behavior exhibited when someone is confronted with a 
particular situation and how to support and improve performance. 
Starting from the apex of the world itself, the characteristics of that world 
contribute various kinds of cognitive demands that must be handled to adequately 
perform domain tasks. There are four dimensions of problem solving worlds that 
define its cognitive demands: dynamism, the number of parts and the eztenaiueness 
of interconnections between the parts or variables, uncertainty, and risk (Woods, in 
press). All domains (or applications within a domain) can be characterized in terms 
of a position along these dimensions. In general, when a problem solving world is 
described in everyday terminology as "simple," i t  will place low on all four of these 
dimensions; while a world described as "complex" will place high on these 
dimensions (but remember complexity is a function of the interaction of all three 
apices). 
When a world is dynamic, problem solving incidents unfold in time and are event- 
driven, that is, events can happen at indeterminate times and the nature of the 
problem to be solved can change (e.g., multiple failures). The result is cognitive 
demands associated with anticipation or prediction of the behavior of the world and 
the need to be able to  revise one's assessment of the state of the world and 
therefore one's tactical or strategic response (cf., Montmollin k De Keyser, 1085; 
De Keyser, 1086 for treatments of how dynamism d e c t s  cognitive demands). 
Failures to revise are one source of futation errors (Figure 2). 
When a world is made up of large number of highly interconnected parts (cf., 
Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1086; Dorner, 1083; Woods k Hollnagel, 1987), one 
failure can have multiple consequences (produce multiple disturbances); a 
disturbance could be due to  multiple potential causes and can have multiple 
potential fues; there can be multiple relevant goals which can compete with or 
constrain each other; there can be multiple ongoing tasks a t  different time spans. 
In addition, the parts of the world can be complex objects in their own right. One 
typical error form is failures to  consider side effects, requirements, or post- 
conditions (Dorner, 1983). Another problem solving error that occurs when a world 
is high on this dimension of complexity (particularly when it is simplified to cope 
with the complexity) is to  mistake one factor related to the state of the world as 
the single explanation for that state. This becomes an error when the attribution to 
a single factor delays or prevents identification of the set of factors that actually 
contribute to the observed situation (Bechtel, 1982). 
When data are uncertain, an inferential process is needed to go from data to 
answers about the state of the world. When uncertainty is high, some data always 
fail to  fit together into the correct assessment due to  red herrings, sensor failures, 
human reported data, perceptual judgements, irrelevant factors, or multiple failures. 
Not only does the inferential value of different data vary, the inferential value of a 
single set of data can vary with context. Furthermore, data gathering to  reduce 
uncertainty can become necessary and can interact with effort and risk. A typical 
cognitive failure form is over-reliance on familiar signs (Rasmussen, 1986). See 
Cohen et d., 1987; Coombs & Hartley, in press; Einhorn k Hogarth, 1985; Sorkin 
k Woods, 1985; Schum, 1980; Dubois, in press for treatments of different sspects 
of uncertainty and its consequences for problem solving demands and activities. 
When there is risk, possible outcomes of choices can have large costs. The presence 
of risk means that one must be concerned with the rare but catastrophic situations 
as well as with more frequent but less ccmtly situations. When uncertainty is 
coupled with risk, situations of choice under uncertainty and risk arise. Current 
knowledge about human performance in risky decision making indicates that 
generalizations from research with non-risky tasks to risky tasks must be made very 
cautiously. 
To  illustrate how interactions among these dimensions d e c t  cognitive demands, 
consider a world that has high evidential uncertainty how this can interact with 
the other three dimensions. When a world is both uncertain and dynamic, 
strategies for acquiring data become important. All evidence is not available at 
once because it comes in over time or because it must be actively acquired with 
associated costs (effort and risk). As a result, situation assessment and evidence 
gathering interact, e.g., the information value of the data to  be collected can 
interact with the effort that must be expended in order to  collect it (e.g., Moray, 
1984; John- k Payne, 1985), especially when there is a high workload. 
Uncertainty m d  risk interact when data gathering can be an action in the world of 
interest with attendant consequences for parts of the world. For example, medical 
tests can have negative consequences that must be balanced with gain of 
information (Cohen et al., 1987) or obtaining data from a location involves danger 
such ss radiation exposure or fire (Klein et al., 1986). A common strategy in 
research and in building machine experts (Mycin) is to  consider situation 
srrsessment/diagnosis independent from data gathering. However, this simplification 
obscures the interaction between these two and the cognitive demands generated by 
that interaction when evidence comes in over time or has associated costs in terms 
of effort and risk (Cohen et al., 1987). It is one example of failing to  take the 
perspective of the problem solver in the situation when mapping cognitive demands. 
The need to know when and where to  look for evidence results in an attentions1 
cognitive demand to focus in on the significant subset of data for the current 
problem context, given a large amount of potentially relevant data. In this 
significance d data information handling demand (Woods, 1986), the problem solver 
must decide what data is relevant to  consider in determining a solution; thus, it is 
part of problem formulation. A large category of errors in worlds high on the 
dimensions d complexity can be described as failures of attention (Woods, 1984b), 
in that, from hindsight, data from which the solution could have been extracted 
were availabh but were not attended to or looked for a t  the right time or in 
conjunction r i t h  the appropriate set of data, given an erroneous assessment of the 
situation or m erroneous approach to the utilization of evidence. From the point of 
view of problem formulation, these attention failures are seen as errors of solving 
the wrong problem. Examples of breakdowns in this cognitive demand include 
disturbance management in process control accidents with conventional alarm 
systems (Leeti, 1983; Woods et al., 1986) and intelligence failures in military history 
(Wohlstetter, 1962; Shlaim, 1976). 
The position of a domain along these dimensions determines the cognitive demands 
and the cognitive situations that problem solvers can face in the world in question. 
These demands can rtrongly affect what u e  effective or remible reasoning rtrategies 
to  adopt and the cognitive failure forms that will occur. The difficulty of meeting 
these demands varies depending on the processing characteristics of the relevant 
cognitive agents, the uchitecture of the various cognitive agents (Sorkin k Woods, 
1985; Fischhoff et al., 1986; Woods et al., in press) and on the representation of 
the world that is provided to the problem solving agent (Rasmussen k Lind, 1981; 
Rasmussen, 1985). 
For example, Fischhoff et al. (1986) discuss how risk interacts strongly with multi- 
agent architectures to  influence the level of risk acceptance of the joint cognitive 
system and therefore the quality of problem solving behavior. Furthermore, they 
show how changes in the power and scope of centralized information systems (a 
change on the representation apex) can change the distributed decision uchitecture 
and strongly sffect risk taking behavior, i.e., the decision criteria on the willingness 
to innovate or depart from doctrine at various levels of a hierarchical organization. 
If one views the triad from the vantage point of problem representations, the effect 
of various possible representations depends on the cognitive demands imposed by 
the world and on the processing characteristics of the relevant cognitive agent. Any 
particular representation makes certain information or manipulations of information 
explicit at  the expense of other information or manipulations which are pushed into 
the background. A simple example is notational systems such as numeral systems - 
try multiplication and division in the Roman numeral system. 
Human Error  and Person-Machine Mismatches 
Questions about human error - what it is, what factors produce it, what forms 
does it take, how to measure the potential for error, how to predict its form or 
frequency or timing, where is a task vunerable to error - are essential topics for 
risk identification and management. The level of effort devoted to these questions 
has accelerated recently (e.g., Moray k Senders, in preparation; Rasmussen, Leplat 
k Duncan, 1986). 
There u e  beveral common themes in the recent work on human error (e.g., 
Rssmussen, 1986; Moray k Senders, 1986; Rasmussen et al., 1986; Reason k 
Embrey, 1985; Woods, in press). First, there is a distinction between error forms - 
the likelihood of different kinds of errors given that an error occurs, and error 
emission patterns - the statistics of how often will inadequate performance occur 
(e.g., Senders, 1 9 ~ ) .  Researchers have generally focused on the systematic error 
fonns because these suggest potentially identifiable and correctable underlying 
factors. 
Research on error today aasumes error is the result of limited rationality - people 
u e  doing reasonable things given their knowledge, their objectives, their point of 
view and limited resources, e.g., time or workload (Resson k Mycielska, 1982; 
Montmollin & De Keyser, 1986; Woods, in press) - and that error analysis consists 
of tracing the problem solving process to  identify points where rationality breaks 
down. This has been called an assumption of imperfect rationality or a cognitive 
existence theorem (there is some cognitive rystem which can be postulated which 
would rationally, i.e., within its knowledge and information processing capability, 
exhibit the behavior that has been observed). 
A third thane derives from rtudies of actual incidents (e.g., Pew et al., 1981; 
Reason k Mycielska, 1982; Woods, 1982; Perrow, 1984; Montmollin k De Keyser, 
1985). Thew studies reveal that there are a ret of individually necessary but only 
pintly suf f~ ien t  conditions for a disaster to  occur; therefore, labeling any one the 
cause requires additional information (e.g., Mackie's I19741 point about a 
background causal field). For example, in an actual train derailment leading to a 
two train crash, one can refer to  a large number of conditions but for which the 
accident would not have occurred - such ss, the information processing demands 
placed on the driver, the change in habits due to  the end of the holiday period 
schedule, the speed of the train, the proximity of another track a t  the site of the 
derailment, the timing that another train was on this other track at  nearly the 
same time, etc. 
This obsemtion has led t o  general agreement among the research community (but 
not necesserily in particular application communities) that it is more fruitful to  
t h i i  about person-machine system flaws than human errors (e.g., Perrow, 1983; 
Rasmussen, 1986). The label "human error" i often used as a residual category; it 
tends to  imply responsibility and blame (punishment); it focuses changes on local, 
incident-spgir~c responses (different people, better motivation). Error attribution is 
an exercise in hkdsight judgement (a two state discrete dimension); whereas prior 
to the outarme there are only degrees of performance (a continuous dimension) and 
factors that make it more or less difficult to perform. In the train crash example, 
all the trains that  day went too fast through the section of the track where the 
derailment occurred. Thus, once performance deviates from its target, it has the 
potential to be labelled erroneous. Whether it will lead to negative consequences 
depends on the presence of other necessary factors. 
A more productive alternative is to focus on the factors that produce the behaviors 
underlying the disaster (as Perrow 1983 puts it, what forced the erroneous 
behaviors). For example, an airplane crash into a mountain on a clear day was 
originally lakled "crew error." However, further investigation revealed that this 
seemingly irrational incident wss actually the product of the interaction of a set of 
factors - the flight computer course had been changed without notifying the pilot, 
the new come  was visually quite similar to the old, and a dry air whiteout made 
the mountain invisible to the pilots (Mahon, 1981). Identifying how a set-of 
factors converge in the genesis of a disaster leade to an emphssis on 
demand/resource mismatches, person-machine performance, multiple contributors to 
incidents, multiple responses, and failures as potential learning experiences. From 
this perspective we need to understand the relationship between human processing 
mechanisms (e.g., Arkes & Hsmmond, 1986; Edwards & von Winterfeldt, 1986) and 
the demands and resources actually present in complex problem solving situations 
such as fligbtdeck operations, emergency response in nuclear power plants, or 
marine safety. For example, one position is that human processing consists of 
relatively simple but normally quite effective mechanisms. Performance failures 
occur when designers unintentionally create excessively harsh cognitive environments 
due to the demands of the world itself and due to the primitive representations 
available (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1986; 1987). 
One path to approach questions about human error is to examine criteria for 
skilled or expert performance. One often noted aspect of skill or expertise is the 
ability to adapt one's response in light of changing circumstances in pursuit of a 
goal (Brown et al., 1982; Bainbridge, 1981; Woods & Roth, 1986). Adaptability 
depends on abilities to predicy or anticipate the behavior of the world and to to be 
sensitive to what might happen next (e.g., a field of attention). This definition 
emphasizes the ability of the rkilled performer to compensate for environmental 
variability or disturbances. Error then becomes a breakdown in one's resistence to 
variability or disturbances, either failures to recognize the need to adapt (behavior 
persists in one path in the face of changing circumstances that demanded a shift in 
response) or erroneous adaptation (the need for adaptation was recognized but the 
attempted adaptation was inadequate due to incomplete knowledge). This view 
emphasizes the active role of any cognitive agent or set of cognitive agents in 
controlling a world and the need to treat performance failures through changes in 
the capabilities, resources and architecture within the cognitive systems triangle. 
This suggests that human participation often prevents the propagation of errors or 
usually works around error prone points (flaws) due to the flexibility, adaptability, 
"intelligenceg of the human in the loop. For example, it is ironic that decision 
automation m often justified on the grounds of human incompetence, however it is 
the same person who must compensate for the "brittleness" typically exhibited by 
machine agents in the face of unexpected situations (Woods et a]., in press). This 
is in stark contrast to the view that the human is an independent source or 
contributor of errors, where system failures in which human actions played a role 
should be treated by increasing the role of machine cognitive agents in order to  
eliminate or reduce the human's role. 
One source of mismatches within the cognitive system triad that contribute to 
performance breakdowns has been purely technology-driven deployment of new 
automation capabilities. When this occurs, there are frequently unintended and 
unforseen negative consequences in terms of new types of errors/accidents. Examples 
are multifold. Among the most dramatic instances are: cases of shifts from 
manual to supervisory control in process control where productivity actually fell 
from previous levels due to failures to support the new supervisory control demands 
(Hoogovens Report, 1976); cases of automation related disasters in aviation (e.g., 
Wiener, 1983; 1985): a shift in power plant control rooms from tile annunciator 
alarm systems to computer based alarm systems that wentually collapsed and 
forced a return to the older technology because strategies to meet the cognitive 
demands of fault management that were implicitly supported by the old 
representation were undermined in the new representation (Pope, 1978); and shifts 
from paper based procedures to computerized procedures that have also collapsed 
due to disorientation problems again as a result of a failure to anticipate the 
reverberations of technological changes in the cognitive system triangle (Elm & 
Woods, 1985). 
Consider a simple example of automation. You have a portable cassette tape 
recorder to record letters. In the manual recorder you must switch from one side of 
the tape to the other when you have filled one side. Now you purchase a new, 
more technologically sophisticated recorder that has an automatic reverse - when 
you reach the end of one side, the machine automatically begins to record on the 
other side of the tape. You no longer have to take out the tape, reverse it, and 
reload it. Automation has produced positive impact, especially if you frequently 
record while your hands are busy at some other activity like driving a car. 
However, there are other consequences or effects of the new automation that 
introduce possibilities for new kinds of errorsjinadequate outcomes if not addressed. 
'A m e &  p- b mderway to t-k the eUertn of recent changa h commercial a h t d e c k  a~tomation, d ,  
Curry & W'. 
In our automated recorder example, cc:mider what happens if on one day you 
record enough to fill the first side of a tape and part of the second. On the next 
day you want to add additional material to the tape; in other words, you want to  
resume recording where you left off the previous day. Notice what can happen. 
You do not remember where you left off - on side A or on side B and there is no 
cue in the configuration of the device to  tell you which (because the tape is always 
in the machine on the same side - the machine switches for me). Thus there is 
the possibility that you will simply initiate the record mode and begin t o  speak 
without the second command needed t o  start on side B. As a result, a portion of 
the material you had recorded the previous day will be erased and recorded over. 
Note that this is a new error formfnegative outcome; it is impossible with the 
manual machine - one always begins to  record where one left off previously. The 
point is that new automation aids can have multiple effects on the human side and 
that some of these effects can be negative. In other words, there are post-conditions 
associated with new automation that must be met otherwise errorsfnegative 
outcomes can occur - in this example, some way to keep track of which side of 
the tape is unrecorded (a display or memory aid) or for the machine t o  be capable 
of resuming to record from the place where previous recording stopped (further 
automation). The point is not that new technology should be avoided - because 
the automation does make possible significant improvements. Similarly, the point is 
not that new technology is always beneficial - because there are post-conditions 
associated with its introduction that must be satisfied in order for the potential to 
be achieved and for undesirable consequences t o  be avoided or mitigated. 
Furthermore, these post-conditions will generally strongly influence the way the 
technology is used (or even the type of technology used). One strong example of 
this has ocurred in marine transportation (Perrow, 1984). Technology only driven 
increases in the machine power devoted to  navigation and collision avoidance did 
not reduce marine accidents (GafTney, 1982). This spurred the U.S. marine 
community to  continue to increase levels of automation. However, the existence of 
automation related accidents triggered the european community to look a t  what we 
have called here the cognitive system and to use machine power to enhance total 
system performance (e.g., to reduce f ~ a t i o n  errors by encouraging communication of 
task relevant information across cognitive agents). 
One problem is to measure and predict human performance (or problem solving 
performance), especially as a function of changes in the man-machine system. PRA 
is sometimes offered as a .candidate. However, aa currently practiced, it cannot 
adequately fulfill this role for human related issuers: among many deficiencies, it 
cannot address cognitive factors, it cannot address the effect of changw in the man- 
machine system, it is basically a look up of cumulative experience but there is no 
experience with new technologies on which to base predictions, and the criterion of 
risk is too narrow for evaluating human performance. 
To  have effective man-machine systems in complex worlds requires sophisticated 
human-machine performance modeling capabilities. Significant research work has 
been done on human error and there are several rwearch progrsms underway to 
use this data base t o  develop analytical models of human performance (Mancini, 
1886; Woods & Roth, 1886). 
Appendix 
Excerpt from 
"Fundamental Surprise" 
by 2. Lanir 
Webster 's Anecdote 
Fundamental to this theory is the distinction between two different types of 
surprise: situational and fundamental. One way to introduce this distinction is 
with an anecdote about Noah Webster, the well-known dictionary lexicographer. 
One day, be arrived home unexpectedly to  find his wife in the arms of his servant. 
"You surprised me," said his wife. "And you have sstonished me," responded 
Webster. Webster's precise choice of words captured an important difference 
between his situation and that  of his wife. 
One difference between surprise and astonishment is the different level of intensity 
associated with the two: astonishment is more powerful and extensive than 
surprise. Indeed, Mr. Webster's situation possesses an element of shock. His image 
of himself and his relations with his wife were suddenly and blatantly proven false. 
This was not the case for Mrs. Webster who, although surprised by the incident, 
still could maintain her image of herself, her environment, her husband, and the 
relations between them. Indeed, even if Mrs. Webster had taken all the steps she 
viewed as necessary to  prevent the incident, she had to assume that there was 
some possibility of her unfaithfulness eventually being revealed. Her feelings might 
be analogous to  those of drivers who brakes suddenly fail. Although surprised and 
frightened, such drivers should have realized that brake failures are always a 
possibility. Thus, we are aware that failures occur in nature as well as in 
technical, social, and organizational systems, so that when they do occur, our belief 
in those systems is not completely destroyed, however surprised and upset we 
might be. 
For Mrs. Webster, the failure was due to an external factor. Although she was 
uncertain about the external environment she was not uncertain about herself. 
In contrast, Mr. Webster's astonishment revealed unrecognized uncertainty extending 
far beyond his wife, hi servant, or other external factors. For him, comprehending 
the eventb significance required a holistic reexamination of hi self-perceptions in 
relation to his environment. Although this surprise offered Mr. Webster a unique 
opportunit). for self awareness, i t  can at the price of refuting his deepest beliefs. 
A recond distinction between rurprbe and sstonbhment lies in one's ability to 
define in advance the issues for which one must be alert. Surprises relate to 
specific events, locations, and time frames. Their demarcations are clear. 
Therefore, it is possible, in principle, to  design early warning systems to prevent 
them. In contrast, events providing astonishment affect broad rcopes and poorly 
demonstrated issues. Mr. Webster's shocking incident revealed only the "tip of an 
iceberg." 
Another distinction concerns the value of information. Mrs. Webster lacked one 
item of information which, had she had it in advance, would have allowed 
preventing her surprise: the information that her husband would return early that 
day. No single piece of information could have prevented Mr. Webster's 
astonishment. In most cases, the critical incident is preceded by precursors from 
which an outside observer could have deduced the state of the couple's relations. 
Such observers should be less prone to the tendency to interpret information in 
ways that suit one'e own world view, belittling or even ignoring the diagnostic 
value of information that contradicts it. 
A fourth distinction between fundamental surprise and astonishment is in the 
ability to  learn kom the event. For Mrs. Webster, the learning process is simple 
and direct. Her early warning mechanisms were ineffective. If given a recond 
chance, she might install a mechanism to reduce the possibility of being caught in 
a similar situational surprise. 
Mr. Webster might attempt an explanation that would enable him to comprehend 
it without having to undergo the painful process of acknowledging and alerting a 
flawed world view. For example, he might blame the servant for "attacking his 
innocent wife." If it were established that the servant was not primarily at  fault, 
he might explain the incident as an insignificant, momentary lapse on his wife's 
behalf. In more general terms, we may say that Mr. Webster's tendency to seek 
external, incidental reasons reflects the human tendency t o  behave as though 
astonishment is merely a surprise and, thus, avoid recognition of the need to 
experience painful 'self" learning. 
We will refer to Mrs. Webster's type of sudden discovery as a "situational surprise" 
and Mr. Webster's sudden revelation of the incompatibility of his self-perception 
with this environmental reality as a "fundamental surprise." 
3.4. THE DESIGN OF OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Nelville Moray 
Department of Industrial Engineering 
University of Toronto, Canada 
Human Factors North, Inc. 
Toronto, Canada 
The design of operating procedures must be a matter of a 
systems approach, in which engineers, operators, management, 
human factors specialists, writers and trainers must be involved. 
This is particularly true of Emergency Operating Procedures. A 
design aid, the Emergency Operating Procedure Procedure, m, is 
suggested for this purpose. 
Although the purpose of this paper is to provide a rational 
theory and design method for all operating procedures, I shall 
exemplify the method by considering the special case of emergency 
operating procedures (EOP). Recently, Feher, Moray and Senders 
(1987) have reviewed the design of EOPs, and the ideas to be 
presented here are drawn from their report. 
In designing EOPs, the aim is to ensure that under the pres- 
sure of a hazardous incident the operators will both know what to 
do and also will be able to do it. It follows that the EOPs are 
not just a list of actions to be taken, but should also implicitly 
embody rational and integrated planning concerning manning levels, 
training, anthopometrics, shift work philosophy, etc. Without 
such an integrated approach the EOP, while correctly describing 
what actions, should be taken, cannot ensure that the operators 
will be able to carry out the actions. 
For example, if the EOP is generated by the engineers respon- 
sible for the physics of process control, but without interaction 
with the architect-engineers who design the control room layout, 
a procedure which is correct in terms of engineering functions of 
physical chemistry might be written, but which required two con- 
trols to be operated simultaneously which are, say, 3 meters 
apart. If so, a single operator could not carry out the EOP. If 
the design of the control room is already frozen at the time the 
EOPs are generated, they will require at least a 2-person crew. 
If on the other hand, management has set the manning level of the 
control room, it will mean either the engineers will be con- 
strained in how they allocate function in the EOP, or there will 
be an impact on the organizational hierarchy and training of the 
control room crew. For example, a decision will have to be made 
as to whether each member of the crew will be trained to carry 
out all functions, or whether they will specialize each on one 
part of the system (for example, one on the control of reactivity, 
another on the control of the cooling system, in a nuclear power 
plant). The allocation of function will in turn prescribe the 
workload to be born by each operator. If operators must both 
read the procedures and carry them out, they will be more heavily 
loaded than if a supervisor reads out the procedures and the 
operators carry them out; but in that case the supervisor in turn 
may become overloaded. 
In practice at present different industries take different 
approaches. At the IAEA meeting in Munich in 1986, for example, 
one group said that they first wrote the procedures and then 
decided on manning level, while another group apparently did the 
reverse. The overall impression was that nowhere was there a 
technique which could act as the core of the design procedure, 
around which rational design and integration could take place. 
The EOPP (Emergency Operating Procedure Procedure or Emergency 
Operating Procedure Philosophy) provides such a technique. 
The EOPP diagram is a graphical representation of the flow 
of information and control during normal and abnormal operations 
(examples are shown in Figures 1-4). The box diagram shows the 
various activities by which the control room crew interact with 
each other and with the process. The flow graph below each box 
diagram shows a time-line of events. 
Figure 1 shows a simple situation in which a supervisor and 
an operator manually control a process. In normal operation 
there is a cycle in which the operator Looks at the plant, the 
plant Shows the operator its state, and the operator Acts on the 
plant. (This normal cycle is shown in a dashed box in each flow 
chart.) when an incident occurs, the plant Shows an abnormality, 
and the operator Tells the supervisor. The supervisor consults 
the EOPs (shown by dashed parallel lines), Commands the operator 
to act, and Requests Confirmation that the action has been taken. 
He may also Request Data to help him chose or monitor the EOP, 
and the operator will Tell him the data. (Because of this cycle 
we have sometimes called this the "show and tell" model.) 
If we compare Figure 1 with the other Figures, the value of 
the EOPP becomes apparent. It displays clearly and graphically 
the implications of the management's operating philosophy. Notice 
how an automated plant changes the flow of information and con- 
trol. Notice what happens when two operators are used, and the 
difference between two operators with and without a supervisor. 
In the former case, the operators have an enormous burden of 
reading EOPs and also communicating each with the other. In the 
latter case, they are relieved of those burdens, but at the cost 
of a very heavy workload on the supervisor. 
We have, in the report cited, considered a number of implica- 
tions which these EOPP diagrams revealed. For example, consider 
how they are related. If in a Figure 4 type of system, the super- 
visor were to become ill suddenly, or, in an extreme case, be 
killed by a terrorist, the system would become a Figure 3. Would 
the operators be able to work with EOPs designed for a Figure 4, 
and when all their training assumed a Figure 4? This analysis 
clearly shows that when designing EOPs, abnormal plant conditions 
are not only hardware conditions, but also crew conditions. As 
far as I know, no EOPs have ever been explicitly written with 
regard not merely to plant condition but also to crew condition. 
But considering the EOPP diagrams shows that EOP design, training, 
and manning must be integrated, and that a change in crew level 
or organization should be explicitly considered in an emergency, 
and EOPs written for those situations. 
The workload on the various crew members can be estimated 
qualitatively in terms of the number of lines entering and leaving 
each box. It would probably be possible to quantify this to some 
extent by treating the graph as a time-line analysis for each EOP 
scenario, although we have not so far done this. We believe it 
is most important for the clear picture it provides of strength 
and weaknesses of communication among the crew. One particular 
point is related to the belief among many experts that an extra 
crew person is needed for emergency situations. There is abundant 
evidence that under pressure people are inefficient decision 
makers. In particular, they tend to commit themselves too early 
to a plausible diagnosis of the trouble, and monitor displays for 
evidence to confirm their hypothesis, and to assure themselves 
that their intervention is succeeding. The EOPP shows that the 
operators are likely to be completely taken up in the L-A-S-T-CF 
sequence, and the supervisor in reading the EOPs and his C-RD-RC- 
CF-T sequence. It is important that someone has time to monitor 
the overall plant condition, particularly looking for information 
which may reveal that the state of the plant is not actually what 
the operators believe it to be, or that disturbances are propagat- 
ing to other parts of the system. The EOPPs support the conten- 
tion that an extra operator, whose task is not to take part in 
the EOP but to monitor the plant and make independent state as- 
sessments, is desirable, since otherwise the supervisor or one or 
both operators would have to perform this task. 
Developing an EOPP in detail also shows the impact on train- 
ing. The particular L-A-S sequence performed by an operator 
depends on the training he has received, as does the structure of 
his communication with his fellow crew-members. If he has been 
trained to specialize in one part of the plant and communicate 
only with the supervisor, the flowchart will be different from 
its nature if all operators operate all parts of the plant. The 
advantages of specialization are reduced workload and a reduction 
or elimination of ambiguity about which operator will carry out 
which actions (obey which commands). Training is simpler. But 
the crew becomes heavily dependent on the supervisor for coordina- 
tion and inflexible in their tasks. 
In summary, neither BOP generation, training, manning levels, 
operating philosophy (how much automation to use), or control 
room organizational hierarchy can be considered as separate opera- 
tions. The first decision must be the operating philosophy. In 
the decisions which follow from the choice of an operating philo- 
aophy we believe that the EOPP diagrams can play a useful role in 
integrating a systems approach to design for fault management. 
Feher, M., Moray, N., & Senders, W. 1987. The Development of 
Criteria for Emergency Operating Procedures. Atomic Energy 
Control Board. Ottawa, Canada. 
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4. TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 
4.1. COMMENTS ON INHERENTLY SAFE TECHNOLOGIES 
Prof. Borie Segeretbhl 
IIASA. Laxenburg, Austria 
1. The Issues 
Modem society has seen an enormous increase irr scale and complexity of indusmal ac- 
tivities. For a long period of time this development went unquestioned. An almost complete 
faith in the skill of managers and engineers prevailed. The situation has changed dramati- 
cally during the last two decades. There are three main reasons for this. 
First. Nuclear power emerged in the fifties as the ultimate solution to the worlds in- 
creasing demand for electrical energy After the initial successes accompanied by a few but 
partly covered accidents the public became more and more concerned about the darker sides 
of this new technology. 
Second. Environmental degradation and a growing concern for the quality of our physi- 
cal living conditions lead to a more critical amtude to uncontrolled industrial expansion. 
Third. Several spectacular industrial accidents like Seveso meant that public faith in 
the quality of indusmal safety measures was destroyed almost overnight. 
Public concern about the risks of industrial activities is reaching proportions which are 
almost beyond control in some cases. This is obvious in the case of opposition to nuclear 
energy. To a growing extent the same opposition can be seen in matters related to all han- 
dling of toxic materials or hazardous waste. 
Political pressures from the public, and in some cases from the international community 
has lead to the establishment of new government agencies which have as their specific task 
to deal with regulation of industrial activities. 
Industry is becoming womed about the present situation. The safety level of most in- 
dustrial plants is without doubt good enough to answer any reasonable demands from 
regulators. This is, however, not enough in all cases. As can be seen from the nuclear in- 
dustry, demands concerning safety leads to a destruction of the economic base for the whole 
industry. This can, with the exception of a few countries, ultimately lead to a disappearance 
of the whole technology. 
The problem related to social and political acceptability of certain types of industrial 
activities is not independent of a country'soverall cultural, political and economic situation. 
Without going into details we want to mention the fact that different policies relared to 
nuclear power in countries like FRG, France, USSR, Sweden and USA does not depend 
only on the technical quality of their power plants or the overall economic situation in these 
countries. The general attitudes are a function of the population's total social and political 
awareness with the priorities following from this. 
2. Definitions of Inherent Safety 
Inherently safe technology is in the smctest sense of the word a system in which safety 
is based on physical properties of process design rat!er than on characteristics of technical 
components. A fail-safe system has to bedesigned with components which by no means can 
be considered as being fail-safe. Inherently safe properties of the system are triggered by 
malfunctioning components, instrumentation failures or operator errors. In extreme cases 
the definition of and insistence on inherent safety is absurd. It is a matter of demanding that 
"whatever happens nothing may happen". 
It is essential to make a clear distinction between qualitative and quantitative demands. 
Qualitative demands imply that no causal paths from any type of malfunction or error may 
exist to a state where releases of energy or matter harmful to the environment and/or man 
take place. Quantitative requirements accept the possibility that in very improbable situa- 
tion release levels might occur which are so low that they don't cause any harm. 
If we take the case of a nuclear reactor. No causal path from any operating conditions 
to a core meltdown is allowed to exist in a system which is inherently safe wirh respec! 10 
core melrdown. Other accident trajectories, which might cause minor contamination or 
releases, can be constructed. As a relative concept we can however say that the plant is in- 
herently safe due to the fact that its construction makes a core meltdown not only extreme- 
ly improbable but completely impossible. This is one important propeny of inherent safety 
as it is generally understood. Inherent safety is a design concept related to broad scenarios 
defining what is considered as being unacceptable - e.g. core meltdown - while no claims 
are being made to elimination of all conceivable minor and major incidents in oumageous- 
ly improbable situations. 
Lawrence Lidsky (1987) has suggested that a useful way toclassify nuclearplants would 
be to use four safety categories. In declining order of safety the classifications would be: 
"absolute" safety (no hazardous materials or confined energy sources); "inherent" safety 
(immune to major structural failures and operator error); "passive" safety (no immunity to 
major structural failure or operator error, but no need for active systems in the events of sub- 
systems failure); and "engineered" safety (no immunity to major st~uc~ural f ilure; positive 
response required to subsystem malfunction or operator error; in-depth defenses). 
In the nuclear energy field all radically new development projects under way in dif- 
ferent countries arc probably concerned with the design of systems which fulfill the require- 
ments of "passive" safety while "absolute" safety and "inherent" safety are concepts which 
require more theorctical and practical clarification before they can be accepted as a base for 
technical research and design activities. 
3. Approaches in the Nuclear Industry 
The focus of attention in the nuclearindusay has been on ways to prevent loss of coolant 
accidents (LOCAs) with a potential for leading to core meltdowns in traditional reactor 
designs. The concept "inherently safe" stands for alternative reactor designs which have 
been proposed as radically safer alternatives to designs now used in commercial plants. As 
mentioned above the design concepts would lead to a classification of these concepts as pas- 
sive safety design rather than inherently safe designs. From a practical point of view this is 
of course a minor point. What is essential is that work on radically new designs is under 
way. 
Two heavily promoted alternative designs have attracted a lot of attention: the PIUS 
(Process Inherent Ultimately Safe) design proposed by ASEA and the HTGR (High 
Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor) proposed by several companies in Europe and the USA. 
Of these two PIUS is more innovative and perhaps in a stricter sense inherently safe while 
the HTGR is more tested. Both designs are., however, commercially unproven experimen- 
tal designs. 
The PIUS reactor is a radically new LWR. The reactor core, primary cooling system 
and steam generators are immersed in a large pool of cold, borated water within a prestressed 
concrete pressure vessel. The pool and the primary cooling system are hydraulically con- 
nected, but under normal conditions the pnssurt developed by the coolant pumps is just 
enough to keep the pool water from entering the core. Any disturbance in the cooling sys- 
tem would upset the balance, and the borate solution would flood the core. The boron in the 
water would shut down the chain reaction, and the cold pool water would carry off the 
residual heat. Neither an operator nor an electromechanical device would be needed to set 
these events in  motion (Lester 1986). 
The European work on HTGRs will not be described in this paper as the topic has been 
dealt with in other papers in these proceedings. 
Intensive developmenteffor~s areunder way in USA. Three conceptual design programs 
were started in 1984. They include two LMR (Liquid Metal Reactor) concepts, the General 
Electric Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) and the Rockwell international 
Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR), and the modular HTGR. Each reactor concept has 
adopted passive means of reactor shutdown and heat removal and thereby minimized the 
number of systems and components rquired for nuclear safety. In each of the designs, 
safety-related systems are limited to the reactor module. The rest of the plant and inter- 
mediate heat transpon systems are decoupled from the safety systems. 
To control hazardous materials we can: 
(1) Avow them (rubrlllulion) 
(2) Ure b r r  of them (Inlenrlfiullon) 
(3) Use lhem under conditions which make lhem kss hrrardous (rltenurtlon) 
(4) Conloln them - r o  lhrt they do no1 l u k  oul 
(5) Conlrol l u k r  - by emergency Irolrllon, open plants lo encourrge dlsperrlon. elc. 
(6) Survive krkr  - by flrcprol.cllon. flre-fighting. oxploslon-rorislant bulldingr, otc. 
Since Fllxborough the lasl two have been emphasized. 
Inherent safety deals wlth the first three and wlth the choice of condltlons so that un- 
controlled reactions cannot occur. 
Inherently safer plants are cheaper because: 
(1) we n o d  b r r  rdded*n ufety oqulpment 
(2) If we ure b r r  mrterlrl, the plrnl wlll br rmrller 
Fig. 1: The concept of inherent safety (Kletz 1984, p 6). 
Safety of the LMR is based on natural laws such as gravity, thermal conductivity. ther- 
mal expansion. Doppler broadening, and sodium coolant density change to meet safety re- 
quirement and criteria. These properties are the basis for reliable shutdown and heat removal 
systems that function without electrical or mechanical suppon and are insensitive to station 
blackouts. Systems remain functional at all times, do not rely on operator action, and there- 
fore cannot fail or be shut off. 
Passive safety of the modular HTGR stems from the ability to effectively utilize in- 
herent features of the concept including the inert coolant, the capability of the refractory 
coated fuel to withstand high temperatures, the high thermal inertia and high temperature 
stability inherent in thegraphitecore and support structures, and the strong negative tempera- 
ture coefficient of the reactor core (Lester 1986). 
4. Chemical Industry 
Nuclear and chemical hazards are viewed and controlled differently. This reflects the 
different organizations of the industries and the different levels of public and political con- 
cern. The nuclear industry is a very small group of highly sophisticated large companies. 
Communication and coordination of development and safety activities is therefore efficient. 
This is m e  even in competitive situations. Also, the public hazard and acceptance aspect 
has been recognized since the beginning of the nuclear industry as a prerequisite for opera- 
tion of nuclear power plants. As a consequence it has traditionally been possible to give high 
priority to the setting of safety goals valid for the industry as a whole. 
Thechemical industry is structured differently. It consists of a wide spread of company 
types, and analogous risks can be created by many whose use of hazardous substances is 
ancillary to their main business. The competition in the market for chemical products is dif- 
ferent from the nuclear industry. There is a continuous need to minimize cost in many plants 
producing bulk chemicals for international market. The price competition in the nuclear in- 
dustry has a completely different structure (if it exists at all). 
The concept of inherent safety has no clearly established position in the chemical in- 
dustry. Trevor Kletz (1984) has for a long time been advocating the concept as a design base 
for safer chemical plants. The approach taken by Kletz is a practical engineering approach. 
He does not bother with a scientifically consistent definition of inherent safety. In Figure 1 
we reproduce his view of the concept of inherent safety. 
Time is not ripe to even try to give an overview of the concepts and principles in the 
chemical industry. The situation is to unstructured and it is obvious that only marginal im- 
provements will be achieved in the near future. The chemical industry is simply so con- 
strained by economics,politics and tradition, that thedevelopment of new concepts and prin- 
ciples for chemical processes and plants will take a long time to come. Fortunately much 
work is being done on quantitative improvements to compensate for the slow progress in 
the field of qualitative innovations. 
What can be said about the chemical industry is said very well by Kletz. It is, however, 
difficult to identify a generic concept of inherent safety in this approach. By following 
Kletz's guidelines it is in most cases impossible to state that one design is inherently safe 
while another is not. It is of course possible to compare the relative safety of different designs 
but this as such does not imply that there is a qualitative difference between designs in such 
a way that an inherently safe plant can be defined and identified. 
5. Conslraints 
As Lester (1986) has pointed out, many people in the nuclear industry regard the idea 
of a major shift away from current technology as unrealistic. According to this view, it is 
better to improve existing technologies incrementally. This would enable the industry to 
draw on the enormous store of knowledge related to the LWR. Whatever the advantages of- 
fered by new systems, the revolutionary concepts would encounter many unanticipated 
problems. The critics are also worried about diverting development from the international 
mainstream of technological development 
The constraints on the chemical industry have been mentioned above. Many of the 
problems related to introduction of radically safer plants can be traced back to traditions of 
thinking in the industry and, on a more tangible level, to concerns for competitiveness, cost 
efficiency, and new risks created by untested processes. 
Before an old and tested design is abandoned in favor of a radically new one there has. 
to be, in the word of Norman Clark (1987), an alternative which shows promise of dealing 
with the pitfalls and puzzles experienced in the operation of existing technological practice, 
since in the absence of such a candidate it is likely that attempts will continue to be made 
to prop up the status quo - to regard 'anomalies' as 'puules'. 
Constant (1984) states: "Old communities and traditions virtually never give birth to 
radically new technologies. No manufacturer of piston aircraft engines invented or inde- 
pendently developed a turbo-jet. No designer of conventional reciprocating steam engines 
independently developed a steam turbine .... When abrupt transitions in technological prac- 
tice do occur. as happens from time to time, they almost always are the work of people out- 
side, or at least on the margins of, the conventional community." 
We will not spend time on these philosophical matters in this paper. To a large extent 
the issues mentioned relate to the general question of innovations and the driving forces be- 
hind them. a few words will be spent on the economics of the industries. Both as a driving 
force behind and as an obstacle for introduction of radically new and safer plants and proces- 
ses. 
A common feature of proposed safe designs for nuclear reactors is that they are small, 
modular and standardized. The PRISM plant consists of nine pool-type reactors grouped in 
thee power blocks. each producing 415 MWe (net) giving a total of 1.245 MWe. The 1.400 
W e  SAFR design consists of four pool-type reactors. each individually controlled and 
operated in a common control room. Each reactor is coupled to a single 350 W e  turbine 
generator unit operating with superheated steam. The American design for a modular HTGR 
plant consists of four reactor modules, each rated at 350 MWt, coupled to two steam turbine 
generators yielding a net power output of about 550 MWe. 
The economic benefits from modular and standardized design of small units can be s u b  
stantial. The effons to develop small plants is in conflict with conventional wisdom which 
says that big plants are cheaper to build and operate than small. By big is meant reactors on 
the l000MW range. The rationale behind this traditional opinion is that a much larger 
proportion of the capital costs of nuclear plants is size-independent compared with the cost 
of building other types of plants. Other factors have, however, led the industry to reconsider 
the question of economies of scale. Large plants are increasingly difficult to finance, entail 
greater liability, and may not match a utility's load growth. Scaling down conventional reac- 
tors would, however, not produce a competitive small plant. Instead, some potential ad- 
vantages inherent in small reactors must also be designed to meet the same criteria for stand- 
ardization and enhanced safety expected of larger reactors in the future (Douglas 1986). 
The economics of safety are changing in the chemical industry too. Traditionally this 
industry has been allowed to operate in a rather loose framework of environmental regula- 
tions. The situation is changing rapidly. Now a substantial proponion of the chemical 
industry's investments are used for new environmental and pollution connol equipment to 
enable plants to operate under normal operating conditions with stricter environmental 
protection regulation. According torecent calculations by the Chemical Manufacturers' As- 
sociation in the U.S.A., the amount spent in 1988 on protective equipment will total $3 bil- 
lion which is 17% of the industry's planned capital spending (Anonymous 1987). 
These investments are spent on protective measures for future operation of the plant. 
The cost of cleaning up after a long period of polluting activities is not insignificant either. 
he Environmental Protection Agency has announced that it will impose new controls to 
reduce the levels in surface waters of 66  toxic chemicals released from 61 plants in New 
Jersey. Alabama, East Virginia and South Carolina. Together they have been pouring away 
10,000 tons too much of toxic chemicals a year. The clean-up will cost them $500m a year. 
Thecost mentioned above are investments required to ensure legal operation under nor- 
mal circumstances in the future. The cost of future accidents is an altogether different issue. 
Nobody knows with cenainty what the situation will be. The only assumption which can be 
made is that future accidents in the chemical industry can be very expensive and lead to 
plants closing down and companies going bankrupt. The value of investments in inherent- 
ly safe systems in the chemical industry have to be assessed against the probable costs of 
other alternative. More information on future hypothetical liabilities resulting from acci- 
dents are from a pure cost benefit analysis point of view badly needed. An indication of the 
amounts involved comes from the fact that Union Carbide has been sued for $3 billion in 
India. A probable level for a settlement could be around $600m or equivalent to 10% of the 
company's total assets. The role of the insurance industry will of course change with these 
new legal environments. 
The figures indicated above make it clear that there is a strong econon~ic incentive for 
more work on inherently safe systenls and designs in the chemical industry. The problem is 
a qualitative issue - how to avoid closing down - and a quantitative issue - how to stay 
profitable. 
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Fig. 2: An Atlas of Safety Thinking according to Kletz (1984, ppl18-119) 
To  find a scientifically valid answer to the question of how to structure and define in- 
herently safe technology will take a long time. This search could be like chasing nonexistent 
windmills if it is allowed to loose track of the practical constraints of reality, technology and 
economics which are a prerequisite for all industrial progress in a world structured the way 
ours is today. And there are no alternative worlds available, as far as I know. Therefore I 
want to finish this paper with a view given by Kletz in Figure 2. This gives us a practical 
view of how to live with the reality of research, design and engineering while searching for 
future perfect solutions to problems which are not even clearly defined yet. 
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4 . 2 .  INVESTIOATIONS ON HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENTS OF THE HTR-500 
Prof. Rudolf Schulten 
Institute of Reactor Development 
Nuclear Research Centre, Julich, FRG 
1. T e c h n i c a l  Concept  o f  HTR-500 
The HTR-500 i s  based  on t h e  THTR-300 power p l a n t .  The d imens ions  o f  t h e  
power p l a n t  a r e  n e a r l y  t h e  same b u t  a  doub l ing  o f  a  power o u t p u t  c a n  b e  
r e a c h e d .  F ig .  1 shows t h e  o v e r a l l  p l a n t .  
I n  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  t h e  HTR-500 power p l a n t  complex t h e  r e a c t o r  con ta inment  
b u i l d i n g  i s  s i t u a t e d  hous ing  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  pr imary s y s t e m ,  t h e  shutdown f a c i l i t i e s ,  p a r t s  o f  t h e  decay  h e a t  removal 
sys tem and o t h e r  s a f e t y - r e l e v a n t  components. I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o n t a i n -  
ment b u i l d i n g  a c t s  a s  a  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  e x t e r n a l  i m p a c t s .  A l l  t h e  component 
p a r t s  c a r r y i n g  a c t i v i t y  a r e  a r r a n g e d  i n s i d e  t h e  r e a c t o r  con ta inment  b u i l d i n g  
e x c e p t  t h e  f u e l  e l ement  s t o r a g e ,  which i s ,  however, a l s o  equ ipped  w i t h  
a  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  e x t e r n a l  impac t .  The r e a c t o r  s e r v i c e  b u i l d i n g  on t h e  
one  s i d e  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o n t a i n m e n t  b u i l d i n g  and t h e  t u r b i n e  b u i l d i n g  on 
t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  form a l i n e  of b u i l d i n g s  f a c i n g  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  equipment  
b u i l d i n g .  
F i g .  2  shows a  v e r t i c a l  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  
w i t h  i t s  i n t e r n a l s .  The t h e r m a l  e n e r g y  i s  g e n e r a t e d  by 1 , 1 4 5 , 0 0 0  s p h e r i c a l  
e l e m e n t s  w i t h  a  d i a m e t e r  o f  6 cm, a b o u t  80  % o f  which a r e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  
and 20 % g r a p h i t e  e l e m e n t s  used i n  t h e  THTR-300 f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o r e  o n l y .  
Each f u e l  e l ement  c o n t a i n s  low-enr iched  uranium f u e l  i n  t h e  form o f  
1 6 , 0 0 0  c o a t e d  p a r t i c l e s  equ ipped  w i t h  an  a d d i t i o n a l  S i c  l a y e r  f o r  t h e  r e t e n -  
t i o n  o f  m e t a l l i c  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s .  The f u e l  e l ement s  p a s s  t h r o u g h  t h e  r e a c t o r  
o n l y  once  (OTTO-fuel l ing) .  The s p e n t  f u e l  e l ement s  a r e  d i s c h a r g e d  f rom t h e  
c o r e  t h r o u g h  t h r e e  f u e l  e l e m e n t  d i s c h a r g e  p i p e s  w i t h o u t  i n t e r r u p t i n g  power 
o p e r a t i o n .  The s p e n t  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  a r e  d i r e c t l y  d i s c h a r g e d  i n t o  c a s k s  and 
t r a n s p o r t e d  t o  t h e  s t o r a g e .  No s p e c i a l  c o n d i t i o n i n g  f o r  s p e n t  f u e l  is  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  long- te rm i n t e r i m  s t o r a g e  o r  f o r  f i n a l  s t o r a g e .  
The w a s t e  management c o n c e p t  i s  adap ted  t o  t h e  s p e c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
t h e  HTR l i n e .  1 0  y e a r s '  i n t e r i m  s t o r a g e  o f  t h e  s p e n t  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  i n  f u e l  
storage casks i s  intended t o  be followed by t r anspor t  t o  a  nuclear waste 
repository f o r  ult imate disposal.  Due t o  the  l imited quan t i t iy  of spent 
f u e l  elements, closing of t h e  HTR fue l  cycle is not a  s u i t a b l e  solut ion,  
so  t h a t  - as  f o r  o ther  prototype nuclear power s t a t i o n s  - d i r e c t  ultimate 
disposal i s  envisaged i n  t h e  long r u n .  
This concept corresponds t o  t h e  AVR and THTR-300 waste management concept, 
a s  l icensed by t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
The reactor  pressure vessel  i s  designed as a  l a rge  cavi ty  prestressed concrete 
r eac to r  vessel  (PCRV) a s  i n  the  THTR-300. The complete primary system i s  
in tegrated i n  t h e  PCRV. 
The HTR-500 is  equipped with 6 steam generators of he l i - co i l  design operating 
i n  countercurrent. Each steam generator is associated with a  c i r cu la to r .  The 
c i rcu la to r  design i s  t h e  same as t h a t  of t h e  THTR c i r c u l a t o r ,  it i s ,  however, 
equipped w i t h  ac t ive  magnetic bearings and arranged i n  a  v e r t i c a l  posit ion.  
The helium coolant flows downwards through t h e  reac to r  core ,  then upwards 
through t h e  steam generators t o  t h e  c i r cu la to r s  from where it i s  reci rcula ted 
t o  t h e  cold gas plenum, cooling on its way t h e  outer  surfaces  of t h e  primary 
system. 
Because of t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t h e  separate  two-loop decay heat removal 
system, t h e  main cooling system consist ing of 6 steam generator /c i rcula tor  
un i t s  has no safe ty  funct ion.  Therefore, t h e  main cooling system is of a  
purely conventional design outs ide  the  reactor  containment building,  i . e .  it 
i s  designed t o  t h e  usual standards applied t o  modern conventional power plants .  
2. Safety Features of t h e  HTR-500 
2 . 1  Safety Charac te r i s t i c s  
Due t o  t h e  design, t h e  core s t ruc tu re  and the  mater ia ls  r e s i s t a n t  t o  high 
temperatures, t h e  HTR pebble-bed reactor  i s  capable of making use of physical 
laws giving r i s e  t o  inherent safe ty  cha rac te r i s t i c s .  
On t h e  one hand, these  safe ty  cha rac te r i s t i c s  spec i f i c  t o  the  HTR r e s u l t  i n  
extremely benign and s a f e  operating and accident behaviour which allows 
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t h e  u s e  o f  s i m p l e  and uncompl ica ted  s y s t e m s  f o r  o p e r a t i o n  and a c c l d e n t  
c o n t r o l .  T h i s  is very  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  because  
- t h e  o p e r a t i n g  s t a f f  has  ample t i m e  f o r  r e a c t i o n ,  
- manual measures  a r e  p o s s i b l e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  m a l f u n c t i o n s ,  
- t h e  r i s k  of c a p i t a l  l o s s  i s  very  low. 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  s p e c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  of t h e  HTR-specific s a f e t y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  r e s u l t s  f rom t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  damage i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a c c i d e n t s .  
T h i s  means t h a t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  damage and f requency  is  very  s m a l l  
b u t  a l s o  t h e  damage i t s e l f .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  environment i s  n o t  exposed t o  
consequences  o f  a  s e r i o u s  n a t u r e  even  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
The HTR1s p r i n c i p l e  i n h e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  
- n e g a t i v e  t e m p e r a t u r e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  r e a c t i v i t y  e f f e c t i n g  s e l f - s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
and l i m i t a t i o n  of r e a c t o r  power, 
- ce ramic  ( g r a p h i t e )  c o r e  s t r u c t u r e  and f u e l  e l ement s  e n s u r i n g  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s  up t o  a b o u t  3500 O C ,  
- low r a t i o  of power d e n s i t y  t o  h e a t  c a p a c i t y  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  s low rise o f  t h e  
f u e l  e l ement  t e m p e r a t u r e  under  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
- i n e r t ,  p h a s e - s t a b l e  gaseous  c o o l a n t  (he l ium)  r u l i n g  o u t  t o t a l  l o s s  o f  
c o o l a n t .  
2 .2  Shutdown System 
The HTR-500 i s  equipped w i t h  two r e d u n d a n t  shutdown sys tems  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  and t h e  i n c o r e  r o d s .  
The 48 r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s a f e t y  system used e x c l u s i v e l y  f o r  r e a c t o r  
scram.  When t h e i r  e f f e c t  i s  needed ,  t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  d r o p  i n t o  b o r e h o l e s  i n  
t h e  s i d e  r e f l e c t o r  b l o c k s  under  t h e  f o r c e  o f  g r a v i t y .  
The 72 i n c o r e  r o d s  a r e  used f o r  c o n t r o l  and long- term shutdown. They a r e  
manoeuvred by a  pneumat ic  p i s t o n  sys tem.  Long-term shutdown by t h e  i n c o r e  r o d s  
is e f f e c t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  by manual r e l e a s e  and does  n o t  have t o  b e  i n i t i a t e d  
e a r l i e r  t h a n  1 0  hours  a f t e r  shutdown of t h e  p l a n t  by t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s .  
The pyrocarbon and s i l i c o n  c a r b i d e  c o a t i n g s  of t h e  f u e l  p a r t i c l e s  form a  
h i g h l y  e f f e c t i v e  p r e s s u r e  and g a s - t i g h t  con ta inment  o f  t h e  f u e l  and t h e  
f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  up t o  h igh  t e m p e r a t u r e s  s a f e l y  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  
a t  t h e  p l a c e  o f  g e n e r a t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p r imary  c o o l a n t  h a s  o n l y  a  ve ry  low a c t i v i t y  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
d u r i n g  normal o p e r a t i o n  end under  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  s o  t h a t  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  
b a r r i e r s  a r e  much l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  i n  o t h e r  r e a c t o r  t y p e s .  
The g a s - t i g h t  f a i l - s a f e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  hav ing  a  w a l l  
t h i c k n e s s  of 5  m and m u l t i p l e  r edundan t  p r e s t r e s s i n g  c a b l e s  r e p r e s e n t s  a n o t h e r  
b a r r i e r .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  a c c i d e n t s  t h e  maximum 
p o s s i b l e  l e a k a g e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  a t  t h e  m e t a l  p e n e t r a t i o n s  and c o n n e c t i o n  
2 l i n e s  is  l i m i t e d  t o  33 cm by s t r u c t u r a l  d e v i c e s .  I f  r u p t u r e  o c c u r s  i n  t h e s e  
components ,  t h e  c o o l a n t  t h e r e f o r e  e s c a p e s  ve ry  s lowly .  I t  t a k e s  a b o u t  1 . 5  h  
b e f o r e  p r e s s u r e  e q u i l i z a t i o n  is e s t a b l i s h e d .  During t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  c o o l a n t  
g a s  i s  passed  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  s t a c k  t h r o u g h  p r e s s u r e  r e l i e f  v a l v e s .  When 
p r e s s u r e  e q u i l i z a t i o n  between t h e  r e a c t o r  con ta inment  b u i l d i n g  and t h e  
a tmosphere  has  been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  hel ium i s  d i s c h a r g e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  v e n t i -  
l a t i o n  a i r  f i l t e r  sys tem.  
The HTR-500 i s  equ ipped  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  f i l t e r ,  which under  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
is c a p a b l e  o f  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  m e t a l  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  e f f e c t i v e l y .  
3 .  HTR B a s i s  A c c i d e n t s  
P r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  g a i n e d  from t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p rocedure  and t h e  o p e r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  AVR and t h e  THTR-300, a s  w e l l  a s  r i s k  a n a l y s e s  performed f o r  t h e  
HTR p l a n t s ,  have c o n f i n e d  t h a t  t h e  d e s i g n  o f  t h e  s a f e t y  sys tem is  d e t e r m i n e d  
by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c i d e n t  c a t e g o r i e s :  
- f a i l u r e  of i n d i v i d u a l  decay h e a t  removal  sys tems  o r  l o o p s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  decay h e a t  removal c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e s e  s y s t e m s ,  
- u n i n t e n t i o n a l  power e x c u r s i o n  and,  a s  a  r e s u l t ,  t e m p e r a t u r e  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e ,  
- d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  a c c i d e n t s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  reduced c o o l i n g  c a p a c i t y  o f  
t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t ,  
- t u b e  r u p t u r e  i n  t h e  s team g e n e r a t o r ,  i . e .  i n g r e s s  of  w a t e r  i n t o  t h e  pr imary 
sys tem.  
I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d e s i g n - b a s i s  a c c i d e n t ,  f o r c e d  c o o l i n g  of  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  
r e m a i n s  i n t a c t .  D e s i g n - b a s i s  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  a c c i d e n t s  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  which 
has  t o  b e  v e r i f i e d  i n  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p r o c e d u r e  w i t h i n  t h e  p e r m i t t e d  l i m i t i n g  
dose  v a l u e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  5 2 8 . 3  of  t h e  F e d e r a l  R a d i o l o g i c a l  P r o t e c t i o n  
Ord inance .  The f u e l  e l ement  t e m p e r a t u r e s  a r e  r educed  below 500 O C  w i t h i n  
a  few h o u r s ,  s o  t h a t  even t h e  most improbab le  a c c i d e n t - f a i l u r e  combina t ions  
i n c l u d i n g  w a t e r  o r  a i r  i n g r e s s  can b e  c o n t r o l l e d  w i t h o u t  any problems.  Below 
a b o u t  500 O C  t h e  r e a c t i o n  r a t e s  of s team o r  oxygen w i t h  t h e  g r a p h i t e  o f  
t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  a r e  n e g l i g i b l y  low. 
4. Recen t  S t u d i e s  on Determining Damage d u r i n g  H y p o t h e t i c a l  A c c i d e n t s  
The r e l e a s e  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  due t o  e x c e s s i v e  t e m p e r a t u r e  
can  b e  r u l e d  o u t ,  a s  f a r  a s  is  humanly p o s s i b l e ,  by t h e  r e l i a b l e  a f t e r h e a t  
removal  s y s t e m s  111. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  THTR-300, f o r  example, a  f a i l u r e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  2  x  has  been de te rmined .  
Recen t  e x p e r i m e n t a l  r e s u l t s  and i n s i g h t s  a l s o  e n a b l e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i d e n t s  
and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  t o  b e  d e s c r i b e d  more p r e c i s e l y .  S i n c e  t h e s e  a c c i d e n t s  
a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  e v e r y  c a s e  w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  t h e  
r e a c t o r  and t h e  i n t e r n a l s  of t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l ,  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  
work p r i m a r i l y  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on t h e  behav iour  o f  t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s ,  t h e  
components and p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  a t  h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s .  
4.1 Behav iour  o f  t h e  F u e l  Elements  a t  E l e v a t e d  Tempera tu res  
The b e h a v i o u r  o f  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  a t  a c c i d e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  h a s  been s t u d i e d  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  121.  For  t h i s  purpose ,  s p e n t  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  from t h e  AVR 
r e a c t o r  were  h e a t e d  under  s i m u l a t e d  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s .  It became a p p a r e n t  
t h a t  up t o  a  t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  1600 - 1800 O C  o n l y  s l i g h t  and n e g l i g i b l e  q u a n t i t i e s  
o f  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  were  r e l e a s e d .  I f  t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  risis f u r t h e r  t h e n  t h e  
d i f f u s i o n  o f  m e t a l l i c  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  p a r t i c l e  c l a d d i n g  b e g i n s  
131 .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s m a l l  r e a c t o r s  i n  t h e  power r a n g e  from 200-250 MWth, 
a  d a n g e r o u s  r e l e a s e  of  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  can t h u s  be  r u l e d  o u t  even i n  s e v e r e  
a c c i d e n t s  s i n c e  t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e  r a n g e  from 1600 - 1800 O C  is  n o t  exceeded 
due t o  good h e a t  c o n d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  1 4 1 ,  151.  T h i s  r e l e a s e  i s  
i n c r e a s e d  w i t h  an even g r e a t e r  r i s e  i n  a c c i d e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  i n  l a r g e r  
r e a c t o r s  and f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  c l a d d i n g s  o c c u r s  a t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  above 2500 OC. 
However, i n  a c o r e  h e a t u p  a c c i d e n t  o n l y  a s m a l l  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  is 
exposed t o  s u c h  t e m p e r a t u r e s .  P r o c e s s e s  d u r i n g  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  
can  be  d e s c r i b e d  by v e r i f i e d  computer programs. 
4 . 2  Behaviour  o f  t h e  P r e s t r e s s e d  Concre te  V e s s e l  a t  E l e v a t e d  Tempera tu res  
Exper imen ta l  s t u d i e s  have a l s o  been made o f  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  
c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  a t  i n c r e a s e d  t e m p e r a t u r e  l o a d  171.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s e c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  i n n e r  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  s u r f a c e ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i s o l a t i o n  and t h e  
l i n e r  s t r u c t u r e ,  were  t e s t e d  a t  up t o  1300 OC. C o n t r a r y  t o  p r e v i o u s  e x p e c t a -  
t i o n s ,  t h e  c o n c r e t e  d o e s  n o t  crumble i n t o  d u s t  b u t  r a t h e r  forms a v i t r e o u s  
mass .  According t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t ,  it can  b e  assumed t h a t  
t h e  bond between t h e  l i n e r  and c o n c r e t e  a t  t h e  i n n e r  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  
c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  can  w i t h s t a n d  a t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  a t  l e a s t  1100 OC w i t h o u t  
t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  v e s s e l  be ing  l o s t .  The t e m p e r a t u r e  i n s i d e  t h e  c o n c r e t e  
w a l l s  d r o p s  s t e e p l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  o u t s i d e .  The ma jo r  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  
c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  t h u s  r emains  a t  moderate t e m p e r a t u r e s .  V e s s e l  s t a b i l i t y  
can be  e x p e c t e d  a t  a l l  t i m e s  s i n c e  i n  a l l  s e v e r e  a c c i d e n t s  t e m p e r a t u r e s  
o f  1100 OC a r e  n o t  exceeded a t  t h e  i n n e r  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  
v e s s e l  181. The volumes of carbon d i o x i d e  and w a t e r  vapour  a r i s i n g  d u r i n g  
h e a t i n g  of t h e  c o n c r e t e  can  e s c a p e  o u t s i d e  due t o  t h e  p o r o s i t y  o f  t h e  c o n c r e t e  
and t h u s  do n o t  p e n e t r a t e  i n s i d e  t h e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  1 7 1 .  Even i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  t h e  most r a p i d  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  
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r e s t r i c t s  t h e  d i s c h a r g e  open ing  of t h e  pr imary system t o  33  cm . The maximum 
e s c a p i n g  g a s  volume is stil l  s o  s m a l l  t h a t  it can  b e  p u r i f i e d  by a f i l t e r  
sys tem i n  a l l  a c c i d e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  g a s  f l o w s  i n t o  t h e  env i ronment .  
4 . 3  Absorp t ion  and R e t e n t i o n  of F i s s i o n  P r o d u c t s  i n  G r a p h i t e  
G r a p h i t e  used i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  f u e l  e l ement s  and t h e  r e f l e c t o r  a b s o r b s  
f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  cesium and s t r o n t i u m ,  even  i n  t h e  h i g h  
t e m p e r a t u r e  r a n g e  161.  According t o  p r e s e n t  knowledge, t h e  ma jo r  f r a c t i o n  
o f  t h e  r e l e a s e d  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  i s  d e p o s i t e d  a t  c o l d e r  l o c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
r e a c t o r  c o r e  and i n  t h e  upper  g r a p h i t e  r e f l e c t o r .  Exper imen ta l  r e s u l t s  
have a l s o  become r e c e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  dynamics o f  t h e  a b s o r p t i o n  
p r o c e s s e s  I l l / .  The most  i m p o r t a n t  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s ,  namely Cs,  S r  and t h e  
r a r e  e a r t h s ,  a r e  p r a c t i c a l l y  c o m p l e t e l y  r e t a i n e d .  The r e t e n t i o n  c a p a c i t y  
o f  t h e  u p p e r  t o p  r e f l e c t o r  c a n  even  b e  improved i n  compar i son  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  
s t a t u s  by a  s u i t a b l e  c h o i c e  o f  m a t e r i a l s  - namely g r a p h i t e  w i t h  an  i n c r e a s e d  
b i n d e r  c o n t e n t .  I o d i n e  and s i l v e r ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  d i s p l a y  l o w e r  a b s o r p t i o n .  
5. P r o c e s s e s  Dur ing  H y p o t h e t i c a l  A c c i d e n t s  
5.1 Leaks  o f  L a r g e  Q u a n t i t i e s  o f  Water  and S team i n t o  t h e  P r imary  C i r c u i t  
The i n g r e s s  of w a t e r  i n t o  t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  l e a k  i n  t h e  
s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r s  c a n  a l s o  b e  a d e q u a t e l y  r e s t r i c t e d .  Leaks  i n  t h e  s t eam 
g e n e r a t o r s  may i n t r o d u c e  a  maximum o f  1 0  k g / s  i n t o  t h e  s y s t e m .  Water  i n f l u e n c e s  
t h e  r e a c t i v i t y  and c a u s e s  c o r r o s i o n  o f  t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  /9/, b u t  h i s  c a n  
b e  r e l i a b l y  p r e v e n t e d  w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  p r o t e c t i o n  s y s t e m .  I f  
a  l e a k a g e  o f  w a t e r  i s  assumed s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  
shutdown s y s t e m ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e n  t h i s  c o u l d  
l e a d  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a c t o r  t e m p e r a t u r e  d u e  t o  t h e  r i s e  i n  r e a c t i v i t y .  
As a  consequence  o f  t h i s ,  depend ing  on o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c i r c u l a t o r s ,  t h e  
g a s  t e m p e r a t u r e  w i l l  r i s e  i n  t h e  uppe r  or  lower s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r .  
A s a f e t y  f u s e  i s  d e p l o y e d  i n  t h e  u p p e r  and l o w e r  r e f l e c t o r  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  
t o  i n t e r r u p t  t h e  power s u p p l y  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  m o t o r s  of t h e  f e e d w a t e r  
pumps i f  t h e  normal  t e m p e r a t u r e  i s  exceeded .  The i n t e r r u p t i o n  i n  t h e  power 
s u p p l y  f o r  t h e  t h y r i s t o r s  of t h e  d r i v i n g  s y s t e m s  f o r  t h e  f e e d w a t e r  pump 
m o t o r s  and o t h e r  u n i t s  i n  t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t  t h u s  o c c u r s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  p h y s i c a l  l a w s  and t h e  maximum w a t e r  i n g r e s s  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  l e s s  t h a n  
1 0  t. S e r i o u s  c o r r o s i o n  and t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  e x p l o s i v e  g a s e s  i n  t h e  con- 
t a i n m e n t  c a n  t h u s  a l s o  b e  r u l e d  o u t  even  i n  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  The 
power s u p p l y  t o  t h e  n u c l e a r  shutdown sys t em c a n  a d d i t i o n a l l y  b e  i n t e r r u p t e d  
s o  t h a t  t h e  n u c l e a r  r e a c t i o n  i s  t h e n  s h u t  down. 
5.2 Leakage o f  Air i n t o  t h e  P r imary  C i r c u i t  
The l e a k a g e  o f  a i r  i n t o  t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t  a f t e r  a  p o s s i b l e  d e s p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
is a d e q u a t e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  by t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  and t h e  r e a c t o r  
c o n t a i n m e n t .  Such a  l e a k  is  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  i f  t h e  h e l i u m  e s c a p e s  from t h e  
p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  up a  p r e s s u r e  e q u a l i z a t i o n .  After d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  
l e s s  t h a n  3 0  % a i r  and a p p r o x i m a t e l y  70  % he l ium a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  
c o n t a i n m e n t .  The r e s i d u a l  oxygen ,  w i t h  a  f r a c t i o n  o f  a p p r o x .  6 %, i n  t h e  
r e a c t o r  c o n t a i n m e n t  c a n  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p e n e t r a t e  i n t o  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  
v e s s e l  by s low c o n v e c t i o n  and d i f f u s i o n  p r o c e s s e s  w i t h o u t  c a u s i n g  s e r i o u s  
2 damage. Only a p e r t u r e s  o f  max. 33 cm can a r i s e  i n  t h e  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  s o  
t h a t  even i n  t h e  c a s e  of f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  v e s s e l  no s e r i o u s  damage t o  t h e  
r e a c t o r  c o r e  can o c c u r  i n  t h e  l o n g  t e rm due t o  t h e  low v e l o c i t y  o f  t h e  
n a t u r a l  c o n v e c t i o n  f l o w s .  Even i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  s t a c k  d r a f t  w i t h  an upper  
and lower  a p e r t u r e  i n  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l ,  t h e  c o r r o s i o n  r a t e  
w i l l  o n l y  amount t o  a b o u t  1 t of  g r a p h i t e  l o s s  p e r  y e a r .  
5.3 R e a c t i v i t y  A c c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  H y p o t h e t i c a l  Range 
R e a c t i v i t y  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  p reven ted  by two i n d e p e n d e n t  d i v e r s i f i e d  shutdown 
sys tems .  The t e m p e r a t u r e  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  w i l l  r i s e  s l o w l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  
of a  h y p o t h e t i c a l ,  d e f e c t i v e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  shutdown sys tem and any i n c r e a s i n g  
r e a c t i v i t y  i s  compensated by t h e  n e g a t i v e  t e m p e r a t u r e  c o e f f i c i e n t  / I / .  
5 . 4  D e t e r m i n i s t i c  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  H y p o t h e t i c a l  A c c i d e n t s  
The t o t a l i t y  o f  a l l  c o n c e i v a b l e  a c c i d e n t s  o v e r  and above  d e s i g n - b a s i s  
a c c i d e n t s  can b e  d i s c o v e r e d  by a  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  a s sumpt ion  o f  t h e  f a u l t y  
behav iour  o f  a l l  s a f e t y - r e l e v a n t  components.  Under t h e  p e s s i m i s t i c  a s sumpt ion  
t h a t  a l l  r e a c t o r  p r o t e c t i o n  measures  f a i l ,  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  must t h e n  
be  pa id  t o  s i x  components t h e  combined f a u l t y  b e h a v i o u r  o f  which c o v e r s  
t h e  e n t i r e  a c c i d e n t  spec t rum.  These  six components a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  
- t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l ,  
- t h e  s team g e n e r a t o r s ,  
- t h e  n u c l e a r  shutdown sys tem,  
- t h e  a f t e r h e a t  removal s y s t e m ,  
- t h e  c i r c u l a t o r s  and 
- t h e  f e e d w a t e r  pumps. 
O t h e r  components,  s u c h  a s  t h e  v a l v e s  and s a f e t y  v a l v e s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
s h u t o f f  d e v i c e s  i n  t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t  can be  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  combina t ion  
scheme i f  t h e  g i v e n  m a j o r  components shou ld  f a i l .  For  example ,  a  f a i l u r e  
o f  t h e  s a f e t y  v a l v e s  i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  pre-  
s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l .  
A t o t a l  of 124 a c c i d e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  r a n g e  can b e  found 
by a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  combina t ion  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e s e  components.  T h i s  
i n c l u d e s  a c c i d e n t s  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  i m p a c t s  i n  which f a i l u r e  
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of t h e  n u c l e a r  shutdown sys tem,  a f t e r h e a t  removal  end c o o l i n g  of t h e  p re -  
s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  i s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  assumed. A l l  o t h e r  a c c i d e n t s  
a r e  of minor  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  A t o t a l  of 1 6  a c c i d e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  t h u s  r e s u l t  
which can  i n  p a r t  l e a d  t o  c o r e  h e a t u p  w i t h  v a r i o u s  sequences  and a  t e m p e r a t u r e  
r i s e  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  and p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l .  T h e i r  impac t s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  depend on t h e  r a t e  o f  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  
c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l .  The w a t e r  i n g r e s s  l i m i t e d  by t h e  c o n t a c t  b r e a k e r  system 
t o  1 0  t ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  hand,  o n l y  p l a y s  a  minor  r o l e .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  c o r e  
h e a t u p  a c c i d e n t ,  t h i s  q u a n t i t y  of w a t e r  i s  namely a l r e a d y  conver t ed  i n t o  
w a t e r  g a s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  few hours  d u r i n g  a  t e m p e r a t u r e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o r e  
b e f o r e  r e l e a s e  o f  t h e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  b e g i n s .  The w a t e r  g a s  produced h a s  
a  h i g h  r e d u c t i o n  p o t e n t i a l  and t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  comparison t o  a  pure  hel ium 
a tmosphere ,  h a s  p r a c t i c a l l y  no i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  behav iour  o f  t h e  f i s s i o n  
p r o d u c t s  / l o / .  
5 . 5  D e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  and R e l e a s e  o f  F i s s i o n  P r o d u c t s  
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  r a p i d  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  i n  a  p e r i o d  from 1 . 5  t o  6  h o u r s ,  
a  s l i g h t  q u a n t i t y  o f  h e a t  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  from t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  t o  t h e  
i n t e r n a l s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  s t e e p  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a c t o r  t e m p e r a t u r e  r e s u l t s  
r e a c h i n g  approx .  2500 O C  i n  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  t h e  c o r e  a f t e r  abou t  40 hours  
and approx .  1800 O C  a s  an ave rage  f o r  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e .  The t o p  r e f l e c t o r  
t h e n  h a s  a n  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  1200 O C  / I / .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  w i t h  a  s low d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  ( i n  an  extreme c a s e  up t o  
100 h o u r s )  t h e  h e a t  from t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  i s  l a r g e l y  t r a n s p o r t e d  by n a t u r a l  
c o n v e c t i o n  t o  t h e  components end t h e  i n n e r  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  
v e s s e l .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  r e a c t o r  t e m p e r a t u r e  amounts t o  a b o u t  1800 O C  a t  
t h e  c e n t r e  w h i l e  t h e  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a t u r e  is  approx .  1200 O C  and t h e r e  i s  
p r a c t i c a l l y  no r e l e a s e  of f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s .  A l l  o t h e r  a c c i d e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  
a r e  r anged  between t h e s e  two ex t remes  w i t h  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t h a t  r a p i d  d e p r e s s u r i -  
z a t i o n s  l e a d  t o  i n c r e a s e d  t e m p e r a t u r e s  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  w i t h  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  
h i g h e r  r e l e a s e s  whereas  s low d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s  r e s u l t  i n  lower  a c c i d e n t  
t e m p e r a t u r e s  and less r e l e a s e .  I n  a l l  c a s e s ,  t h e  r e l e a s e  s t a r t s  a f t e r  a b o u t  
8  h o u r s  and i s  completed a f t e r  approx.  4 0  h o u r s  / I / .  
According t o  p r e s e n t  e x p e r i m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e  and c o n s e r v a t i v e  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  
up t o  1 0  % o f  t h e  p a r t i c l e s  may f a i l  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  r a p i d  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
whereas  f o r  e x t r e m e l y  s low d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  t h e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  i s  of t h e  o r d e r  
o f  magn i tude  o f  approx .  1 p e r  1000. The f r a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  
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r e l e a s e d  v a r y  d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t y p e s .  Gaseous  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  
and i o d i n e  a r e  l a r g e l y  r e l e a s e d  by p a r t i c l e  f a i l u r e  w h e r e a s  ces ium,  s t r o n t i u m  
and o t h e r  m e t a l s  d i f f u s e  t h r o u g h  t h e  p a r t i c l e  c l a d d i n g s .  A c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  
g a s  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  r e s u l t s  f o r  a l l  c o r e  h e a t u p  a c c i d e n t s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
a  s low f l o w  o f  g a s  t h r o u g h  t h e  upper  r e f l e c t o r  ( approx .  1 0  cm/s)  i n t o  t h e  
p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  c a v e r n e  by means o f  n a t u r a l  c o n v e c t i o n .  The 
f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  a r e  t r a n s p o r t e d  from h o t  t o  c o l d  l o c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  sys tem 
by t h i s  g a s  movement. Cs ,  S r  and o t h e r  m e t a l l i c  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  a r e  d e p o s i t e d  
by a b s o r p t i o n  on t h e  g r a p h i t e .  S t r o n t i u m  and t h e  r a r e  e a r t h s  a r e  comple te ly  
r e t a i n e d  and t h i s  is a l s o  e x p e c t e d  o f  Cs / 1 1 / ,  a l t h o u g h  f i n a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
a r e  n o t  y e t  p o s s i b l e .  I o d i n e ,  s i l v e r  and t h e  n o b l e  g a s e s  a r e  n o t  d e p o s i t e d .  
The p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  i s  des igned  i n  s u c h  a  way t h a t  t h e  f i s s i o n  
p r o d u c t s  a r e  t r a n s p o r t e d  by t h e  e s c a p i n g  hel ium t h r o u g h  d e f i n e d  a p e r t u r e s .  
D e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  t r a n s p o r t  o f  t h e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  t h e r e f o r e  
c a n  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  f o u r  p o s s i b l e  d i r e c t i o n s :  
- i n t o  t h e  s p a c e  above  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l ,  
- o r  i n t o  t h e  s p a c e  below t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  v e s s e l  ( f u e l l i n g  room),  
- o r  i n t o  t h e  compar tment  f o r  t h e  g a s  p u r i f i c a t i o n  p l a n t ,  
- o r  i n t o  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  c i r c u i t .  
The t h r e e  compar tments  men t ioned  above a r e  c l o s e d  by a i r l o c k s  d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  
and a r e  c o n n e c t e d  v i a  v e n t  c h a n n e l s  t o  a  f i l t e r  w i t h  a  c o o l i n g  bed connec ted  
i n  f r o n t  s o  t h a t  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  a d e q u a t e l y  remove a l l  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s .  
I f  t h e  g a s  m i x t u r e  o v e r f l o w s  i n t o  t h e  secondary  c i r c u i t ,  a n  a d e q u a t e  d e p o s i t i o n  
o f  i o d i n e  and s i l v e r  i s  p r o b a b l y  t o  be e x p e c t e d  on t h e  s t i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  
c o l d  components and p i p i n g .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  c o l d  c o n d e n s e r  w i t h  i t s  l a r g e  
h e a t  t r a n s f e r  s u r f a c e s  w i l l  o p e r a t e  i n  t h i s  s e n s e .  However, i f  it s h o u l d  
n o t  be  p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  t h i s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  t h e n  a n  i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g  t u b e  
may be  e n v i s a g e d  f rom t h e  c o n d e n s e r  t o  t h e  f i l t e r  w i t h  a  s u p p o r t e d  r u p t u r e  
d i s c  t o  t r a n s f e r  t h e  g a s  m i x t u r e  i n t o  t h e  c o o l i n g  bed and f i l t e r .  
6. Summary 
On the whole, the following may be said according to present expectations 
of the behaviour of fission products during hypothetical accidents. The 
elements strontium, cesium and the rare earths are retained to an adequate 
content in the cold areas of the reactor core in the upper reflector. In 
any case, the escape of gas during any depressurization of the prestressed 
concrete vessel is so slow that a passive filter system can adequately purify 
the escaping gas of iodine and silver, and thus serious environmental pollution 
may be ruled out. 
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4 . 3 .  THE SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HTR-500 REACTOR PLANT 
W i n f r i e d  Wacholz 
Hochtermperatur-Reaktorbau GmbH 
Mannheim, FRG 
The s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  h i g h - t e m p e r a t u r e  r e a c t o r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
t h o s e  o f  t h e  HTR 500 r e a c t o r  p l a n t  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  v e n d o r  o f  high-tem- 
p e r a t u r e  r e a c t o r s ,  BBC/HRB g a i n e d  i n  more t h a n  20 y e a r s  AVR o p e r a -  
t i o n  i n  J u e l i c h  and d u r i n g  t h e  commiss ion ing  and e x p e r i m e n t a l  power 
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  THTR 300 i n  Schmehausen. 
The p r i m a r y  o b j e c t i v e  o f  any r e a c t o r  p r o t e c t i o n  sys tem is  t h e  s a f e  
c o n t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  g e n e r a t e d  by n u c l e a r  
f i s s i o n .  The c l a s s i c a l  a c t i v e  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  f o r  
- shutdown 
- decay  h e a t  removal  and 
- a c t i v i t y  c o n t a i n m e n t  
a r e  u s e d  a l s o  i n  t h e  HTR t o  min imize  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  power s t a t i o n  
o n  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  and t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p l a n t  i t s e l f  u n d e r  a l l  o p e r a t -  
i n g  and a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s .  
The i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  HTR however e f f e c t i v e l y  
c o u n t e r a c t  any  h a z a r d  a r i s i n g  i n  c a s e  o f  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  a c t i v e  
s a f e t y  m e a s u r e s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  a c c i d e n t  c o n t r o l .  The i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  combined w i t h  t h e  p a s s i v e  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  o f  t h e  HTR 
e n s u r e  s u f f i c i e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  e v e n  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  e x t r e m e l y  improb- 
a b l e  a c c i d e n t s .  Even u n d e r  such c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  r e l e a s e  t o  t h e  en-  
v i r o n m e n t  is  low enough s o  t h a t  r a p i d  measures  s u c h  a s  e v a c u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d .  
The combined e f f e c t  o f  t h e  a c t i v e  and p a s s i v e  s a f e t y  m e a s u r e s  and  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  t h e  HTR w i l l  
b e  d i s c u s s e d  u s i n g  t h e  HTR 500 p e b b l e  bed r e a c t o r  a s  example.  
E x a c t l y  t h e  same s a f e t y  a rguments  a p p l y  t o  s m a l l e r  HTR power s t a -  
t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  HTR 1 0 0 .  Due t o  t h e i r  lower  power r a t i n g  and 
power d e n s i t y ,  s u c h  p l a n t s  have  an  e v e n  w i d e r  s a f e t y  marg in .  
The HTR's I n h e r e n t  S a f e t y  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
I n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  " i n n a t e "  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  c o u n t e r -  
a c t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  m a l f u n c t i o n s ,  i n c i d e n t s  and a c c i d e n t s  due  t o  
p h y s i c a l  l aws .  
A c t i v e  e n g i n e e r e d  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s ,  s u c h  a s  pumps and v a l v e s  a l w a y s  
r e l y  o n  t r i g g e r i n g  and e n e r g y  s u p p l y  f o r  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n i n g .  
P a s s i v e  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  need n e i t h e r  t r i g g e r i n g  n o r  e n e r g y  s u p p l y  
f o r  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n i n g .  T h e i r  f u n c t i o n  is t h e r e f o r e  more r e l i a b l e  
t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  a c t i v e  e n g i n e e r e d  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s .  
Due t o  t h e  d e s i g n ,  t h e  c o r e  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  m a t e r i a l s  r e s i s t a n t  
t o  h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s ,  t h e  HTR p e b b l e  bed r e a c t o r  is  c a p a b l e  o f  
making u s e  o f  p h y s i c a l  l a w s  g i v i n g  rise t o  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c -  
ter is t ics .  
On t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e s e  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  
HTR r e s u l t  i n  a n  e x t r e m e l y  good-na tured  and s a f e  o p e r a t i n g  and 
a c c i d e n t  b e h a v i o u r  which a l l o w s  t h e  u s e  o f  s i m p l e  and uncompli-  
c a t e d  s y s t e m s  f o r  o p e r a t i o n  and  a c c i d e n t  c o n t r o l .  T h i s  i s  v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  b e c a u s e  
- t h e  o p e r a t i n g  s t a f f  h a s  ample t i m e  f o r  r e a c t i o n  
- manual m e a s u r e s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  m a l f u n c t i o n s  
- t h e  r i s k  o f  c a p i t a l  l o s s  is v e r y  low. 
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  s p e c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  HTR-spec i f i c  
s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  r e s u l t s  from t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  damage i n  
t h e  e v e n t  o f  a c c i d e n t s .  T h i s  means t h a t  n o t  o n l y  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  
damage and f r e q u e n c y  i s  v e r y  s m a l l  b u t  a l s o  t h e  damage i t s e l f .  
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  i s  n o t  exposed  t o  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a  
s e r i o u s  n a t u r e  e v e n  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i d e n t s .  
The HTR' s p r i n c i p l e  i n h e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  t h e  £01 lowing  : 
- low r a t i o  o f  power d e n s i t y  t o  h e a t  c a p a c i t y  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  
s low r ise  o f  t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e  u n d e r  a c c i d e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  
- c e r a m i c  ( g r a p h i t e )  c o r e  s t r u c t u r e  and f u e l  e l e m e n t s  e n s u r i n g  
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s  up t o  a b o u t  3500 OC 
- n e g a t i v e  t e m p e r a t u r e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  r e a c t i v i t y  e f f e c t i n g  
s e l f - s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and l i m i t a t i o n  o f  r e a c t o r  power 
- i n e r t ,  p h a s e - s t a b l e  g a s e o u s  c o o l a n t  ( h e l i u m )  
r u l i n g  o u t  t o t a l  l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t .  
I n  t h e  £01 lowing  t h e  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  d e t a i l .  
HTR 500 S a f e t y  Sys tems  
These s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  now e x p l a i n e d  on t h e  example o f  
t h e  HTR 500. 
F i g .  1 shows a  c r o s s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  
v e s s e l .  You c a n  see t h e  c o r e  w i t h  t h e  g r a p h i t e  r e f l e c t o r ,  t h e  
s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r  w i t h  c i r c u l a t o r  and i n  a d d i t i o n  a n  a u x i l i a r y  
h e a t  e x c h a n g e r  f o r  d e c a y  h e a t  removal .  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o n l y  t h e  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l .  
Shutdown System 
The HTR 500 i s  e q u i p p e d  w i t h  two r e d u n d a n t  shutdown s y s t e m s  con- 
s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  and t h e  i n c o r e  r o d s .  
The 4 8  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s a f e t y  s y s t e m  u s e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  
f o r  r e a c t o r  scram.  When t h e i r  e f f e c t  i s  needed ,  t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s  
d r o p  i n t o  b o r e h o l e s  i n  t h e  s i d e  r e f l e c t o r  b l o c k s  u n d e r  t h e  f o r c e  
o f  g r a v i t y .  
The 72 i n c o r e  r o d s  a r e  u s e d  f o r  c o n t r o l  and long- te rm shutdown.  
They a r e  maneuvred by a  pneumat ic  p i s t o n  sys tem.  Longterm shutdown 
by  t h e  i n c o r e  r o d s  i s  e f f e c t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  by manual r e l e a s e  and 
d o e s  n o t  have  t o  b e  i n i t i a t e d  e a r l i e r  t h a n  1 0  h o u r s  a f t e r  shutdown 
o f  t h e  p l a n t  by t h e  r e f l e c t o r  r o d s .  
Decay H e a t  Removal System 
The d e c a y  h e a t  removal  c o n c e p t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
f e a t u r e s  ( c f .  F i g .  2 ) :  
- u s e  o f  t h e  main h e a t  removal  sys tem (main h e a t  s i n k )  
s e p a r a t e  and r e d u n d a n t  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  s y s t e m  
w i t h  s e p a r a t e  c i r c u l a t o r s  and h e a t  e x c h a n g e r s  i n t e -  
g r a t e d  i n  t h e  p r i m a r y  s y s t e m ,  
u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  c o n v e c t i o n  s h o u l d  t h e  
c i r c u l a t o r s  f a i l  
r e s t a r t  o f  t h e  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  sys tem by 
manual m e a s u r e s ,  s i n c e  p r o l o n g e d  f a i l u r e  o f  
d e c a y  h e a t  removal  ( 10 h )  i s  t o l e r a b l e  
- i n t e g r a t i o n  of  t h e  ve ry  s imp le  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  sys tem 
of  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  i n t o  
t h e  decay h e a t  removal concep t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  of  
t o t a l  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  decay h e a t  removal sys tems 
l i s t e d  above. 
The redundant  decay h e a t  removal h e a t  exchangers  a r e  a r r anged  
s e p a r a t e l y  so  a s  t o  e n s u r e  s u f f i c i e n t  n a t u r a l  convec t ion  i n  t h e  
pr imary  c i r c u i t ,  should  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c i r c u l a t o r s  f a i l .  
The two redundant  decay h e a t  removal l o o p s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  con- 
t r o l  an a c c i d e n t ,  because  t h e i r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by making 
u s e  o f  n a t u r a l  convec t ion  and manual measures.  
I n  t h e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  e v e n t  o f  f a i l u r e  o f  b o t h  decay h e a t  renoval  
l o o p s  and t h e  main h e a t  removal system, s u f f i c i e n t  h e a t  can  b e  
removed v i a  t h e  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  system, normaly used  f o r  c o o l i n g  
t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  and i t s  l i n e r  d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  
A c t i v i t y  Containment 
The concep t  o f  a c t i v i t y  conta inment  i s  based  on a  m u l t i - b a r r i e r  
p r i n c i p l e  (F ig .  3 ) .  
The f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  a r e  r e t a i n e d  by t h e  fo l lowing  b a r r i e r s :  
- t h e  c o a t e d  p a r t i c l e  having  a  d i ame te r  of  abou t  0 .5  mm 
- t h e  g r a p h i t e  m a t r i x  o f  t h e  f u e l  e lement  of  6 cm d iame te r  
- t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  
- t h e  r e a c t o r  conta inment  b u i l d i n g  
The pyrocarbon and s i l i c o n  c a r b i d e  c o a t i n g s  on  t h e  f u e l  p a r t i c l e s  
form a  h i g h l y  e f f e c t i v e  p r e s s u r e  and g a s - t i g h t  conta inment  o f  t h e  
f u e l  and t h e  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  up t o  h i g h  t e m p e r a t u r e s  which s a f e l y  
r e t a i n s  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v i t y  a t  t h e  p l a c e  o f  g e n e r a t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  pr imary  c o o l a n t  h a s  o n l y  a  v e r y  low a c t i v i t y  concen- 
t r a t i o n  d u r i n g  normal o p e r a t i o n  and under  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  so  
t h a t  t h e  subsequent  b a r r i e r s  a r e  much l e s s  impor t an t  t han  i n  o t h e r  
r e a c t o r  t ypes .  
The g a s - t i g h t  f a i l - s a f e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  having  
a  wa l l  t h i c k n e s s  o f  5 m and m u l t i p l e  redundant  p r e s t r e s s i n g  c a b l e s  
r e p r e s e n t s  a n o t h e r  b a r r i e r .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  h y p o t h e t i c a l  d e p r e s s u r i -  
z a t i o n  a c c i d e n t s  t h e  maximum p o s s i b l e  l eakage  c r o s s  s e c t i o n  a t  t h e  
me ta l  p e n e t r a t i o n s  and connec t ion  l i n e s  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  33 cmz by 
s t r u c t u r a l  d e v i c e s .  I f  r u p t u r e  o c c u r s  i n  t h e s e  conponents ,  t h e  
c o o l a n t  t h e r e f o r e  e s c a p e s  v e r y  s lowly .  I t  t a k e s  about  1 . 5  h u n t i l  
p r e s s u r e  e q u i l i z a t i o n  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  During t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  c o o l a n t  
g a s  i s  passed  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  s t a c k  through p r e s s u r e  r e l i e f  
v a l v e s .  When p r e s s u r e  e q u i l i z a t i o n  between t h e  r e a c t o r  conta inment  
b u i l d i n g  and t h e  atmosphere h a s  been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  he l ium i s  
d i s c h a r g e d  through t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  a i r  f i l t e r  system. 
The HTR 500 i s  equipped w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  f i l t e r  which under  a c c i d e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  meta l  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  e f f e c -  
t i v e l y .  
HTR Accident  Behaviour 
P r a c t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  ga ined  from t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p rocedure  and t h e  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  AVR and t h e  THTR 300 a s  w e l l  a s  r i s k  a n a l y s e s  pe r -  
formed f o r  t h e  HTR p l a n t s  have conf i rmed t h a t  t h e  d e s i g n  of  t h e  
s a f e t y  system i s  determined  by t h e  fo l lowing  a c c i d e n t  c a t e g o r i e s :  
- f a i l u r e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  decay  h e a t  removal  s y s t e m s  o r  l o o p s  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  decay  h e a t  removal  c a p a c i t y  
o f  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  
- u n i n t e n t i o n a l  power e x c u r s i o n  a n d ,  a s  a  r e s u l t ,  t e m p e r a t u r e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  
- d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  a c c i d e n t s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  r e d u c e d  c o o l i n g  
c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  c i r c u i t  
- t u b e  r u p t u r e  i n  t h e  s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r ,  i . e .  i n g r e s s  o f  w a t e r  
i n t o  t h e  p r i m a r y  sys tem.  
The a n a l y s e s  p e r f o r m e d  f o r  t h e  HTR 500,  a r e  summarized i n  F i g .  4 .  
The t ime-dependent  c u r v e s  o f  t h e  maximum f u e l  e l e m e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  
f o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  shown. The l o a d  and  f a i l u r e  l i m i t s  
o f  t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  a r e  g i v e n  f o r  compar i son .  The v a r i o u s  tempera-  
t u r e  c u r v e s  show t h e  dependence  o n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e s  assumed 
i n  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  t h a n  F i g .  4 shows t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c i d e n t  
s e q u e n c e s :  r a p i d  cooldown by t h e  main h e a t  removal  s y s t e m  (MLC), 
decay  h e a t  removal  u s i n g  two (CACS ( 2 )  ) o r  o n l y  o n e  d e c a y  h e a t  
removal  l o o p  (CACS) (1) ) , h e l i u m  c i r c u l a t o r  f a i l u r e  and decay  h e a t  
removal  v i a  t h e  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  h e a t  e x c h a n g e r s  by n a t u r a l  con- 
v e c t i o n  (LOC) , and t h e  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  a c c i d e n t  w i t h  d e c a y  h e a t  
removal  v i a  o n e  decay  h e a t  removal  l o o p  (CACS (1) (DEPRESS) ) . 
I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  d e s i g n  b a s i s  a c c i d e n t s  f o r c e d  c o o l i n g  o f  t h e  r e a c -  
t o r  c o r e  r e m a i n s  i n t a c t .  Des ign  b a s i s  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  a c c i d e n t s  
whose c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  t h e  p e r m i t t e d  l i m i t i n g  d o s e  v a l u e s .  The f u e l  
e l e m e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  a r e  r e d u c e d  below 500 OC w i t h i n  a  few h o u r s ,  
s o  t h a t  e v e n  most  i m p r o b a b l e  a c c i d e n t - f a i l u r e  c o m b i n a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  
w a t e r  o r  a i r  i n g r e s s  c a n  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  w i t h o u t  any prob lems .  Below 
a b o u t  500 OC t h e  r e a c t i o n  r a t e s  o f  s t e a m  o r  oxygen w i t h  t h e  g r a p h i t e  
o f  t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t s  a r e  n e g l i g i b l y  low. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  F i g .  4 shows t h a t  even  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  i m p r o b a b l e  a c c i -  
d e n t  s e q u e n c e s  such  a s  t o t a l  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  decay  h e a t  removal  
s y s t e m  and h e a t  removal  e x c l u s i v e l y  v i a  t h e  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  s y s t e m  
(LCS),  o r  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  scram s y s t e m  (ATWS) , t h e  f u e l  e l e m e n t  t e m -  
p e r a t u r e s  r e m a i n  c l e a r l y  below t h e  d e s i g n  t e m p e r a t u r e  p e r m i t t e d  f o r  
c o n t i n u o u s  o p e r a t i o n .  Thus it i s  e n s u r e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  no 
r e l e a s e  o f  a c t i v i t y  e x c e e d i n g  t h a t  d u r i n g  normal o p e r a t i o n .  
HTR A c c i d e n t  S e q u e n c e s  
A c c i d e n t  s e q u e n c e s  h a v i n g  a  v e r y  low p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o c c u r r a n c e  
( h y p o t h e t i c a l  e v e n t s )  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  pro-  
c e d u r e .  They a r e ,  however ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  r i s k  a n a l y s e s .  Com- 
p r e h e n s i v e  r i s k  a n a l y s e s  have  b e e n  per formed  f o r  HTR p l a n t s ,  
p e r m i t t i n g  an e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i s k  i n c u r r e d  by an  a c c i d e n t .  
Based o n  t h e  American AIPA-study, a  d e t a i l e d  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  
was p e r f o r m e d  f o r  t h e  HTR by t h e  n u c l e a r  r e s e a r c h  c e n t e r  J u e l i c h  
and t h e  G e s e l l s c h a f t  fUr  R e a k t o r s i c h e r h e i t  (GRS) on b e h a l f  o f  
t h e  F e d e r a l  M i n i s t r y  o f  t h e  I n t e r i o r .  Numerous h y p o t h e t i c a l  
a c c i d e n t s  were a n a l y z e d  f o r  t h e  THTR 300 i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  a c c i -  
d e n t  a n a l y s e s  p e r f o r m e d  w i t h i n  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  D e t a i l e d  
d a t a  on a c c i d e n t  s e q u e n c e s  i n  t h e  THTR 300,  which a r e  r e l e v a n t  
t o  t h e  p l a n t  r i s k ,  were d e t e r m i n e d  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  emergency p r o -  
t e c t i o n  p l a n n i n g  by a  team a t  t h e  J u e l i c h  N u c l e a r  R e s e a r c h  C e n t e r .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  r i s k  e v a l u a t i o n  was c o n d u c t e d  f o r  t h e  HTR 500. I t  
i s  t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  and common r e s u l t  o f  a l l  t h e s e  a n a l y s e s  t h a t  
t h e  r i s k  o f  an HTR i s  v e r y  low. I t  i s  o f  d e c i s i v e  i m p o r t a n c e  t h a t  
f o r  t h e  HTR n o t  o n l y  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  damage and f r e q u e n c y  b u t  a l s o  
t h e  damage i t s e l f  i s  v e r y  s m a l l .  
I t  h a s  been  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  THTR l i c e n s i n g  p r o c e d u r e  and by 
numerous a c c i d e n t  and r i s k  a n a l y s e s  t h a t  a  c o r e  hea t -up  combined 
w i t h  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  would r e s u l t  i n  an  a c c i d e n t  h a v i n g  t h e  maxi- 
mum e f f e c t .  
I n  c a s e  o f  r e a c t o r  sc ram t h e  decay  h e a t  i s  p r i m a r i l y  removed t h r o u g h  
t h e  s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r  and t h e  main s t e a m  f e e d w a t e r  c i r c u i t  ( F i g .  5 ) .  
I f  t h i s  sys tem f a i l s ,  t h e  s e p a r a t e  r e d u n d a n t  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  
s y s t e m  comes i n t o  a c t i o n  ( F i g .  6 ) .  I f  t h i s  sys tem f a i l s  a l s o ,  t h e  
t i m e  o f  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  i n t e r r u p t i o n  w i l l  b e  u s e d  t o  r e s t o r e  d e c a y  
h e a t  removal  by s i m p l e  manual measures  p r o v i d e d  i n  advance .  T h i s  
p r o c e d u r e  meets a l l  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s  and 
h a s  b e e n  c o n f i r m e d  by t h e  German M i n i s t r y  i n  c h a r g e .  The m e a s u r e s  
d e s c r i b e d  above have  b e e n  p r a c t i c a l l y  t e s t e d  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  THTR 300 
s o  t h a t  d e c a y  h e a t  removal  is  e n s u r e d  even  i n  e x t r e m e l y  r a r e  e v e n t s .  
I n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e s e  f a c t s ,  t h e r e  is ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  l i n e r  c o o l -  
i n g  sys tem which i s  a lways  o p e r a t i n g  and c a p a b l e  o f  e n s u r i n g  r e a c t o r  
c o o l i n g  on i t s  own ( F i g .  7 ) .  Under s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  maximum f u e l  
e l e m e n t  t e m p e r a t u r e s  w i l l  rise t o  a b o u t  1200 OC i . e .  a b s o l u t e l y  no 
d a n g e r .  T h i s  r e d u n d a n t  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  sys tem o p e r a t e s  a t  a  w a t e r  
t e m p e r a t u r e  o f  a b o u t  70 OC. I t  is  o f  v e r y  s i m p l e  d e s i g n  a n d ,  h e n c e ,  
o f  h i g h  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  A d d i t i o n a l  r e d u n d a n t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  manual 
f e e d  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  which c a n  a l s o  b e  implemented b e c a u s e  f a i l u r e  
o f  t h e  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  s y s t e m  i s  p e r m i t t e d  f o r  a  p e r i o d  a s  l o n g  a s  
o n e  day .  F o r  a  f u r t h e r  e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  HTR 
s y s t e m ,  a  s i m u l t a n e o u s  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  
r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  was assumed ( F i g .  8 ) .  Under s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  
p r i m a r y  g a s  r e l e a s e d  i n t o  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o n t a i n m e n t  b u i l d i n g ,  i s  
p a s s e d  t h r o u g h  p a s s i v e - f i l t e r s  and d i s c h a r g e d  to t h e  to e n v i r o n m e n t .  
Under such  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o n l y  a  few p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  f u e l  ele- 
ments  w i l l  r e a c h  t e m p e r a t u r e s  up t o  2500 OC, w h e r e a s  c o r e  meltdown 
i s  r u l e d  o u t .  Even i f  t h e  l i n e r  c o o l i n g  s y s t e m  s h o u l d  t o t a l l y  f a i l ,  
t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  i s  main- 
t a i n e d .  Assuming t h a t  any t y p e  o f  c o o l i n g  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  s y s t e m  i s  
i n t e r r u p t e d ,  t h e  t e m p e r a t u r e s  a t  t h e  i n n e r  c o n c r e t e  s u r f a c e  would 
rise t o  1100 OC ( F i g .  9). Hereby a b o u t  1 0  % o f  t h e  w a l l  t h i c k n e s s  
would b e  i m p a i r e d  o n  t h e  i n n e r  v e s s e l  s u r f a c e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n t e -  
g r i t y  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  i . e .  
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s a f e  conta inment ,  i s  ensu red .  Th i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  based on expe r i -  
ments performed i n  t h e  Nuclear  Research Cen te r  J u e l i c h ,  where p a r t s  
o f  t h e  p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  equipped w i t h  a  l i n e r  
o n  t h e  i n n e r  s u r f a c e  were h e a t e d  t o  1200 OC. The c o r e  t h u s  remains  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  a  f a i l - s a f e  s t r u c t u r e  formed by t h e  massive p r e s t r e s s e d  
c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  w i t h  5 m w a l l  t h i c k n e s s  (F ig .  1 0 ) .  
The longer - te rm r e l e a s e  o f  meta l  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  from t h e  f u e l  
e l e m e n t s  is  much r e t a r d e d  and c o n s i d e r a b l y  reduced  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  
t h e i r  d e p o s i t i o n  on c o l d e r  s u r f a c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  p r imary  sys tem and 
t h e  r e a c t o r  conta inment  b u i l d i n g .  A p a s s i v e  me ta l  f i l t e r  i n s t a l l e d  
a t  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  s t a c k  i n l e t  a c t s  a s  a  f u r t h e r  b a r r i e r  f o r  f i s s i o n  
p r o d u c t  r e t e n t i o n  under  a c c i d e n t  c o n d i t i o n s .  I n  t o t a l ,  t h e  r a d i a t i o n  
exposu re  of  t h e  environment  i n  t h e  e v e n t  of  t h i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i -  
d e n t  i s  low enough s o  t h a t ,  a cco rd ing  t o  t h e  " g e n e r a l  recornmenda- 
t i o n s  f o r  emergency p r o t e c t i o n  i n  t h e  environment  of  n u c l e a r  p l a n t s " ,  
immediate measures f o r  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  and t h e  environment  a r e  n o t  
r e q u i r e d .  
The emergency p r o t e c t i o n  p l ann ing  f o r  t h e  THTR 300 was based on an 
ana logous  e v e n t .  The competent  a u t h o r i t i e s  confirmed t h a t  evacua- 
t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  would n o t  be  neces sa ry .  
Summary 
The HTR is  a  r e a c t o r  having  a  p a s s i v e  s a f e t y .  
I t  is  equipped w i t h  t h e  u s u a l  a c t i v e  eng inee red  s a f e t y  sys tems 
i n  a  s i m p l i f i e d  form. 
Due t o  i t s  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and t h e  b u r s t - s a f e  
p r e s t r e s s e d  c o n c r e t e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l  a c t i v i t y  conta inment  is  
ensu red  even wi thou t  t h e  e f f e c t  of a c t i v e  s a f e t y  systems.  
Even i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  ex t r eme ly  h y p o t h e t i c a l  a c c i d e n t s  t h e  e f f e c t  
on t h e  environment  i s  low enough s o  t h a t  e v a c u a t i o n  o r  r e l o c a c t i o n  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d .  T h e r e f o r e  l a r g e - s c a l e  damage 
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  and i n d u s t r i a l l y  u s e d  a r e a s  i s  s a f e l y  r u l e d  
o u t .  
Thus t h e  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h i s  t y p e  o f  r e a c t o r  i s  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d ,  
i . e .  a n  HTR c a n  b e  c o n s t r u c t e d  n e a r  i n d u s t r i a l  and  u r b a n  c e n t e r s .  
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4.4. A DYNAMICAL BASIS FOR INHERENTLY SAFER CHEMICAL AND 
NUCLEAR REACTORS 
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Abstract  
A reaction-kinetics description suggestive of a characterization of safer 
chemical and nuclear reactors is formulated and examined. At issue is the choice of 
reactants, the imposition of kinetic conditions which affect reaction channels, and the 
existence of an intrinsic reaction dynamic which is self-limiting and hence power 
excursion bounded. Risks associated with the dispersal of hazardous substances due 
to reaction-driven containment failure may thereby be abated. 
Introduction 
Our interest here is in the inherent safety of technological devices generically 
known a s  reactors. These devices are characterized by reaction domains which 
sustain matter and energy transformations based on nuclear, atomic, ionic or mole- 
cular processes. The process industry, energy industry, transportation industry, and 
many others are heavily dominated by such devices. As.suggested in Fig. 1, these 
matter-energy transformation devices constitute an essential link between natural 
resources and human services. 
Safety considerations enter because the reactions often yield hazardous sub- 
stances a s  reaction products (e.g., poisons, contaminants, radioisotopes, . . . ) and 
because reaction excursion can lead to an excessively rapid accumulation of energy, 
thereby inducing high temperature and high pressure conditions. Rupture of the con- 
Reactor 
Natural) - > - 5 ( Human 
Resources 
- 
Services 
Nl(t) , E(t) 
Fig. 1 Generic depiction of a single-stage isolated reactor. An inflow of matter and 
energy from some primary natural resource occurs, reactions which transform 
matter and energy under imposed kinetic and density conditions a r e  
sustained, and an outflow of transformed matter and energy in support of 
human services results; this latter outflow may also include polluting and 
contaminating effects. In practice, numerous reactors may be linked by 
matter-energy flows forming a complex network and further also include 
storage components. 
tainment structure may result in the dispersement of the hazardous substances. 
C o n v e n t i d  approaches to reactor s a f e e  have generally focussed upon 
issues such as  
1. licensinglregulatory provisions, 
2. operatorlequipment reliability, 
3. reactor sizing and area distribution, and 
4. accident containment and suppression. 
These safety considerationsrl) generally imply the acceptance of the fundamental 
physical features of the proress in the device and have their origin in the implicit 
premise of some technological realizability and economic cosfmenefit analysis. 
As another approach to technological process systems safety, we consider here 
the underlying reaction process dynamic in the reactor for which we seek to identify 
those matter-energy transformations which possess certain safety features a s  an 
intrinsic phenomena of the underlying process. We identify the safety features of 
interest to be the following: 
1. the minimization of hazardous substance accumulation and 
2. the existence of self-limiting reactions which impose acceptable power- 
excursion bounds. 
Within this context then, we first introduce a generic description of reaction 
phenomena and their characterization and then examine some underlying reaction- 
dynamic properties which impose self-limiting processes directly related to energy- 
driven excursion. 
Reaction Process Characterization 
The fundamental analysis of all reactors begins a t  the level of relevant 
matter-en erg^. transformation processes. Regardless of whether these are nuclear. 
ionic, atomic, or molecular, there exist but only two broad classifications of reactions: 
those involving collisional-rontact two-body interactions and those involving decay or 
decomposition of isolated single-body events. 
In sufficient generality and including both matter and energy in two-body 
reactions, we may write 
Q 1 + a + b  + c + d +  . . .  + Q 2 ,  (1) 
Here, a ,  b, c, d, . . . are material species, Q1 is the average energy supplied to the 
motion of reactants a and b, and Q2 is the kinetic energy of the reaction products 
together with possible electromagneticenergy associated with the process. 
In view of the very large number of material species in various categories. 
Table I, the number of possible two body reactions is indeed very large. Two such 
examples are the fission process, 
Table I 
Estimated number of material species in selected categories. The uncertainty may 
vary from a factor of about 2 for the subnuclear category to perhaps 100 for the 
number of molecular species. 
Category Number 
Photons (mass equivalent) 
Subnuclear 
Elemental 
Isotopic 
Ionic 
Molecular 
Q1 + 235U + n -, vn + P1 + P2 + f& , (2) 
and hydrogen production involving lithium hydride. 
Q1 + LiH + H 2 0  -, Hz + LiOH + f& . (3) 
The rate a t  which such two-body reactions proceed is given by 
Rab = Kab Na Nb , (4) 
where N, and Nb are the densities of species and a and b and ~ , b  is a reaction rate 
parameter dependent upon the relative kinetic state of the a and b species. The net 
energy return is (62- Q1) and can be positive or negative. 
A single-body decay process is represented by 
e -, f +  ....+&, 
and proceeds a t  the rate 
% = h h ' e ,  
where & is also a reaction rate parameter. 
The decay of radioactive 137Cs into a stable isotope 
137Cs -+ 137 Ba + 9- + Q2, (7) 
and the decomposition of dimethyl ether 
(CH3I20 -* CHI + CO + H2 + 62, (8) 
are examples of single-body reactions. 
The evolution with time of matter associated with various types of reactions 
together with the evolution of energy in the reaction chamber is described by a set of 
reaction rate equations. For a typical i-type reaction species and net energy release in 
the reaction chamber. we write 
and 
where R + i  and R - i  are the reaction rates which add to or subtract from the 
population of i-type species in the reaction chamber. 
In general the existence of i-type particles is determined by the competition of 
various reaction channels involving not only i itself but also other progeny species. 
Thus, the i-type species may appear as  a result of two-body reaction and, similarly, it 
may appear as  a daughter product by the decay of its parent. Further, the i-species 
may be transformed in the reaction chamber by their owndecay tendency or become 
absorbed by reacting with other species. These processes are suggested in Fig. 2 and 
may be used, together with the various forms of the two-body and one-body reaction 
rate expression. Eqs. (4) and (6). to write explicitly for Eqs. (9): 
d h', 
- = 1 z pmo+i K ~ , , ,  Nm(t)lzn(t) + pt+i AtNt(t) 
dt  m n t 
Fig. 2 Graphical representation of two collisional and two decay processes which 
may affect the existence of a general i-type species. Here KC) and Ac are 
reaction rate parameters and p( ,  represents the probability of the i-species 
resulting from the suggested reaction. 
and 
= 1 1 Kqr C P ) q ( t ) [ Q 2  - Qllw + 2 A, h;(t)Q& . (lob) 
dt  q r s 
If there exist I material species, then this system represents 1 + 1  first order, 
nonlinear, coupled differential equations; the nonlinearity may be further increased if 
some of the reaction rate parameters, K() and A( ), possess a specific density 
dependence. 
Hazardous Species Accounting 
For reasons of expository clarity and algebraic convenience, we suppose that 
the number of relevant species in an operating reactor, may - on the basis of some 
numerical toxicity assignment - be classifled as  either benign (i.e. non- hazardous) or 
hazardous. Hence, we consider a set of species represented by bl, bq, b3, ... as benign 
and the remaining species hl, hq, h3,. . . as hazardous.(q' 
The dominant source of hazardous species are reactions yielding an increasing 
accumulation of these species, e.g. 
bl + b2 4 hl + . . .  , 
While hazardous species may appear a s  a result of two-body reaction, they 
may similarly be so destroyed, e.g. 
Additionally, they may transform into benign species by decay according to 
The frequency with which all of the above processes occur depends upon the 
magnitude of the reaction rate parameters and these in turn may depend upon the 
kinetic conditions of the interacting particles. Thus, the choice of primary reactants 
and the kinetic state determines the extent of hazardous species accumulation. A 
reactor design and operational goal to be sought is, therefore, 
(1) a minimization of h a d o u s  species accumulation and 
(2) an internal recirculation/destruction of hazardous species. 
This is suggested by the following example of a reaction network desirable for reason 
of inherent minimization of hazardous substances: 
The net effect is b( 1 + b( 1' + O(h) in which O(h) represents an acceptably small 
hazardous specie accumulation. 
Power Excursion Bounds 
The issue of hazardous species accounting involves principally reaction 
processes upon which the species dynamic Eq. (10a) is based. Then, while the power 
excursion-bound is governed by the companion energy rate equation, Eq. (lob), it is 
nevertheless dependent upon the matter rate equation, Eq. (108). 
Equations (10) describe, in general, a very large set of materials species Ki(t). 
It may frequently be possible to identify a very small number of species as  the 
dominant contributions to energy production. For present purposes and without 
restricting the notions resulting therefrom, we take the dominant species to be 
represented by N,(t). Hence, 
= K' Nx(t) , 
with the r ' ( t )  time variations to be much less in comparison with K,(t). 
Evidently, dEIdt will be bounded if N,(t) is bounded. The question now is the 
following. W h a t  imposition on K,(t) and relevant reaction rate parameter will yield 
a bounded P\',(t)?" 
Consider rewriting Eq. (10a) for i = x with the probabilities folded into the 
rate parameters: 
- hxNx(t) - Nx(t) x K-N$~) . 
P 
The complexity of reactions involving the numerous Km(t), KJt) and Kt(t) map be 
such as to possess a coupled time variation component - relative to N,(t) - so that we 
may well approximate 
because the summations do include x.  Further, we suppose that N,(t) possesses a 
significant self-destruction process'3'so that for the last term of Eqs. (1Oa) and ( I  6) we 
may write 
since p does include x. 
Substitution of Eqs. (17) and (18) into Eq. (16) then gives a dynamic for the 
species of interest Nx(t) a s  
As formulated, 82 is negative, el can be positive or negative, and e0 positive; however, 
if some constant leakage of N,(t) from the reaction domain is admitted, then Bo might 
also be negative. 
An assessment of the time variation of N,(t) defined by Eq. (191, subject to the 
admissible range of the rate parameter coefficients {e0,e1,e2). may well be undertaken 
by drawing upon selected aspects of the geometrical theory of nonlinear dynamical 
equations'4). The relevant conceptual-analytical points of interest are  the following: 
1) determination of equilibrium paints N,* of Eq. (19) defined by 
8, + 8, N i t )  + e2 $(t) = 0, (t  arbitrary) , 
Nx(t)=N. 
2) vector-flow properties of dNX/dt for range of N(t) and t. 
Further, of interest here are evidently only those particle densities N,(t) which are 
real and positive. 
We have examined the entire range of conceivable dynamics resulting for this 
range of parameters and display the result in  Figs. 3 a n d  4. Evidently, an 
asymptotically stable upper bound attract for the particle density - and hence for the 
power excursion - exist for a set of reaction parameter {go, el, e2). 
time time 
Fig. 3 Conceivable time variation of h',(t) for the two cases of {€I0 = 0, €I1 >0, 
€12<0) and {Bo > 8, €I1 = 0, e2<0). Regardless of the initial condition, the 
dynamic which governs N,(t) causes it to approach a stable equilibrium 
attractor N*. An unbounded excursion is thus not possible. 
------ 
time 
Domln for which 
positive equilibria 
N, do no1 exist 
e r ~ < 4 e , e ,  
Bo<O, 01<0 
Fig. 4: Conceivable time variations of N,(t) in the phase-plane 80 - 81. A11 
dyanamics subject to 80=0, 81 SO, e2<0 and for all initial conditions. lead 
to a stable attractor No; no unbounded excursion is possible. (The domain 
on the 80-81 plane bounded by 0 ~ ~ ~ 4 8 ~ 8 2  and 8 1 5 0  does not admit 
steady-state reaction operation.) 
Conc lud ing  Comment  
The analysis undertaken here suggests a basic matter-energy transformation 
characterization for reactors which provides an  "intrinsic" measure of safety against  
hazardous substance accumulation and an  "inherent" protection against unbounded 
power excursions. The practical realizability of such systems depends upon the choice 
of interacting species and the provision of kinetic conditions both of which need to be 
specified for selective "internal-recycling", Eq. (14), and for the specification of a 
dominant "negative-squared" term in the reactive dynamic. It is  evident t ha t  a n  
extensive combinatorics examination of the available species. Table I ,  needs to be 
undertaken a s  well a s  an  expanded perspective on the  range of particle kinetic 
phenomena. 
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Abstract 
One of the criticisms of the nuclear industry is that 
existing designs of reactors have evolved from systems designed 
originally for other, usually military, applications. The logic of 
this line of thinking then continues - if designers had stopped to 
consider the need of large scale electricity generating plant 
specifically, then other design solutions may have been preferred. 
We do not subscribe to this argument as a reason for abandoning 
existing plant, but it is useful to consider the essential safety 
principles which should be applied when considering new designs or 
developments of existing designs for the 'advanced plant' which 
ought to be considered for the next generation. These safety 
principles are discussed under the following generic headings: 
1. Reactivity control 
2. Heat removal from the core 
a. At power 
b. Decay heat removal 
3. Containment 
4. Materials properties 
How these principles apply in practice is considered by 
reference to both revolutionary and evolutionary advanced designs. 
Revolutionary designs claim that they utilize 'inherent' or 
'passive' safety features which make them benign and incapable of 
causing harm to people. Evolutionary designs follow a route of 
improvements from existing, well developed designs which 
incorporate many elements of 'inherent' or pass'ive safety but rely 
upon the basis of experience gathered in operating existing designs 
over several decades. Ve argue that no reactor design to date is 
truly inherently safe and that all must rely to a greater or lesser 
extent on engineered features. Application of the safety 
principles provides criteria against which to judge such designs. 
This leads to the conclusion that our current best judgement is 
that the evolutionary route provides the best way forward on both 
safety and economic grounds. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In releasing the energy of nuclear fission a reactor 
must be provided with a means of controlling the nuclear 
chain reaction. removing the heat generated and ensuring 
that potentially harmful radionuclides are kept safely 
within the fuel. Current trends have led to large 
reactors, with relatively high power densities whose safe 
operation is ensured by means of a range of 'engineered 
safety features' which act to control the system. These 
ESFs have to be very reliable; the basic hazard posed by 
such plant is the combination of a great deal of energy 
and a large amount of hazardous material in the same 
location. In addition to ESFs all large nuclear plant, in 
conmon with other industrial plant, relies to a greater or 
lesser extent on the correct operation of the plant by 
human beings. Last year has seen the catastrophic effects 
of a combination of poor design, inadequate ESFs and 
operator error and mal-practice in the accident at 
Chernobyl. One of the many consequences of this event has 
been to refocus attention on a range of alternative 
nuclear reactor designs which are claimed by their 
protagonists to exhibit 'inherent safety features". These 
are important issues. The public will require reassurance 
that reactors currently being operated are adequately 
safe. Pressure to change course and adopt alternative, 
perhaps radical designs, has already been seen in various 
media articles and a strong justification as to why we are 
not planning to adopt them is needed. Below, some of the 
features of nuclear reactors central to both safety and 
operability are explored in order to examine the 
possibility for increasing safety levels in advanced plant. 
2. REACTIVITY CONTROL 
Power reactors operate with an excess of reactivity to 
provide margins which allow a degree of load-following and 
to extend the core lifetime when refuelling is off-load. 
The reactivity excess is balanced by neutron absorbers 
which control the reactivity level and hence the power 
production. 
Control is made possible by the small contribution 
(typically < 0 . 6 2 )  made to overall reactivity by delayed 
neutrons. The majority of the reactivity thus comes from 
prompt neutrons whose lifetimes are the order of 1 ms or 
less and this makes their control through the use of 
absorber movement difficult to engineer. It is important, 
therefore, to ensure that the available reactivity margins 
are sufficient to ensure that the reactor does not become 
'prompt critical' and hence uncontrollable by engineered 
systems. Inherent natural processes such as Doppler 
broadening can limit the fuel temperature rise resulting 
from a prompt criticality transient and hence reduce the 
potential for prompt criticality transients to degrade the 
core and inhibit core cooling. A further consideration 
for breeder reactors is that their cores are designed to 
be in a configuration which does not maximise reactivity 
so that disruption of the core could increase reactivity. 
These points are discussed further below but the need 
for an element of inherent control of reactivity in any 
reactor design is an important and generally an overriding 
consideration. A reactor requires reactivity control 
which ensures stability under normal operation to reduce 
thermal fatigue effects on structures and natural passive 
processes which lead to a safe and controlled shutdown in 
response to any disruptive transient. These two 
requirements can be in competition since stability in 
reactivity for small transients can slow the reactivity 
response in the case of large and rapid transients. 
Indeed, a very stable behaviour may not be compatible with 
ease of start-up or shut-down. or with mload-following". 
The central feature of reactivity control by inherent 
means is that changes in core conditions produce differing 
effects on core components in terms of reactivity (and for 
thermal reactors, moderation). Such changes include 
temperature and pressure, core ageing and refuelling, and 
mechanical disruption of the core geometry. The diversity 
of possible effects means that reactivity control is most 
readily considered in terms of specific transients and 
this approach is taken here. 
2.1 Local core changes 
Accidents initiated locally within a core may not be 
terminated quickly because of an insensitivity of the 
global reactivity control to local reactivity transients. 
This insensitivity is less likely in small cores, but the 
individual discrete components in small cores may then 
have high reactivity worth. In this case single failure 
can affect global control. The implication is that small 
homogeneous cores may exhibit superior reactivity control 
characteristics for both "localm and global reactivity 
transients. 
2.2 Temperature changes 
The various core components have different reactivity 
significance and temperature coefficients and both these 
may change when the core is refuelled or as it proceeds to 
high burn-up. Similarly, the overall moderation 
characteristics depend upon the properties of the various 
core components. Safety and stability requirements for a 
safe reactor are that the reactivity should decrease in 
response to an increase in fuel temperature at both full 
power and in other states. Also. over-cooling of the core 
should not lead to reactivity rises which are not readily 
controllable and reactor start up and high burn-up power 
operation should be safe and readily controlled. These 
requirements have contradictory elements and almost 
certainly cannot be met by inherent features alone. 
Reactivity control over the full range of operational and 
fault conditions requires active engineered systems to 
compensate for, and where necessary to overcome, the 
natural inherent features which change reactivity. In a 
safe reactor the natural inherent features should be used 
to mitigate the risk important effects of transients 
without worsening either the effects of other transients 
or the overall operability. 
2.3 Core geometry changes 
The core of a safe reactor should be in the most 
reactive configuration when in normal operation. This 
would ensure that any configuration change would decrease 
reactivity both locally and globally. Such changes 
include slow and predictable effects due to refuelling or 
mechanical distortions and rapid effects due to sudden 
structural failure. This goal is achievable in thermal 
fission reactors provided that the negative reactivity 
influence of absorber/moderator/structural components is 
not lost as a result of geometry change. In the LKFBR 
designs currently being developed this goal is in general 
not possible to achieve; additional considerations, such 
as the core structural design and appropriate 
consideration of possible core disruption events, must be 
brought into play. 
3. HEAT REMOVAL FROM THE CORE 
A reactor core remains safe and stable if it remains 
in thermal equilibrium. The control of the heat removal 
rate is straightforward provided that the rate is 
relatively stable. For example, full load power 
production may typically be one thousand times greater 
than the long term decay heat power production but the 
change from one state to the other may be accomplished 
under controlled conditions which make feasible the use of 
diverse heat removal systems matched to the two states. 
Control may be less straightforward under certain 
operational and transient full power conditions and a 
range of feedback mechanisms influencing the core power 
exist. Negative feedback is provided by the Doppler 
temperature coefficient which decreases the neutron flux 
available for fission with increasing temperature. and 
thermal expansion which operates similarly by decreasing 
the density of fissionable atoms in the core. Also, for 
under moderated, thermal reactors, loss of moderator 
(which is also the coolant in LWRs) serves to reduce power 
too. These negative feedback mechanisms have to be seen 
to dominate over potential positive feedback mechanisms 
such as loss of coolant in over-moderated reactors (which 
we now know was the basic mechanism for the power 
excursion at Chernobyl) or mechanical means of increasing 
the core density, eg. displacement of fuel rods by 
mechanical means, in fast neutron reactors. As long as 
the overall power coefficient is negative. under all 
circumstances, then the fission reaction will be self 
limiting. This serves to show how reactivity and heat 
removal are closely related and should in general be 
considered together. 
For any level of reactivity, heat removal processes 
have a greater margin of safety, and natural convection is 
able to give a greater contribution to cooling, for cores 
with low power densities. In fact for many 'inherently 
safe" design concepts the requirement that decay heat 
removal should be achieved without forced convection is a 
major design constraint which leads to smaller reactors 
and de-rated cores with low power densities. Low core 
power densities are a valuable safety feature in two quite 
distinct ways as explained below. 
3.1 Extended accident timescales 
After tripping, either by engineered or inherent 
means, the heat output of a fission reactor falls 
initially to about 51 and eventually to below 0.11 of the 
full power output. During the early part of the transient 
natural heat transfer is usually insufficient for any 
practical power reactor geometry to cool the core and 
unacceptable core temperatures can only be avoided if the 
core is itself a sufficiently large heat sink. Whilst 
this is generally true, the detailed position may vary 
with reactor type. Thus, for the LHFBR, the actual core 
itself is small. with low thermal capacity (although the 
pool design provides a very high coolant thermal capacity) 
and after a trip, the core may temporarily be over-cooled 
by the main pump coast down. After this, many current 
LHFBR designs indicate adequate cooling from natural 
circulation, with the high thermal capacity coolant 
providing the means for extending the time during which 
mitigating action could be taken. Lower core power 
densities also favour this characteristic which may be 
enough to maintain the core in a safe condition until the 
decay heat output falls within the capability of the 
natural cooling available. A secondary benefit of 
extended accident timescales is that it provides an 
opportunity for operator action to intervene to aid 
recovery. Such action may be of limited relevance to an 
inherently safe reactor since there will be little scope 
for the repair or realignment of safety features which are 
governed by the basic structural design rather than 
engineered active systems consisting of many individual 
components. 
3.2 Natural cooling 
A safe reactor should have a capability to remove 
decay heat by natural rather than forced cooling. This is 
practical in many cases as core power densities are not 
too high relative to the coolant heat removal capability. 
The major design options are whether the passive decay 
heat removal is always operating as opposed to being 
positively 'switched on", and whether elements of diverse 
decay heat removal paths should be provided using, for 
example. steam generators and air heat exchangers. 
The reliance upon natural circulation flows as a major 
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natural heat transfer mechanism is not necessarily without 
some difficulties. In complicated geometries multiple 
flow paths may be possible and some of these may have 
insufficient cooling capability. Also. cavitation boiling 
and stagnation may occur and adversely affect core cooling 
both locally and overall. Finally, a passive convective 
flow may be difficult or impossible to enhance or divert 
without engineered systems. All these considerations 
suggest that given the difficulty in predicting 
circulatory flows in complicated geometries with a wide 
range of possible core conditions, the safety 
demonstration for decay heat removal must be based on a 
wide range of tests and a good knowledge of possible fault 
conditions (including structural failures) and scaling 
effects. 
Natural circulation flows are more stable and 
effective if large height differences exist between hot 
and cold zones. This may suggest that decay heat removal 
through steam generators is less attractive than through 
external heat exchangers mounted high on or in the reactor 
building. However, decay heat removal without natural 
circulation may also be possible if heat removal paths are 
short and thermal conductivities are high. Convective 
transfer must ultimately play some part, either in core 
cooling or further down the heat transfer chain in the 
interface with the ultimate heat sink. It cannot be 
ignored as it provides a means for overheating structures 
which the heat is transferred to. This is an additional 
safety consideration. 
4. CONTAINMENT 
The containment system can rely principally on 
engineered features as is the case with most contained 
power reactors operating today. Natural features are used 
to complement the engineered features of the containment 
system, and to a greater extent as in the case of floating 
or underground design concepts. In this sense containment 
is directly related to siting although the origin of the 
need for containment also lies in the appreciation of the 
risk potential of an uncontained LWR in a non-remote site. 
An outer containment building enclosing the whole 
primary circuit serves two safety functions. Firstly, it 
provides a final barrier to the release of fission 
products if the inner barriers fail and can be designed to 
remain effective even under energetic accidents. The 
second function is to provide protection to the primary 
circuit against the effects of some external hazards. 
However, even in an advanced design concept. containment 
is seldom a purely passive system since it must be able to 
transfer the heat from the primary circuit to some 
external heat sink and may additionally feature other 
safety items such as mechanical pressure relief, pressure 
suppression, isolation and electrical combustible gas 
igniter systems. Thus, the containment system tends to be 
an active engineered system which includes a passive 
structure as an obvious component. 
A containment system is passive only for the limited 
case where natural heat transfer processes are sufficient 
to cool the interior without significant degradation of 
the containment function. In practice this requires large 
containment buildings with the wall and surface areas 
maximised and perhaps with external and internal 
convection processes enhanced by the provision of specific 
structures. The ability of such a structure and the 
-allied convective heat transfer mechanisms to cool liquid 
poola with low vapour pressures, such as might arise from 
a molten core, may not be adequate and in these conditions 
radiative heat transfer may be important. 
The assessed risk of a nuclear reactor depends upon 
the distribution of population around the site and remote 
siting is a well-established way of minimising risk. 
Remote siting is also an inherent feature in that 
population growth around the site can be inhibited and in 
emergencies the population can be temporarily relocated by 
accident management interdiction. The main benefit of 
remote siting is in reducing the assessed probability of 
severe reactor accidents causing early deaths in the off- 
site population. Remote siting cannot effect the risk to 
the operators and may have little benefit for off-site 
delayed health effects or economic consequences of severe 
accidents. 
5. HATERIALS PROPERTIES 
Safe reactors should not be vulnerable to chemical 
degradation in structures and components important to 
safety such as in the primary circuit. Therefore, the 
choice of materials is restricted to avoid the 
chemical/metallurgical incompatibilities which could lead, 
at one extreme, to corrosive weakening of structures and, 
at the other extreme, energetic runaway chemical 
reactions. Some examples of incompatibilities are well 
known (eg. embrittlement of stainless steel by trace 
quantities of chlorine, voidage swelling of stainless 
steel in fast neutron fluxes, bearing seizure in pure 
helium or sodium environments and zirconium-steam 
exothermic oxidation) but materials incompatibility is a 
complicated phenomenon requiring detailed examination of 
specific designs and such incompatibilities may not 
express themselves early in the plant lifetime and could 
be dependent on the method of fabrication as well as the 
operational or faulted environment. The actual safety 
implications for specific materials problems will depend 
upon the timescale involved. Thus, a gradual degradation 
may render a design economically non-viable but may not 
pose a severe safety problem. Rapid interactions pose 
immediate safety problems requiring different safety 
considerations. 
In these respects materials compatibilities cannot be 
established without long term experiments in prototypical 
environments which model both the gross physio-chemical 
conditions and the trace elements which may be present in 
low or time dependent concentrations. It is perhaps in 
this way that the questions of safety and operability or 
cost are most closely coupled since the desire to avoid 
some of the more obvious chemical incompatibilities and 
hence potential for fires or explosions may lead to long 
term degradation of structural competence and hence to an 
increased potential for ageing related mechanisms to cause 
structural failures. Operability or cost may be 
influenced directly through increased capital cost, 
shortened plant lifetime and restrictions on the manner of 
operation to avoid corrosion or fatigue effects. 
6. RAMIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR DESIGN 
Even with the very brief description above of the 
requirements of all reactors for adequate reactivity 
control and shutdown provision and heat removal under 
operation and post shutdown conditions it would appear 
obvious that current designs have evolved through reliance 
upon engineered systems. Because of the basic heat 
transfer requirements to get rid of heat from the core, 
usually a large core can only be contemplated if existing 
natural processes are helped by engineered systems. 
Similarly, control and feedback require sophisticated 
instrumentation and detection systems to guarantee stable 
operation. The only means by which such reliance can be 
reduced is by making the reactor smaller. This means 
physically smaller, although a combination of small size 
and lower power density are sometimes proposed. It is for 
-
this reason that economics becomes such an important issue 
for these designs as 'economies of scale' are possibly 
lost and the cost per kW-hr could be much higher than with 
existing plant. Consequently much of the debate 
concerning such designs centres upon economic 
considerations. Since a lot of the basic data for the 
necessary calculations cannot be available until after 
prototype development, this ensures that unquantifiable, 
subjective interpretations can fuel these debates for some 
considerable time. Additionally, smaller reactors (andlor 
reduced rating) means more individual units for a given 
output with the possibility of an adverse effect on the 
overall risk. 
A further ramification of the implementation of the 
concept of inherent safety on design is that it must be 
simple. Simplicity is fundamental to the 'passive' or 
natural processes called upon to provide the essential 
functions in such reactors. If no reliance needs to be 
placed on ESFs then. of course, certain advantages are 
immediately apparent viz:- 
i If there is no equipment for operators to use, the 
chance of them doing it incorrectly is removed. 
ii If there is no equipment to maintain, the chance of 
common mode failure due to maintenance error is removed. 
iii If there is no equipment exposed, it cannot be 
sabotaged. 
iv If staff do not need to access plant, occupational 
dose levels can be reduced. 
v If there is no equipment which depends upon high 
reliability on site electricity - problems with eg. diesel 
generators are eliminated. 
vi If safety systems are really simple. there is the 
possibility of de-institutionalising regulation. 
These are some of the benefits which could be claimed 
if reliance upon ESFs could be totally removed. No such 
situation has been achieved to date - although 
simplification in many areas of reactor operation may be 
achieved in the future. A compromise of having some 
engineered features may negate the philosophical argument 
but represents perhaps a more balanced approach, ie. if 
ESFs can be provided, why not do it? 
7. EVOLUTION TO THE NEXT GENERATION 
The need to control reactor neutronics and 
temperatures in a safe, reliable and economic manner 
constrains design options in many ways. Existing 
mainstream designs of commercial reactors offer examples 
of how a successful design solution can be achieved. They 
also indicate how different degrees of implementation of 
the two basic safety elements - engineered safety and 
inherent safety - have been achieved. Other. perhaps more 
radical, designs have been proposed and occasionally 
developed to a small scale prototype stage and these also 
offer some insight into how the balance between safety, 
reliability and cost is difficult to maintain and even 
more difficult to demonstrate. 
Any examination of existing or proposed reactor 
designs soon reveals that comparisons must be done on a 
whole plant basis and that every aspect of plant design is 
ultimately related to every other aspect. It is therefore 
misleading to base a comparison on only one or a few 
conditions. Moreover, whilst safety aspects can be 
compared at one stage of design development. reliability 
and economic aspects can only emerge properly with 
operating experience. 
Continual improvements in plant design, for both 
safety and efficiency. have been effected since the 
earliest commercially usable electricity generating plant 
went into service in the 1950s. There have. however, been 
several milestones which precipitated particular effects 
in adapting and evolving existing plant. Most obvious, in 
the West, was the accident at Three Mile Island which had, 
and is still having, a profound effect upon the provision 
of safety equipment. personnel training and operational 
procedures, particularly in the USA. A similar, though 
perhaps less intense response occurred in the UK following 
the Windscale fire in 1957. Presently, however. we do not 
expect such dramatic 'quantum leaps' in safety thinking 
partly because of the confidence we have that a really 
serious accident has been made much less likely by the 
lessons learned from these earlier events but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, because of the much more 
detailed monitoring of potential initiating events which 
allows a continuous appraisal of a range of safety 
Bystems. Thus, for example, the failure of the under 
voltage relays in the Reactor Protection Systems at the 
Salem plant in the USA was connnunicated to operating 
utilities worldwide to affect any necessary procedural 
thanges . 
It is now approaching a decade since TMI and enormous 
amounts of effort have been expended in re-appraising the 
safety of existing reactors. This applies particularly to 
LWRs but a proportion is of relevance to gas cooled 
reactors and to the developing LMFBR systems. 
Consequently a great number of improvements or changes to 
enhance operability have been identified and indeed for 
many reactors in the USA, engineered systems have been 
retro-fitted to them. However, there are good prospects 
for continued evolutionary development, some of which are 
presented for illustration below. 
In the UK the PWR design has been re-vamped for the UK 
licensing requirements and many aspects of its design 
would merit an 'inherent safety label'. Others seem to be 
just good common sense (or engineering judgement) which 
should be expected in any new design. In the USA 
Westinghouse Corporation have collaborated with Japan to 
produce an advanced PWR and the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) have come up with a similar approach but 
in this case, for a boiling water reactor. Some of the 
improvements which can be considerd now are, for example: 
i Elimination of low points in pipework (no sumps 
present to inhibit refluxing (natural circulation)). 
ii An increase in water inventories to ensure that the 
core is always covered. 
iii Re-design of main circulation pumps to remove active 
seals (hermetically sealed pumps). This to remove the 
dependence upon essential service water supplies for pump 
seals - a cause of omall loss of coolant accidents in PWRs. 
iv Replacement of borated water by 'grey' control rods. 
v Diversity in pumping power - steam driven pumps (this 
feature is included in the Sizewell B design and has been 
implemented by the French on their PWRs). 
Many such changes can be envisaged, each of which 
offers a distinct improvement for a specific system. More 
general trends can be discerned too. 'Containment" has 
been identified as being crucial to arguments for 
insulating the environment from potential severe 
accidents. In this case this is not accident prevention 
in the sense that containment per se cannot influence 
whether a serious core melt accident may happen or not. 
but its function as a barrier between whatever may ensue 
from such an accident and the environment is becoming much 
more appreciated. One of the principal outcomes of the 
research on fission product source terms is the 
realisation of the potential effectiveness of containment, 
even in conditions well beyond its design basis. In this 
context, 'containment' is used in the LWR sense, ie. as a 
large concrete (or steel) vessel which surrounds the NSSS. 
Nevertheless the general principles also apply to reactors 
with different realisations of the containment concept. 
The first improvement which may be envisaged along the 
evolutionary route is simply to understand better the 
capabilities of containments which have been provided for 
existing plant, especially in their response to beyond 
design basis accidents and the potential for inadvertent 
leakages (through left open valves. etc.). Once this has 
been done, and there is little doubt that 'containment' 
has been the poor relation so far as severe accident 
research has been concerned, the potential for accident 
management and the possibilities for release mitigation 
can be investigated. In the future lie several 'advanced' 
containment concepts which offer greater reliability in 
severe accident conditions. (Note that this implies a 
divergence of accepted practice in the definition of the 
design basis). Several of the more developed ideas are: 
i Provision of enhanced passive heat sinks (eg. Ice 
condenser - implemented on some PWRs - or the pressure 
suppression pool - implemented on BWRs and the RBMK at 
Chernobyl. 
ii Severe accident management - controlled containment 
venting - with or without filters, chill venting etc. 
iii Underground siting - several feasibility studies have 
been made, particularly in Europe. 
Other possibilities include the adoption of lower 
power densities, lower fuel ratings and more sophisticated 
fuel management procedures. 
For fast neutron reactors various other options are 
available. These include advanced fuels such as carbide 
or nitride which offer some of the advantages (without the 
particular problem of low melting point eutectic formation 
of the metal fuel being supported in the US for various 
Integral Fast Reactor ( I n )  concepts). Also, more use of 
natural circulation as a bonus for using sodium as a 
coolant and 'fail safe' shutdown systems may offer 
benefits which could be exploited even further. 
More generally, the dramatic advances in micro- 
processors, information technology and control systems 
offer good prospects for very much improved 
instrumentation, control and man-machine interactions 
although this may lead mainly to the transfer of 'human 
factors" efforts from hardware to software. Successful 
development of this field, when coupled with our 
heightened awareness to and improvements in operability, 
training, operator psychology etc.. offer real advances in 
efficiency and safety. Developments in other fields of 
technical endeavour will also assist - particularly in 
materials. component reliability, inspection and 
maintainability of plant. These are, however, still 
evolving at present and could. as many of the other 
possibilities mentioned above. apply equally to the 
radical designs too. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In sunrmary, there are excellent prospects for 
improvements in certain areas which could be incorporated 
in an evolutionary approach to future reactor design. One 
of the principle problems appears to be that current 
designs are safe enough now and that these improvements 
will provide at least as good a level of safety as the 
alternatives, at the time when the latter might be brought 
into service. The evolutionary approach offers a contrast 
in concept to revolutionary changes in reactor design. 
The basis of such revolutionary designs include the 
following factors: 
i Lower power density and fuel rating 
ii Reliance upon natural processes 
iii Simplicity 
iv Passive systems 
v Less reliance on operator actions 
There is. of course, room for debate as to how 
'revolutionary' several of the currently supported design 
concepts are. Indeed, the principal selling points of 
some, the High Temperature (gas cooled) Reactors (HTRs) in 
particular, are that they are not revolutionary at all and 
only call upon well proven materials, components and other 
design solutions. The HTRs in particular can claim a 
lineage back through to the early UK Magnox gas cooled 
reactors. Similarly. the IFR utilizes well developed 
engineering in the use of sodium as a coolant; even the 
use of metal fuel in the current realization of that 
design is hardly revolutionary as it covers the first type 
of fuel to be used in early breeder programmes in the UK, 
US and France. In contrast to HTR and IFR, only the PIUS 
system from Sweden meets a stringent definition of 
'revolutionary' in that the means for providing shutdown, 
the use of natural circulation in a large volume of water 
and the overall design are quite different from any other 
reactor. Even here, however, it is envisaged that the 
fuel would be in the same form as that used in current 
LWRs . 
It is important to distinguish between some 
'inherently safe" systems on offer which call upon a 
strong development history from related, currently 
utilised reactors, and those which represent significant 
departures. In many ways both the IFR and HTR (in its 
several forms) should properly be seen as evolutionary 
divergences from current design materials practices. 
Therefore, it is only a matter of degree as to how much 
improvement in safety is really on offer and this must be 
'balanced against the need for further engineering 
development. even for systems claiming such a long 
inheritance, before they could be deployed in commercial 
electricity generation. 
The PIUS system is different again. Notwithstanding 
the claims of its protagonists, the design cannot be 
underwritten until the prototype has been built and shown 
to live up to all its expectations and a full and 
extensive safety analysis performed to show that the 
benefits claimed extend to all possible accident 
initiators. 
There is no black and white division between current 
reactors and how they may be developed and possible 
alternatives which purport to offer advantages in terms of 
safety. For current plant designs work is being done to 
increase the safety margins available. Whilst some 'new' 
systems may offer some advantages over existing systems 
and be rooted in the knowledge base already accumulated, 
it is difficult to justify the radical changes in 
direction required in order to implement them for a return 
which may be an increased safety margin over one which is 
already adequate and can be improved. Further. if these 
radical designs are more expensive to construct and 
operate than current plant, further inhibition to the 
development of nuclear power may be introduced, perhaps 
inadvertently by attempting to follow unattainable goals 
in absolute safety. 
All the above represents a logical appraisal of these 
new systems, of course from a point of view within the 
nuclear industry. The political appreciation of the same 
issue may be rather different. For example, the prospect 
of benign or passive reactors is very appealing. When 
this is coupled with the real, or imagined difficulties 
with existing reactor and their potential for harm, it is 
easy to see why such arguments become very appealing. 
Anti-nuclear groups are even beginning to take up a stance 
that if we have to have nuclear parer then why not utilise 
these alternatives which are available now and are so much 
better than what we have? This, of course is a 'the grass 
is always greenerm interpretation of reality or perhaps 
less kindly, a deliberate attempt to divert resources and 
attention to what is known to be unattainable - absolute 
safety. 
Overall, it would eeem that there is no technical 
basis for a complete diversion of effort into any of the 
new designs on offer. Attention to detail and the 
implementation of hard won knowledge for existing reactors 
appears the most secure route for the next few decades for 
electricity generation. However, the industry should not 
turn its back on new ideas and concepts as they come along 
because there is always the need to learn from whatever 
source. In many countries we concentrate upon the need to 
supply a single grid with essentially base load nuclear 
power stations and low efficiency, small units are of 
little interest. However. in many parts of the world such 
units could be exceptionally valuable in remote regions. 
in cold (or hot) regions. for desalination and for a range 
of industrial uses. If designs like PIUS can be shown to 
be so benign that true urban siting is possible then the 
demand for such a system would be very strong. Several 
countries have already developed designs for such 
applications. The Canadians have 'SLOPOKED, a small (10- 
100 MW) unit designed for unattended operation in the 
Canadian Arctic. The Russians claim to have a unit for 
space heating ready for test during 1987. The 
Argentinians claim such a unit for remote siting. Such 
radical reactor designs may not fit the bill for every 
country's needs at present but it is possible that the 
rest of the world will find uses for them. 
4.6.  APPLICATION OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TO THE BUBBLING 
DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WITH 
THE WER-440 REACTOR 
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A b s t r a c t  
S a f e t y  s y s t e m s ,  h a v i n g  t h e  t a s k  t o  l i m i t  and l o c a l i z e  
t h e  consequences  o f  d e s i g n  a c c i d e n t s ,  c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  t o  t h e  erlhancement o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  of  n u c l e a r  
power f a c i l i t i e s .  By means o f  such  s y s t e m s ,  t h e  s o v i e t  
p r e s s u r i z e d  213- type  WER-440 r e a c t o r s ,  i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  
Czechos lovak  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t s ,  a r e  s e c u r e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
d e s i g n  b a s i s  a c c i d e n t ,  which  i s  t h e  l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t  a c c i d e n t  
w i t h  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  o f  t h e  c o l d  l e g  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  c i r c u i t  
main c i r c u l a t i o n  p i p e  w i  t!i t h e  two-sided o u t f l o w  of  c o o l a n t .  
The bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  sys t em,  y e r l o r m i n g  t i le  f u n c t i o n  
o f  c o n t a i n m e n t ,  i s  one  o f  t h e  n o s t  i m p o r t a n t  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  
which t a k e  p a r t  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h i s  a c c i d e n t .  
The b u b b l i n g  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  s y s t c n  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  
s u p p r e s s  t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a s  of  
t h e  pr imary  c i r c u i t  a f t e r  t h e  a c c i d e n t  unde r  t h e  ambient  
p r e s s u r e  and ,  by t h i s  way, t o  p r o h i b i t  t h e  e s c a p e  o f  r a d i o -  
a c t i v e  s u b s t a n c e s  f rom t h e  n u c l e a r  power p l a n t .  The under-  
- p r e s s u r e  i s  ob ta i r i ed  t l i rough c o n d e n s a t i o n  o f  s t e a m  component 
o f  t h e  s t e a m / a i r  m i x t u r e  e s c a p i n g  from t h e  p r i m a r y  c i r c u i t  
and by s u b s e q u e n t  h o l d i n g  o f  t h e  m i x t u r e  i n  t i le  ho ld i r lg  
t a n k s .  Condensa t ion  o c c u r s  d u r i n g  t h e  b u b b l i n g  o f  t h e  m i x t u r e  
t h r o u g h  w a t e r  l a y e r s  i n  t h e  bubb l ing  tower and t h e  p r e s s u r e  
i s  f u r t h e r  d e c r e a s e d  by s p r a y i n g  by means o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e d  
s p r a y  sys t em arid, a f t e r  t h e  bubb l ing  j ~ r o c e s s ,  by s p r a y i n g  
w i t h  t h e  w a t e r  f rom t h e  b u b b l i n g  d e l ) r e s s u r i z n  t i o n  u n i t .  
The f a u l t  t r e e  metliod, which h a s  been s u c c e s s f u l l y  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  a n a l y s e s  of  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  s a f e t y  s y s t e m s  
(LPIS,  HrlIS, a  p a s s i v e  s y s t e m  o f  i l y d r a u l i c  t a n k s ,  a s p r a y  
sys tem,  a  s t eam g e n e r a t o r  emergency feedwate r  sys tem) ,  has  
been employed i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  p o s s i b l e  f a i l u r e s  of  t h e  
sys tem and i L s  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  a n a l y s i s .  The main t a s k  of t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  was t o  perform q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  and t o  f i n d  
p o s s i b l e  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e v e n t s  : ( i )  t h e  under- 
- p r e s s u r e  i s  n o t  o b t a i n e d  and,  ( i i )  fo rmat ion  o f  t h e  under- 
- p r e s s u r e  is  delayed.  On t h e  b a s i s  of such  a n a l y s i s  and t h e  
assembled f a u l t  t r e e ,  weak p o i n t s  of  t h e  sys tem can be found 
and economical  measures i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  overwhole r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  sys tem can be proposed. 
I n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i t s e l f ,  t h e  importance  go c o n f r o n t  
t h e  d e s i g n  documentat ion w i t h  t h e  r e a l  f a c i l i t i e s  and a l s o  
t o  e v a l u a t e  p r o p e r l y  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and redundancy o f  t h e  
sys tem on t h e  b a s i s  of  t h e  the rmal -hydrau l i c  a n a l y s e s  was 
r e v e a l e d .  Human e r r o r s  d u r i n g  ou tage  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  power 
p l a n t  have t u r n e d  o u t  t o  be t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  p o s s i b l e  
c a u s e s  of  f a i l u r e s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  a n a l y s i s  d u r i n g  e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  human e r r o r s  by means of  e n g i n e e r i n g  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
measures confirmed h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  components 
o f  t h e  sys tem i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  low r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  a u x i l i a r y  sys tems  ( v e n t i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s ) .  
The a n a l y s i s  h a s  s u g g e s t e d ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  employ t h e  f a u l t  t r e e  method a l s o  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  a  n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l  system. The r e s u l t s  have proved t o  be 
u s e f u l  and became a  s t i m u l u s  f o r  a  p roposa l  o f  p o s s i b l e  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  an  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  sys tem r e l i a b i l i t y .  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Design,  manufacture ,  implementa t ion and o p e r a t i o n  of 
n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  Czechoslovakia  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  
accordance w i t h  t h e  d e c r e e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Czecho- 
s lovak  Atomic Energy Commission (CSKAE), which by law performs 
t h e  r o l e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  body i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  n u c l e a r  s a f e t y  
o f  Czechoslovak n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t i e s .  S a f e t y  documentat ion i s  
prepared i n  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  s t a g e s :  
a )  An o r d e r i n g  s a f e t y  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n i n g  main ly  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  
a n a l y s i s  o f  environmental  e f f e c t s  of  t h e  n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t y ,  
r equ i rements  on t h e  f a c i l i t y  from the  p o i n t  o f  view of  
n u c l e a r  s a f e t y ,  and s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  programmes o f  q u a l i t y  
a s s u r a n c e  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  is  a  p a r t  o f  the  d e s i g n  t a s k  
and a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  d e c i s i o n  
r e g n r d i n g  t h e  s i t i n g  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y .  
b )  Before t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  commenced and d u r i n g  r e l e a s e  
o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a p p r o v a l ,  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  s a f e t y  r e p o r t ,  
c o n t a i n i n g  a n a l y t i c a l  and exper imenta l  p r o o f s  o f  meet ing 
t h e  demands o f  n u c l e a r  s a f e t y ,  programmes o f  q u a l i t y  
a s s u r a n c e  d u r i n g  manufacture  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  
n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t y ,  and programmes of  i n s p e c t i o n s  i s  be ing  
p resen ted  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  d e s i g n  documentation.  
c )  A f t e r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i s  f i n i s h e d ,  a  p r e - o p e r a t i o n a l  
s a f e t y  r e p o r t  /4/, c o n t a i n i n g  c o n c r e t e  d a t e  r e g a r d i n g  
meet ing t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  n u c l e a r  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  f a c i l i t y  
and c o n d i t i o n s  and requ i rements  of  i ts  f u r t h e r  s a f e  
o p e r a t i o n  is  be ing  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  procedure  
b e f o r e  r e a c t o r  loading.  The p r e - o p e r a t i o n a l  s a f e t y  r e p o r t  
is t h e  h i g h e s t  s t a g e  of  t h e  s a f e t y  documentation.  One of 
t h e  i m p o r t a n t  c h a p t e r s  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  i s  t h e  c h a p t e r  
"Safe ty  Analyses". E l a b o r a t i o n  of  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s e s  i s  
based on t h e  " ~ c t  on Government S u p e r v i s i o n  of  Nuclear  
S a f e t y  o f  Nuclear  F a c i l i t i e s "  /I/, decrees ,  r e g u l a t i o n s  
and d i r e c t i o n s  of  t h e  CSKAE. Those, who e l a b o r a t e  t h e  
s a f e t y  documentat ion,  propose ,  accord ing  t o  t h e  approved 
s a f e t y  ph i losophy ,  t h e  scope o f  t h e  e v e n t  a n a l y s e d ,  
d e f i n e  t h e  s a f e t y  c r i t e r i a ,  computitig assumpt ions ,  
i n p u t  d a t a ,  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  a n a l y s e s  and e v a l u a t e  t h e  
even t s .  S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  of  computer programmes i s  
g r a d u a l l y  c a r r i e d  ou t .  I n  t h e  Nuclear Research I n s t i t u t e  
( N R I )  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  q u a l i t y  and c o n p l e t n e s s  of  t h e  s a f e t y  
a n a l y s e s  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b e f o r e  t h e i r  approva l  by t h e  
CSPAE, which then  r e l e a s e s  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  l i c e n s e .  
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT ANALYSES OF ACCIDENTS 
From t h e  p o i n t  o f  view o f  p o s s i b l e  f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  
n u c l e a r  power p l a n t  (NPP), t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c i d e n t s  a r e  
ana lysed  i n  t h e  s a f e t y  r e p o r t s :  
1) R e a c t i v i t y  i n i t i a t e d  a c c i d e n t s  ( R I A )  
Analyses  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e s e  a c c i d e n t s  both  
d u r i n g  t h e  s t a r t u p  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  and d u r i n g  normal o p e r a t i o n  
a r e  c a r r i e d  ou t .  Choice o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a b l e  t o  i n i t i a t e  
t h e  changes  of  r e a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f i v e  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s :  
- Uncot ro l l ed  wi thdrawal  o f  g roups  of  c o n t r o l  e lement  
a s s e m b l i e s  
- E j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  e lement  assembly 
- I n f l o w  o f  c o l d  wa te r  i n t o  t h e  r e a c t o r  
- Spontaneous  d e c r e a s e  o f  H3B03 c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
- Release  o f  boron d e p o s i t i o n s  from t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  p a r t s  
of  t h e  core .  
2 )  A c c i d e n t s  w i t h  l o s s  o f  t i g h t n e s s  of t h e  pr imary 
c i r c u i t  
C o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o r e ,  f u e l  e lement  a s s e m b l i e s ,  
h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a s ,  t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t  and a l s o  
t h e  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  NPP a r e  ana lysed  w i t h  t h e  aim t o  de te rmine  
t h e  thermal  h y d r a u l i c  c o n d i t i o n s  and e f f e c t s  on t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
p a r t s ,  and a l s o  p r o p a g a t i o n  of r a d i o a c t i v i t y .  The a n a l y s i s  
i s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o u r  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s :  
- Large l o s s  of c o o l a n t  d u r i n g  t h e  d e s i g n  b a s i s  a c c i d e ~ i t  (LBA) 
- Non-compensatible l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t  
- Compensatible l o s s  of c o o l a n t  
- Loss of c o o l a n t  a f t e r  a  r u p t u r e  of the  steam g e n e r a t o r  tube.  
A t  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  ph i losophy  of  s a f e t y  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  
a c c i d e n t s  beyond d e s i g n  b a s i s  i s  being developed.  
3 )  Acciden t s  f o l l o w i n g  a  l o s s  o f  t i g h t n e s s  o f  t h e  
secondary  c i r c u i t  
The a n a l y s e s  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  on t h e  assumpt ion of  
c o r r e c t  o r  i n c o r r e c t  f u n c t i o n  o f  the  c o n t r o l  and s a f e t y  
sys tems  and a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  
e v e n t s  : 
- Rupture o f  t h e  main s t eam c o l l e c t o r  
- Rupture of t h e  main s t eam p i p i n g  
- Rupture of  t h e  feedwate r  c o l l e c t o r .  
4 )  Acciden t s  f o l l o w i n g  a n  i n c o r r e c t  f u n c t i o n  of  
components 
Heat  t r a n s f e r  between t h e  primary and secondary c i r c u i t s  
can be i n a d e q u a t e  owing t o  t h e  i n c o r r e c t  f u n c t i o n  o f  components. 
S e v e r a l  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s  e r e  be ing  cons ide red  , a s ,  f o r  
example: 
- Fuel  e lement  assembly b lockage  
- S e i z u r e  of  t h e  r o t o r  o f  t h e  main c i r c u l a t i o n  pump 
- Loss  of  e l e c t r i c  power s u p p l y  o f  some o r  a l l  main c i r c u l a t i o n  
PUPS 
- F a i l u r e  o f  t u r b o - g e n e r a t o r s ,  f eedwate r  r e g e n e r a t o r s  and 
l o s s  o f  f eedwate r  supply .  
5) A c c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m s  o f  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s  
In  t h e  sys tems of r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s ,  a c c i d e n t s  d u r i n g  
f u e l  hand l ing ,  r e a c t i v i t y  change caused by a n  i n c o r r e c t  f u e l  
l o a d i n g ,  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  c o o l i n g  of f u e l  e lement  a s s e m b l i e s  
and t h e i r  mechanical  damage can occur .  I n  t h e  sys tems of 
r a d i o a c t i v e  was te ,  a c c i d e n t s  d u r i n g  management of  gaseous ,  
l i q u i d  and s o l i d  waste  a r e  p o s s i b l e .  
6 )  Acciden t s  i n i t i a t e d  by e x t e r n a l  e v e n t s  
~ m ~ l i c a t i o n s '  o f  an  impact  of e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  
f l y i n g  o b j e c t s ,  e f f e c t  of f i r e s ,  e x t e r n a l  p r e s s u r e  wave, 
f l o o d s  and e a r t h q u a k e s  a r e  analysed.  
These a n a l y s e s  a r e  t o  conf i rm t h a t  the  equipment o f  
t h e  N I T  and i t s  c o n t r o l  and s a f e t y  sys tems meet t h e  des ign  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and s t a n d a r d s  and t h a t  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n  and 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  e n s u r e  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of  o t  l e a s t  one of t h e  
p r o t e c t i v e  b a r r i e r s  ( f u e l  e lement  c l add ing ,  pr imary c i r c u i t ,  
con ta inment )  i s  main ta ined  i n  a  c a s e  of f a i l u r e .  The a n a l y s e s  
a l s o  v e r i f y  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  " L i m i t s  & Condi t ions"  ( t e c h n i c a l  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s )  d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  NPP equipment and 
o f  a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  personnel .  
From t h e  p o i n t  o f  view of  s a f e t y  ana lyses ,  t h e  des ign  
b a s i s  a c c i d e n t  f o l l o w i n g  a  r u p t u r e  of  t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t  
main c i r c u l a t i o n  p i p i n g  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  l a r g e s t  ( a s  t o  t h e  
phenomena i n v o l v e d )  and, a t  t h e  same time, t h e  most h e t e r o -  
geneous event .  Here ,  keep ing  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  a d m i s s i b l e  r a d i a t i o n  
dose  of  p u b l i c n e a r  t h e  s i t e  of  t h e  NPP i s  t h e  main s a f e t y  
c r i t e r i o n .  
3. SAFETY SYSTEMS OF A NPP WITH VVER-440 REACTOR OF TYPE V-213 
The l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t  a c c i d e n t  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  r u p t u r e  of  
t h e  main c i r c u l a t i o n  p i p i n g  ( d i a m e t e r  of  500 mm) w i t h  a  
double-s ided o u t f l o w  o f  c o o l a n t  is  cons ide red  t o  be t h e  most 
s e v e r e  p o s s i b l e  a c c i d e n t  f o r  t h e  213-type VVER-440 r e a c t o r  
/2,3/. I n  o r d e r  t o  l o c a l i z e  such  an a c c i d e n t ,  which i s  c o n s i d e r -  
ed t o  be t h e  d e s i g n  b a s i s  a c c i d e n t ,  tlie NPP is equipped w i t h  
a  number of s a f e t y  systems.  The emergency c o r e  c o o l i n g  sys tem 
(ECCS), d e s t i n e d  t o  f l o o d  immedia te ly  t h e  c o r e  and t o  remove 
t h e  h e a t  from t h e  c o r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  p reven t  i ts  m e l t i n g  i s  t h e  
most  i m p o r t a n t  s a f e t y  system. To t h i s  system, a  n e x t  s a f e t y  
system, t h e  s p r a y  sys tem (SS) ,  e n s u r i n g  p r e s s u r e  s u p p r e s s i o n  
a f t e r  a c c i d e n t  and washing o u t  t h e  r e l e a s e d  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  
from t h e  environment  o f  h e r m e t i c a l l y  sea led  a r e a s  of  t h e  
power p l a n t ,  i s  p a r t i a l l y  connected.  The s p r a y  sys tem 
co-opera tes  d u r i n g  i t s  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  Sov ie t -des igned  
bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  conta inment  (bubb l ing  system,BS),  
which e n s u r e s  p r e s s u r e  s u p p r e s s i o n  and r e d u c t i o n  o f  t empera tu re  
i n  t h e  h e r n e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a .  T h i s  large-volume sys tem i s  
a n  a b s o l u t e l y  p a s s i v e  sys tem w i t h  no need of  power s u p p l y  
and s e r v e s  a s  a  con ta inment  o f  t h e  NPP. A diagram o f  t h e s e  
sys tems  is  i n  F ig .  1. 
3.1. Emergency c o r e  c o o l i n g  sys tem 
According t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n  de te rmina t ion  and t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
of a c t i o n ,  t h e  emergency c o r e  c o o l i n g  system (ECCS) i s  d i v i d e d  
i n t o :  
- p a s s i v e  sys tem (PSI 
- a c t i v e  low-pressure  i n j e c t i o n  sys tem (LPIS) 
- a c t i v e  h i g h - p r e s s u r e  i n j e c t i o n  sys tem (HPIS). 
3.1.1. P a s s i v e  sys tem 
The p a s s i v e  sys tem (100 p e r  c e n t  redundancy) c o n s i s t s  of 
3  3  two accumula to r s  (volume of 7 0  m ) with  40-50 q o f  H3B03 
s o l u t i o n  w i t h  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  12 g / l  and t e m p e r a t u r e  h i g h e r  
3  t h a n  55 OC. Above t h e  s o l u t i o n  l e v e l ,  t h e r e  a r e  20-30 q o f  
n i t r o g e n  w i t h  p r e s s u r e  o f  6 m a .  
The a c c u m u l a t o r s  a r e  i n t e r c o ~ e ~ t e d  w i t h  t h e  r e a c t o r  by 
means of  c o n d u i t s  w i t h  t h e  r a t e d  I .D.  of 250 m; one c o n d u i t  
( f rom one of  t h e  a c c u m u l a t o r s )  l e a d s  above t h e  c o r e ,  t h e  
o t h e r  l e a d s  under  t h e  core .  The sys tem o p e r a t e s  f o r  some t ime 
w i t h o u t  any  power s u p p l y  till  i t  is emptied. Then t h e  p a s s i v e  
sys tem must be changed f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  low-pressure i n j e c t i o n  
sys tem,  which i s  c a p a b l e  of  prolonged opera t ion .  The p a s s i v e  
sys tem i s  s i t u a t e d  i n s i d e  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  zone. 
3.1.2. Ac t ive  low-pressure i n j e c t i o n  system 
The system c o n s i s t s  of  a  low-pressure pump of t he  
primary c i r c u i t  emergency coo l i ng  ( f low r a t e  of approximately  
3  380 / h ) ,  s t o r a g e  tank wi th  bo r i c  a c id  H BO s o l u t i o n  a ( concen t r a t i on  of 12 g / l ,  temperature  of 40 C and volume 
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o f  about 350 m ) and coupl ing  piping.  The system i s  a c t i v a t e d  
i n  t he  even t  of l a r g e  l eakage  from the  primary c i r c u i t  and 
f o l l ows  t he  f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  PS. 
The system is  composed of t h r e e  f u n c t i o n a l l y  and technolo-  
g i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  subsystems, which a r e  mutual ly  independent  
and each of them i s  a b l e  t o  ensure  coo l i ng  b f  t h e  co r e  i n  t he  
even t  of  t he  DBA. Two subsystems a r e  connected t o  t h e  p ip ing  
l e a d i n g  from t h e  accumulators  t o  the  r e a c t o r ,  t h e  t h i r d  sub- 
system i s  connected d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  cold and ho t  l e g s  of one 
loop  of t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t .  I f  t h e  t anks  a r e  a l r e ady  empty, 
t he  p u p  s u c t i o n  is au toma t i ca l l y  switched over t o  the  coo l an t  
c o l l e c t i o n  l i n e  from the  wel l  i n  the  f l o o r s  of  t he  h e r m e t i c a l l y  
s e a l e d  boxes v i a  t h e  h e a t  exchanger. 
3.1.3. Ac t ive  h igh-pressure  i n j e c t i o n  system 
The HPIS h a s  t h e  same redundancy a s  t he  LPIS, t h a t  is,  
i t  c o n s i s t s  of  t h r e e  independent  loops  equipped wi th  high- 
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- p r e s su r e  pumps ( f low r a t e s  of  approximately  60 m /h)  and 
3  w i t h  s t o r a g e  tanks  (about  100 m 1. The system i s  a c t i v a t e d  
i n  t he  even t  of sm a l l e r  l eakages  from the  primary c i r c u i t  
and a l s o  i n  t h e  c a s e  of r u p t u r e  o f  t h e  main steam c o l l e c t o r  
o r  the  main s team piping. Concen t ra t ion  of  t h e  H3B03 s o l u t i o n  
i n  t h e  t anks  is 40 g/ l .  P r e s s u r e  tubes  of high-pressure  loops  
l ead  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  cold l e g s  o f  t h r e e  o u t  of  t h e  s i x  main 
c i r c u l a t i o n  loops.  
The emergency coo l i ng  system is a c t i v a t e d  i n  t h e  even t  
o f  s i g n a l l i n g  a  dec r ea s ing  l e v e l  i n  t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  end 
dec r ea s i ng  pr imary c i r c u i t  p ressure .  The f i r s t  of t he s e  
s i g n a l s  a c t i v a t e s  t h e  HPIS. If t h e  decrease  of  t he  p r e s s u r i z e r  
l e v e l  con t i nues  and t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t  p r e s s u r e  f a l l s  below 
4 W a ,  t he  p a s s i v e  system wi th  accumulators  i n t e r v e n e s  auto-  
m a t i c a l l y .  A t  t h i s  moment, t h e  LPIS a l r e a d y  r e c e i v e d  an 
impulse  t o  s t a r t  i t s  o p e r a t i o n  ( a t  t h e  second s i g n a l  - 
p r e s s u r e  lower  t h a n  12  W a ) .  Th i s  system d e l i v e r s  c o o l a n t  
i n t o  t h e  c o r e  f o r  6 0  seconds  a f t e r  t h e  l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t  
a c c i d e n t  (LOCA) a t  a  p r e s s u r e  of  0.7 MPa, t h a t  is d u r i n g  
t h e  pe r iod  when t h e  accumula to r s  a r e  a l r e a d y  empty and a r e  
b e i n g  c losed.  
3.2. Systems o f  a c c i d e n t  l o c a l i z a t i o n  
These s y s t e m s  must d e c r e a s e  p r e s s u r e  and t empera tu re  
i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  and t o  wash o u t  t h e  f i s s i o n  
p r o d u c t s  from t h e  environment of t h i s  a r e a .  
I n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r i n c i p a l  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  equipment i s  s i t u a t e d  : a  r e a c t o r ,  main 
c i r c u l a t i o n  p i p i n g ,  s team g e n c r a t o r s ,  main c i r c u l a t i o n  pumps 
and d r i v e s ,  a  main c l o s i n g  v a l v e  and d r i v e s ,  a  p r e s s u r i z e r  
w i t h  i t s  bubbl ing  t ank ,  p r o c e s s  equipment, f i l t e r s  of t h e  
sys tem o f  c o n t i n u o u s  p u r i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t  
c o o l a n t ,  a  r e c i r c u l a t i o n  a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  s y s t e m  of t h e  
h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a ,  and p r e s s u r e  s u p p r e s s i o n  c o n t a i n -  
ment w i t h  h o l d i n g  tanks .  
T h i s  equipment is s i t u a t e d  i n  s e p a r a t e d  rooms, which 
a r e  i n t e r c o n n e c t e d  i n  such  a  way t h a t  they  form one  common 
h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a ,  des igned  f o r  a  p r e s s u r e  range  from 
0.08 YPa t o  0.25 W a  ( u n d e r p r e s s u r e  and o v e r p r e s s u r e  r e l a t i n g  
t h e  ambient p r e s s u r e ) .  I n  t h i s  a r e a ,  s l i g h t  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  
(100-200 Pa)  i s  main ta ined  d u r i n g  normal o p e r a t i o n .  
A l l  rooms o f  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  a r e  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  non-attended (rooms o f  s team 
g e n e r a t o r s  and main c i r c u l a t i o n  pumps, room of  f i l t e r s  o f  
con t inuous  p u r i f i c a t i o n )  and p a r t i a l l y  a t t e n d e d  (room o f  
d r i v e s  o f  t h e  main c i r c u l a t i o n  pumps and main c l o s i n g  v a l v e s ) .  
The boxes o f  t h e  s t eam g e n e r a t o r s  and main c i r c u l a t i o n  pumps 
a r e  connected w i t h  t h e  bubb l ing  tower v i a  a  c o u p l i n g  c o r r i d o r ,  
through which t h e  s t e a m / a i r  m i x t u r e  f lows  a f t e r  a n  a c c i d e n t .  
The c o u p l i n g  c o r r i d o r  h a s  f low s e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  s t eam/a i r  
mix tu re  of  11 x  6.3 m. 
3.2.1. Spray sys tem 
S i m i l a r l y  t o  t h e  a c t i v e  ECCS, t h e  s p r a y  sys tem(SS)  
c o n s i s t s  o f  t h r e e  f u n c t i o n a l l y  independent  subsystems 
(200 p e r  c e n t  redundancy).  Each subsystem i n c l u d e s  a  l a r g e -  
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- c a p a c i t y  pump (approx imate ly  600 q /h )  and, i n  c o n t r a s t  
wi th  t h e  LPIS, a l s o  a  tank wi th  N2H4 and KOH s o l u t i o n ,  
a  w a t e r - j e t  pump and s p r a y  nozz les .  The s p r a y  sys tem s t a r t s  
i t s  o p e r a t i o n  when t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  
zone r i s e s  t o  0.108 Wa.  The pump d e l i v e r s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  from 
t h e  tank o f  t h e  LPIS i n t o  t h e  s p r a y  n o z z l e s  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  
h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a rea .  The s o l u t i o n  i s  sprayed,  t h e  s team 
component condenses  and t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  
s e a l e d  a r e a  d e c r e a s e s .  
The s w i t c h i n g  over  t o  s u c t i o n  from t h e  w e l l  i n  t h e  
f l o o r  of  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  v i a  t h e  h e a t  exchanger 
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  LPIS. 
111 t h r e e  subsystems a r e  p u t  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  
and a u t o m a t i c a l l y  and t h e  o p e r a t o r  cannot  a f f e c t  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n  
f o r  some time. T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  h o l d s  a l s o  f o r  t h e  LPIS and HPIS. 
E l e c t r i c  power supply  of a l l  t h r e e  g roups  o f  low-pressure ,  
h igh-preesure  and s p r a y  pumps i s  r e a l i z e d  independen t ly  from 
t h r e e  independen t  v o l t a g e  s o u r c e s .  The.motors of  a l l  pumps 
a r e  connected t o  t h e  home consumption sys tem o f  t h e  NPP and 
r e c e i v e  v o l t a g e  from t h e  working o r  r e s e r v e  t r ans fo rmers .  
The t h i r d  s o u r c e  i n  t h e  even t  o f  complete l o s s  o f  home con- 
sumption (which i s  assumed d u r i n g  t h e  DBA) is  t h e  power supp ly  
from d i e s e l  g e n e r a t o r s  (DC). Each group is  hiupplied from i t s  
own DC s t a t i o n .  The DCs s t a r t  up w i t h i n  1 0  seconds  and, f o r  
example, t h e  low-pressure  pumps a r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s c h e d u l e  
o f  g r a d u a l  DC l o a d i n g ,  connected a f t e r  a n o t h e r  1 5  seconds.  
System r e l i a b i l i t y  is ensured  by v a r i o u s  k i n d s  of  
v e r i f i c a t i o n s ,  i n s p e c t i o n s  and checks  of  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  
sys tem and components. The comprehensive i n s p e c t i o n s  arid 
t e s t i n g  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h  the  r e a c t o r  s h u t  down and 
cooled.  With t h e  r e a c t o r  a t  power, t h e  o p e r a t o r  can perform 
a  check of  a c c u h u l a t o r  l e v e l ,  p r e s s u r e  and boron c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
and a  check of  t i g h t n e s s  and proper  f u n c t i o n  of  check v a l v e s  
w i t h o u t  a d v e r s e l y  a f  f  e c  t i n g  t h e  o p e r a b i l i t y  and e f f e c t i v i t y  
o f  t h e  p a s s i v e  sys tem.  During r e a c t o r  o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  a c t i v e  
sys tem pump wear,  d e l i v e r y  and c a p a c i t y  can be v e r i f i e d ,  
f o r  which a  s p e c i a l  c o l l e c t o r  f o r  the  t e s t i n g  of  r e c i r c u l a t i o n  
regime i n  t h e  c i r c u i t O s t o r a g e  tank-pump-col lec tor-s torage tank 
i s  provided.  A t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  d i e s e l  g e n e r a t o r s  a r e  a l s o  
checked. T h i s  p e r i o d i c  i n s p e c t i o n  is c a r r i e d  o u t  each month 
and l a s t s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3 0  minutes .  
3.2.2. Bubbl ing d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  containment 
T h i s  s y s t e m  h a s  t h e  t a s k  t o  d e c r e a s e  t empera tu re  i n  t h e  
pr imary c i r c u i t  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  a f t e r  t h e  a c c i d e n t  
and t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e r e  a n  underpressure  r e l a t i n g  the  NPP 
ambient  p r e s s u r e .  I n  t h i s  way, any escape of r a d i o a c t i v i t y  
from t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  i s  preven ted .  During an 
a c c i d e n t ,  a  f a s t  e v a p o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  escaped c o o l a n t  f lowing  
through t h e  c o u p l i n g  c o r r i d o r  i n t o  t h e  BS (F ig .  2 , 4 )  t a k e s  
p l a c e .  The u n d e r p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  i s  
main ta ined  by means of  condensa t ion  of  t h e  s t eam component 
o f  t h i s  s t e a m / a i r  m i x t u r e  d u r i n g  t h e  bubb l ing  through t h e  
b o r i c  a c i d  ( c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  12  g / l ,  t empera tu re  of  40-60 OC) 
l a y e r  i n  t h e  bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t .  Cool ing and 
condensa t ion  is  promoted a l s o  by s p r a y i n g  o f  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  
s e a l e d  a r e a  o f  t h e  p r imary  c i r c u i t  by t h e  s p r a y  system. The 
non-condensed r e s i d u a l  o f  t h e  mixture ,  which t r a v e l l e d  through 
t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  o f  t h e  bubbl ing d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t ,  
g o e s  immediate ly  t o  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  h o l d i n g  t anks  
f o r  a  bng- term s t o r a g e .  
The b u b b l i n g  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  conta inment  i t s e l f  c o n s i s t s  
o f  a  l a r g e  number o f  bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t s  (Fig .  3 ) .  
These u n i t s  a r e  composed o f  p a r a l l e l  t rougs  f i l l e d  w i t h  b o r i c  
a c i d  and covered by caps ,  forming a  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  
between t h e  w a l l s  o f  t h e  t r o u g h s  and t h e  caps.  The s t e a m / a i r  
m i x t u r e  e n t e r s  t h e  u n i t  th rough  t h e  i n l e t  channel  from below 
among t h e  t r o u g h s ,  d u r i n g  an impac t  on t h e  cap r e v e r s e s  i t s  
f l o w  d i r e c t i o n ,  pushes t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  and bubbles  
through t h e  w a t e r  l a y e r  ( h e i g h t  o f  approximate ly  0.5 m )  
behind t h e  c l o s u r e .  Such d e s i g n  of  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  h a s  
l a r g e  f l o w  s e c t i o n  and low h y d r a u l i c  d r a g  (ayprox imate ly  
5  kPa).  The whole sys tem i s  l o c a t e d  i n  a  tower w i t h  twe lve  
independen t  f l o o r s ,  each f l o o r  c o n t a i n i n g  153 bubb l ing  de- 
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t s .  The a r e a s  behind t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e s  
of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f l o o r s  a r e  mutua l ly  s e p a r a t e d  and connected 
w i t h  t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  v i a  a  d u p l i c a t e d  check valve .  Each 
t r i a d  o f  t h e  f l o o r s  h a s  i ts  common ho ld ing  tank,  t h a t  is,  
t h e r e  a r e  a l t o g e t h e r  f o u r  h o l d i n g  tanks.  
Dur ing an a c c i d e n t  ( w i t h i n  10 t o  1 5  m i n u t e s ) ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  
i n  f r o n t  o f  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  ( t h a t  is,  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  
s e a l e d  a r e a  o f  t h e  pr imary c i r c u i t )  d e c r e a s e s  a f t e r  t h e  p a s s a g e  
o f  t h e  s t e a m / a i r  m i x t u r e  th rough  t h e  bubbling d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
u n i t  under t h e  NPP ambient  p r e s s u r e  by t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  s p r a y  
sys tem(Fig .  5) .  This  e f f e c t  i s  c o n t r i b u t e d  a l s o  by s p r a y i n g  
w i t h  t h e  wa te r  from t h e  f l o o r s  o f  the  bubbl ing d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  
conta inment .  T h i s  w a t e r  i s  pushed i n t o  t h e  a r e a  o f  t h e  bubb l ing  
tower by o v e r p r e s s u r e ,  a r i s i n g  behind the  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e .  
The water  f l o w s  from t h e  bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t  f l o o r s  
o n l y  u n t i l  t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  de- 
c r e a s e s  under  t h e  NPP ambient  p ressure .  A t  t h i s  moment, two 
i d e n t i c a l  and m u t u a l l y  independen t  check v a l v e s  (which d i r e c t l y  
connec t  t h e  a r e a s  i n  f r o n t  o f  and behind t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e )  
t u r n  open i n t o  t h e  a r e a  i n  f r o n t  of  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  
and,  i n  t h i s  way, e n a b l e  p r e s s u r e  e q u a l i z i n g  ( t h i s  i s  e f f e c t i v e  
d u r i n g  a  " smal i  LOCA" a c c i d e n t ) .  These v a l v e s  a r e  equipped 
w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  d u p l i c a t e d  l o c k  b lock ing  t h e i r  opening i f  
t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  boxes is  h i g h e r  than  
t h e  NPP ambient  p r e s s u r e .  
A f t e r  t h e  bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  phase i s  f i n i s h e d ,  
t h e  o v e r p r e s s u r e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  NPP ambient p r e s s u r e  remains 
o n l y  i n  t h e  h o l d i n g  t anks ,  which a r e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  and 
where t h e  p r e s s u r e  can be dec reased  a  long  t ime a f t e r  the  
a c c i d e n t  by means o f  t h e  by-pass p iping.  T h i s  p i p i n g  connec t s  
t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  sys tem used 
d u r i n g  r e p a i r  work and i s  c l o s e d  by a  v a l v e ,  o p e r a t e d  manually 
from a  p l a c e  o u t s i d e  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a .  Bes ides  
t h i s  p i p i n g ,  a l s o  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  p ip ing ,  s e r v i n g  o n l y  d u r i n g  
ou tage  o f  t h e  u n i t  and c l o s e d  d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  NPP 
by an e l e c t r i c a l l y  o p e r a t e d  va lve ,  l e a d s  t o  t h e  h o l d i n g  tanks .  
A t  l e a s t  s i x  f l o o r s  of  t h e  bubbl ing tower must o p e r a t e  p r o p e r l y  
i n  o r d e r  t h a t  t h e  whole sys tem may f u l f i l l  i t s  t a s k  d u r i n g  
LOCA. 
4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE BUBBLING DEPRESSURIZATION 
CONTAINMENT (BS ) 
The BS r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  h a s  been c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h  
t h e  aim t o  f i n d  weak p o i n t s  of  t h e  system and, e v e n t u a l l y ,  
t o  propose  measures  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  r e l i a b i l i t y  /5  + 11/. 
The work was focused  on t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  i s s u e s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  
The f a u l t  t r e e  method, which was s u c c e s s f u l l y  employed i n  t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  s a f e t y  sys tems p resen ted  i n  Chap te r  3, was s e l e c t e d .  
4.1. A n a l y s i s  o f  BS f a i l u r e s  
The complete  non-execution of  t h e  BS b a s i c  f u n c t i o n ,  
t h a t  is,  a  f a i l u r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  
h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a s  o f  t h e  primary c i r c u i t  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  NPP ambient  p r e s s u r e ,  must be cons ide red  a s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  BS. I n  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  de layed  e x e c u t i o n  o f  
t h i s  f u n c t i o n ,  t h a t  is  a f t e r  t h e  time p e r i o d  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  
d e s i g n  (approx imate ly  15 m i n u t e s )  is ,  however, a l s o  inadmiss ib le .  
T h i s  assumpt ion is,  of l o u r s e ,  a l r e a d y  t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t  
c o n s e r v a t i v e .  F u r t h e r  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  BS r e s t s  i n  a  long-term 
s t o r a g e  o f  t h e  s t e a d a i r  r e s i d u a l s  a f t e r  condensa t ion  i n  t h e  
h o l d i n g  t anks .  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  i t s  non-execution w i l l  be 
n e g l e c t e d  h e r e  w i t h  regard  t o  t h e  dcs ign of  the  h o l d i n g  
t a n k s ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  t h e  two preceding f a i l u r c s  and 
a  p o s s i b l e  e x t e n t  of  exposure  t o  danger of  p o p u l a t i o n  n e a r  
t h e  NPP. 
4.2. Causes o f  non-execut ion o f  t h e  BS f u n c t i o n  
The u n d e r p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a  o f  t h e  
pr imary c i r c u i t  i s  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  i f  t h e  a r e a  h a s  a  l a r g e  
leakage.  T h i s  l e a k a g e  can a r i s e  when some of  t h e  s i x  h e r m e t i c  
d o o r s  i n t o  t h i s  a r e a  a r e  open. T h e i r  l o c k i n g  is  s i g n a l l e d  
i n t o  t h e  u n i t  c o n t r o l  room and t h e i r  opening d u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  
of t h e  NPP i s  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  a f t e r  unblocking of t h e i r  l o c k s  
by t h e  o p e r a t o r .  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  f a i l u r e  i s  very  low and 
depends main ly  on t h e  o p e r a t o r e s  e r r o r  ( e r r o r  o f  s i g n a l l i n g  
equipment c a n  be, i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  n e g l e c t e d ) .  
The second p o s s i b l e  c a u s e  why t h e  underpressure  i s  n o t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  c a n  be a  f a i l u r e  o f  two ho ld ing  t a n k s  ( a  f a i l u r e  
of each o f  them i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  e l i m i n a t i o n  of t h r e e  f l o o r s  
o f  t h e  b u b b l i n g  tower from o p e r a t i o n )  o r  s i x  f l o o r s  of  t h e  
bubb l ing  tower (more c o n s e r v a t i v e  assumption w i t h  regard  
t o  t h e  a p p r o v a l  t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  sys tem with  one f l o o r  w i t h o u t  
w a t e r  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n s ) .  
The most  s e r i o u s  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  ho ld ing  t ank  i s  i t s  
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a r e a  i n  f r o n t  of  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  
c l o s u r e ,  which can  occur  a f t e r  t h e  opening of  one of  t h e  
two h e r m e t i c  d o o r s  o f  t h e  h o l d i n g  tank (analogous  c o n c l u s i o n  
as f o r  t h e  d o o r  o f  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a )  o r  opening 
t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  p i p i n g  ( r a t e d  I . D .  200 nun) a g a i n s t  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  ( a g a i n ,  t h e  main cause  i s  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
e r r o r ) .  The same r e a s o n i n g  h o l d s  even i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f a i l u r e  
o f  t h e  BS f l o o r ,  which is  a g a i n  des igned w i t h  two h e r m e t i c  
d o o r s  i n t e r c o n n e c t i n g  t h e  a r e a s  i n  f r o n t  o f  and behind t h e  
h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  e v e n t s ,  a  very  f a s t  p r e s s u r e  
e q u l i z a t i o n  i n  a l l  a r e a s  o c c u r s  and t h e  bubbl ing d e p r e s s u r i z -  
a t i o n  i s  s u p p r e s s e d .  F u r t h e r  p o s s i b l e  causes  l e a d i n g  t o  a  
f a i l u r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  call be n e g l e c t e d  u i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e i r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  ( f o r  example,  l o s s  o f  w a l l  t i g h t n e s s ,  
check v a l v e s  i n t o  t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  s t u c k  c l o s e d ) .  
Formation of  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  can  be delayed d u r i n g  bo th  
t h e  bubb l ing  s t a g e  and t h e  subsequen t  sp ray ing .  
The f i r s t  e v e n t  can be caused by a  s m a l l  l eakage  of  t h e  
h o l d i n g  t a n k s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  e i t h e r  a  l eakage  of t h e  by-pass 
c o n d u i t  w i t h  r a t e d  I .D. of  57 mm ( t h e  va lve  i s  n o t  c losed  o r  
i s  mechan ica l ly  damaged i n  t h e  a r e a  of  t h e  c o u p l i n g  c o r r i d o r )  
o r  a  l eakage  o f  t h e  check v a l v e s  w i t 1 1  r a t e d  I .D.  o f  500 mm 
between t h e  h o l d i n g  t anks  and t h e  a r e a  above t h e  h y d r a u l i c  
c l o s u r e .  
Spray ing  i s  cons ide red  t o  be i n s u f f i c i e n t  when l e s s  than  
s i x  f l o o r s  o f  t h e  bubbl ing d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  u n i t  a r e  i n  
o p e r a t i o n .  A f l o o r  i s  e l i m i n a t e d  from o p e r a t i o n  when t h e r e  a r e  
e q u a l  p r e s s u r e s  i n  f r o n t  o f  and behind t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e .  
T h i s  p r e s s u r e  e q u i l i z a t i o n  can occur  when t h e  he rmet ic  door 
o f  the  f l o o r  i s  n o t  drawn c l o s e  ( i n  t h e  bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z -  
a t i o n  phase ,  t h i s  door draws c l o s e  and opens o n l y  when t h e  
o v e r p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  a r e a  behind t h e  h y d r a u l i c  c l o s u r e  is  
e s t a b l i s h e d )  o r  i n  t h e  e v e n t  of  t h e  opening o f  one o f  t h e  check 
v a l v e s  of  t h e  f l o o r  ( b o t h  l o c k s  o f  t h i s  v a l v e  a r e  n o t  locked 
u p )  wi th  t h e  r a t e d  I .D. of  250 mm. Other c a u s e s  a r e  cons ide red  
t o  be l e s s  p robab le .  The s lowing  down of  s p r a y i n g  caused by 
a n  i n s u f f i c i e n t  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p r a y  sys tem ( s low fo rmat ion  
o f  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s e a l e d  a r e a )  i s  n o t  
cons ide red ,  e i t h e r .  
4.3. Assessment o f  BS r e l i a b i l i t y  
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  p reced ing  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  a  f a u l t  t r e e ,  
which i s  i n  a  s i m p l i f i e d  form p r e s e n t e d  i n  Fig.  6, h a s  been 
assembled. The f a u l t  t r e e  w i t h  147 i n i t i a t i n g  e v e n t s  employed 
f o r  t h e  mathemat ica l  t r e a t m e n t  (F ig .7 )  was e v a l u a t e d  q u a l i t a -  
t i v e l y  and q u a n t i t a t i v e f y b y  means o f  the  computer programme 
KADO. The i n p u t  d a t a  used were es t ima ted .  
A s  t h e  most c o n s e q u e n t i a l  causes  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  top 
e v e n t  of  t h e  f a u l t  t r e e ,  t h e  opening of  v a l v e s  i n  t h e  
v e n t i l a t i o n  p i p i n g  from t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  ( o p a r a t o r  *s e r r o r )  
and mechanical  l o s s  of  t i g h t n e s s  of t h e  by-pass p i p i n g  from 
t h e  h o l d i n g  t anks  ( o r  even n o t  c l o s i n g  o f  t h e i r  v a l v e s  owing 
t o  human e r r o r l w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  Both p resen ted  f a i l u r e s  
mani fes ted  themselves  pronouncedly even i n  t h e  subsequen t  
a n a l y s i s  focused on a  s e a r c h  o f  common cause  f a i l u r e s .  When 
t h e s e  c a u s e s  were l i m i t e d ,  t h e  f a i l u r e s  connected wi th  n o t  
c l o s i n g  o f  some of t h e  h e r m e t i c  doors  i n  t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  
s e a l e d  a r e a s  tu rned  o u t  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t .  
4.4. P r o p o s a l s  o f  BS m o d i f i c a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  h i g h e r  
r e l i a b i l i t y  
I n  connec t ion  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  a n a l y s e s ,  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and t e c h n i c a l  measures l i m i t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r  and t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  a  v e n t i l a t i o n  sys tem on t h e  BS were proposed. F u r t h e r ,  
t e c h n i c a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  a s s u r a n c e  o f  i n t e g r i t y  
and compactness o f  t h e  by-pass p i p i n g  from t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  
( p r o t e c t i v e  s h i e l d s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of  c o u p l i n g  c o r r i d o r , f i x e d  
guy ing  of  p i p i n g  o r  a d d i t i o n a l  mounting of  a  va lve  i n  t h e  
v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s )  were proposed. The check o f  
t h e  c l o s i n g  up of t h e  h e r m e t i c  d o o r s  b e f o r e  t h e  r e p e a t e d  s t a r t  
o f  t h e  NPP o p e r a t i o n  a f t e r  planned o r  unplanned o u t a g e s  was 
made more s t r i n g e n t .  
5. CONCLUSION 
One of t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  s a f e t y  sys tems  of  t h e  Czecho- 
s l o v a k  NPPs w i t h  p r e s s u r i z e d  wa te r  r e a c t o r s  VVEH-440 type  213, 
.the bubb l ing  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  conta inment  having t h e  t a s k  t o  
l o c a l i z e  ( p r e s s u r e  s u p p r e s s i o n )  t h e  d e s i g n  b a s i s  a c c i d e n t  
( l o s s  o f  c o o l a n t  a c c i d e n t  a f t e r  a  r u p t u r e  o f  t h e  main c i r c u l a t i o n  
p i p e  w i t h  double-s ided o u t f l o w  o f  c o o l a n t -  and s imul taneous  
l o s s  of  home consumption e l e c t r i c  power s u p p l y )  h a s  been 
analysed.  The r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  was c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  
Nuclear Research I n s t i t u t e ,  Ref, u s i n g  t h e  f a u l t  t r e e  method, 
which proved t o  be s u c c e s s f u l  a l r e a d y  i n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
a n a l y s e s  of  s e v e r a l  s a f e t y  sys tems /12/. The p a s s i v e  and 
a c t i v e  sys tems  of  emergency c o o l i n g  (IIPIS. LPIS),  t h e  s p r a y  
sys tem and t h e  sys tem of  emergency supp ly  of  s t eam g e n e r a t o r s  
were analysed . 
The aim of t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  p a s s i v e  and 100  pe r  c e n t  
redundant  BS h a s  been a  q u a l i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  p o s s i b l e  c a u s e s  of  f a i l u r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  u n d e r p r e s s u r e  and 
p o s s i b l e  c a u s e s  of  delayed f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h i s  underpressure .  
On t h e  b a s i s  of  s u c h  a n a l y s i s  and o f  t h e  assembled f a u l t  t r e e ,  
i t  was p o s s i b l e  t o i d e n t i f y  "weak" p o i n t s  of  t h e  sys tem and 
t o  propose  economical  measures i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  sys tem o v e r a l l  
r e l i a b i l i t y  . 
During t h e  a n a l y s i s  i t s e l f ,  t h e  importance  o f  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  
o f  d e s i g n  documentat ion wi th  t h e  r e a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  work was 
demonstra ted .  On t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
was s u c c e s s i v e l y  made more a c c u r a t e ,  supplemented and modified.  
Also  t h e  need o f  p r o p e r  e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and 
redundancy o f  t h e  sys tem on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e r m a l  h y d r a u l i c  
a n a l y s e s  h a s  t u r n e d  up t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The human e r r o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  NPP outage  ( t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  non-execut ion o f  t h e  c l o s i n g  o f  some h e r m e t i c  d o o r s  of  
t h e  h e r m e t i c a l l y  s c a l e d  a r e a s  a f t e r  a  check o f  BS, non- 
- execu t ion  o f  t h e  c l o s i n g  o f  manual ly  o p e r a t e d  v a l v e s  on t h e  
by-pass p i p i n g ,  t h e  opening o f  v a l v e s  on t h e  p i p i n g  connec t ing  
t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s  w i t h  t h e  v e n t i l a t i o n  sys tem f o r  t h e  r e p a i r  
r6gime)  were i d e n t i f i e d  a s  t h e  most  f r e q u e n t  c a u s e s  o f  f a i l u r e s .  
The r e s u l t 8  o f  a n a l y s i e  wi th  human e r r o r s  e l i m i n a t e d  by means 
o f  t e c h n i c a l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  measures  m a n i f e s t e d  t h e  h igh  
r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  f u n c t i o n a l  p a r t 8  o f  t h e  sys tem,  which c o n t r a s t e d  
w i t h  a  r e l a t i v e l y  low r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  the  a u x i l i a r y  sys tems 
( v e n t i l a t i o n  o f  t h e  h o l d i n g  t a n k s ) .  
The a n a l y s i s  showed, among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  a l s o  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  u s e  t h e  f a u l t  t r e e  method f o r  a  n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l  
sys tem even i n  t h e  c a s e  of s e r i o u s  absence of c r e d i b l e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  d a t a .  The a n a l y s i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  and t h e  r e s u l t s  
tu rned  o u t  t o  be u s e f u l  and formed a s t i m u l u s  f o r  a p roposa l  
o f  p o s s i b l e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  i n c r e a s i n g  t h c .  system r e l i a b i l i t y .  
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ABSTRACT 
The development o f  t e c h n i c a l  processes has r e s u l t e d  i n  Large and 
complex i n s t a l l a t i o n s  w i t h  a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  Large consequences o f  
unwanted events. The systems have become Less t r a n s p a r e n t  f o r  
a l l  p a r t s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  systems and t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
causes and consequences may be d i f f i c u l t .  The d e s i g n  f o r  s a f e t y  
cou ld  use a c o n t r o l  system approach where feedback o f  
o p e r a t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  used t o  improve t h e  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  
system. Feed fo rward  approaches a re  used t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  s a f e t y  
Level o f  t h e  system. The des ign  o f  s a f e t y  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
des ign  f o r  humans i n  t h e  system e.g. t h e  d e s i g n  o f  t h e  work ing 
environment. D i f f e r e n t  methods such as a la rm handl ing, feedback 
o f  a c t i o n s  , s i m u l a t i o n  and o t h e r  o p e r a t o r  suppor t  systems can 
p r o v i d e  means t o  improve t h e  working environment. 
The c o n t r o l  system connects d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  process t o  
each o t h e r  and i s  a l s o  a Link t o  t h e  humans. The s a f e t y  o f  t h e  
c o n t r o l  system r e q u i r e s  methods f o r  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  bo th  
equipment and a p p l i c a t i o n  p lanning.  For t h e  l a t e r  p a r t  a rev iew 
method s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  HAZOP method f o r  p rocess  components i s  
presented. The method has been t e s t e d  on  t h e  sequence c o n t r o l  o f  
a chemical p l a n t  w i t h  good r e s u l t s .  
INTRODUCTION 
A f te r  the  recent accidents i n  Large techn i ca l  systems (nuclear 
and chemical plants, space shu t t l e )  there  has been a  Large 
debate on the sa fe t y  o f  complex techn i ca l  system. I n  many 
count r ies  the  p u b l i c  confidence i n  techno log ica l  development has 
been se r i ous l y  challenged. Some o f  the  problems are undoubtedly 
connected u i t h  the  r a p i d  techn ica l  development uhere 
o rgan i za t i ona l  and managerical p r a c t i s e  has not been ab le  t o  
develop u i t h  t he  same speed. 
The need f o r  h igh  e f f i c i e n c y  has in f luenced on both  techn i ca l  
design and opera t iona l  pract ise.  By designing Larger 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a  more e f f i c i e n t  product ion i s  poss ib le  due t o  the  
scale. This development a lso  means tha t  there  i s  a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
Large consequences o f  accidents and unwanted events. Correlated 
t o  t he  increase o f  scale the  complexity o f  t he  p l a n t s  has a lso  
increased. Several separate processes may be connected i n t o  
product ion  Lines u i t h o u t  o r  w i th  very small in te rmedia te  
storages uhich could serve t o  decouple t he  system. Also energy 
savings systems and t h i g h t  o v e r a l l  c o n t r o l  systems in t roduce 
i n t e r a c t i o n s  making t h e  system Less t ransparent  bo th  t o  
designers and opera t iona l  s t a f f .  
I n  t h e  use o f  p l a n t s  t he  need f o r  e f f i c i e n c y  has Led t o  an 
opera t ion  u i t h  smal ler  margins, uhich i s  poss ib le  due t o  the 
techno log ica l  development and more accurate con t ro l .  
Operation may i n  some cases be d i f f i c u l t  because o f  new less  
knoun rau ma te r i a l s  and products, uhich a l so  may be dangerous i f  
they are not t r e a t e d  i n  a  proper way. The same product ion  
f a c i l i t i e s  may a l so  be used f o r  the product ion  o f  a  v a r i e t y  of  
products. A need f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  against the  markets and the  
costumers together u i t h  the  need of e f f i c i e n c y  requ i re  a  f as t  
swi tch over from one product t o  an o ther  i n  order t o  keep 
storages small. I n  these circumstances the  opera t ion  becomes 
q u i t e  complex u i t h  a  v a r i e t y  o f  opera t ion  s t r a t e g i e s  ava i l ab le  
where the  consequences o f  a  wrong choice may be large. 
As a r e s u l t  o f  the descr ibed development t he  t echno log i ca l  
systems have become less  t ransparent  f o r  a l l  t he  p a r t s  dea l i ng  
w i t h  them. There may be d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  causes and 
consequences due t o  bo th  process connect ions and c o n t r o l  
i n t e r a c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  some ideas o f  how t o  dea l  w i t h  
t h e  problems a re  discussed. 
CONTROL OF SAFETY 
Des ign ing  f o r  sa fe t y  can be considered as a c o n t r o l  problem, 
where t he  feedback o f  ope ra t i ona l  exper ience can be used as 
i n p u t  f o r  improvements o f  t he  system safety .  Because t he  
p l ann ing  f o r  sa fe t y  inc ludes  Large and complex i n d u s t r i a l  
i n s t a l l a t i o n s  a l s o  very u n l i k e  acc iden t  scenar ious w i t h  l a r g e  
consequences have t o  be considered. I n  these cases a feedback 
approach i s  no t  poss i b l e  because o f  t he  lack o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  
experience. Hence, a feedforward concept has t o  be adapted, 
where t h e  sa fe t y  l e v e l  i s  p red i c t ed  by us i ng  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  
models. The p r e d i c t i o n  i s  then  used t o  op t im i ze  t h e  design i n  
o rder  t o  reach an acceptable l e v e l  o f  sa fe ty .  Feedback i n  t h i s  
concept i s  used t o  ensure t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  models used i n  t h e  
p r e d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  sa fe t y  leve l .  
The v a l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  feedforward sa fe t y  c o n t r o l  u s i n g  
o p e r a t i o n a l  feedback i s  poss i b l e  because o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  events 
w i t h  Low p r o b a b i l i t y  u s u a l l y  a re  a combinat ion o f  events w i t h  
h i ghe r  p r o b a b i l i t y .  By a r rang ing  a systemat ic  ga the r i ng  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  p a r a l l e l 1  from these events o p e r a t i o n a l  
exper ience can be used t o  improve t h e  models used f o r  the  
e s t i m a t i o n  o f  a l s o  low p r o b a b i l i t y  events. 
A l though many s i t u a t i o n s  can be covered by t h e  descr ibed  
approach a l l  events w i l l  not  appear under normal operat ions.  
Consequent ia l l y  a l l  i n f o rma t i on  can no t  be gathered. Also t h e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  models used could cause some problems. I n  many 
c a l c u l a t i o n s  independency i s  assumed between sma l l  events 
causing a Large event. However, the  c a l c u l a t i o n s  w i l l  f a i l  i f  
they a re  no t  independent o r  t he re  i s  some common cause which 
has not been considered. A common cause f a i l u r e  may e.g. imply 
t h a t  severa l  f a i l u r e  precaut ions are inoperable a t  the  same 
time. Common cause f a i l u r e  are usua l l y  int roduced by humans i n  
t he  system. E.g. a design o r  a maintenance e r r o r  can make 
the  components inoperable. 
HUHANS IN  THE SYSTEH 
Humans have an important r o l e  i n  a l l  complex i n d u s t r i a l  p lan ts .  
People are responsible f o r  decisions, design, opera t ion  and 
maintenance. Also the r i s k  analyses are done by people as a p a r t  
o f  the  design procedure. Due t o  these f a c t s  the humans and the 
p lan ts  are interconnected i n  a very complex system o f  causal 
re la t i onsh ips  which impl ies  t ha t  the  humans have a Large 
i n f l uence  on the system e i t h e r  by making e r ro rs  which may 
i n i t i a t e  a chain of unwanted events or  by performing cor rec t  
ac t i ons  which i n h i b i t  an ongoing chain o f  events. The important  
r o l e  o f  humans i s  a reason f o r  consider ing him a l so  i n  the r i s k  
analysis.  The reason f o r  human e r r o r s  can usua l l y  be seen as a 
mismatch between the  ac tua l  s i t u a t i o n  and the  resources 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the human. Typ i ca l  examples o f  the mismatch are  
i n r r e l e v a n t  in format ion  presented e.g. i n  the  c o n t r o l  room, 
unsa t i s fac to ry  operat ion guides, Lack o f  t ra in ing ,  etc. The 
de tec t i on  and co r rec t i on  o f  these mismatches i n  advance are 
important  p a r t s  o f  the work f o r  improved system safety. 
The sa fe  design o f  the working environment could s t a r t  from task 
ana lys is  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  s ta tes  o f  the plant .  The aim o f  the 
design should be an e r r o r  t o l e r a n t  system, uhere the  e r r o r s  
could be observed and reversed before they have developed 
unacceptable consequences. This could be achieved by feedback 
from ac t ions  made i n  the  system. 
The task ana lys is  u i l l  a lso  be a base f o r  con t ro l  room design 
uhere d i f f e r e n t  operator support systems u i  11 p lay  an important 
r o l e  i n  the  future.  Such systems may be used t o  g i ve  the  
operator  guides how t o  uork i n  new s i tua t ions .  Also alarm 
handl ing can be used t o  prov ide  the  operator u i t h  re levant  
i n fo rma t i on  about 
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t h e  s t a t e  o f  the  process. On- l ine s i m u l a t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  
c o n t r o l  room g ives  t h e  o p e r a t o r  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  compare t h e  
consequences o f  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i o n s  and can be a  suppor t  f o r  the  
cho ice  o f  operat  ions. 
SAFETY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Two impor tan t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  systems a re  t h e  man-machine 
i n t e r f a c e  (MMI) and t h e  c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s .  RMI i s  one o f  t h e  
most impor tan t  p a r t s  t o  suppor t  t h e  humans i n  t h e  system. Many 
g u i d e l i n e s  and c h e c k l i s t s  have a l s o  been developed f o r  MI 
design. Due t o  t h e i r  genera l  n a t u r e  t h e i r  use i n  p r a c t i c a l  
des ign  may be d i f f i c u l t .  
The c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s  i n  a  modern automat ion system a r e  
r e a l i z e d  by handware and s o f t w a r e  and t h e  so f tware  p o r t i o n  i s  
growing. The sof tware can be d i v i d e d  i n t o  system so f tware  and 
a p p l i c a t i o n  software. The system so f tware  and i t s  r e l i a b i l i t y  
a n a l y s i s  can be considered as a  p a r t  o f  t h e  equipment. For t h e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  equipment many t o o l s  a re  a v a i l a b l e .  
Genera l ly ,  t h e  equipment a r e  r e l i a b l e .  The syn thes is  o f  a  
r e l i a b l e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n  is, however, 
s t i l l  a  d i f f i c u l t  task.  T h i s  s y n t h e s i s  i s  based on t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  so f tware  and t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  w i l l  much depend on t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  t h i s  design. Desp i te  o f  t h e  common o p i n i o n  t h a t  many 
s e r i o u s  e r r o r s  a r e  made i n  e a r l y  des ign  stages l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  
has been g iven  t o  t h i s  f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
The a p p l i c a t i o n  so f tware  i s  u s u a l l y  system s p e c i f i c  and some 
a p p l i c a t i o n  o r i e n t e d  languages a r e  used. The programming f o r  a  
s p e c i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  c a l l e d  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  The 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  task  i s  ve ry  s i m i l a r  t o  normal programming and 
many o f  t h e  methods o f  s o f t w a r e  e n g i n e e r i n g  cou ld  be app l ied .  
Some m o d i f i c a t i o n s  may, however, be necessary. 
Te ensure t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  performance o f  a  c o n t r o l  system some 
d e s i g n  rev iew methods a r e  needed. t h i s  c o u l d  be used t o  ensure 
t h a t  s a f e t y  r e l a t e d  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  c o r r e c t l y .  
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A DESIGN REVIEY EXAMPLE /1/ 
A method t o  review the sa fe ty  o f  the design o f  the  sequent ia l  
c o n t r o l  funct ions has been used i n  connection w i th  a  large batch 
process. Sequential c o n t r o l  was chosen because o f  i t s  great  
importance i n  t h i s  type o f  processes, where up t o  40 X of the  
programming e f f o r t  i n  t he  c o n t r o l  implementation i s  devoted t o  
abnormal s i t u a t i o n s  and i n te r l ocks .  
The review method i s  developed t o  evaluate the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  sequent ia l  f unc t i ons  by a  systematic ta lk- through i n  a  
review team, where spec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  i s  g iven t o  sa fe ty  
considerations. The review i s  permormed i n  a  team i n  sessions 
conducted by a  chairman. The team includes the  author o f  t he  
speci f icat ions,  a  process engineer, a  system user and an 
experienced con t ro l  engineer. 
The procedure i s  done i n  two phases. I n  the f i r s t  phase the  
s t ruc tu re  o f  the sequence con t ro l  system i s  evaluated and i n  the 
second phase a  step by step eva luat ion  i s  performed. 
I n  the evaluat ion o f  t he  s t r u c t u r e  the fo l l ow ing  top i cs  are  
discussed: 
- acceptable r u l e s  and design p r i n c i p l e s  
- a l l o c a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  tasks t o  d i f f e r e n t  sequences 
- hierarchy o f  t he  sequences 
- communication and syncron iza t ion  o f  the  sequence 
- i n t e r a c t i o n s  w i th  o ther  pa r t s  of  the  c o n t r o l  system. 
Although some o f  these aspects are re la ted  t o  the  sof tware 
implementation t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  should not be 
constrained by the  c h a r a s t e r i s t i c s  o f  some s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l  
system. 
I n  t he  step by step eva lua t i on  th ree questions are o f  general 
i n te res t :  
- i s  t h e  opera to r  a l lowed t o  ask f o r  t h i s  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n  
- i s  t h e  process i n  a  s t a t e  where t h i s  a c t i o n  i s  
p e r m i t t e d  
- w i l l  t h e  in tended  a c t i o n  be s u c c e s s f u l  
These checks a re  in tended  t o  p reven t  abnormal s i t u a t i o n s  by  
e n s u r i n g  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  necessary equipment and 
raw-mate r ia l s  and by check ing r e l e v a n t  measurements and p rocess  
components. 
At  each s t e p  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t o p i c s  a r e  discussed: 
- what a r e  t h e  most c r i t i c a l  process parameters i n  t h i s  
process s t a t e  
- what a re  t h e  c r i t i c a l  process components a t  t h i s  s t e p  
- what ace t h e  p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  operat ion,  
e.g. t h e  f o l l o w i n g  checks a re  done 
- a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  raw-mater ia ls  and u t i l i t i e s  
- a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  process components 
- v a l i d i t y  o f  c r i t i c a l  measurements and c o n t r o l s  
- v a l i d i t y  o f  checks per formed e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  
c o n t r o l  sequence 
p o s s i b l e  excep t ions  a re  checked by key-words analogous 
t o  t h e  HAZOP-method ( c f .  t a b l e  1) 
t h e  behaviour  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  system i n  abnormal 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  e.g. a la rm generat ion, a c t i v e  shut  down, 
e t  c. 
consequences o f  abor ted  e x e c u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  act ions,  
e.g. due t o  e r r o r s  
Comparison o f  t h e  sequence c o n t r o l  t o  e a r l i e r  des ign  
d e c i s i o n s  e.g. i n t e r l o c k  and f u n c t i o n a l  requi rements 
g i v e n  i n  t h e  HAZOP notes. 
Table 1 Example o f  keywords 
measurement 
parameter  
s e t p o i n t  
s t a t u s  s i g n a l  
keyword 
m i s s i n g  (no t  updated) 
t o o  low 
t o o  h i g h  
n o t  a v a i l a b l e  
t o o  low 
t o o  h i g h  
n o t  v a l i d  
n o t  a v a i l a b l e  
n o t  s t a b l e  
o p e r a t i o n  a c t i o n  m i s s i n g  
e x t r a  a c t i o n s  
e r r o r  
c a l c u l a t e d  v a r i a b l e  
t i m i n g  
m i s s i n g  
n o t  v a l i d  
t o o  e a r l y  
t o o  l a t e  
i n  wrong o r d e r  
s imu l taneous ly  
de layed 
The d e s c r i b e d  rev iew method was uses f o r  a n a l y s i s  o f  a r e a c t o r  
c o n t r o l  program c o n t a i n i n g  60 steps. The a n a l y s i s  was done 
d u r i n g  t h r e e  sess ions and t h e  t i m e  used was about t e n  hours. The 
rev iew was regarded as u s e f u l  and a l o t  o f  improvements were 
suggested. Moreover t h e  sess ions p r o v i d e d  a good communication 
channel  between process engineers and c o n t r o l  system designers.  
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h e  des ign ing  f o r  s a f e t y  a  c o n t r o l  system approach was 
suggested where bo th  feedback and feedforward techniques are 
used. The s a f e t y  des ign a l s o  i n c l u d e s  t h e  p l a n n i n g  o f  t h e  
work ing  environment f o r  t h e  humans i n  t h e  system and t h e  task  
a n a l y s i s  u i l l  t h e n  have an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  e.g. i n  the  MMI 
design. 
Wi th  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  r o l e  o f  s o f t u a r e  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  systems t h e  
impor tance o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  programming has grown. A method 
f o r  rev iew o f  t h i s  programming i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  sequence 
c o n t r o l  was presented. The exper ience  o f  t h e  method has been 
p r o m i s i n g  and t h e  method w i l l  be developed i n  t h e  fu ture,  when 
t h e r e  a l s o  w i l l  be e f f o r t s  t o  develop i t  f rom a  pure manual 
method towards more automat ic  rev iews.  
For  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  handware r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  modern c o n t r o l  
systems computerized t o o l s  a r e  necessary and t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  a  
need f o r  development works i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  However, t h e  c o n t r o l  
system i s  an i n t e g r a t e d  f u n c t i o n a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  process and t h e  
s a f e t y  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  system has t o  be cons idered  toge ther  u i t h  
t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  p l a n t .  Noreover, t h e  s a f e t y  des ign 
shou ld  be embedded i n  t h e  normal d e s i g n  p rac t i se ,  when no  
separa te  s a f e t y  and q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  groups shou ld  be needed f o r  
t h e  c o n t r o l  systems. 
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5.2. ADVANCED SAFETY CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: 
PROPOSAL TO LIMIT CATASTROPHIC RELEASES 
W. Kr6ger 
Inetitute for Nuclear Safety Reeearch 
Nuclear Reeearch Centre, Julich, FRG 
Extended summary 
Taking West Germany as a representative example, statutory regu- 
lations guarantee a high safety standard for nuclear power plants. 
Primary aims are to prevent the public from radiological damage 
and to minimize risk. For this purpose dose limits are established 
for an unsheltered reference person at worst location for design- 
relevant accidents (5 rem, WBy ) .  Conservative calculation 
principles (all exposure pathways including 24 h-ingestion, 
50 years exposure time, worst weather conditions including rain, 
etc.) have been fixed. For large light water reactors (LWR's) 
safety criteria are formulated which require a complex, highly 
active safety system, often with four redundant trains and with 
no need for operator action within the first 30 minutes. The 
high safety standard is confirmed by comprehensive risk assess- 
ment, e.g. the German Risk Study for the Biblis B-PWR (DRS), 
showing low figures for individual and societal risk. 
Nevertheless, the risk defined by compounding factors is not 
acceptable to a large part of the public, mainly because severe 
(beyond design) accidents with catastrophic activity releases 
and consequences for this relatively small country with a high 
population density cannot be excluded. Taking the more favourable 
results from Phase B of the DRS, which is near completion, in 
comparison with Phase A from 1978, it can be seen that almost 
100% of the inventory of noble gases, a few percent of the 
iodine and cesium as well as significantly less strontium (0,02%) 
are expected to be released in the case of the accident category 
with the greatest release. The overall frequency of this category 
is in the range of 10-7 to per reactor-year, which is ex- 
tremely low; it includes event sequences with core meltdown = 
early containment failure. 
+ 
The calculation of radiological consequences results in 
- no or only a few acute fatalities, 
- several thousand additional cancer deaths (7000/14000), 
- evacuation and relocation of several thousand people 
(3800/240000) , 
- contamination of large areas and subsequent decontamination 
of hundreds of square km, as well as 
- financial damage to the public in the range of milliards 
(US billions) of DM. 
The results are sensitive to the modelling of counter-measures, 
e.g. a delay or collapse of evacuation procedures may increase 
acute health effects significantly. 
The aversion of the public to accidents with high and longterm 
possibly trans-generation consequences cannot be eliminated by 
their extremely low frequency. Added to this is the fact that 
the Chernobyl disaster has removed the hypothetical character 
from this type of event. Therefore, effort has been made by the 
Institute to evaluate more restrictive safety requirements which 
may help to overcome public resistance to nuclear power and to 
realize urban siting. In any case, they should be used as a 
starting point for a discussion on an international level aimed 
at developing common or comparable safety criteria for super- 
safe advanced reactors. 
The basic idea for the proposed Advanced Safety Criteria (ASC) 
(Table 1 )  is to limit the activity release resulting from severe 
accidents in such a way that emergency measures no longer need 
to be considered for the protection of the public and financial 
+ By use o f  B04-version o f  UFOMOD-Code, which has been developed w i t h i n  
DRS Phase A and which i s  under rev is ion  now; average (K) maximum values 
i n  brackets.  
damage can be coped with by the society. Emergency measures 
include 
- acute measures such as evacuation, distribution of stable 
iodine tablets and early relocation, as well as 
- late measures such as late relocation and area decontamination. 
For this purpose dose limits for short-term (7 days) and long- 
term (30 years) exposure after severe accidents are proposed for 
individuals at worst location. They must assure sufficient pro- 
tection of the public. Quantitative safety goals in terms of 
tolerable risk figures are not proposed, mainly because of sub- 
stantial uncertainties in radiological consequence calculations 
and questionable comparability of different risks. Reasonable 
values for dose limits derived from intervention levels for 
protective actions show whole-body doses ranging from 
1 to 25 rem for short-term exposure and 
10 to 250 rem for long-term exposure. 
Based on these dose limits maximum releases for severe accidents 
can be back-calculated. For these calculations principles are 
suggested which have originally only been valid for design-rele- 
vant accidents and which are conservative. They can be slightly 
reduced in their degree of conservatism for this purpose, e.g. 
by shortening the exposure time, and by considering natural 
sheltering and the normal behaviour of the reference person at 
worst location. 
"Severe accidents" include all events and event sequences of such 
a low probability that the plants do not need to be designed 
against them. They normally dominate the risk and need to be 
identified by comprehensive probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) ,  
which is regarded as being sufficiently developed for this pur- 
pose. This assures consideration of events of frequencies down 
to per reactor-year, which is proposed as a quantitative 
cut-off criteria. Vulnerability in relation to acts of sabotage 
and catastrophic rare events should be as small as possible. 
The application of these advanced safety criteria is demonstrated 
by the following example: 
Assuming 1 rem as the reference dose limit for 7 days and 10 rem 
as an even more stringent limit for 30 years exposure time, as 
well as the proposed conservative principles for back-calcula- 
tion, the tolerable release of the representative nuclide Cs-137 
is in the range of 35 rem (Fig. 1) for an unpopulated zone with 
a radius of 400 m, 100 m emission height and unfiltered short- 
term release. More favourable technical parameters may lead to 
greater, less favourable to slightly smaller, tolerable releases. 
We do not intend to dictate the technical measures by which these 
criteria can be fulfilled. But we know from PSA experience and 
risk reduction studies for mitigation features that designing 
reactors with passive inherent safety characteristics is the only 
promising approach: 
The reactor may not loose its retention capability even 
under total loss of cooling conditions due to physical 
reasons; the attempt to exclude loss of cooling conditions 
by providing an additional active safety system is mis- 
leading. 
The course of severe accidents must be slow to allow 
for mitigating counter-measures and for the reversal of 
wrong human actions. 
Attempting to make high consequence accidents tolerable by adding 
additional active equipment and forcing frequencies below cut- 
off values is less promising because of unavoidable intercompo- 
nent/system dependent failures which limit the attainable 
realistic figures for the reliability of active systems. 
The question of whether these stringent requirements can be ful- 
filled by a competitive technical reactor system has been eva- 
luated for current German HTGR concepts. In conclusion, it seems 
to be clearly possible for small HTR's (200 MWt HTR-Modul of KWU 
and 250 MWt HTR-100 of BBC) and potentially even for medium HTR's 
(1200 MWt HTR-500 of BBC) to meet them. The physical character- 
istics of small HTGR's are such that under core heatup conditions 
following total loss of cooling maximum temperatures of the fuel 
elements do not exceed values where the elements would be sub- 
jected to temperature induced failure (Fig. 2) . For medium HTGR' s, 
t h e  maximum t e m p e r a t u r e s  are i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  t o t a l  p a r t i c l e  
f a i l u r e ,  b u t  d u e  t o  a s t r o n g  p r o f i l e ,  o n l y  a few p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  
f u e l  e l e m e n t s  r e a c h  t h e s e  t e m p e r a t u r e s  a n d  t h e  a v e r a g e  t e m p e r a -  
t u r e s  are b e l o w  1600 OC. T h i s  phenomenon a n d  t h e  s t r o n g  r e t e n t i o n  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  ' c o l d '  g r a p h i t e  f o r  f i s s i o n  p r o d u c t s  r e l e a s e d  f rom 
t h e  core r e s u l t  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  releases i n t o  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  
u n d e r  h y p o t h e t i c a l  t o t a l  loss o f  c o o l i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  
TABLE I 
Advanced Safety Criteria ( ASC ) 
proposed by the lnstltute 
The aim is to limit activity release of severe 
accident in such a way that emergency 
measures do not need to be considered 
( no evacuation. relocation. decontamlnatlon ) and 
the financial damage can be coped with 
The way_ is to establish short- term and. 
long- term dose limits for individuals at 
worst location. ranges of 
1 to 25rem for 7 days exposure 
10 to 250rem for 30 years exposure 
Reactor with passive Inherent safety 
characteristics is most promising for 
fulfilment 
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5.3. REFLECTIONS ON THE SAFE TECHNOLOGY MOVEMENT 
Alvin M. Weinberg 
lnatitute for Energy Analysis 
Oak Ridge Aasociated Universities, Tennessee, USA 
Four dramatic technological failures--Three Mile Island, Bhopal. 
Challenger, and Chernobyl--have shaken the public's confidence in technol- 
ogy. The reaction to these failures has followed three divergent paths. 
(1) In many countries strong voices urge abandonment of some of these tech- 
nologies, particularly nuclear power. ( 2 )  A middle ground is the proposal 
to improve, incrementally, the existing technologies. These improvements 
are both technical and organizational. This is the response of most of the 
established nuclear and chemical industries. (3) An extreme view, which in 
the past few years has acquired a considerable constituency, has been to 
replace the existing technologies, whose safety is largely probabilistic, 
with technologies whose safety is deterministic, that is, inherent. I call 
this trend the Safe Technology Movement (STH). Hy paper will attempt to 
trace the growth of the Safe Technology Movement, particularly in chemical 
and nuclear industry, and to assess its prospects. 
The Inherently Safe Chemical Plants 
The main proponent of inherently safe chemical plants has been Prof. 
Trevor Kletz of Loughborough Technological University. After the disaster 
at Flixborough in 1976 where an explosion in a plant producing cyclohexane 
caused 28 deaths, Kletz proposed designing chemical plants so as to be 
"inherently safe." Kletz's main idea was to keep the inventories of highly 
toxic 'or highly explosive materials so small that even in the event of a 
catastrophic failure, not very much damage would be done. Kletz has pro- 
pounded these views widely, and he published a book under the auspices of 
the Institution of Chemical Engineers, in which these ideas were presented 
systematically. 
Three  y e a r s  ago I p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  a  N a t i o n a l  Academy e t u d y  on R i sk  and 
F a i r n e s s  which gave me an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d i e c u s s  i n h e r e n t  e a f e t y  of chem- 
i c a l  p l a n t s  w i t h  managers of one of America ' s  l a r g e s t  chemical  companies.  
Bhopal had s tunned  t h e s e  managers ,  y e t  i t  vould  be an  e x a g g e r a t i o n  t o  s a y  
t h a t  t h e y  have i n c o r p o r a t e d  K l e t z ' s  somewhat unor thodox  views i n t o  t h e  
d e s i g n ,  o r  even t h e  r e d e s i g n  of t h e i r  chemica l  p l a n t s .  
One s u g g e s t i o n ,  which IIASA may be a b l e  t o  h e l p  implement ,  would be  
t h e  s t r o n g e r  i n j e c t i o n  of p r i n c i p l e s  of s a f e t y ,  even  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y ,  i n t o  
t h e  c u r r i c u l a  of chemical  e n g i n e e r i n g  s c h o o l s .  Chemical e n g i n e e r i n g  i n  t h e  
Un i t ed  S t a t e s  is t a u g h t  by u n i t  p rocess - - tha t  i s ,  by i d e n t i f y i n g  p r o c e s e e s  
s u c h  a s  d i s t i l l a t i o n ,  h e a t  t r a n s f e r ,  c o n t r o l ,  e t c . - - tha t  a r e  common t o  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a l l  chemical  p l a n t s .  I s h o u l d  t h i n k  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  cou ld  be  
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a  u n i t  p r o c e s s  a l s o ,  and p o s s i b l y  cou ld  be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  
t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n  of chemical  e n g i n e e r s .  
IIASA might  p l a y  t h e  r o l e  of convening chemica l  e n g i n e e r i n g  p r o f e s s o r s  
f rom v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e i r  r e a c t i o n  t o  Bhopal. I n  f i n a l  
a n a l y s i s ,  Bhopal was a  d e s i g n  f a i l u r e ,  p robab ly  more t h a n  an  o p e r a t i o n s  
f a i l u r e .  Had t h e  e n g i n e e r s  who d e s i g n e d  Bhopal been made aware  of K l e t z ' s  
i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  d e s i g n  p r e c e p t s ,  and had t h e s e  been i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  Bhopa l ,  
t h e  a c c i d e n t  would n o t  have happened. A t r a n s n a t i o n a l  d i a l o g u e  on Bhopa l ,  
w i t h  t h e  aim of g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  emphasis  on s a f e t y  i n  e n g i n e e r i n g  
c u r r i c u l a ,  seems l i k e  a  wor thwhi l e  e n t e r p r i s e  v h i c h  could  be u n d e r t a k e n  by 
IIASA. 
I n h e r e n t l y  S a f e  Nuclear  R e a c t o r s  
Though t h e  i d e a  of i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s  was f i r s t  p u b l i c l y  
a r t i c u l a t e d  by David L i l i e n t h a l  i n  1980, t h e  i d e a  i t s e l f  i s  much o l d e r .  
One f i n d s  i n  t h e  o l d  l i t e r a t u r e  v a r i o u s  i d e a s  f o r  r e a c t o r s  t h a t  were 
i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  much s a f e r  t h a n  t o d a y ' s  l i g h t  w a t e r  r e a c t o r s .  
Thus Edward T e l l e r  had l o n g  advoca ted  p u t t i n g  r e a c t o r s  underground--an i d e a  
r e c e n t l y  r e s u r r e c t e d  by Andrei Sakharov;  S. Untermeyer had proposed a n  
e s s e n t i a l l y  i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  BUR some 30 y e a r s  ago ;  W. Ergen had s u g g e s t e d  
r e d u c i n g  t h e  pover o u t p u t  of a  r e a c t o r  s o  t h a t  t h e  r e a c t o r  would be s e l f -  
c o o l i n g ,  even  i f  a l l  e x t e r n a l  h e a t  t r a n s f e r  sys tems were l o s t .  
Three Mile Island gave impetus to the technical development of inher- 
ently safe reactors. Host prominent vere K. Hannerz's Process Inherent Ul- 
timately Safe reactors; Lohnert's modular HTGR; and P. Portescue's "for- 
giving" reactors--particularly large gas-cooled, graphite moderated 
systems. These technical proposals vere accompanied by three major studies 
of the technical and institutional problems involved in moving to inher- 
ently safe reactors; the Institute for Energy Analysis' A Second Nuclear 
Era; Uassachusetts Institute of Technology's National Strategies for 
-
Nuclear Pover Reactor Development; and the Office of Technology Assess- 
ment's Nuclear Pover in An Age of Uncertainty. 
Host of these studies and proposals originated outside the mainstream 
of nuclear industry. Uany in the industry feared that introduction of a 
new generation of reactors that vas inherently safe would lead to pressure 
to shut down existing reactors. Thus industry chose to respond to the 
challenge by incremental improvements both in the design of new reactors, 
and in the operation of existing reactors. 
Nevertheless the vords "inherently safe" seemed to have so powerful an 
appeal that, by around 1982, one found the vords being used frequently in 
Department of Energy budgets. The Department, hovever, was somewhat equiv- 
ocal: modular reactors had caught its fancy (as being better suited to the 
financing practices of the utilities). That these reactors also vere 
"inherently safe" or at least possessed inherently safe features was 
conceded but vas not emphasized at the time. Nevertheless, both of the 
main lines of advanced civilian reactor development within the Department 
of Energy, the modular UTGR and the Liquid Metal Reactor, vere inherently 
safe as vell as being modular. 
Chernobyl has pushed inherent safety to the fore (where I believe it 
belongs). With nuclear energy's future now hanging in the balance in many 
countries, inherent safety has nov become an important, possibly pre- 
dominant as a design criterion. What vas believed originally to have been 
a n  impossible goal, now seems to be taken more or less for granted. As a 
result, no fever than a dozen or so ideas for inherently safe reactors nov 
are under discussion in many parts of the world. 
A Cata log  of  I n h e r e n t l y  Safe Reactors  ( a f t e r  Lu Yingzhong) 
P r o f e s s o r  Lu Yingzhong of the  I n s t i t u t e  of Nuclear Energy a t  Tsinghua 
Univers i ty  i n  B e i j i n g ,  China, has r e c e n t l y  catalogued and c l a s s i f i e d  some 
t h i r t e e n  d i f f e r e n t  " i n h e r e n t l y  sa fe"  r e a c t o r s . '  Here I s h a l l  on ly  
summarize b r i e f l y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  under ly ing  i n h e r e n t  s a f e t y  a s  i d e n t i f i e d  
by P r o f e s s o r  Lu. Tnese p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  two i n  number. 
a . )  P a s s i v e  shut-down c a p a b i l i t y  wi thout  c o r e  damage under any 
t r a n s i e n t  c o n d i t i o n .  The Chernobyl a c c i d e n t  was touched off  by a  l a r g e  
r e a c t i v i t y  t r a n s i e n t ;  a n  i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  r e a c t o r  would have t o  
( 1 )  e l i m i n a t e  a l l  dangerous r e a c t i v i t y  t r a n s i e n t s ;  o r  ( 2 )  withs tand  w i t h o u t  
damage any p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i v i t y  t r a n s i e n t .  
b.) P a s s i v e  decay h e a t  removal under any c o n d i t i o n .  The Three Mile  
I s l a n d  a c c i d e n t  occur red  a f t e r  t h e  r e a c t o r  was s h u t  down. Had TMI-2 been 
equipped w i t h  means f o r  decay h e a t  removal under 9 c i rcumstances ,  t h e  
a c c i d e n t  would no t  have occurred. 
Lu c a t a l o g u e s  t h e  t h i r t e e n  i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  r e a c t o r s  under f i v e  main 
c a t e g o r i e s :  
I. PIUS fami ly :  These r e a c t o r s  d e r i v e  from t h e  o r i g i n a l  SECURE 
des ign  of ASEA-ATOM. The r e a c t o r ,  which i s  a  PWR, l i e s  a t  t h e  bottom 
of a  very l a r g e  pool of borated wate r ;  t h e  primary cool ing  system i s  
s e p a r a t e d  from t h e  borated water  by two h y d r a u l i c  d e n s i t y  locks .  Any 
u p s e t  i n  t h e  c o o l a n t  flow breaks t h e  l o c k s ,  and al lows t h e  b o r a t e d  
water  t o  quench t h e  cha in  r e a c t i o n  and t o  remove the  a f t e r h e a t .  S i x  
d i s t i n c t  r e a c t o r s  based on t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  have been i d e n t i f i e d  by 
Prof .  Lu and a r e  summarized i n  Table 1, t a k e n  from LU'S paper .  
11. HTGR family:  These semi-homogeneous r e a c t o r s  a r e  g r a p h i t e  
moderated and helium cooled. In a l l  c a s e s  t h e  r e a c t o r s  a r e  s o  
small-- less  t h a n  300 We--that a f t e r h e a t  can be removed by comple te ly  
p a s s i v e  n a t u r a l  convection. Lu i d e n t i f i e s  f o u r  r e a c t o r  d e s i g n s  i n  
t h i s  family.  Table  2. 
111. W B R  fami ly :  Liquid metal b r e e d e r s ,  o r d i n a r i l y  cons idered  t h e  
l e a s t  f o r g i v i n g  of a l l  r e a c t o r s ,  t u r n  o u t  t o  possess  c e r t a i n  i n h e r e n t  
s a f e t y  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  a r e  being e x p l o i t e d  i n  s e v e r a l  proposed 
i n h e r e n t l y  s a f e  FBRs. Tnese r e a c t o r s  a r e  a l l  pool-type r a t h e r  than  
loop-type;  s e v e r a l  of them use m e t a l l i c  r a t h e r  than  oxide f u e l ;  and 
a l l  i n c o r p o r a t e  p a s s i v e l y  ac tua ted  shutdown systems. Three i n h e r e n t l y  
s a f e  FBRs a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Prof. Lu's Table 3. 
'"ordeals of Chernobyl and t h e  R e - J u s t i f i c a t i o n  of I n h e r e n t l y  S a f e r  
Reactors ,"  Working Paper ,  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Energy Analys i s ,  Oak Ridge 
Associated U n i v e r s i t i e s ,  January 26, 1987. 
Tab.1. The Characteristics of PIOS Family 
Concept E1.Power Hain Features Designer 
PIU6 500 MI l.PCRV,8.4HPm,13DX34.5~,13500Ot ASEA-ATOH 
2.6tatic fluid valves 
PIUS-I1 500 MI 1.Three modules ASEA- ATOM 
2.PCRV, fluid valves as above 
ISER-'3 500 HW 1.Steel V,9.4HPa,9DX32W,2100t IHHI* 
(Cold Vessel) 2.St.fl. valveflloat. ball valve 
ISER-2 200 MI 1.Steel V,12.5HPa,6.6DX24HB,lOOOt IHHI* 
(Cold Vessel) 2.St.fl. valveflloat. ball valve 
ISER-HV 350 HW 1.Steal V,12 Wa,6.6DX28W J AERI 
(Hot Vessel), 2.St.fl. valveflloat. ball valve 
PIUS-BWR 750 klW l.PCRV,6.8HPa,13DX35W ORNL 
2.Dynamic (Vortex) fluid valve 
*Ishikawajima-Barima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. 
Tab.2. The Major Characteristics of IS BTGR Family 
Concept El. Power Main Features Designer 
HHTQR 139.6HW 1.Prismatic fuel element GA Tech. 
2.Steel V,6.B3ma,6.BDX13.34M,76Ot 
3.6ida-by-side arrangement 
HTR-M 80HW 1.Spherical fuel element K W  
2.Steel V, 6 W a ,  6.6DX7.5KBB 775t 
3.Side-by-side arrangement 
HTR-100 l00m 1.Spherical fuel element ERE 
2.Steel V, 7MPa, 6.1DX11.7KEB 750t 
Also PCRV under consideration 
3.Integrated, 60 above core 
6FGR-750 285HW 1.6pherical fuel in central holes JAERI 
of prismatic graphite blocks 
2.6teel V, 7MPa, 6.6DX27.2KE 
S.lntegrated, SG under core 
Tab.3. The Hain Characterimtic~ of IS FERs 
Concept E1.Power Main Featurer Designer 
LSPB 1319HWe l.Loop or pool configuration EPRI 
2.Pasrive rod release from 
Curie-point or other 
temperature effect 
3.Natural circulation system 
decay heat removal from 
reactor to atmomphere 
6AFR 350HWe 1.Pool configuration Rockwe 1 1 
2.same as LSPB for shut down Intl. 
3.Same as LSPB for decay heat 
removal 
4.Hodule "Power Pack" design 
PRISM 133HWe 1.Poolconfiyration GE 
2.Self-actuated release of 
shutdown roda from over- 
temperature 
3.Radiant Veaael Auxiliav 
Cooling System (RVACS) 
for deoay heat removal 
4.Three modulea couple 
with one turbine 
IV. Low pressure ISRs using novel coolants: Three schemes based on 
the use of low pressure, high boiling coolants have been suggested. 
These include the lead cooled DIOHYSIUS (from EIR, Switzerland); the 
organic cooled CANDU; and the molten salt, graphite moderated system. 
V. The Heat Only BUR: The Institute for Nuclear Energy Technology in 
Beijing is now building a S-megavatt thermal, heat-only inherently 
safe boiling light water reactor for district heating. The reactor is 
a variant of the Soviet reactors for district heating being built in 
Corky; the INET design uses an ingenious hydraulic control rod drive 
that is coupled to the primary circulating pump. Any loss in pressure 
automatically and passively actuates the control rods. This 5 MUt 
reactor is the first that actually vill demonstrate a passively safe 
system. 
The I m ~ a c t  of Inherent Safety 
Those of us who are intrigued by the idea of inherent safety somehow 
see this as a way out of the nuclear impasse. We argue that if nuclear 
reactors were inherently safe, then nuclear energy vould no longer be 
opposed by the environmental movement (this assumes that the vaste disposal 
system could also be made inherently safe). This position is supported by 
suggestions, such as those of environmentalist, J. Beyea, that inherently 
safe reactors might be accepted by environmental activists provided their 
development vere accompanied by serious attempts to develop solar energy. 
And often in the writings of environmental activists one sees allusions to 
the desirability of inherently safe reactors. 
The problem, of course, is, How does one prove that an inherently safe 
reactor is inherently safe; or, having proven this to the satisfaction of 
the technical community, how does one persuade the skeptical public? One 
certainly can prove that an inherently safe reactor can withstand mishaps 
that vould destroy existing reactors; for example, an incident like TMI-2 
or Chernobyl simply could not happen in PIUS or in mod-HTGR. The difficult 
point is to prove that some other mishap, particularly one that no one has 
thought of, cannot cause serious damage. 
I don't see any total resolution of this dilemma except through con- 
sultation with serious informed skeptics. Perhaps what is needed is a 
"Peace Treaty" between nuclear supporters and nuclear opponents, the 
purpose being to establish vhat degree of safety, if incorporated into 
nuclear systems, would make them acceptable to the skeptics. llASA might 
be the focus for drawing up such a treaty, and for promoting its rati- 
fication by pro- and anti-nuclear groups. 
1 should think that a most important step in restoring the public's 
confidence in nuclear energy would be to restore the confidence of the 
environmental movement in nuclear energy. After all, 25 years ago environ- 
mentalists by and large were supporters of nuclear energy--because if the 
nuclear system is operating properly, it is environmentally benign. A 
renewed coalition of environmentalists and nuclear enthusiasts seems like a 
fantasy today; perhaps inherently safe reactors could be made the basis for 
such a coalition. 
The Future of the Safe Technology Uovement 
Safe technologies, particularly in chemical industry and in nuclear 
power, would constitute a technical fix for the debilitating attacks on 
advanced technologies that are now so prevalent in much of the Western 
world. Unfortunately, the safe technology movement encounters opposition 
both from existing industry, which sees it as threatening technologies that 
are already in place; and from the Greens, who are opposed to technology 
for political reasons. 
The opposition of existing industry could be overcome, in principle, 
through operation of the market. If the new technologies were economical 
as well as inherently safe, they would ultimately prevail. A more 
difficult question is whether the new technologies will develop through a 
succession of incremental improvements of the old technologies ("quantity 
giving rise to quality") or whether completely new approaches are 
required. For example, there are some in the nuclear community who insist 
that Artificial Intelligence is a key to great improvement in safety. The 
general idea is to build into the safety systems elaborate pre-analyzed 
scenarios; any incipient malfunction is immediately categorized as being an 
instance of a scenario, is analyzed, and appropriate corrective action is 
taken. Whether such improvements will be perceived as constituting 
adequate safety is hard to say. Over 2000 reactor years of safe operation 
in light water reactors has now been observed since RII-2. This already 
means that we can say with about 87 percent confidence that the a priori 
core melt probability is no higher than l~-~/reactor-~ear. By 2000, 
there vill be about 8,000 light water reactor years; if there are no core 
melts by then, we can say with 99.97 percent confidence that the a priori 
core melt probability is no higher than 1 in 1000; but only with 55 percent 
probability that it is no higher than 1 in 10,000. This is not very 
reassuring. Thus the incremental approach would have to be supplemented by 
demonstration experiments in which accidents that would damage an un- 
improved LWR are shown to be aborted in an improved LWR. Largely for this 
reason, I favor the inherently safe design approach. 
As for the opposition from the Greens, all one can say is that there 
are technologies--the so-called soft technologies--which are accepted by 
this group. Is it possible that the Appropriate Technology Movement, which 
has been embraced by anti-technology groups, could be transformed into a 
Safe Technology bvement? I would think that a new coalition involving 
centrist elements drawn from both the Greens and the technologists might 
rally around a Safe Technology Movement. The challenge would then rest 
with the technologists to produce economical, safe technologies; I would 
hope the technologists have more success in responding to this challenge 
than they have had in responding to the challenge of the Appropriate Tech- 
nology Movement. 
5 . 4 .  SAFE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDI- 
TIONS FOR THEIR SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY 
Harry Otway 
Joint Research Centre, Commission of the European 
Communities, Ispra, Italy 
Abstract 
Engineers have always proposed only those technologies they 
believed to be "safe". Nevertheless, some technologies have 
encountered public opposition which has delayed implementation 
or even blocked it completely; other, emerging, technologies 
face similar prospects. Since earlier claims of safety on the 
part of experts were either not believed, or safety was not 
even the main cause of concern, it seems unlikely that public 
groups will be convinced by assertions that, this time, the 
technologies in question are "inherently safe". This paper uses 
insights gained from earlier social science research on public 
perceptions of risky technologies as background for a discus- 
sion of how technical, institutional and procedural aspects of 
technologies might be designed to improve their social accept- 
ability. 
Background 
There is a general consensus that "risk" expresses some combi- 
nation of the probability of an adverse event and the magnitude 
of the consequences of that event. Although this definition is 
useful for engineering calculations, it is insufficient for 
the broader and more complex questions of societal risk manage- 
ment. Common sense, lay definitions of risk seem to be related 
more to the magnitude of loss than its probability. This is not 
unreasonable; risk is an abstraction which, despite the titles 
of research papers suggesting the contrary, cannot be "per- 
ceived". 
Rayner and Cantor (1) view risk as a polythetic concept, that 
is, one composed of a chain of items, each of which shares some 
features with its neighbours on either side, but without any 
single essential feature common to all of them. In practical 
terms, we can liken this to a queue of people, each of which 
has his or her own definition of risk. Each person's definition 
overlaps that of the people standing immediately next to him, 
but the definitions of the people at the two ends of the queue 
might have nothing in common with each other. (This is remini- 
scent of the children's game in which a whispered message is 
passed from one person to the next until, with great amusement, 
what the last person understood is compared to what the first 
person really said.) Confusion of this sort seems typical of 
many public debates, ostensibly about risks to health and 
safety, where engineering assurances about probability and mag- 
nitude of loss do not correspond to the concerns of public 
groups opposed to the technology; as we pass along the queue, 
not only does the emphasis on placed on probability of loss 
change, but we also encounter differing opinions about which 
qualitative attributes of loss should be considered legitimate. 
The difference between technical and social definitions may be 
reflected in a survey of public attitudes toward nuclear power 
in Italy (21, in which 24% were found to be in favour and 60% 
opposed. When the question was re-worded for the case of reac- 
tors with "demonstrated safety", there was a shift to 35% in 
favour with 43% opposed. This suggests that, although enhanced 
safety might help to make nuclear power generation more attrac- 
tive, it may not be enough to ensure social acceptability. 
However this is completely consistent with insights gained from 
social science research on public perceptions of hazardous 
technologies. Although this research has used a variety of 
methods based on different theoretical perspectives, a broad 
set of general principles has emerged to describe (not pre- 
scribe) how normal people integrate information and experience 
to form attitudes. It is generally agreed that beliefs about 
environmental damage, health and safety (hereinafter called 
measurable losses) are just some of the many beliefs that 
underlie attitudes towards risky technologies. 
Results of Empirical Studies 
There is now a large body of empirical research on public atti- 
tudes and beliefs related to risky technologies (3). In addi- 
tion to perceptions of measurable losses and economic benefits, 
a number of qualitative attributes of losses (and the technolo- 
gies that cause them) have been found to cause technologies to 
be perceived as being more dangerous than might be indicated by 
engineering risk estimates. If these factors, mostly related to 
individual psychology, are included in a person's definition of 
the risk concept, they will likely increase his awareness of 
danger: 
- the risk exposure is involuntary, as opposed to risk-taking 
with consent, eg, a skier's exposure is voluntary while most 
environmental hazards are involuntary; 
- there is no personal control over the hazard eg, a skier has 
skill-based control, an airline passenger none; 
- there is uncertainty about the outcome of the exposure, eg, 
the effects of exposure to many chemicals is not well known, 
even to experts; 
- there has been no personal experience of the situation in the 
past--fear of the unknown increases anxiety; 
- the risk-causing agent cannot be detected by the human 
senses, eg, is odourless, invisible, silent, making it impos- 
sible for people to know if they have been exposed or not; 
- the loss is the result of technical failure, which people 
expect should not be allowed to happen, as opposed to natural 
hazards which we do not expect to control (this has been empir- 
ically found to be a source of stress, see ref 4); 
- there can be delayed effects of the risk exposure even after 
direct exposure has ceased, eg, the risk of crossing the street 
is over once the street has been successfully negotiated, the 
risks of radiation continue for years after the actual exposure 
is over (this has been observed as a source of stress in those 
who believed they were exposed to radiation in the Three Mile 
Island Accident, ref 5); 
- future generations can be affected by present exposure--a 
threat to a basic human need to assure the continuation of 
species; 
- the benefits of the technology are not highly visible, or are 
received by a group other than the one at risk--a question of 
the fairness of the principles and procedures used to allocate 
risk; 
- there is a possibility of large, catastrophic accidents which 
could affect the entire cornmunity--this fear is not just a psy- 
chological quirk, the Chernobyl and Bhopal accidents graphi- 
cally demonstrated both the potential magnitude of accidents 
and the problems of crisis management. 
A technology may also be perceived as having social and politi- 
cal outcomes associated with its use. The following beliefs 
been found to either enhance or diminish acceptability, depend- 
ing on the values of those doing the perceiving; some of them 
have contributed negatively to the attitudes of those opposing 
technologies, but positively to those of supporters: 
- the technology will lead to the increased centralisation of 
political and economic systems; 
- it will cause increased dependence on small groups of techni- 
cal elites; 
- it will increase GNP; 
- it will create new jobs; 
- it will require strict physical security measures or special 
police powers; 
- it will enhance national prestige; 
- it will allow independence of foreign suppliers; 
- the benefits provided are thought to be frivolous rather than 
socially necessary; 
- the technology also has potential military applications. 
Some Generalisations 
Taking a step back from these lists of specific attributes that 
can influence perception and acceptance of technologies, we can 
list a few broad, general findings that come from this research 
that are also supported by psychological theory. 
- In principle, lists such as these cannot be exhaustive. The 
attributes that people use to characterise a technology can be 
anything that they have come to associate with it. 
- It follows from this that public attitudes toward different 
technologies can be determined by different attributes. 
- Not only might the salient attributes vary from one technolo- 
gy to the next, but their relative importance also depends on 
the particular technology in question, which group is inter- 
viewed and when. 
- Finally, risk, whether estimated or even taken from statisti- 
cal tables, is usually only one determinant of technology 
acceptability. Technologies are judged, and accepted or 
rejected, on the basis of a complete package of beliefs about 
them, not just on risks alone. (Think of debates on the social 
acceptability of large computer systems where discussion tends 
to focus on aspects such as privacy, social change, working 
conditions: mortality risk is hardly an issue here, although 
many applications of the technology are controversial.) 
Some Observations 
Despite our assertions that risk, per se, may not be as impor- 
tant to public attitudes as is sometimes thought, public 
debates do often seem to centre on discussions of risks. Look- 
ing at these debates more closely in the light of the research 
results summarised earlier leads to the following observations: 
- Technical people, consistent with their training, tend to 
define "the system" in technical terms (eg, ref 6) and risk in 
terms of those losses that are measurable and insurable. 
- Lay people seem to define "the system" globally, including 
its interactions with social and cultural systems, and thus 
define risk as including how they expect the system to impact 
on their lives. 
- Both definitions are "rational" within their own frames of 
reference--that is, they are consistent with the goals, inter- 
ests and responsibilities of the people holding them. 
- Many public hearings, etc, are structured by those sympathe- 
tic to the technical definition of system and risk, thus lay 
participants may be forced to frame their arguments in those 
terms. 
- Therefore debates about risk are often carried out with the 
parties implicitly using different definitions of terms. 
- Once attitudes are established they are relatively stable 
because existing beliefs serve to mediate and filter new infor- 
mation. What appear to be rapid swings in public attitudes are 
of ten cases of image formation, where a new product or politi- 
cal candidate appears on the scene and attitudes respond rap- 
idly as new information is assimilated. 
- Attitudes are most sensitive to new information that can be 
verified by first-hand experience, and can also be influenced 
by events external to the technology in question (eg, an oil 
crisis, international tensions). 
- Improved safety cannot be verified by lay people, thus 
is not likely, by itself, to ensure social acceptability. 
Implications for Inherently Safe Systems 
The main point of the argument so far is that physical risk 
alone is clearly not the only determinant of how technologies 
are perceived and that, since improvements in safety cannot be 
independently verified by lay people, they may not even cause 
large changes in how risk itself is perceived. Thus I think it 
reasonable to assume that reducing physical risks by changes in 
design philosophies and physical plant are unlikely to have a 
large enough effect on public attitudes to create a climate for 
the acceptance of technologies previously rejected. This is 
especially true when we reflect on the fact that acceptance 
problems of the past were partly caused precisely because the 
public did not find expert assurances credible. 
In the following paragraphs I will speculate on how a system 
might look if we took into consideration other, non-safety fac- 
tors which influence public concerns about a technology. I will 
not pay attention to questions of technical and economic feasi- 
bility, and will consider the institutions and procedures asso- 
ciated with the technology as well. 
To begin with, we might imagine that systems could be made 
smaller, and thus more likely to be perceived as providing 
benefits for the same community that must bear the risks. 
Smaller, decentralised systems would also be responsive to the 
concerns of those worried about increasing centralisation and 
depersonalisation caused by larger technologies. Although 
smaller systems could result in the loss of economies of scale, 
this might be offset if siting were less controversial. A 
smaller plant, sited quickly and with little uncertainty about 
the outcome of the site application might, in the long run, be 
cheaper than a large plant of an economical scale affected by 
interminable delays and high uncertainty. 
We can also speculate on how institutions and procedures could 
be changed to respond to public concerns. The debates that sur- 
round decision making for the siting of hazardous technologies 
essentially reflect the political rejection of technically dom- 
inated perceptions and policies. One suggestion for improving 
the credibility of experts and of technical information is to 
provide increased social access to them. This could take the 
form of power sharing where the technical system, now of a 
scale to supply local needs, is designed, sited and managed by 
a group composed of technical experts and managers from the 
corporate sponsor and representatives of the community. This 
sort of approach could help to ensure citizen familiarity with 
both technical process and people and could help to modify per- 
ceptions of the voluntariness of exposure and the control over 
the outcome of accidents, assuming that participation in crises 
management teams is also foreseen. 
Recent research has begun to explore approaches in which pro- 
fessionals do not alone make the critical judgements about what 
are the significant attributes of decisions and how risks 
should be managed. These approaches (eg, 7), based on models of 
mediated dispute resolution, focus analysis and discussion on a 
wider range of concerns than are usually accepted by technical 
experts and allow the perceptions of both lay and technical 
publics to become a legitimate part of decision making. They 
seek to legitimate lay involvement and to convert conflicts 
into relationships where public officials and local residents 
seek to produce together mutually acceptable outcomes (see also 
Kunreuther, this volume). 
These are new ideas, and experience is needed to determine 
their feasibility; obviously they cannot be effective if they 
are never tried. Lay people do appear to act rationally in 
siting disputes in the sense of working effectively to promote 
their own interests ( 8 1 ,  and experience of user participation 
in the design of informatics systems has also been encouraging. 
In the final analysis, the level of actual citizen control may 
be far less important than the trust that can be developed 
through working together. Still, even if power sharing schemes 
did succeed in creating a more receptive climate, it is not 
obvious that they would actually result in lower risks or bet- 
ter management. 
Communications is a relatively new theme in risk research. This 
is partly in response to recent legislation, in both Europe and 
the USA, which requires that people exposed to industrial 
hazards be informed of the risks and how they should behave 
should an emergency occur. It is also due in part to the aware- 
ness that the confidence and sense of consensus needed to 
resolve acceptance problems can only be helped by effective 
communications between technical and lay groups. 
There is a great deal of research being undertaken now to bet- 
ter understand what makes for effective communications (9). 
However, as a beginning, one can make some general recommend- 
ations for improving communications about technical matters: 
- Start communications efforts early, before designs have been 
completed and sites selected. 
- Listen to lay people--communication is a two-way street. 
- Try to understand what people are telling you and acknowled- 
ge the validity of their perceptions for them. (The US EPA 
experience of communications about the risks from arsenic 
emissions from the Tacoma smelter suggested that formal educa- 
tional activities had no effect on public risk judgements, but 
that informal aspects of communication did, eg, the demonstra- 
tion that public concerns were being taken seriously and that 
the public were considered capable of contributing to risk man- 
agement activities (101.) 
- Always be honest, balanced and complete. People are exposed 
to a wide variety of communications every day in the form of 
advertising and have become rather skilled at detecting and 
rejecting one-sided and self-serving messages. 
- Don't claim too much for improved safety--somethin9 unfore- 
seen will inevitably happen and the damage to public confidence 
will be proportional to the claims made. Knowledge is always 
limited and every new discovery also reveals new areas of igno- 
rance. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The idea of improving industrial safety through inherently safe 
design features, such as passive safety devices or self- 
limiting processes is a good one. Unfortunately, it is only 
loosely coupled to the problem of the social acceptability of 
these systems. To begin with, most systems proposed have always 
been claimed to be safe and, sometimes, experience has cast 
doubt on these claims. Further, risk perception research has 
rather clearly shown that risk, as such, is only one of many 
determinants of how people perceive technologies and judge 
their acceptability. Indeed, the relative position of safety in 
the social judgement of acceptability is illustrated by the 
fact that society has chosen to accept a great number of inher- 
ently unsafe technologies, eg, the automobile. 
Some thought should be given to supplementing enhanced safety 
with innovative ways of increasing public involvement in deci- 
sion making and risk management. This is something which could 
be the subject of experiments, perhaps first at the community 
level. Improved communications is an integral part of this. 
These efforts, however, are likely to be more successful for 
"new" technologies which are just emerging as public policy 
issues, such as bio-technology, than for older technologies 
were battle lines are established and positions entrenched, 
such as nuclear power. For the latter case, the main problem is 
one of establishing credibility--where credibility has been 
damaged through past behaviour and confidence undermined by 
accidents that experts had said couldn't happen, this is a dif- 
ficult, long-term task. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL RISK IN MODERN SOCIETY 
Laxenburg, March 18-20, 1987 
Final Agenda 
First Day (March 18) 
8:30- 9:00 Registration 
9:OO- 9:15 Welcome address (T. Lee, IIASA) 
9:15- 9:30 Welcome address ( L .  Konstantinov, IAEA) 
9:30-1O:OO IIASA's risk activities (B. SegerstAhl, II.4SAI 
10:OO-10:15 Organizational remarks ( C .  Kromer, IIASAI 
Break 
1. REGIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ECONOMY) 
Chairman: Dr. F. Niehaus (IAEA) 
10~45-11:OO Introduction (F. Niehaus) 
11:OO-11:20 Risk Management of Potentially Hazardous Industrial 
Installations (D. Slater) 
11:30-11:50 The European Approach to Risk Management ( A .  Amen- 
dola) 
12:OO-12:20 Decision Criteria for Siting of Complex Industrial 
Facilities (R. Keeney) 
Lunch 
14:OO-14:20 Emergency Planning and Preparedness (M. Haynsl 
14:30-14:50 Risk Management in the Netherlands (C. van Kuijen) 
Break 
15:30-15:50 Advanced Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants: 
Proposal to Limit Catastrophic Releases (W. Kroger) 
1 5 ~ 5 0 -  Discussion 
425 
Second Day (March 19) 
2. SPECIAL SESSION 
Chairman: Prof. V. Kaftanov (IIASA) 
9:OO- 9:30 Chernobil Accident: Measures and Lessons (Video, 
I. Kuzmin) 
9:30-10:lO Crisis Management (Video, P. Lagadec) 
Break 
11:OO-11:20 Industrialization, Infrastructure, Risk Manage- 
ment: The Case of the Cubatao Area in Brazil 
(C. Costa-Ribeiro) 
3. MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION (TECHNOLOGY) 
Chairman: Prof. B. Wahlstrom (Technical Research Centre of 
Finland ) 
11:30-11:50 Introduction (B. Wahlstrom) 
12:OO-12:20 Social and Economic Aspects of System Safety ( R .  
Dynes ) 
Lunch 
14:OO-14:20 Human Error Analysis ( J .  Rasmussen) 
14:30-14:50 New Interface and Control Technologies as Sources 
of Difficulty for the Human Operator (L. Bain- 
bridge 
15:OO-15:20 Problem Solving in Complex Worlds (D. Woods) 
Break 
16:OO-16:20 The Design of Operating Procedures (N. Moray) 
16:30-16:50 Application of Fault Tree Analysis to the Bubbling 
Depressurization System of a Nuclear Power Plant 
with the VVER-440 Reactor (V. Krett) 
16:50- Discussion 
Third day (March 20) 
4. MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
Chairman: Prof. M. Antonovsky (IIASA) 
9:OO- 9:20 Introduction (M. Antonovsky) 
9:30- 9:50 Atmospheric Dispersion Models (M. Dickerson) 
10:OO-10:20 Management of the Consequences Following the Cher- 
nobil Accident in Austria (F. Schonhofer) 
Break 
1l:OO-11:20 Marginal Effectiveness of Safety Costs (I. Kuzmin) 
11:30-11:50 Methodological Problems of Decision Alternatives 
Comparison and Risk Factors ( 0 .  Larichev) 
12:OO-12:20 The General Indicator of Risk Analysis ( V .  Demin) 
Lunch 
14:OO-14:20 Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power (L. 
Sztanyik 
5. CONCLUDING SESSION 
Chairman: Prof. B. Segerstbhl (IIASA) 
14:30-14:50 Technological Risk and the Policymaker ( J .  Neu- 
mann ) 
15:OO-15:20 Summary and discussion, session I 
15:20-15:40 Summary and discussion, session 2 
15:40-16:OO Summary and discussion, session 3 
16:OO-16:30 Closing remarks 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Task Force Meeting 
SAFE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
Laxenburg, May 11-12, 1987 
Final Agenda 
Firat Day (May 11) 
8:30- 9:OO Registration 
9:OO- 9:15 Welcome address (T. Lee, IIASA) 
9:15- 9:30 IIASA's risk activities (B. Segersthhl, IIASA) 
9:30- 9:45 Organizational remarks ( G .  Kromer, IIASA) 
Break 
SESSION I: TECHNICAL CONCEPTS 
Chairman: Dr. W. Kroger (Kernforschungsanlage Julich) 
10~20-10:30 Introduction (W. Kroger) 
10:30-10:50 Hypothetical Accidents of High-Temperature Reactors 
and their Implications (R. Schulten) 
11:lO-11:30 The Inherent Safety Characteristics of the HTR-500 
Reactor Plant (W. Wacholz) 
11:50-12:lO Safe Technological Systems by the ~ntermediate 
State Approach (H. Crinicher) 
Lunch 
14:OO-14:20 A Dynamic Basis for Inherently Safer Chemical and 
Nuclear Reactors (M. Harms) 
14:40-15:OO Safety Principles for Advanced Plant (D. Phillips) 
15:OO-15:30 Summary and Discussion, Session I 
Break 
SESSION 11: GENERAL SAFETY CRITERIA 
Chairman: Prof. H. Kunreuther (University of Pennsylvania) 
16:OO-16:20 Large Scale Accidents and Public Acceptance of 
Risk ( G .  Yadigaroglu) 
16:40-17:OO Designing for Safety ( M .  Ollus) 
428 
Second Day (May 12) 
9:OO- 9:20 Outlines of a Managerial Approach to Risk ( C .  
Ostberg ) 
9:40-10:OO Probabilistic Risk Analysis in the Netherlands ( B  
Ale ) 
10:OO-10:30 Summary and Discussion, Session I1 
Break 
SESSION 111: POLICIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
Chairman: A. Weinberg (Oak Ridge Associated Universities) 
11:OO-11:20 Reflections on the Safe Technology Movement (A. 
Weinberg) 
11:40-12:OO Safe Technological Systems: Reflections on the 
Conditions for their Social Acceptability (H. 
Otway 
Lunch 
Role of Compensation and Insurance in Siting Hazar- 
dous Facilities. (H. Kunreuther) 
System Approach to Risk Prevention ( J .  Hadas) 
Summary and Discussion, Session I11 
Break 
CONCLUDING SESSION 
Chairman: B. Segerstihl (IIASA) 
16:OO-17:OO Concluding Remarks of the Session Chairmen and 
Final Discussion 
